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RUSSIA U. S. S. R.

A COMPLETE HANDBOOK

Edited by

P. MALEVSKY-
MALEVITCH

WILLIAM FARQUHAR PAYSON
NEW YORK

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PREFACE

THERE is a steadily growing interest among all intelligent people in that part of the world which was the Russian Empire and which now appears as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In no part of this planet have the changes during the last three decades been greater, the development of human history and institutions more involved, and the results so far-reaching on the thoughts and actions of modern times. There is a great wealth of material available for tracing out the general course of events in the Soviet Union. The Press is full of information about it, and every organ for the dissemination of knowledge is almost choked with the reports, official and unofficial, which are at hand. At the same time actual statements of accomplishments and failures, of realities and expectations are profusely diluted with propaganda of various kinds and of a conflicting nature.

Russia has always been wrapped in a veil of mystery. The stories which were told before the Revolution gave to the uninitiated reader a picture which he could not analyse or understand, and the almost fantastic course of the Revolution only served to confuse still further the public mind. Moreover, there have been no large scale attempts to carry out an objective survey of the last phase of the Empire together with the progress of the Soviet State since the Revolution. The situation is further complicated by the conflicting reports on the Soviet programmes, estimates and statements of detailed results which are exploited according to the sympathies and desires of the readers and their secondary sources of information. With the present Government establishing an entirely new system, based on untested and generally little known principles, the situation is really more than chaotic.

There seems, then, a very real place for this work which aims to sketch conditions as they existed in various fields of thought and of activity during the early part of the twentieth century in the Russian Empire, and then to show how conditions changed into those of the present day. The serious scholar, and even the average reader, will secure an appreciation of the tendencies of life in the Empire and the Soviet Union that will help him to understand much of the present and of the possibilities of the future.

The authors, who have collaborated in this volume, have been moved by the one idea of picturing the actual train of events with the greatest possible degree of objectivity. Practically all their studies of present conditions have been based on the official documents of the Soviet Union. These are amazingly frank, once the reader understands the

fundamental difference between the principles of this Union and the other nations of Europe and America, which are founded on diametrically opposed conceptions. Conclusions must rest upon knowledge and understanding. The friendships and hostilities that exist upon an ambiguous use of unsystematic information and an ignorance of theoretical bases must disappear. If this work will clear up confusions which exist in the minds of almost every one about the trend of events in the U.S.S.R. and will aid in producing a succinct and intelligent picture of the last thirty years, it will have abundantly served its purpose and the wishes of the authors. More than that, it will have done a real service to humanity in eliminating controversies and in clearing the way for a truer understanding of a problem of universal importance.

CLARENCE A. MANNING.

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EDITOR'S NOTE

THERE is today hardly any other country which arouses so much universal and conflicting interest as Russia. In the post-War world, where the very foundations of the traditional social order seem often to give way under the unprecedented burden of responsibilities, commitments and rapidly succeeding complications—the natural results of the monstrous holocaust of 1914–1918,—“the Russian experiment” stands out as the great controversy of the age. To those who have lost patience and hope, it has been the incentive for revolutionary enthusiasm and speculation; to those who believe that the old order can be saved and is worth preserving it has been a warning against the use of untested and Utopian remedies on the suffering body of humanity.

These conflicting opinions and (even more often) emotions have found their expression in numerous publications which, very naturally, bear a highly controversial and partisan character, frequently lack objectivity and usually champion either the “White” or the “Red” side. A student of the Russian question would find it very difficult to discover in any language a general survey of the past and present conducted on non-partisan lines.

This is one of the needs which the authors of the present publication have set themselves to fill.

Another equally important principle, which prompted the authors in their work is the desire to demonstrate that Russia's organic and inherent weight in international relations has advanced the Russian Revolution to the preminent position it occupies in the mind of the world, and not the fundamental policies and theories of Communism. Had this Revolution happened in a less important country its significance would have been merely local and transitory. Thus, the prominence of Communism and of its world-activities depend, to a large degree, on Russia's importance for the world, regardless of her regime.

Finally, the authors have endeavoured to throw a true light on the value of Communism, as a cure for the ills of humanity and as an undisputable promise for the future. This is particularly important in the present acute crisis which seems to have brought the world into a blind alley.

The failure of the Five Years Plan, be it even only partial is an answer to this question. This failure is no longer concealable. It is evidenced by the proclamation of a second period of industrialization, not for the purpose of developing the prosperity which was promised after the first; by the catastrophic food and supply situation which follows

on several years of excellent and average harvests, and cannot, in reason, be attributed to "Capitalist intervention" or counter-revolutionary plots; by the growing nervousness of the Communist leaders, demonstrated by the mass of conflicting orders and counter-orders, since the food crisis was precipitated during the summer of 1932; by the sullen disaffection of the population, once more reduced to conditions reminiscent of the famine of 1920. The Soviet Press itself is full of recriminations and gloomy forebodings, and the few officially-optimistic pronouncements, which still occasionally appear, sound cheerless and unconvincing.

The authors have endeavoured to be as objective as humanly possible. All the information concerning the Soviet regime and its present position has been derived exclusively from official Soviet statistics, reports and Press news. Of course, it has not been always possible to accept Soviet estimates at their face value; all estimates were checked but the documentation used was always of strictly official Soviet origin.

If the authors' conclusions are often unfavourable to the present Government, it is not because of counter-revolutionary sympathies, but because the Communist dictators have not lived up to their promises and have not brought peace, social justice and prosperity to the Russian people. On the contrary, on the evidence of indisputable facts, the Russian people is forced to bear ever increasing burdens and is not afforded any kind of constitutional redress against the costly experiments of its rulers.

The editor expresses his deepest gratitude to his American and British friends who have made it possible to accomplish this publication, as well as his profound appreciation to Lieutenant-Commander Rupert T. Gould, R. N. (ret.), Professor Clarence A. Manning, of Columbia University, and Colonel A. A. Zaitzov, formerly of the Russian General Staff for their invaluable assistance in his editorial work.

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Note. Since this publication went into print a number of interesting changes have taken place in the U.S.S.R. Some of them are recorded in the addenda.

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RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

PART ONE—GENERAL

HISTORY

I

THE VARANGIAN PERIOD

A STUDY of Russian history clearly brings out the distinctive course of Russia's growth and development as compared with Europe. Both the natural conditions of the vast land that is Russia today and the cultural, spiritual and political influences which determined its position among the other nations of the World tended to make of it a continent apart, where East and West met and even blended into one. In fact, it can be said that Russia is neither European nor Asiatic—it is related by ties of blood and culture to both Europe and Asia.

The Slavs are related by blood and language to the races of Europe. But until the eighteenth century definitely established political and cultural intercourse between Russia and Europe it is only this relation that can be claimed as a common bond. From the earliest times, the Eastern Slavs started on a historical path that for centuries separated them from what can be called the "pax Europaica"; and if until 1700, there existed a certain contact between them, this bore an incidental character, chiefly determined by the political "ebb and flow" on Russia's western frontiers.

The two main reasons for this were cultural and religious.

Inaccessible, intemperate in climate, sparsely populated and deficient in the resources which could attract the conqueror or the trader, Russia never heard the tramp of the Roman legions. Neither Roman nor Greek was ever tempted to investigate the enormous forests, swamps and vast steppes of a region which ancient imagination peopled with curious and abhorrent monsters (*the Hyperboreans of Herodotus*) and which they believed to be the land of eternal darkness. Thus Russia remained "undiscovered" till almost the last quarter of the first millennium; and knowledge of it was confined to myths and stray reports; the reports serving chiefly to render the myths stranger and more uncanny.

At the beginning of our era, the Slavs, moving in the rear of the great barbaric migration to Europe, reached the upper basins of the Danube and the Elbe in the West, and the shores of the Adriatic and the southern slopes of the Balkans in the South. This westward movement was arrested by the resistance of earlier settlers (Germans); and this resistance deflected eastwards in turn the Slavonic migration. In the sixth

and seventh centuries the Slavs are to be found firmly established in the basins of the rivers W. Dvina and Volkhov and the Dnieper.

Here they established a chain of communities, loosely bound to each other by the common roots of language, social institutions and religion. Their chief occupations were agriculture and trade with the aborigines of Turkic and Finnic blood, with whom the Slavs mixed freely.

By the end of the eighth century these communities had founded several important townships, centres of trade and administration. The basin of the Volkhov, situated near the shores of the Baltic, was brought into commercial relations with the Baltic ports; Novgorod, the most important of its towns, became a centre for trade between the German littoral, Scandinavia and the Russian *hinterland*. Its commercial contacts also spread as far south as Byzantium.

During the ninth century Russia became an arena for the trading and colonizing activities of the Norsemen, those great rovers of early European history.

As already stated, the Slavonic settlements formed a chain in the basins of the Volkhov and Dnieper. These rivers running North and South formed the shortest route from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Only a short distance separated the two waters and here a portage was easily effected, all the river traffic being conducted on light canoes, similar to those of the American Indians. In addition the Kingdom of the Volga Bulgars (in the middle basins of the Volga and Kama rivers) and the Khazar Kingdom (on the lower Volga) maintained a very important trade with Persia and Arabia. This trade-route could easily be reached along the waterways of the Volkhov basin.

It is probable that at a much earlier date the Norsemen (or Varangians, as the Slavs called them) had established political and trade relations with the Slavs. The absence of political unity and the frequent feuds among the Slavonic tribes prompted the Varangians to establish their own control over the route. This they effected in the second half of the ninth century. Historical data are insufficient to reconstruct the story of this conquest of the trade-route "from Varangia to the Greeks," as early Russian chronicles call it; but the date 862 A.D. is generally accepted by historians as marking the establishment of Varangian rule in Novgorod. Thence their military and trading expeditions gradually worked their way southward, and towards the close of the ninth century their rule was firmly established along the whole course of the two rivers.

This event was of fundamental importance in Russian history; for it served to establish a direct and regular contact between the Slavonic lands and Byzantium, thus bringing Russia for the first time into contact with the civilized nations of Europe.

By this time Rome had ceased to be the secular capital of the world, the Old Roman Empire was no more, and a new world was being born on the ruins of the old. On the shores of the Bosphorus there remained, however, a mighty Empire centred round the capital of Constantine

the Christian—Constantinople or Byzantium, the seat of Eastern Christianity. But at the end of the first millennium little of the old Roman traditions survived in its eastern successor. It had become preeminently Asiatic in almost every feature, reviving the *Hellenistic* tradition of Alexander the Great. Although endowed with many Western possessions, its face was definitely turned to the East; and the majority of its population, while under a nominally Roman rule, was of Asiatic origin. Centuries of contact with Persia and other civilizations of the Near and Middle East had made Byzantium, still calling itself the "Second Rome," a truly *Europasian* state, where European and Asiatic elements had been blended into a new composite body.

The Greek monks were called by Grand Duke Vladimir to teach the Christian faith to his subjects in the end of the tenth century and this fact played a very important part in Russian history. For although in the tenth century the separation between Constantinople and Rome had not been formally established, yet their dogmatic and canonical divergencies were already so marked that a great deal of hostility existed between them. Russia inherited at the baptismal font the feud between the two, and centuries later she became the champion and centre of Greek Christianity.

As to Russia's secular inheritance from Byzantium this made itself apparent at a later date. The Varangians were too much attached to their own aristocratic, semi-feudal institutions to copy the highly centralized organization of the Byzantine State and, as rulers of Russia, never acquired the authority of the Emperors of Constantinople. The clan disputes among the Varangian princes and a very early cessation of Norse emigration into Russia always prevented the formation of a centralized State wherein the principles of Byzantine statesmanship could take root.

The Varangians have left very few indications of their erstwhile dominion over Russia. Neither the Russian language nor Russian popular customs show many traces of it. Only in the legends (and, to a very restricted degree, in the common law) can one find slight vestiges of Scandinavian influence.

By the end of the eleventh century the Varangian conquerors had become completely absorbed in the Slavonic population, forming the nucleus of the upper class—to which notable families from the Slavs themselves had also been co-opted. All ties uniting the Norsemen to their former country had long been severed and forgotten. They had brought a new nation into being—the Russian nation¹—and spread the name "Russian" from the Volkhov and Dnieper to the basin of the Volga, the Caspian, the Black Sea and the Carpathian mountains.

After two centuries of internecine strife among the conquerors, some semblance of order was established by the greatest of Russia's early

¹ From the word *Rus*, believed to have been the name of the particular Varangian clan or tribe, which had established itself in Novgorod.

rulers—Yaroslav the Wise. He divided his territory into principalities governed by members of the house of Rurik.¹ These princes succeeded to the Grand Duchy of Kiev, the most important of the principalities, according to seniority in the same generation. The ruler of Kiev bore the title of Grand Duke and the rest owed him allegiance. At the death of the Grand Duke, his brother or the next of kin in the same generation “received” Kiev, all the others changing their “seats” one step higher. Alongside the administration of the princes, who governed with the assistance of the *druzhinas*,² there existed the popular assemblies or *veche* of the towns. The *veche* elected municipal officers and judges.

Although devised in the interests of peace, this system led to innumerable feuds and crimes among the members of the reigning house; and Kiev, the centre of all the strife, suffered greatly, in spite of the flourishing trade which it carried on with Byzantium.

About this time the rise of a junior branch of the house of Rurik³ which had acquired a domain in the North gradually changed the centre of influence. The aristocratic and semi-feudal South, divided into a dozen small principalities continually at war with each other, was losing prestige as compared with the North—younger and poorer, but more disciplined. In 1169 Grand Duke Andrew definitely established his capital in Suzdal, having previously taken and sacked Kiev. At the close of the period (thirteenth century) the political supremacy of the North over the South was firmly established.

It is at this time that a new force appeared from the East—the Mongols—a force that was destined to play a much more important part in the making of Russia.

II

THE MONGOLIAN PERIOD

THE first encounter of the Russians with the Mongols occurred in 1223, when a Russian army was severely defeated by the Mongol generals, Djebe-Noyon and Subutai. The Mongols, who had just completed a two year march through Persia and the Caucasus in pursuit of the defeated Shah of Khoresm, were returning to their homes. They regarded the battle as a rearguard action, immediately retiring from the Russian borders. Almost twenty years passed before they reappeared under the leadership of Khan Batu, grandson of Genghis Khan (the Great Mongolian Emperor, founder of the vastest Empire known to history).

The Mongolian Empire at the death of its founder was divided between his sons—the *Kipchak steppes*—(roughly all the territories in

¹ Rurik is believed to be the elder of three brothers, who took possession of Novgorod in 862.

² Literally—company of friends.

³ That of Vladimir Monomachos—1113–1125.

the basins of the rivers Ural and Volga and the Caspian Sea) falling to the lot of Djuchi, the eldest. It was the latter's son, Batu, who fought westward. In the campaigns of 1237-1243 his armies conquered all of Russia (the extreme North excepted), took Warsaw, occupied Silesia, and established themselves for a century as overlords of the territory now known as Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Rumania.

Russia was laid bare; her armies, fighting stubbornly, perished in the field; her princes proved unable to unite even in the face of this terrible menace, and she was reduced to paying a heavy annual tribute (*the yassak*) for almost three hundred years to the Great Khan, who built himself a capital (Saray) on the Volga.

After the conquest the Mongols' attitude towards the conquered country was tolerant. They regarded it as a part of their Empire, left its local institutions intact, showed great respect for the Russian church (a Russian Episcopal See had been established at Saray soon after the conquest) and in general abstained from interfering with the internal affairs of the principalities; the Mongol governors (*baskaks*) were much more the Great Khan's Residents at the courts of the Russian princes than active administrators: only in cases of disobedience or revolt did the Mongol troops reappear to establish "law and order" with characteristic ruthlessness.

Having no choice the Russian princes courted the Great Khan's protection; and it is chiefly due to this that Moscow, once the insignificant fief of a junior branch of the House of Rurik, grew in to the new capital of Russia.

The unquestionable political and administrative ability of the Princes of Moscow, and their cautious and crafty policy towards their overlords of the Golden Horde, made Moscow, towards the close of the fourteenth century, the most important of Russian centres, so much so that Grand Duke Dmitry in 1380 summoned the other Princes to join him in an attempt to throw off the Mongolian yoke. In a pitched battle fought on the shores of the river Don (The "Field of Kulikovo") Khan Mamay was completely defeated, and the legend of Mongol invincibility destroyed forever.

It was, however, only a century later (1480) that the power of the Mongols over Russia was definitely broken.

The Mongol yoke had a tremendous influence on Russia and Russian mentality. First of all, it created a spirit of national unity. The levelling policy of the Golden Horde, which treated the territory regardless of its feudal divisions, subjected Russia to a uniform standard of government. The Mongols introduced into Russia a regular postal service as part of a system covering the whole of their Empire from the Dnieper to the shores of the Pacific, and a uniform monetary and fiscal system. Furthermore, the Russians learned from their conquerors the art of war; and they were also brought into closest contact with the great Eastern civilizations, whose influence in language, art and craftsmanship became predominant and so continued until the close of the seventeenth century.

Equally important is the Mongol influence on Russian statesmanship and social order. The Mongol Empire stood even more than Byzantium for autocracy. Every individual subject of the Great Khan, no matter how exalted in rank, was his servant, over whom the Khan exercised unlimited authority. The Khan held all property, of which his subjects had only the use so long as it pleased him; in matters of peace and war, policy and administration his decision was final. The Great Khan could say long before Louis XIVth of France, "*l'Etat c'est moi*," for his rule was absolute and divine.

This *etatism* could not but produce a lasting effect on the imagination of Russian statesmen. On the eve of the Mongolian conquest Russia was no more than a loose confederation of principalities, held by their rulers on a basis of semi-private proprietorship. Its incorporation into the Mongol Empire made it both a Nation and a State. Russian statesmen, the Princes of Moscow and their advisers in particular, copied the Mongol models of administration and policy. The settlement of numerous Mongol communities among the Russians, and the entry of Mongols in thousands, at a later period into service with the Russian princes, all tended to propagate Mongol ideas in Russia.

It is under the Mongol, too, that the Russian Church became a national institution. Its dependence from the see of Constantinople was perforce weakened; and, as regards administration, completely severed.

Russia's relations with Europe were also greatly affected by the Mongol conquest. The terror which these ruthless warriors had inspired during the campaigns of 1240-1243 in the West, resulted in a crusade being preached against them by Pope Alexander VI. As a result, Austria, Hungary, and Poland were liberated—not so much, however, by force of arms as by the fact that the Mongols could not find pasture enough for their innumerable cavalry. Russia, however, remained a Mongol province with her western neighbours more or less leagued together to resist any attempt on the part of the Mongols to issue forth from her borders. They went further, undertaking, with the blessing of Rome, several invasions into Russian land. Among the more important were—the invasion of the Swedes into Ingria (territory south of the river Neva and Lake Ladoga) in 1240, and that of the German Knights into Pskov territory in 1242. Both were heavily defeated by the Russians under Grand Duke Alexander Nevsky.

In the fourteenth century, Lithuania, an independent principality, with strongly Russian characteristics, was united under one crown with Poland, and from this time on till the middle of the seventeenth century an almost continuous state of war existed between her and Russia. The Polish-Lithuanian State rapidly pushed its eastern frontiers to the Dvina and far beyond the Dnieper. In the wake of the Poles came the Roman clergy which used the Sword as much as the Cross in an effort to convert the Orthodox population to Roman Catholicism.

It was only through Mongol help that the Russians were able to hold their ground and even occasionally take the offensive.

III

MOSCOW

THE beginning of the sixteenth century finds Moscow dominating all the Russian North. Novgorod had been annexed with its vast territories, stretching from Lake Ilmen and the mouth of the Neva to the White Sea and the basin of the North Dvina. The possessions of Moscow reached the Volga in the east and southeast; while in the south its frontiers spread to the basin of the Desna, an affluent of the Dnieper.

The growth of Moscow's power was determined by two factors: it had freed itself at the close of the fifteenth century from the Mongol domination and had become the spiritual heir of Byzantium (which had fallen to the Turks under Osman in 1453).

The first event not only established Russian national and political independence but added considerably to her territory and population through the annexation of all the Mongol provinces west of the Volga.

The fall of Byzantium, also, was of the first importance to Moscow, which became the most powerful and the only independent centre of Greek Orthodoxy—the "Third Rome" as it styled itself. The general international situation warranted this, for from then on the Eastern Christian Churches and the peoples of Eastern Europe and the Near East have regarded Russia as their natural supporter and protector. Russia accepted this as a religious mission, which later expressed itself in her advance to the Black Sea and her political interest in the Balkans.

The assumption of the title of Caesar (Tzar) by the Moscow rulers also implied acceptance of the Byzantine principle that the supreme secular power was at the same time the ultimate embodiment of ecclesiastical authority on earth.

Ivan the Terrible

It was in the long reign of Ivan the Terrible¹ (1533–1584) that the foundations of the future Russian Empire were laid. Ivan was undoubtedly one of the greatest and most remarkable of the Russian rulers, a man of extraordinary political foresight and of pre-eminent military, administrative and legislative ability.

He succeeded to the throne when three years old; and during his minority he was a helpless yet indignant witness of the fierce struggles conducted behind his throne by the various parties of boyars (the highest order of nobility) who constituted the council of regency. More than once their selfish ambitions almost succeeded in wrecking the ship of state. Throughout his reign, Ivan could never divest himself of a consequent aversion towards their order.

¹ "Terrible" is an incorrect translation of the Russian word "Grozny," which really means "awe-inspiring"; this title was given to several of Ivan's predecessors and was used as signifying "Great."

He was sixteen when following a bloody revolt of the townspeople of Moscow, which overthrew the regency and almost reduced the city to ashes, he assumed the supreme power (1547). His youth, neglected by the regents, had been a truly wild one; but on assuming the government he showed that he possessed enough moral strength to shake off old habits and devote himself, heart and soul, to the task of administration and of healing the wounds inflicted on his country by the malpractices and corruption of the regency.

Ivan's Domestic Reforms

In 1550 Ivan promulgated a political programme which comprised the enactment of a new Code of Civil and Criminal law, and the reform of the local self-government (fiscal, judicial and administrative); between 1550 and 1560 he put the finances of the country in order, carried out the first census of land and population in Russia, reorganized the armed forces of the State and succeeded in establishing comparative peace and order throughout his domains. He frequently convoked *Zemsky Sobors* (Land Congresses), comprising representatives of the nobility, the clergy, the industrial middle class and peasant communes, to learn his country's opinion on matters of internal and external policy. One of the best known among these was the Sobor of 1551, with whose assistance Ivan enacted the New Civil Code and a Code of Canon Law.¹

The Tzar, while unable to abolish all the privileges of the boyars who assisted him in the government through the Duma of Boyars (a consultative and executive Council), yet raised men of humble, even obscure origin to the highest rank in the administration, selecting his most trusted councilors from among them and entrusting them with the most difficult tasks of government. He instinctively felt that he could better trust their loyalty and devotion than that of the boyars—most of whom were descended from royal blood, and who had grown accustomed to regarding themselves as co-rulers with the Tzar.

He was assisted in the great task he had undertaken by an Inner Council, of which the highly educated Metropolitan Makarius, his chamberlain Alexis Adashev and the learned monk Silvester were the most prominent members for the first ten years of his reign.

Among other activities Ivan strove to develop the natural resources of his country and to encourage industry and trade.² He invited foreigners skilled in arts and crafts to take service with him and he sent young men abroad for the purpose of study, as Peter the Great did a century and a half later. His efforts to establish regular intercourse with Europe were largely thwarted by the combined efforts of his neighbours. This was the reason for the special trading privileges extended by Ivan

¹ The autocratic power of the Tzar of Moscow had that particularity that it was combined with the autonomy of the local communes or "mir." The mir, responsible to the central Government, independently administered local finances and justice through yearly elected officers. This was regarded as a duty more than a privilege—the electors were responsible to Moscow for their representatives' behaviour.

² An attempt to build a flying machine was made under his auspices, but proved a failure.

to England and Denmark, since these were the only two European countries which pursued a friendly policy towards Russia.¹

The most far-reaching of his internal reforms was an attempt to change the system of land-tenure.

Most of the land held as private property belonged to the princes (descendants of the House of Rurik), and to the boyars, on a semi-feudal basis. Such estates were called *votchinas* and entitled the owners (*votchinniki*) to a great number of privileges which made them almost independent rulers. Their allegiance to Moscow depended chiefly on a community of interests or on its power and influence in the district. The Tzar "held" the towns and the communities of free peasants—and was of course the most important of all the *votchinniki*.

The *votchinniki* were notorious for the fickleness of their allegiance and often sided with the enemies of Moscow (especially Lithuania).

This situation had gravely troubled Ivan's forebears; and he now decided to change the system of land-tenure to conform with that established in the Tzar's own domains.

This consisted in making grants of land on a conditional basis, the holder being obliged to serve the State in peace and war. The tenure of these grants was not necessarily hereditary, the Government reserving the right to dispose of the grant, vacated by death or otherwise. These grants were called *pomesties* and the holders *pomestchiki* who usually belonged to the so-called *dvoriane* (second order of nobility) a rank easily reached by service to the State.

In Ivan's eyes, this system had many advantages of a political, military, social and fiscal character, all of which combined to increase the central Government's authority and control.

Ivan initiated his land-tenure reform in 1550 by settling one thousand selected families and their liegemen on grants of Crown land in the immediate neighbourhood of Moscow. Simultaneously he invited the *votchinniki* throughout the country to surrender to him their estates and to receive in exchange either equivalent or larger grants of Crown lands in other parts of the country or the same estates with some Crown lands added to them, on a Crown lease; thus transforming them into *pomesties*.

This, of course, met with a great deal of opposition. Ivan resorted to acts of coercion against those most prominent in their resistance. At the slightest pretext the *votchinas* were confiscated from their owners by acts of attainder, divided into *pomesties*, and granted to men devoted to the Tzar's cause. At the same time Ivan heaped honours and advantages on all those who accepted his offer.

Ivan's Foreign Policy

Simultaneously with his internal activities Ivan undertook the task of strengthening Russia's external position. He first turned his attention to the eastern frontiers, where the situation was far from satisfactory.

¹ R. Chancellor established the Muscovy Company in 1554.

An intermittent state of war with the Khanate of Kazan had existed for over a century on the Middle Volga and Kama rivers. The Kazan Tatars were a thorn in Moscow's side; interfering with its trade, its communications with the Russian North and constituting a perpetual menace to the peaceful population of the adjoining Russian territories. They also carried on an important slave-trade with the East and their slaving raids into Russian territory were almost a yearly occurrence.

In 1552, after two years of careful preparation, Ivan besieged Kazan in person and stormed it. In 1554 the Khanate of Astrakhan on the Lower Volga was also conquered by the Russian armies. The Volga basin, stretching to the Ural Mountains, became Russian. The Russians also gained access to the Caspian Sea and the northeastern Caucasus (the districts of Kumyk and Terek) acknowledged Russian suzerainty. Ivan's policy in the annexed territories was a wise one; he tolerated the local customs and religious institutions¹ and relied on the peaceful colonization of the vast unoccupied lands by Russian settlers whom he greatly encouraged. Towards the end of his reign the conquered provinces had accepted the new order, the native population retaining its distinctive character and living in amity with the newcomers.

Towards the end of his campaigns in the east, Ivan's attention was drawn to his western borders. Here a powerful league was gradually forming against him. Poland, Lithuania, the Livonian Order (of German Knights) and Sweden were anxiously watching the extraordinary growth and activity of their eastern neighbour—the fate of Livonia, then in a state of disintegration, being their chief concern.

At the beginning of the century the Livonian Order had acknowledged Russian suzerainty. On this ground, Ivan now required the Order to pay a (nominal) annual tribute and to abandon its policy of interfering with the transit of Russian goods to the Baltic ports. Receiving no satisfactory reply, he opened hostilities against the Order. In 1558 the Russian armies invaded its territories, speedily captured most of its fortresses and reached the shores of the Baltic. The Danes, in alliance with the Russians, invaded Curland and Duke Magnus, their leader, was invested by the Tzar with the lands formerly belonging to it after swearing allegiance to Ivan.

The Order realizing that it could not withstand Moscow single-handed concluded a treaty in 1561 with Poland and Sweden, by which part of its territories became a vassal State of Poland under the ex-Grand Master, who assumed the title of Duke of Curland; Estonia was ceded to the Swedes. Poland, Lithuania and Sweden declared war on Russia in 1562. For the first 15 years the Russian armies not only held their ground victoriously but also reconquered all the provinces lost to Lithuania during Ivan's minority.

The election to the Polish Crown (1579) of King Stephan Batory, perhaps the ablest soldier of his time, marked a turn of fortune's wheel. In the next four years the Russians were driven out of the Baltic Prov-

¹ His Ambassador to Turkey claimed for the Tzar the title of a "friend of Islam."

inces and lost ground in Lithuania. By the peace of 1583 Ivan had to relinquish the greater part of his conquests, only retaining Smolensk and the territories on the Upper Dnieper. Thus his dream of a Western Empire was shattered.

Since 1564 great changes had come about in Russia. The war in the West was forcing Russia to make great sacrifices and concentrate all her resources as much as possible. In spite of this the Tzar and his advisers although sorely embarrassed for men, armaments and supplies were still pressing on with the scheme of land-tenure reform. The war with Lithuania gave many a discontented landowner an opportunity for going over to the side of the enemy.

Defections on the part of those who were unwilling to submit to the new order only increased the severity of Ivan's measures of coercion. Hostility between him and a large number of boyars and their dependents was greatly on the increase when, in 1564, the defection of Prince Kurbsky while in command of a Russian army in Livonia brought the crisis to a head. Kurbsky was a bosom friend of Ivan, his companion in peace and war for over fifteen years and a member of the Inner Council. His treachery not only to his country but to his suzerain and friend seemed to sap what little faith Ivan still had in men of his order. Such was the impression Kurbsky's treason made upon him that he decided to abdicate and left Moscow with his family and bodyguards. However, the common people of Moscow, who were always unflinchingly devoted to the Tzar, rose in arms and threatened to do away with the boyars if the Tzar did not return. Ivan reconsidered his decision; but he only consented to remain on the throne on condition that a separate estate—*Oprichina*—should be established over which he could exercise authority independently of the boyars.

The country was divided into two parts—the *Oprichina* and the *Zemstchina*—the latter being administered as of old by the Tzar and Duma of Boyars—the former governed by the Tzar and the *Oprichniki*—a thousand selected guardsmen, mostly of humble and obscure origin. The *Oprichina* incidentally embraced most of the territories where the old system of land-tenure was prevalent.

This regime lasted for seven years, during which time more and more territories were assigned to the Tzar's "separate estate." Ivan, displaying ruthless cruelty, set out to eradicate the boyars and "Princelings" in a way that had neither justification nor excuse.

It was a cruel age and the sufferings inflicted on the "enemies" of the Tzar were great. It must in extenuation be said that Ivan had little reason to love the old order of boyars and that on most occasions he had good ground to suspect their loyalty. He was definitely determined to break their power and to replace them by another order based on the principle of service to the State. The good of the State seems to have been his ideal; but his ruthless methods of achieving this end naturally aroused fierce opposition, which in turn led him into further excesses against the old order.

Towards the close of Ivan's reign a new and mighty Empire—Siberia—was added to his realms, the Tartar Khanates on the Obi and Irtysh rivers being subjugated by Don Cossacks¹ under Ataman Yermak.

Ivan died in 1584 with his plans still unfinished and leaving Russia greatly weakened by twenty-five years of ceaseless wars. He has been greatly maligned by many historians. That he should commonly be represented as a senseless and cruel tyrant is due to the circumstance that the class which had the greatest reasons to fear and dislike him has left the only written documents illustrating his period. His enemies abroad, goaded on by traitors and ill-wishers, created a picture of Ivan that does not agree with the love and veneration which the humble folk bore him. In the popular songs and legends which still survive he is praised as a just ruler, the protector of the poor and the terror of Russia's enemies.

Ivan's greatest error was in overtaking the strength of the country, which was not prepared for the magnitude of his schemes and reforms. So far as Russia was concerned, he had come before his time. He left it greatly weakened and in a state of unrest; in less than a quarter of a century it was again in the hands of those same boyars and Princelings whose power he had attempted to destroy.

Ivan's immediate successors, his son Feodor (1584-1598) and the latter's brother-in-law, Boris Godunov (1598-1605) first as regent, then as Tzar, followed the general lines of Ivan's policy.

One outstanding problem confronted them—the shortage of labour in the centre of the State. There were several reasons for this: the great loss of human life occasioned by war; the colonization of the new territories of the Volga; the emigration of the peasants to the south (the semi-independent Cossack communities of Little Russia, Ukraine) and the Don; and the great increase on the number of private land holdings resulting from Ivan's reform of the land-tenure system.

In those days, the Russian peasant class was divided into two distinct groups: the landed peasants, who formed free peasant communities, and held their land directly from the Tzar; and the landless peasants² who hired themselves out to the landowners on a system of yearly contracts, under which they undertook to till the land, the proceeds being divided between the contracting parties.

Owing to the above mentioned shortage of labour, and to the great demand for it, the peasants, lured by better conditions or promises, often broke their contracts. Besides leaving the lands of the smaller owners to waste, the continual migration of a large proportion of the peasants made it very difficult for the authorities to collect the taxes. Furthermore, the Government viewed with great concern the impoverishment of the pomestchiki from whom it drew its military and civil power and whom it was paying for their services by grants of land. A steady supply

¹ Russian settlers outside the borders of the State. Cossack or Kazak, a word of Turkish origin, means a free man.

² These were quite distinct from the personal serfs (*kholops*) of the nobility. The latter were usually persons who had sold themselves into serfdom, or else prisoners of war.

of labour had to be maintained and during Ivan's reign the Government on many occasions automatically prolonged the labour contracts for an extra year or more and severely punished all infringements, thus restricting the peasant's choice of his employer. Towards the end of the century the years which the Government declared "free" became steadily fewer: and finally a ukaze of Tzar Feodor definitely abolished the peasant's right to transfer himself from one master to another.

In adopting this policy the Government was merely continuing to carry out the plan of mobilizing all the State's resources. Having "tied" the upper classes to its service and the middle classes and free communities of peasants to the payments of the head-tax and other State duties, it now tied the landless peasant to the land. The system, however, was not devoid of a certain element of equity for although the peasant became a bondsman to the landowner, yet the latter in his turn was as much a bondsman to the State. The Government reserved the right to control the relation between the landowners and the peasants. But in course of time this relation developed, almost inevitably, into that of master and slave.

"The Time of Trouble"

The end of the sixteenth century saw the advent of troubled times for Russia. Feodor was the last Tzar of the Rurik dynasty and Boris Godunov ascended the throne as the chosen of the towns and the pomestchiki, but very much to the displeasure of the higher nobility.

Godunov was undoubtedly a gifted and just ruler, but his seven years reign was chiefly marked by repeated plots of the boyars to overthrow him, and by his measures of retaliation. Relying on his undoubted popularity with the middle classes, the Tzar met conspiracies by banishments and executions. The party of the boyars, however, found new allies in the disaffected peasants; and after Boris' death his young son (Feodor II) met an untimely death in a boyar plot, organized in favour of a pretender, Dmitry, who claimed to be a son of Ivan the Terrible. Dmitry, supported by the boyars and the Poles, took possession of Moscow, but was soon murdered (1606).

After this, anarchy reigned supreme in Russia for seven years—till 1613, when a Sobor in Moscow elected Michael Romanov Tzar. During these years—called "The Time of Trouble"—pretender followed pretender; central authority was powerless: the Poles not only seized Smolensk, but once occupied Moscow for over two years; King Sigismund of Poland, master *de facto* of a great part of the country, claimed the Russian Crown for himself; the Swedes occupied Novgorod and vast tracts of Russian territories in the North (Ingria); large masses of rebellious peasants and bands of the riffraff of the towns scoured the country; towns and estates were laid bare by contending parties or by marauders; pestilence made its appearance; and, as the old chronicles have it, "the wrath of God descended on the land like a fleece."

Gradually, however, the more moderate elements of the population,

rallied by the encouraging voice of the Church, mustered to the saving of the State. A great patriotic movement was set on foot at Nizhni-Novgorod under the merchant Minin and Prince Pozharsky, and 1611 saw the militia of the nobility and the towns in the field, Moscow recaptured, and the Poles in flight. A Sobor was convened in the beginning of 1613. Here the boyars made a last bid to secure the throne for one of their members—Prince Galitzine; but a petition signed by 5,000 representatives of the militia of the nobility and presented to the Sobor by them all in full armed array, turned the tables in favour of the more democratic candidate—Michael Romanov, who was duly elected and crowned.

IV

THE FIRST ROMANOVS

MICHAEL was the son of a most remarkable statesman, Feodor Romanov. He had been forced to take holy orders by Godunov, on the latter's accession to the throne, and had later been elected to the Patriarchate of Russia. Under his monastic name of Philaretos, he was associated for over fifteen years with his son in the government of Russia.

The task was an arduous one—the "Time of Trouble" had left the country in a state of chaos and at war with its western neighbours (not until 1635 did the Poles definitely abandon their claims to various Russian territories and the Polish King his to the Crown of Moscow). It needed true ability to reestablish order and to maintain the young Tzar on the throne. The boyars, for many years to come gave but a grudging submission to the "upstart" Tzar's authority; and many are the plots known to have been fomented by them against him with the help of the Poles, whose armies more than once ravaged Russia's borders and appeared again under the very walls of Moscow.

Michael with his father as chief adviser, continued the "democratic" policy of Ivan and Godunov. During his reign, and those of his son Alexis and grandson Feodor, the Government became accustomed to lean more and more on the middle classes (the "dvoriane" or second order of nobility, and the trading communities of the towns). Sobors were frequently convened and consulted on matters of internal and external policy. This made the Government popular and strengthened its position.

The first three Romanov rulers, the Patriarch Philaretos, Tzar Michael (1613–1645) and Tzar Alexis (1645–1676) proved to be very capable administrators. During the whole of the seventeenth century the structure of the Russian nation was being made stronger and more secure. Its boundaries were greatly extended: the whole of Siberia became a Russian province, and large tracts of Russian lands in the south

and southwest, which had been annexed by the Poles, were returned to Russia. The latter was the result of a general rising of the Little Russian (Ukrainian) Cossacks under Hetman Bogdan Khmelnitzky against the political and religious oppressions of Warsaw. After a Sobor held in Moscow had decided in favour of annexation, the treaty of Periaslavl (1658) between the Ambassadors of the Tzar and the representatives of the Cossack Rada (Supreme Council) admitted Little Russia (Ukraine) as a part of the Russian State. The Cossacks retained their self-government and elected their own Hetman as of yore; but this investiture required the Tzar's sanction and Moscow garrisons occupied the more important strategic points of the Ukraine. Furthermore, the right of deciding all questions of external policy vested in the Tzar.

Internally great changes were also wrought. The administration, finance, justice and the government of the Church were all put in order. Encouragement given to trade and industry restored the prosperity of the land in a remarkably short time. The reign of Alexis in particular saw reforms begin to take a somewhat Western turn; many foreigners established themselves in Russia and intercourse with the Germans, English, Dutch and French became more regular. This period corresponds with a very definite decline in the power of Russia's neighbours. Poland, weakened by internal dissension lost the power of aggression. Sweden, Poland's traditional ally, had parted company with her; and a new enemy of Poland appeared in the south—the Turks, who occupied all the Polish territories, south of Kiev, from the Dnieper to the Pruth. True, Russia was as yet unable to recover the Russian provinces on the right banks of the Dnieper or on the Neva and the Baltic—the latter held by the Swedes. But, in the eyes of her Western neighbours, there was no longer any doubt that Russia was growing into a great Power to be reckoned with.

It was in the reign of Alexis that a great reform of the Russian Church took place, accompanied by a crisis in the relations between the spiritual and secular powers. Since the days of Ivan III the autocratic power of the Tzar, inherited from the Mongols, was tempered by the influence of the Church. This influence was greatly increased by the elevation of the Metropolitan of Moscow to the rank of Patriarch (1589).

The importance of the Moscow Patriarchate was greatly enhanced by the fact that Patriarch Philaretos, the father of Tzar Michael, had actually shared the government of the State with his royal son. From this day onwards the Patriarch became, after the Tzar, the most important person in the State, its regent in the Tzar's absence from Moscow.

In the person of Nikon, elected to the Patriarchate in 1652, the Russian Church found an ambitious and forceful head. He started his rule by instituting, with the approval of the Tzar, a commission empowered to enquire into the malpractices of Church administration and also to

rectify, revise and standardize the Church ritual and Canon Law which had become greatly corrupted by careless copying and abuses. A Sobor held in 1656 endorsed the revised versions, and this was followed by ukazes reforming the Church services and enforcing the new order all over Russia. In his reforms Nikon was backed by the most learned advice that the Russian and other Greek Catholic churches could produce: but unfortunately the reforms, naturally enough, occasioned a schism in the Russian Church—the so-called “Old Believers,” refusing to accept the new books or the alterations of the services.

But Nikon had greater ends in view than a mere reform of the Russian Church. He wanted to make the Patriarchal See of Moscow (the “Third Rome”) the supreme centre of the Eastern Christian Church and to set the ecclesiastical power above that of the State. He had an immense influence over the pious Tzar and used it without discrimination. Such was his authority that at one time it was difficult to decide who was the actual sovereign—Alexis or Nikon.

In 1660 a breach occurred between the Tzar and Nikon, who, in a huff, divested himself of his functions and retired to a monastery, leaving the Church without leadership. After years of fruitless negotiations an Ecclesiastical Court presided over by the Patriarchs of Alexandria and Antioch and attended by legates from the Patriarchs of Constantinople and Jerusalem, met in 1666. This deprived Nikon of his functions and titles, reduced him to the state of an ordinary monk, and relegated him to a monastery.

His church reforms, however, were endorsed by the Court; and the Government continued to put them into force relentlessly, and sometimes with a great deal of cruelty, persecuting the “Old Believers,” forbidding their religious meetings, and confiscating their property.

Nikon was a purist in his orthodoxy, and his services to the Church were truly great. It was his inordinate ambition (not for himself but for the See which he occupied) that ruined his career. Moscow was not prepared to accept ecclesiastical leadership—the old tradition of the Supremacy of the State, and of the divinity of the Sovereign’s power, was too deeply rooted. However, the struggle between the civil and ecclesiastical authority lasted for some time longer, till Peter the Great, some fifty years later, definitely altered the government of the Church.

V

ST. PETERSBURG

Peter the Great

THE reign of Peter the Great (1686–1725) marks a new epoch in the history of Russia. From 1700 onwards the world witnessed the brilliant, almost dazzling transformation of the Tzardom of Moscow into the mighty Russian Empire; its evolution from a State “lost in the depths

of Asia" into an important and, on some occasions, decisive factor in Western politics; its advance to the forefront of the civilized nations, and its participation in the achievements of Western civilization.

The reign also marks an important change in the traditional character of Russia, from a semi-Asiatic country to a Western State; from an "Orthodox Tzardom," where autocracy was tempered by the influence of the Church and self-government, into a bureaucratic absolutism on a Western pattern.

The changes wrought by Peter the Great in Russia's everyday life were tremendous: their only parallel is the transformation of Japan into a modern power during the second half of the nineteenth century.

Europeanization, however, did not come to Russia entirely as a blessing; it is responsible for the beginning of a social cleavage that ultimately brought her to the Revolution of October, 1917. The Westernizing process Europeanized the upper classes, but the great masses of the people (the peasants in particular) remained, almost to the present day, aloof and distrustful of it.

However, at the moment Peter's reforms, or at least a large proportion of them, were long overdue. On the eve of the eighteenth century Russia found herself technically extremely backward. This was evident to all onlookers, and many had been the efforts of the Russian rulers during the seventeenth century to bring her up to date. But none of them had combined the power and the will to break through age-old traditions and prejudices. It needed a character of extraordinary forcefulness and ruthlessness to achieve this. Such a man appeared in the person of Peter.

Although only the youngest surviving brother of Tzar Feodor II, Peter, at the age of 6, was proclaimed Tzar in 1686 by a powerful Court faction.

This faction, headed by Artamon Matveyev, the young Tzar's guardian, united all the men of progressive mind, and may well be termed the "Progressive Party." Hence the atmosphere in which Peter grew up served to develop his inborn thirst for progress and knowledge.

In 1692 Peter's eldest half-brother Ivan was proclaimed co-Tzar through the efforts of the "Conservative Party." Tzar Ivan V never took any part in affairs of State; he was merely used as a tool by a faction which fell to pieces after his sister Sophia had made an unsuccessful attempt to govern in his name.

From his early childhood Peter showed an extraordinary capacity for acquiring knowledge. In days when education, even in the royal palace, did not extend beyond the reading of Scripture, the inquisitive boy managed to discover tutors for himself and to learn things that no Russian Prince before him had attempted to learn: geometry, astronomy, fortification, musketry, tactics, navigation, boat-building, Latin, German. . . . It was characteristic of him to follow theory up by the practical application of his knowledge. This was a marked trait of his throughout life: thus during his travels abroad (1697-98) he studied

artillery in Königsberg, shipbuilding in Holland, sailmaking and navigation in England, anatomy in Leyden, engraving in Amsterdam.

His other great talent was in the choice of men, whom he promoted irrespective of class or country. He always managed to make them not only his devoted followers but also intelligent and capable administrators.

Some playmates (The Amusement Company), with whom as a boy, and later as a youth, he played at warlike exercises, formed the germ of his two famous regiments of guards—Preobrazhensky and Semionovsky. These regiments were at once the nucleus of his victorious army, and the companions of his labours and reforms.

It is interesting to note that in this Peter remained true to the old Russian tradition of government through a selected élite: the Preobrazhensky, in particular, and the Semionovsky were a development of the *druzhina* of the early Russian Princes, the Guardsmen of the Mongol Overlords, the *dvoriane* and even more the *Oprichniki* of Ivan the Terrible. These regiments consisting of 52 companies each (ab. 6000) recruited exclusively from the ranks of the nobility, never had throughout Peter's reign more than 8 to 12 companies in the field. The Tzar employed the rest in every official capacity: engineers, fleet- town- and road-builders, administrators, educators, the Tzar's commissioners, controllers, leaders of expeditions, etc. In fact, they were the "eye and arm" of the Tzar. Peter himself selected certain guardsmen to go abroad for special training; and these throughout his reign were to be found overseas studying every art and craft in Europe. A remarkable collection of letters exchanged between the Tzar, who started his military career as drummer in the Preobrazhensky, and the corporals and sergeants of the regiment illustrates both their devotion to him and his implicit faith in their loyalty. The officers and men of the two regiments held high rank in the army: thus a Guards corporal ranked with an army captain and a lieutenant-colonel with a general.

Peter's Foreign Policy

Two problems of external politics were engaging the Moscow Government at the end of the seventeenth century: the unsatisfactory situation on the Baltic, where the Swedes held Ingria, Estonia and Latvia; and the unsettled condition in the South, where intermittent war existed with the Crimean Tartars, supported by the Turks. The latter seemed the more pressing problem since on its solution depended the consolidation of Russian rule in the newly acquired territories of Little Russia (Ukraine).

The Crimean campaign of 1695 showed Peter that the task was, as yet, beyond his power. The Turkish fleet's command of the sea nullified the victories gained by his armies. This inspired Peter to seek foreign help against the Turks, and an Extraordinary Embassy (1697-98) was dispatched to the West, visiting Curland, Denmark, Brandenburg (Prussia), Holland and England. Peter accompanied the Embassy

incognito (as Peter Mikhailov, corporal of the Preobrazhensky). The Tzar's plan of an anti-Turkish coalition failed.

However, a new plan was born in Peter's mind. During his visit to the northern capitals he had discovered that great tension existed between the Swedes on one side, and the Poles and Danes (the latter supported by England) on the other. War was imminent and Peter saw his chance of recovering the Russian Baltic littoral. Having concluded peace with Turkey after a second and successful campaign in the Crimea, he joined the anti-Swedish coalition. In 1700 war broke out between the contending parties.

It began disastrously for Peter. His army, when besieging Narva, was entirely routed by Charles XII of Sweden, only the Preobrazhensky and Semionovsky regiments gallantly fighting their way through the encircling forces. Charles, however, committed the mistake of underestimating Peter's energy and resources and, thinking that he had disposed of the Russians, he turned against the Poles and "stuck in Poland" for eight years, during which period Peter conquered the whole of Ingria, firmly occupied the Neva, laid the foundations of his new capital, St. Petersburg, on its shores (1703), and built a fortress on an island in its mouth (Kronstadt).

When Charles, having vanquished the Poles, turned once more against Peter it was too late. In 1708, Charles invaded Little Russia but was completely defeated by Peter at the battle of Poltava (1709). The King, the traitor Ukrainian Hetman Mazepa, and a few followers alone escaped to Turkey. Although the war with Sweden continued for another 12 years, Peter could now concentrate his attention on domestic affairs.

From the beginning of the Crimean war onwards, Peter had been diligently building a fleet, with which he secured command of the Sea of Azov and the Baltic.

In 1721 Sweden, by the treaty of Nystadt ceded to Russia Ingria, Estonia (with Reval), Latvia (with Riga) and part of Finland and Karelia.

The fight for the Baltic, though occupying such an important place in Russian history, was, in Peter's mind, of merely subsidiary importance compared with his general plans of internal reforms and his projects of Eastward expansion. He had joined the league against Sweden merely in order to establish himself firmly at the gates of Europe and assure his intercourse with it.

But actually the strain of the war against Sweden, at that time a first class military power, continued seriously to affect and handicap his policy, both domestic and foreign throughout the greater part of his reign; and the Tzar's plans were in consequence circumvented by the needs of the war and its aftermath.

Peter's Domestic Reforms

The War with Sweden conclusively proved to Peter the shortcomings of his country's administrative organization. But it was only in 1708

that he could start on remodelling his government. In this year he promulgated a wide plan of reforms. First of all local self-government, where corruption was rampant, was entirely abolished. Crown functionaries were appointed to every post previously held by elected officers.

In 1711 the Central Government itself was reformed. A Senate was substituted for the Duma of Boyars; the members of this new supreme governing body being recruited by the Tzar on the principles of bureaucratic seniority. Administrative *Collegia* were established in St. Petersburg, to replace the old governmental departments. The Collegia, governed by boards of bureaucrats had, until much later, very little real authority. In Peter's time they were mere secretariats which assisted the Senate in the routine-work of government.

In 1722 Peter promulgated his famous *Table of Ranks*, copied from the Prussian organization of the state services. This table established a detailed division of all the servants of the Crown (military and civil) according to their position, functions, wages, and special branch of service. A time-table was fixed for advancement in each branch, and examinations established for functionaries passing to a higher grade.

All these reforms, whatever might have been Peter's ulterior intentions, had one primary aim—the construction of an efficient administrative machinery which would enable him to muster all the country's available resources and use them to the limit of their capacity. There is reason to believe that the Tzar regarded the bureaucratic regime as a transitory form. Notes and memoranda, discovered after his death, show that Peter had contemplated a more liberal constitution, with representative government and decentralization. This, however, never came into being. The fact remains that Peter's administrative, judiciary and fiscal reforms entirely altered the original character of Russian Government. The traditional paternal autocracy, tempered by religion and by the institutions of local self-government, gave place to an enlightened absolutism of the Western pattern.

During Peter's reign moreover an important change took place in the government of the Russian Church. At the death of Patriarch Adrian in 1700 Peter refused to sanction the convening of a Sobor of the Church to elect a successor, on the ground that the dualism of Tzar and Patriarch was detrimental to the State. Till 1721 the Church was governed by a *locum tenens*, when a collegiate body of bishops and laymen, the Holy Synod, was created by ukaze. The appointment of the members rested with the Crown; and its representative, the Procurator General, became from this time onward the real administrator of the Church. The Tzar assumed the title of Head and Protector of the Church.

This reform reduced the Church to a department of the Government; thus radically altering its position within the State, and initiating a speedy and progressive decline of its influence upon the life of the Russian people.

In peasant affairs a new marked departure in Peter's reign was a change in the old Russian conception of bondage. Peter imposed a poll-

tax on all serfs. Until then the fiscal obligations of the serfs were limited to providing labour for the landed estates. This appeared, and was interpreted as, a public duty. Peter's departure from this principle, dictated by the necessities of war, and the upkeep of an increasing army of servants of the Crown, brought the peasant's obligation to the landowner into the category of private or personal dependence. Like any other citizen, the peasant now paid taxes to the State (these payments, however, were smaller than those made by any other category of citizens); and, in addition to this, he was under obligation to work for his master—who inevitably began to regard him as a private chattel, similar to the other assets of his property, such as working implements, cattle, etc. The Government, which had at first controlled the employment of bond labour, now became primarily interested in the revenue it produced. It made all pomesties hereditary and delegated to the owners the collection of the peasants' taxes.

This reform must be stigmatized as unfortunate and unjust. The balance that existed in the old Russian State between the obligations of landowner and peasant was upset in favour of the former, and very much to the detriment of the latter. Henceforth the peasants, none too pleased with their state of bondage before, felt there was no justification for it. The reform sowed the seed of an unrest, which throughout the following centuries, often broke out into open rebellion.

In the chain of his remarkable activities, the agrarian policy of Peter the Great must figure as the weakest link. The other achievements of the Tzar were stupendous. He reorganized the Russian army on a Western model, yet on original lines (he was the first to use mounted infantry (dragoons), and to introduce new tactics in gunnery and new principles of fortification—all of which served as models to the greatest commanders of Europe in the eighteenth century); he was the creator of the Navy and mercantile marine, both of which became, even in his own time, important factors in European politics and trade; he laid the foundations of Russian industry (the metal industry in particular); he encouraged trade, to which he gave an extraordinary impetus; he laid the foundations of lay instruction in Russia and made education compulsory for all the servants of the State; he encouraged knowledge and science by every means at his disposal,¹ and his foreign policy assured to Russia a safe western frontier and a regular contact with Europe.

His handling of eastern problems was no less bold and vigorous. His expeditions to Central Asia and his conquests of the greater part of the Caucasian littoral of the Caspian Sea were designed to open trade—communications with India, and his policy in the Black Sea was to lead during the century to Russian colonization of the whole of the southern steppes. This served to create the myth of his "will," a document which never existed; still it must be admitted that the scheme outlined in this mythical testament, culminating in the seizure of Constantinople, was one which he might very naturally have contemplated.

¹The Imperial Academy of Science was created by him.

In 1721, at the close of the Swedish War he was proclaimed (by the Senate, Holy Synod and the troops) Peter the Great, Emperor of Russia, Father of his Country. He died in 1725 from exposure, overwork, and excesses, aged 53.

It has been often said of Peter the Great that he was merely a blind imitator of western patterns. This is not so. From Europe, Peter took that technical equipment which Russia entirely lacked, but while copying European models he always endeavoured to adapt them to Russian conditions, and his failures in this respect are largely due to the straits in which his country was during the war with Sweden. A great patron of foreigners, he nevertheless put Russians in every responsible post, foreigners, with few exceptions, being merely technical advisers. His admiration for Europe did not blind him to the fact that Russia was not European: witness a sentence in a letter to the Governor General of Astrakhan, written a year before his death—"We shall need Europe for another 20 years; then we can turn our back on her."

As with Ivan the Terrible, the demands of his foreign policy (in his case, a successful one) thwarted his efforts at internal reconstruction. Like Ivan, he too overestimated the resources of his people; and his untimely death put an end to the projects that might have corrected, or at least alleviated, mistakes committed under pressure of events. But, unlike Ivan, in his social reforms he showed no consideration for the traditions of the country.

Russia, at the end of Peter's reign, had become a great Power. Yet in making her great, he had unwillingly sown a seed—social discontent—which one day bore a harvest of revolution.

VI

PETER'S INHERITANCE

DURING the eighteenth century Russia continued to expand. In the west she reached her natural boundaries, uniting under the Russian Crown most of the Russian people.¹ She annexed large new territories in the south and consolidated her position on the Black Sea; her armies were victorious against Turk, Tartar, Pole, German (the Seven Years War) and Swede. Her importance in world politics grew steadily; she had developed her way into the family of European nations, among whom she now occupied a place of honour. The new capital, St. Petersburg, became a brilliant centre of arts and elegance.

Below the surface, however, all was not healthy. The chasm separating the new upper class from the bulk of the people was growing. The Europeanization of the former went hand in hand with the enslavement of the peasants to the landowners.

¹ The Galician and Carpathian Russians excepted.

The succession to the throne became a series of palace revolutions. "*Le trône russe n'est pas possessif, il est occupatif*," said Frederick II of Prussia.

Peter was succeeded by his second wife (Catherine I, 1725-1728) who was merely the figure-head for a powerful faction of high officials, supported by the Guards; then came a minor (Peter II, 1728-1730) his grandson, then his niece, Anne (1730-1740) daughter of Tzar Ivan V, called to the throne by another faction; again a minor, Ivan VI of Brunswick (1740-1741) grandson of Anne's sister. In 1741 Elizabeth, daughter of Peter, seized the throne, assisted by the Preobrazhensky. Aided by a succession of able favourites she reigned for twenty years (1741-1761), a period marked by the creation of the University of Moscow (1755) and the abolition of capital punishment except in cases of high treason.

Elizabeth was succeeded by her nephew Peter III of Holstein (1761-1762) a weak and dissolute foreigner. With the assistance of the Guards he was dethroned by his wife Catherine II the Great (1762-1796), a princess of German blood and a most remarkable woman. Extremely licentious in her private life, she ruled the country through her favourites, among whom were such outstanding statesmen as Panin, Potemkin, Orlov and Bezborodko. During her reign Russia's armies covered her name with glory; while New Russia (the territories between the Dnieper and the Dniester), the Crimea and part of Poland were annexed to the Russian Crown.

The Empress patronized art, science and learning. Continuing the reforms initiated by Peter the Great, Catherine pressed forward an intensive westernization of Russian institutions. At one time she contemplated establishing representative institutions, but the influence of Frederick the Great prevailed on her, and the plans were abandoned.

A law promulgated by her husband but put into force and developed by her—the emancipation of the nobility from compulsory service to the State—destroyed the last vestige of justice in the existing system of peasant serfdom. The peasant from now on became a slave, to be used or sold at his master's discretion. The institution of peasant serfdom was introduced into Little Russia, where until then it had hardly existed. When colonizing New Russia, Catherine granted enormous tracts of land to her favourites (or their protégés) accompanied by quotas of Crown peasants (until then freemen) whom the State regarded merely as material to be used at will, and naturally as serfs. During her reign, and that of her successor, over 4,000,000 peasants thus lost their freedom.

In these circumstances peasant risings became frequent and violent; one headed by Pugachev, who claimed to be Tzar Peter III, and wrote "freedom and land for the peasants" on his banners, was for a time successful over all the territories between the Urals, Kazan, the basins of the Volga and the Don. It was only suppressed by the use of considerable armed forces.

At the close of the eighteenth century Russia stood like a lonely giant in a world not a little fearful of her next move. The "Northern Bear" was becoming a concern to European chancelleries. Her stupendously rapid development, her enormous resources, the autocratic power of her Government and the seemingly blind obedience of her teeming population, all filled her neighbours with concern.

A definitely hostile tendency had already begun to make itself felt, when the advent of the French Revolution—which destroyed and shook so many thrones, swept away old institutions, and introduced a new era with the battle cry, "Liberté, Fraternité, Egalité"—forced monarchist Europe to seek an ally in Russia. Both sides—the Revolution and the old order—vied with each other to court Russia's good pleasure. Catherine decided in favour of the old order, even though throughout the century Russia and the French Monarchy, with the exception of the Seven Years War, had always been in opposite camps. Her erratic son, Paul I (1796–1801) at first followed her policy (Field-Marshal Suvorov in 1798–1799 drove the French from Italy), but afterwards allied himself with the French (1800). This cost him his throne and his life, as he was murdered by an anti-French faction of which his son and heir, Alexander I was the unconscious tool.

VII

ALEXANDER I

Foreign Policy

ALEXANDER, who succeeded to his murdered father's throne in 1801, was a very remarkable man—perhaps the most brilliant diplomat of his time. In the struggle against Napoleon's European policy of civic equality (under French tutelage), Alexander promulgated a scheme for a liberal federation of national states. In a striking document—his instructions for his Ambassador to Great Britain (1804)—he sketches such a federation, the first prototype of the League of Nations. As part of this plan, he envisaged the liberation of the Western and Southern Slavs from Austrian, German and Turkish domination, and the creation of a Slavonic federation with Russia as their protector. Greece and the Danubian principalities were included in the scheme. Representatives of this federation were to deal in Congress with all questions of international policy; the plan had as its chief aim, the preservation of peace.

The wars with Napoleon, however, were continually forcing Russia to ally herself with the Austrians and Prussians and naturally excluded that part of the scheme which concerned the Slavs under their sway. So far as concerned the Balkans, Alexander pursued his plans with energy; he succeeded in wresting the Ionian Islands from the Turks and in establishing a Russian protectorate over the Republic created there and also over Montenegro. Further, he succeeded in forcing the Turks to

grant the Danubian Principalities (Moldavia and Wallachia) an autonomous constitution. But by reason of Russia's life and death struggle with France, the Balkans naturally became relegated to the background.

Napoleon's victories over the allies which eliminated Austria and Prussia, brought Russia and France face to face. In East Prussia (1806-1807) for the first time both parties could appraise each other's resources and skill. Although the Russians were outnumbered, their stubborn fighting qualities induced Napoleon to seek an agreement with Alexander. The latter, abandoned by his Allies, felt that an agreement with Napoleon might offer a better opportunity for his scheme. As a result, by the Treaty of Tilsit (1807) the two Emperors "divided" Europe into two spheres of influence: Napoleon was to have a free hand westward of a line which followed the eastern frontiers of Prussia, of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw (created from the Prussian provinces of former Poland under French protectorate) and of Austria.¹ Alexander was to have a free hand east of this line—in the Balkans, the Black Sea, the Caucasus and in the eastern Baltic.

In the light of later political developments the Treaty of Tilsit held many advantages for Russia. Her interests in the East were unaffected and her prestige in Europe was enhanced. However, it also involved many disadvantages: *e. g.* Russia agreed to join Napoleon's Continental System, directed against Great Britain (which greatly affected Russian trade), and ceded the Ionian Islands to France (thus closing the southern Balkans to herself). But the most subtle offset was Russia's formal consent to the creation of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw under Napoleon's protectorate. This stole a leaf from Alexander's wreath, since he had to surrender to Napoleon the kudos of reconstitution of the Polish State, of which, there is no doubt, the Tzar had always been the champion. The Poles who until then had looked to him for their liberation, now transferred their allegiance to Napoleon. This was a blow to both Alexander's political scheme and his personal prestige.

The Polish question became a stumbling block which prevented a really sincere alliance between the two Emperors. The very fact that Napoleon had insisted on becoming overlord of Poland definitely disclosed his disbelief in a permanent arrangement with Russia; and by encouraging the Poles to demand the retrocession of the Lithuanian and Little Russian Provinces of the Polish Kingdom (annexed to Russia at the end of the eighteenth century), he threw away every chance of a lasting understanding with Alexander.

At last (1812), the situation reached a crisis, and war broke out. Russia was confronted by France and her eleven European allies (including Austria and Prussia—the two latter more or less unwillingly drawn into the struggle on Napoleon's side).

Napoleon invaded Russia at the head of an army of 600,000. After a series of the most stubborn battles in his career he succeeded in captur-

¹ In 1809 East Galicia—the district of Tarnopol—was ceded to Russia to maintain her neutrality during the Franco-Austrian War of 1809.

ing Moscow, which was burned by the inhabitants before they abandoned it. This event was characteristic and showed Napoleon that the Russians meant to fight to the bitter end. His efforts at concluding a peace with Alexander were unavailing: and the burning of Moscow marks the beginning of his end. Forced to retire from Russia, he ultimately deserted his army which melted away, perishing from wounds, hunger and cold. The last named, however, did not play so great a part in Napoleon's defeat as usually represented. Napoleon began his retreat from Moscow in September (long before the winter set in) after having failed in his attempts to break through the Russian army opposing his movement southward, which would have given him an opportunity of recuperating his heterogeneous army, which, at the time, was already on the point of disintegration.

The Russian victory of 1812 was followed by a coalition against Napoleon, in which the Tzar's armies played the most important part. Many contemporary Russian statesmen, however, deprecated Russia's share in the wars of 1813 and 1814 and considered that to "save" Europe at the cost of Russian blood and treasure would only profit Austria and Prussia. Later in the century these forebodings were justified.

After the battle of Waterloo a Congress met in Vienna (1815) to settle European affairs. Alexander went to Vienna, still hoping that he might push his Federation plan through, especially in view of the fact that the Allies' ultimate victory was principally due to Russia's share of the anti-French coalition.

But with the Napoleonic bugbear removed and its originator securely in British hands and on his way to St. Helena, the European Cabinets combined to thwart Alexander's plans—for now it was "Russian ambition" that they feared. Long before the opening of the Congress, London, Paris, and Vienna had agreed upon a common policy. Russia found herself isolated and Alexander's scheme of a European Federation definitely fell through. As regards the Polish¹ question the only doubtful concession he was able to get was the exchange of Galicia (returned to Austria) for the Grand Duchy of Warsaw (ceded to Russia). Under Metternich's influence and as an alternative to his scheme of federation the "Holy Alliance" was created, of which Russia, Austria and Prussia became the chief members. The other great Powers, France and Great Britain, never definitely joined it, although they occasionally participated in the congresses which it organized.

The Holy Alliance was very different in spirit from Alexander's original plan. It was a league of Christian States or rather Governments for the purpose of settling international conflicts and for preserving "law and order"; the latter aim soon caused it to assume a definitely counter-revolutionary character. So far as international relations were concerned the Alliance worked well: it succeeded in preventing wars between its members for almost forty years (till the Crimean War).

¹ The principal demand tabled by Russia was the reconstitution of the Polish Kingdom, united to Russia in the person of the Sovereign.

Domestic Policy

Alexander's liberal inclinations met with no less opposition in his own domains. At his accession to the throne he contemplated two main lines of reform: the political reorganization of the State, and the improvement of peasant conditions.

As a preparatory step towards the former end, the Senate was reorganized as the Supreme Court of the Empire; the old Collegia were abolished and Ministries created in their place, having at their head Ministers responsible to the Crown; a Council of Ministers under the chairmanship of the Sovereign dealt with all interdepartmental matters; a Council of Empire (of State) was created in order to improve the technique of legislation; in Alexander's mind, it was intended to become the Second Chamber of a representative legislature.

Two plans for the political reorganization of the State were elaborated under his orders: that of Speransky (later to become the codifier of Russian law), definitely under the influence of the French conception of a centralized state—and that of Novossiltzev, who drew his inspiration from the Constitution of the United States and offered a plan for a Russian Federation, with one Imperial and several Provincial Legislatures. The latter plan was favoured by Alexander, and steps were taken to carry it into effect. Representative constitutions were granted to Poland and Finland (annexed to Russia in 1809); Russia was divided into Governor-Generalships intended to become later provinces of the Russian Federation; and councils of bureaucrats and elected nobles were created in each Province, with the idea that they might ultimately become the second chambers of the provincial legislatures. The projected reforms, however, were never destined to become law; and at Alexander's death (1825) they were definitely shelved. They had proved impracticable, chiefly because of the several problems—mainly connected with the serf-status of the peasants—which they involved.

During the eighteenth century the peasants had literally become the slaves of the landowners; and with the exemption of the latter from compulsory service to the State every vestige of justification for serfdom had disappeared. In addition to this the landowners had gradually become the financial and police agents of the Government; for the collection of taxes, the providing of recruits for the army and the preservation of law and order were delegated to them. The landowners received the right to deport their refractory serfs to Siberia. They had been successful in having all limitations on their right of property revoked; *e. g.* in 1782 Catherine II had ceded to them the sub-soil rights and the right to fell ship timber (which until then, had been vested in the State).

The Emperor Paul was the first to introduce a measure somewhat alleviating the condition of the serfs—limiting the landowner's right of serf-labour to three days a week. Previous to this, Catherine had ordered a thorough investigation of the whole question—but for fear of opposition from the nobility, she had never dared to go further into the matter.

Alexander, supported by a small circle of friends imbued with liberal ideas, had in view a drastic reform of serfdom, although it is doubtful whether he ever seriously contemplated the complete abolition of that institution. He soon came to use his peasant-policy as a weapon against the opposition of the landowners to his general schemes.

In the beginning of Alexander's reign the Senate, the centre of aristocratic opposition, made an attempt to transform itself into a House of Nobility and to force the Government to grant it political privileges limiting the Imperial power. On one occasion, when a certain decree affected a privilege of the nobility, the Senate withdrew it from publication and the Government had some difficulty in dealing with the situation. This was a warning, for Alexander's liberalism was anything but aristocratic, and the general tendency of his policy was to diminish the privileges of a special class and to establish a better balance of power. Thus his series of measures issued in favour of the serfs were primarily intended to intimidate the landowners.

These measures consisted of a law enabling all classes (the serfs excepted) to own land, a privilege which previously was one confined to the nobility; of a law establishing the procedure of voluntary liberation of serfs with land, and of strict regulations to control any illegal practices (cruelty, exploitation, etc.) of the owners towards the serfs. In 1819 the Emperor actually liberated all the serfs in the Baltic provinces and in Finland. These measures showed the landowners that the Government could, if it wished, counterbalance their privileges by granting privileges to the peasants. The Government was not strong enough to push the reform further; it depended too much on the cooperation of the nobility with its administration to risk a definite breach.

The death of Alexander I in 1825 was the occasion of the so-called Decembrist rebellion, which it is usual to consider as the first act of the Russian Revolution that culminated in 1917; this point of view, however romantic, must be discarded. Neither in form nor in substance can one build any connection between the Decembrist plotters and the later revolutionaries. If it were logical to consider every anti-governmental movement as part of a single Russian revolutionary process, it would be necessary to look for the "first act" of the Revolution many centuries earlier. The history of Russia is peculiarly fecund—perhaps more so than that of any other country, in rebellions. The official Bolshevik historians are apt to claim that every rising against the Government, from mediaeval times onwards, was part of the class-struggle against Capitalism. In substance, the Decembrist plot was an aristocratic movement, whose chief actors were army officers and members of the nobility.

The reasons for the rising were manifold and disconnected: the very definite opposition of part of the nobility to a regime that had successfully limited their privileges through its peasant policy; the spread among a section of the officers of liberal and even radical ideas; discontent with the Government's apparent subservience to Metternich in Russia's foreign policy and with its refusal to launch itself into a war

with Turkey on account of the Greeks¹; the fears inspired by Alexander's Polonophile policy among the ultra-nationalist section of society, etc. The plotters formed two societies, the Southern and the Northern; and they hoped to make use of the discontent among the rank and file of the army to produce a successful *coup d'état*.

The army's discontent was chiefly due to the introduction, after 1815, of the so called Military Settlements (farms worked by soldiers and their families under military control) with the idea of making the army, or part of it, self supporting economically and for providing it with recruits. Towards the end of Alexander's reign one third of the army (ab. 200,000) had been settled in these militarized farms, where the farmer-soldiers were subjected to a detailed and severe discipline.

The Southern Society had a republican and the Northern a constitutional-monarchist character. Both contemplated the liberation of the serfs and a land reform. The connection between the two societies were weak, and no concerted plan of action had been pre-arranged.

What seemed a favourable moment for action offered itself after Alexander's death, because of the circumstances connected with the succession to the throne.

VIII

NICHOLAS I

The Decembrist Rebellion

ALEXANDER, who was childless, should have been succeeded by his brother, Grand Duke Constantine, the viceroy of Poland; the latter, however, was unwilling to assume the responsibilities of imperial power and renounced his claim with Alexander's consent in favour of his brother Nicholas. The necessary act was passed in 1823—but, for some reason kept secret. On Alexander's death, Nicholas did not immediately assume his rights and the delay occasioned by his correspondence with the Grand Duke Constantine (who firmly refused to alter his decision) gave the plotters their opportunity. Rumours of the arrest (and even murder) of the Grand Duke Constantine by his brother's agents were spread among the Guards on the days preceding their taking the oath to the new Tzar; and on December 26th, 1825, part of the garrison of St. Petersburg mutinied and assembled on the Senate Square calling for Constantine. However, the older Guards Regiments (famous for their participation in every *coup d'état* in the eighteenth century) remained loyal and deaf to the appeals of the rebels, who were easily dispersed without great bloodshed. Of the ringleaders a hundred and twenty were tried, and five—who had plotted the death of the Tzar—were executed; the rest received long terms of imprisonment and were deported to Siberia.

¹ The latter was untrue as the Government since 1823 had been preparing for such a war.

Russian literature has built a vivid romance around the figures of the Decembrists—some of whom, admittedly, were quite remarkable men. What struck the popular fancy at the moment was that all the plotters belonged to the highest class of society, many of them bearing the greatest names of Russia (the Princes Trubetzkoy, Galitzine, Rostovsky, Volkonsky, etc.); but it is certain that the rebellion had no popular support or character. It closely followed the old pattern of the *coups d'état* carried out by the Guards so successfully and so often in the preceding century. But the character of the Guards had changed, and the resources of the Government had greatly increased.

Domestic Policy

Emperor Nicholas I (1825–1855) was a man totally unlike his brother. A rigid disciplinarian, a lover of formality and of meticulous regularity, an admirer of Prussian methods, a firm believer in the divinity of the Sovereign's power and an avowed legitimist, he enjoyed neither his predecessor's popularity nor his international prestige. Unpopular with the army, distrustful of the nobility and with no real knowledge of affairs of state (for he had not been schooled to assume supreme authority), he governed Russia bureaucratically, never really delegating his power, or part of it, to anyone.

He had, however, many striking qualities: a great sense of duty, sincerity in his opinions and a love of justice; he also was an untiring worker.

He realized that affairs in the country were in a critical state and demanded immediate reforms. However, unlike his liberal brother, who was seeking for the cooperation of public opinion, Nicholas decided on a course of bureaucratic reforms; believing that regulation down to microscopic details of the work of the public services was the best way to discipline the country into order and prosperity.

Having successfully crushed the Decembrist rebellion and having on the whole shown a great deal of moderation in dealing with the culprits, he ordered an account of the projects of the plotters to be presented to him and carefully studied them.

One of the complaints of the Decembrists was the chaotic state of legislation and legal procedure. Nicholas appointed the veteran statesman Count Speransky to preside over a commission for legal reform. This published in 1832 the Russian Code of Law—the first since the days of Tzar Alexis.

Another of his measures, influenced by the study of the Decembrist projects, was the reorganization of the State Bank and a general reform of financial matters. This was carried out by Finance Minister Count Kankrin. The Government stabilized the currency by legal measures at the rate of $3\frac{1}{2}$ paper rubles for one gold ruble, and gradually exchanged the old notes for new paper currency at par with gold.

Towards the peasants Nicholas pursued the same policy as his brother and there is no doubt that he never abandoned the project of liberating

the serfs. This, however, was dictated not so much by moral or economic considerations as by his distrust of the landed nobility and by a desire to weaken their influence in the State.

The measures passed under his reign in favour of the peasants were: a law forbidding the sale of serfs without a sufficient amount of land, another prohibiting the separation of families by sale, and a series of new regulations favourable to the peasants as to the exploitation of serf labour. A committee was set up by the Tzar to prepare a law liberating the serfs. The work of this committee, however, was not completed at his death, and the reform was carried out by his son, Alexander II.

On the other hand, his administration was frankly based on the principle of a "police state"; and by his creation of the Corps of Gendarmes he greatly increased the political powers of the administration. The Gendarmes were empowered to investigate everything and everybody. The administrative powers delegated to the new institution were immense; and at the slightest indication, or even suspicion of "political untrustworthiness," the suspect was imprisoned or banished to Siberia.

The Tzar, who more or less distrusted everybody, had all matters, even of a very insignificant importance, referred to him in person. This created incredible complications of red tape, and the country, under his regime, soon became an immense camp of bureaucrats, chancelleries and police officers.

As a natural result of the burden of work thus thrust on the Tzar's shoulders, and the impossibility of dealing with it in any but the most formal way, there arose what Russia termed "the autocracy of a hundred thousand bureaucrats."

With all his love for "law and order" the Tzar did not go below the surface of things. So long as things looked well and were in accordance with the existing regulations, he did not bother to investigate them any further. This was applicable both to the army and to the civil services; and it led to widespread corruption. A flood of papers concealed the real state of affairs; and the ruthless suppression of opinion made it impossible for Nicholas to judge of matters in any more human way than by the official reports of his innumerable chancelleries.

The "Iron Tzar," as he was often called, saw the edifice which he had been building for thirty years crumble owing to the collapse of his foreign policy, in which his principles of legitimism had earned him the title of the "Gendarme of Europe."

Foreign Policy

In the first years of his reign Nicholas continued his brother's foreign policy: the war with Turkey (1828-1829), envisaged during the last years of the preceding reign, terminated by the peace of Adrianople, which established the independence of Greece and the autonomy of Serbia, Moldavia and Wallachia. The moderation of Nicholas' terms of peace greatly astonished Europe. But this astonishment was turned to apprehension by the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi (1833) when Russia and

Turkey concluded an alliance by which they declared the Black Sea closed to the navies of all other countries. In addition, Russia guaranteed the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, in exchange for a full recognition of her exclusive right to protect all Christians under Turkish rule. Turkey thus became in the eyes of the world a Russian vassal. Russia in return assisted the Sultan to emerge victorious from his struggle with his rebel vassal Machmed Ali, the Pasha of Egypt.

The treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi was an important victory of Russian diplomacy, but Nicholas' legitimist sympathies soon diverted his attentions to European affairs. In 1830 he decided to intervene in favour of the Bourbons in France and summoned the other members of the Holy Alliance to assist him in the task. The Polish Rebellion which broke out in the same year prevented the Tzar from sending his armies to France to crush the revolution.

The Polish Rebellion cannot be attributed to Nicholas' policy. Although a declared enemy of representative government he rigidly adhered to the letter of the Polish Constitution. The Poles had no real complaint about the regime; what they resented was the limitation of the privileges of the Polish minority in the lands annexed by Russia from Poland in the eighteenth century.

The Rebellion was suppressed (not without difficulty) and, as a result, the Polish Constitution was abrogated and the Polish army disbanded. The local administration still remained in Polish hands but the Government at Warsaw was made responsible to that in St. Petersburg and Poland was garrisoned with Russian troops. This unfortunate event which did not promote either Russian or Polish interests merely complicated the issue between the two countries.

In 1848 Nicholas I intervened in the Hungarian Revolt, which the Russian troops crushed. The country was given back to the Hapsburgs, Russia stipulating that none of the leaders of the revolt, who had surrendered to the Russian army, should suffer more than banishment. On the successful termination of the revolt Austria took up a position far from favourable to Russia. The Austrian Minister Prince Schwarzenberg is known to have said: "Austria will stagger the world by her ingratitude." This soon proved to be true.

After 1848, Franco-Russian relations, which had never been cordial since the fall of the Bourbons, reached a stage of crisis, which was not improved by Napoleon III's proclamation of the Second Empire. Moreover, in order to consolidate his throne Napoleon maintained an aggressive foreign policy. He succeeded in getting the Turks to confer on him the title of Protector of the Christians in the Holy Land, which by the treaties of 1774 and 1833 belonged to the Russian Crown. Russo-Turkish relations, not over cordial for the last decade, reached a breaking point and war was declared in 1853; France and Great Britain declared war on Turkey's side and later the weight of Sardinia was thrown into the same scale.

The Russian plan of campaign was to invade Turkey through the

Danubian Principalities. Accordingly, these were occupied by the Russian army. Simultaneously, the Turkish fleet was destroyed by the Russians at the naval battle of Sinopus. The war might have been ended in a few months, before the Allies could give Turkey their assistance.

It was at this moment that Austria acted. The Government of Vienna demanded the withdrawal of the Russian troops from the Principalities and threatened war. Prussia's attitude was unfriendly and Nicholas, thus abandoned by his "allies," saw no way out but to comply. The bulk of the Russian army was perforce retained on the western frontiers. This allowed the Turks and their allies to invade the Crimea and, after a siege, famous for the resistance of its garrison, to storm the fortress of Sebastopol. Russian victories in the Caucasus could not alter the position of affairs, as the Russian High Command did not risk moving any large body of reserves from the Western front to the Crimea.

In this contest with the French and British the Russian army was revealed as inferior in equipment, armament and tactics. Only the stoicism and valour of the troops prevented a disaster of greater magnitude.

Emperor Nicholas I died heart broken in the spring of 1855.

In 1856 the war was ended by the Treaty of Paris. In exchange for Sebastopol Russia had to abandon her conquests in the Caucasus, and to surrender the mouth of the Danube to the Turks. She agreed to maintain no navy and to dismantle her forts in the Black Sea. She was also compelled to abandon her claim to protect the Sultan's Christian subjects, whose rights were henceforth to be guaranteed by all the Great Powers.

IX

ALEXANDER II

THE death of the Emperor Nicholas I marked the collapse of his regime and cut out for his successor, Emperor Alexander II (1855-1881), an enormous task of reconstruction and reform. The structure of the State had given way everywhere: Nicholas' foreign policy, based on the traditions of the Holy Alliance, had proved futile, and those on whose gratitude Russia had every right to rely—Austria and Prussia—had turned against her in her hour of trial; the Russian military organization entrenched behind a brilliant façade of impeccable discipline and meticulous regulations, proved unequal to contesting the field against armies whose command had paid more attention to the progress of armaments, and whose supply and ordnance services were more efficient and honest; the innumerable army of bureaucrats, badly paid but provided with extensive powers of extortion, had shown itself a corrupt and inefficient body; the country, although dragooned into apparent blind obedience, proved apathetic in the crisis; recruiting for the army during the Crimean War was accompanied by bloody revolts; and there was a wide-

spread rejoicing at the difficulties of the day apparently in the hope that improvement must necessarily follow disaster.

Fortunately, Alexander II, unlike his father, was a man of a kindly and liberal disposition, moderate in his opinions and inheriting some of the more attractive qualities of his uncle Alexander I—yet very definitely a man of more character and resolution.

Domestic Reforms

His first reforms were dictated by the financial depression which followed the Crimean War. Laws were passed to encourage industrial, financial and trading companies and to implement an extensive programme of railway construction. These enabled the country in a very short time to rectify its finances.

The most pressing problem which confronted the Government was that of serfdom. Alexander had decided from the very beginning to emancipate the serfs. A great deal of preparatory work had been accomplished in the preceding reign, but whereas Nicholas had limited his efforts to bureaucratic investigation, Alexander appealed for collaboration to the nobility and the leading public men of the day. In 1857 the Emperor ordered the Governor-General of Vilna to organize Provincial Committees among the nobility of the Lithuanian provinces with a view to elaborating a plan of emancipation. The other provinces followed suit; a Central Committee in St. Petersburg and the Council of Empire—summing up the labours performed in the provinces—drafted a law which was promulgated by Imperial Manifesto on March 3, 1861.

The Act of Emancipation freed all serfs unconditionally; the land allotted to them was to be bought from the owners with the State's assistance. The Government issued emancipation bonds to the landowners for this purpose and collected corresponding sums from the peasants at the rate of 5% of the total cost yearly. The amount of land allotted to the peasants was roughly equal to that which they had previously held for their own use and was about one-half of the total acreage belonging to the landowners before the reform.

This reform unfortunately fell short of public expectations in many respects. In the first place the land allotted to the peasantry was not given to them individually but as common property. This was done to ensure payment for the newly granted land—a matter for which the communes were made collectively responsible. The peasants thus found themselves again subjected, as a class, to a special regime. The law at that time made no provision to enable individual peasants to leave the commune and become individual landowners, unless they abandoned their share of common land. This not only affected their economic freedom, but made them socially and legally dependent on the special institutions of the commune.

In addition, the peasants soon felt the pinch of poverty. While serfdom flourished, it was the duty and interest of the landowners to provide them with land or work; now the growing numbers of the peasantry

greatly increased the ranks of the landless or of those whose land-tenures could not suffice to keep body and soul together. It must be said in explanation that, previous to emancipation, the serfs were divided into two categories: house-serfs and land-serfs. The Emancipation Act granted land only to the second category, the first were set free with the idea that they would either provide hired labour for the estates or else be absorbed into industry. In practice this resulted in creating a class of landless peasants (the forerunners of the "poorest peasants" of today) who touched the depths of poverty.

The condition of the newly freed men compared very unfavourably with that of the State peasants who at the time of the emancipation, were very numerous indeed (about 50% of the whole peasant population¹). The reform left these in full possession of all the lands which they had been working and until the Revolution of 1917 there existed a very marked contrast between villages of former State peasants and former private peasants.

It would have been much wiser had the reform, instead of creating thousands of peasant communes created millions of farms, by allotting the land individually; this being supplemented by the creation of a fund to assist the peasants to buy more land out of the immense reserve of Crown lands. All this the Government of Nicholas II introduced, with remarkable results, some fifty years later after the first Russian Revolution (1905-1906). Unfortunately it was too late. The poverty and discontent among the peasants grew every year and served to increase the ranks of the discontented.

Nevertheless, despite its shortcomings, the reform was a very decided step forward. It was the first important item of Alexander's general scheme and completely changed the order of things in Russia.

Alexander's other important measures were the introduction of local self-government for the rural districts (the Zemstvos) and the towns (Municipalities) and reform of the judiciary, of the penal code and of the military service.

The Zemstvos, created by the Imperial ukaze of 1864, reestablished local self-government, and departed for the first time from the class basis by providing for the representation of every class on the Boards of the Zemstvos on a basis of equality.

The electors were divided into three curias: private landowners, peasant communes and townspeople. The Zemstvos had the right of limited taxation and were put in charge of education, roadbuilding, public health, and improvement schemes.

In 1870 the towns were similarly organized. Town Councils representing all classes of society replaced the old burgomasters with their boards appointed by the Crown.

Alexander's judicial reform of 1864 was no less important. Juries were introduced; the proceedings of all courts were greatly improved and

¹ In 1860 there were:—private peasants (men)—10,050,200 State peasants (men)—10,544,092. These figures are taken from the census of 1859.

made public; the judges were rendered independent of administrative interference and pressure, the new law making them irremovable except by process of law; the Russian bar was created, the penal code was revised and justice made equal for all classes of society—with the exception of the peasants, as special courts were created to deal with questions, other than criminal offences, affecting the last named. This was due, of course, to their special organization into communes.

The reform of military service (1874) was the last of the principal measures promulgated in Alexander's reign. The old system of long term service (25 years) for recruits impressed, by rota, from the communes was abandoned, as being too heavy a burden on the population and as providing practically no reserves. This system had obliged Russia to keep up a standing army which in peace-time had proved a most serious draw on her exchequer; and yet one which, in the case of a serious conflict like the Crimean War, had proved entirely insufficient even for strictly defensive purposes.

The new law introduced a system of conscription which provided for a short term of active service to be followed by several years in the reserve. It was drawn on democratic lines, calling to the colours all young men of 21 without distinction of class. Exemption was only granted to young men who were the only breadwinners of their families. The term of service was also shortened in the case of young men with a secondary education.

These reforms were accompanied by a series of minor ones tending to improve the social services. The censorship, which had stifled opinion under Nicholas, was greatly relaxed, and public opinion found a voice. This greatly facilitated the Government's effort to eradicate the corruption, red tape and inefficiency so prevalent in the preceding reign.

The Government encouraged education: it was during Alexander's reign that the education of the peasant masses started on a vast scale.

In domestic matters Alexander's reign was undoubtedly an age of great progress and constructive activity. The social order which he established endured till the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917.

Alexander's far-reaching policy, however, did not bring political peace to Russia. Not only did the Tzar have to face strong opposition to his views from both the conservative and radical sectors of society, but his life was constantly in danger; many attempts on it had been frustrated before the last proved fatal.

Conservative opposition came, of course, from the landed nobility—who, fearful of the Government's radicalism, clamoured for political rights that would enable *them* to control its policy.

The radical and revolutionary opposition came from the newly-formed *tiers etat*—the intelligentsia, a class of intellectuals recruited from every layer of society but centering chiefly in the Universities and the Press. As early as 1862 groups of Terrorists became active, and propaganda urging assassination of members of the Government and administration was widely disseminated. The revolutionary movement took very defi-

nite shape in the Polish Rebellion of 1863, which had to be crushed by armed force. As a result Poland lost the last remnants of autonomy, the very term *Kingdom of Poland* being changed to the *Governor-Generalship of the Vistula*. The land-tenure reform which the Russian Government subsequently carried out in Poland—on the lines of the Russian emancipation, insured the loyalty of the Polish peasants to the Russian Crown till the World War.

Revolutionary activities took a very sharp turn after the Turkish War (the War of Liberation, 1877–78) when all the terrorist activities were concentrated against the person of the Tzar. Previous to that, between 1870 and 1875, their propaganda had been directed without any marked success towards rousing the masses of the peasantry.

There is no doubt that the revolutionary activities were directed by two different elements: one was desirous of forcing the Government into further reforms of a more radical character; the other, fearing that the Government's liberalism would weaken the revolutionary spirit in the masses, attempted to force the Government by a succession of outrages to adopt repressive measures, which would alienate the moderate elements of society. In this they partly succeeded. The Government found itself between the devil and the deep sea. However, the Tzar remained faithful to his moderately liberal ideas: on the very day of his assassination (March 13, 1881) he signed a ukaze convening the so-called *Representative Committees* (of delegates of the *Zemstvos*, the Municipalities, etc.) to advise the Council of Empire. The plan of a Constitution had been drawn by Count Loris-Melikov, Minister of the Interior; who by introducing a representative regime and allying the moderate progressive elements with the Government, hoped to put a stop to revolutionary activity.

Foreign Policy

Alexander's foreign policy was inspired by the tragic events attending his accession. The Treaty of Paris had imposed on Russia obligations which limited her rights as a sovereign power in the Black Sea; and her Near Eastern policy of giving protection to the Balkan Slavs had received a definite check. In her Caucasian dominions the Moslems—not without Turkish assistance and emboldened by the defeat of the Russians—were in open revolt.

The Government first directed its attention to the Caucasus and the Middle East. The former had been nominally under Russian rule since the beginning of the century, when the last Georgian King voluntarily surrendered his dominions to Russia in order to protect it from devastation by Turkish and Persian raids. Russia held the lowlands, leaving the unruly mountain tribes more or less to their own devices, although she was continually compelled to make war on them. In the middle of the century the Moslems under Shamil rose en masse, and a Holy War threatened to reduce the Caucasus to ashes. The Government collected large reinforcements and decided to subdue the mountaineers. Towards

1860 the Caucasus, under its new viceroy Prince Bariatinsky, was entirely pacified and subject to full Russian control.

After 1847 the centre of Russian activities in the Middle East was the fortresses on the upper Ural river—Orenburg-Orsk. From there, Russian punitive expeditions were sent to retaliate against the continual raids of the Uzbeks of Khokand, the Bokharans and Khivans from the valleys of the Syr Daria and Amu Daria.

It soon became clear that only firm Russian occupation of these valleys would ensure the peaceful development of the Russian part of Turkestan, the Kirghiz steppes and Semirechie. The conquest of the Uzbek Khanate of Khokand was accomplished by 1865. Two years later the Khan of Bokhara, who had sent armies to assist the Uzbeks, had to acknowledge Russian suzerainty.

In the same decade Russia acquired large territories in the Far East. By the Treaty of Aygun (1860) and of Peking (1861) the Chinese relinquished to her, in return for Russian mediation with the British and French, the northern banks of the Amur, the region of the Ussuri, the Maritime Province with Vladivostok and the Northern half of the Island of Sakhalin.

The Russian successes in Asia did not fail to arouse great nervousness in Europe; particularly in Great Britain where public opinion became fearful for British interests in India. Russia's policy towards her new subjects and vassals on the borders of Afghanistan was very liberal and broadminded. Local institutions were allowed to continue; Russia played the part of tribal peace-maker; and Russian money and administration very rapidly promoted the welfare of the population, which had been groaning for decades under the despotic rule of its Khans. The fame and prestige of the "White Tzar" spread far beyond the borders of the Empire at a time when the Indian Mutiny had shown up the defects of British administration in India.

The British Government viewed with concern the growth of Russian popularity in Asia; and early in the sixties it entered into negotiations with the Government of St. Petersburg with a view to agreeing upon a line of demarcation and a neutral zone: Russia, it was suggested, was to keep the valley of the Amu Daria, while Afghanistan was to be included in the British zone of influence. The Khanates of Khiva and Bokhara were to be declared neutral. Russia, already holding Bokhara, could not agree to these terms. Besides, British participation in the Crimean War still rankled in the Russian mind and it was a popular belief that Russia's foreign difficulties were all due to the "Englishwoman's plots."¹

The Russian Government in those circumstances needed allies to counteract British opposition. The Government's attention was drawn to the United States, with whom cordial relations had existed since the days of the American Revolution. During the Crimean War the attitude of the United States had been friendly to Russia. American public opinion, concerning itself but little with the complications of the balance of power

¹ A reference, of course, to Queen Victoria.

in Europe, sympathized with Russia's championship of the Christian population of the Balkans against their Ottoman rulers.

During the American Civil War Russia, in her turn, adopted a friendly attitude towards the Government of Washington at a moment when British recognition of the Confederacy as a belligerent state was in the balance. A Russian fleet was sent to New York and another to San Francisco. Russia intimated that she would resist by force any attempts to interfere in her commerce with the United States and flatly refused to consider any scheme of joint European intervention in the war (at that time Napoleon III and the British Government were negotiating with other European Cabinets for a peaceful joint intervention in favour of the Confederates).

Desiring to demonstrate her friendship for the United States Russia sold to that Power all her American possessions (Alaska) in 1867 for the nominal sum of \$7,200,000.

However, her cordial relations with the United States in those days could not provide Russia's Eastern policy with a counterbalance to British and French opposition. Alexander took advantage of the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871) to abrogate the Treaty of Paris (with German sanction, given in return for Russia's assent to the creation of the German Empire). In the light of later developments, it is to be regretted that Russian moral support helped to create the German Empire. But a united Germany was essential for the moment and enabled Russia to regain her position in the East.

With his usual moderation Alexander II, having acquired what he desired in the Black Sea, was now prepared to come to an understanding with Great Britain in the Middle East. The two Governments guaranteed the neutrality of Afghanistan. Russia, in addition, declared her willingness to respect the independence of Khiva, provided the Khivans maintained peace. However, the latter continued their raids into Russian territory and in 1873 a Russian expedition under General Kaufmann took possession of the Khanate, part of which was annexed to Russia, while the rest acknowledged Russian suzerainty as a vassal state.

The War of Liberation

After 1870, grave complications arose in the Balkans. Turkish oppression of the Christian population of Bulgaria, Bosnia, Herzegovina and Macedonia reached unprecedented dimensions; and the ensuing massacres, of Bulgarians in particular, roused public indignation throughout the world. The same state of things prevailed in Armenia, where thousands of peaceful inhabitants fell before the fury of Turkish irregulars. The Great Powers which, after the Crimean War had undertaken to protect the Christian subjects of the Sultan, seemed, with the exception of Russia, to be unconcerned, and would not act. Gladstone, Britain's great liberal leader, alone urged intervention. Finally, a European conference was called. The Government of the Sultan, however, emboldened by an entire absence of concerted action and by the disaccord

that reigned between the European cabinets, paid no heed to counsels of moderation.

Events in the Balkans meanwhile took a turn for the worse. Serbia and Montenegro, where public opinion was clamouring against the massacres in Bosnia and Herzegovina, declared war on Turkey in 1876. Such was the popular feeling in Russia that on the outbreak of war thousands of Russian volunteers enlisted in the Serbian army. The disproportion of forces, however, was too great; and after many months of stubborn fighting the Turks had Serbia at their mercy. The European Conference again intervened with no success, and Serbia was only saved from annihilation by Russia declaring war on Turkey early in 1877. Russia was soon joined by Rumania, a vassal state of Turkey (formed by the union of Moldavia and Wallachia in 1859).

No war was ever more popular in Russia. A great feeling for their Slav brethren in the Balkans, who were also their brothers in faith, permeated every class of society. The people regarded the war as a crusade and called it the War of Liberation. The hardships of the campaign (undertaken when the Russian army was undergoing reorganization) and some severe reverses which the Russians suffered at the outset could not damp the general enthusiasm.

In the spring of 1878 the victorious Russians were at the gates of Constantinople when Great Britain and Austria intervened—in favour of Turkey. Threatened by new international complications which might lead to another war, Russia agreed to suspend her military operations without occupying Constantinople. A preliminary treaty was signed at San Stefano, which established the following regime for the Balkans:

Serbia was to receive Bosnia and Herzegovina and become an independent Kingdom; Turkey agreed to the creation of a Bulgarian principality consisting of Bulgaria proper, Macedonia and Eastern Rumelia; she was to return to Russia the mouth of the Danube and that part of Bessarabia lost under the Treaty of Paris; in addition Russia received the Provinces of Batum and Kars in the Caucasus. Armenia was to be granted an autonomous regime, and Russian troops were to occupy the country for 10 years to see that reforms were carried through.

In spite of the moderation that Russia showed in this agreement (she actually received only the Caucasian Provinces as new additions to her territory), the Treaty of San Stefano aroused tremendous opposition from Great Britain and Austria. Russia, to avoid further complications, saw herself forced to accept the insincere mediation of the German Chancellor Prince Bismarck and agreed to revise the San Stefano provisions. A European Conference was called at Berlin and the concerted efforts of the diplomatic coalition against Russia, of which Disraeli was the leading spirit, reduced the Russian victory to a diplomatic defeat.

The "sick man of Europe" was once more saved by the British, this time with Austrian and German support. The Treaty of Berlin gave Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria (nominally they remained provinces of Turkey) reduced the principality of Bulgaria by half, leaving Mace-

donia to Turkey and dividing the remainder into two vassal states—Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia—the latter receiving merely a form of autonomy under direct Turkish control; the Russian mandate over Armenia was cancelled, the Great Powers undertaking to see that the Armenians were granted the regime stipulated in the Treaty of San Stefano. This last never materialized, and for over thirty years the Turks were allowed a free hand in this unfortunate country.

The Treaty of Berlin created in the Balkans a state of affairs which was primarily responsible for the war of 1914. It created a *Serbia irredenta* (Bosnia and Herzegovina), led to estrangement and enmity between Serbia and Bulgaria over the Macedonian question; gave Austria (and through her, Germany) an unprecedented position in the Near East, which naturally led to tension with Russia; and, in general, created an atmosphere pregnant with hostilities. Russia did not lose materially, for she received all that was agreed upon by the Treaty of San Stefano; but the defeat of her truly liberal policy served, without any doubt, to concentrate the explosive matters which blew Europe up in 1914. After the Great War, Europe was forced to revert to the principles of San Stefano. But even now that which could have been a long established and consolidated order has not been reached: the Macedonian problem is still an obstacle to complete peace in the Balkans, and the tragic destinies of the people of Armenia will always be a blot on European and Christian honour.

X

ALEXANDER III

(1881–1894)

ALEXANDER III ascended the throne after his father had been tragically murdered. His political ideals resembled those of his grandfather Nicholas I; like the latter, he put all his belief in enlightened autocracy; he was an avowed enemy of liberalism for Russia and in his father's tragic end he saw not only a proof of its failure but a justification—nay, an imperative demand—for a reversal of policy.

His very first actions showed the young Tzar's intentions: one by one his father's most trusted councillors were honourably retired from public service, and only those who had definitely proved their conservative sympathies remained in office.

Alexander III selected his collaborators carefully from men who had trusted conservative opinions and whose character guaranteed implicit obedience, for the Tzar meant to rule personally—he would be his own Cabinet, his ministers being mere agents to carry out the Imperial wishes.

Alexander III was not popular with society and did not seek for popularity; he worked and lived within a very restricted circle of friends

and relations. As a private man he bore an impeccable character: straightforward, kindly, frank in his likes and dislikes, frugal and simple in his tastes. As a public man he was masterful but distrustful, brooking no contradiction, an untiring worker, always honouring his word and always firm in his decisions.

Domestic Policy

Alexander's domestic policy can easily be outlined; it consisted in strengthening the powers of the administration, weakening that of all institutions in which public opinion could be expressed and satisfying in every possible way the economic needs of his subjects.

With regard to the last item, he put into practice the most rigid economy, which began by reducing the civil list of the Imperial family; the Tzar himself saw to it that the members of his family and household set an example of cutting down expenses.

In a similar way the estimates for the army, navy and civil services were cut down considerably.

The economies in the Government expenditure enabled the Tzar to introduce a series of financial reforms which tended to ameliorate the condition of the peasantry: the poll-tax was abolished (1886); a law was passed to accelerate the legal transfer of the lands allotted to the peasants in 1861, and the payments due from them for these lands were greatly reduced; Crown lands were made available, for leasing or purchase, to the peasants on comprehensible and advantageous terms; and great stretches of Crown lands in Eastern Russia and Siberia were opened up for peasant emigration and settlement.

Labour legislation was first introduced in 1882 with the creation of an inspectorate of factories (in charge of health and life saving regulations), the regulation of working hours, and the limitation of female and juvenile labour.

Alexander's financial reforms prepared the way for the introduction of the gold standard, which was carried out in the first years of his successor's reign (1897).

He continued his father's policy of intensive railway building. Here the greatest event was the laying down of the Great Siberian Railway (1891)—an event of world-wide importance.

All these measures gave a great impetus to trade and industry, which flourished under a regime that hoped to stifle political and social discontent beneath a wave of prosperity.

The other features of Alexander's domestic policy were much less fortunate, and were dictated by his intense dislike for everything that breathed of liberalism.

The Zemstvos' powers were curtailed, and those of the Provincial Governors strengthened; for instance, the peasant communes were deprived of the right to elect their representatives to the Zemstvos. A new law (1890) gave them the right to elect a list of candidates from which the Governors were to select the members. New officials, the Land

Captains, were created; these were in charge of all peasant affairs and took the place of elected judges in the Peasants' Courts.

The administrative powers of the police were greatly increased in order to wage war against political "untrustworthiness." All persons suspected of antigovernmental tendencies were subjected to police supervision. An emergency state of *special ordinance* or of *siege* was frequently proclaimed in order to give the administration greater freedom of action.

Censorship, greatly slackened by Alexander II, was reintroduced in full force. The autonomy of the Universities was suspended, and a law (1884) subjected them to the direct control and administration of the Ministry of Education.

Every attempt at political organization was crushed with the utmost severity. As usual in such cases the zeal of the police often saw plots and worse, where there was merely youthful radical enthusiasm or justifiable discontent. The abuse to which this gave birth and the harsh treatment of political convicts and deportees found no redress.

Policy Towards National Minorities

Alexander III was the first ruler to introduce a definite system of Russification. This chiefly affected such countries as Poland, Finland and the Baltic provinces.

In the former the Russian language was introduced in all the schools, Government officials were obliged to use it exclusively and it became the official language of the courts. As a nation the Poles became "untrustworthy"; and the Polish middle class saw themselves debarred from public offices in their own country (no restrictions were applied to them outside the Polish provinces).

In Finland, although the Tzar respected the Finnish Constitution and never definitely suspended it, the Finnish Legislature was restricted in every way which the Government of St. Petersburg could devise. The Russian language, moreover, was introduced as the third legal language of the State (in addition to Swedish and Finnish) and Russians were appointed to all offices in the grant of the Government.

The measures of Russification in Finland had chiefly a petty and annoying character and only served to create a feeling of animosity between the two countries, without really serving the purpose for which they were designed. There existed, of course, a great number of anomalies: for instance, whereas Russians were required to produce a Finnish permit to enter Finland, the Finns could enter Russia without any such formality; Russian goods imported into Finland were dutiable but not Finnish goods imported into Russia; the Russian Government was spending a great deal of the taxpayers' money on Finland, yet the Finns did not participate in any expenditure of the Empire. All this could have been corrected by measures passed by the Government through the Legislature at Helsingfors, but Alexander preferred to pass them by Imperial ukaze, which aroused a great deal of discontent.

In the Baltic provinces he pursued a policy antagonistic to the German minority (the landowners); this, of course, could have gained him the sympathies of the local Lettish and Estonian population, had it not been accompanied by an attempt to Russify the latter also.

During his reign the Jews, who had never possessed the same rights as other citizens, had fresh disabilities imposed upon them.

The Jewish disabilities had a distinctly religious character; any Jew who became a Christian acquired every right of Russian citizenship. The restriction imposed on the Jews by Alexander III produced as a result, a great number of fictitious conversions to Christianity. At the same time a large number of Jews joined the revolutionary camp, from which as a general rule they had previously kept aloof.

Foreign Policy

The principle underlying Alexander's foreign policy was peace—in token of which he earned the surname of "Peacemaker" from his people.

During the thirteen years of Alexander's reign Russia was at peace with all her neighbours. This enabled the Government to devote all its attention to domestic affairs, particularly the finances and industry of the country.

Alexander avoided every kind of entanglement in foreign affairs, and he pursued this end with firmness throughout his reign without allowing his love of peace to be interpreted as weakness. This was chiefly responsible for the peaceful adjustment of the Kushka incident, which had almost brought Russia and Great Britain to loggerheads.

The incident occurred as a result of an Afghan raid into Russian territory: Subsequently Russian troops seized the strategic frontier fort of Kushka and made a punitive expedition into Afghanistan proper. The British Government, always nervous at every Russian move in Central Asia, demanded the immediate withdrawal of the Russian forces. Alexander's firm assurance that his troops would retire immediately after the payment of an indemnity by the Afghans, and his refusal to abandon Kushka, were accepted by the British Government, whose representations to Kabul served to settle the conflict without loss of time.

In a similar way, the Tzar's firmness in 1885 served to dispel a new Franco-German crisis. His intimation that Russia would view with disfavour any aggressive move on Germany's part cooled the belligerent spirit of Berlin.

A new departure in Russian foreign policy was the Franco-Russian *rapprochement*, which began, soon after this incident, by a French loan for Russian railway-building and for the development of industry. This was soon followed by a political agreement and in 1891 by a military understanding—preparatory steps towards the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1895.

The *entente* with the French was to serve as counterbalance to the Austro-German alliance which isolated Russia in the Near East. Alexander's idea was to stabilize the peace of Europe by international

political agreements. This explains why he renewed the alliance with Germany and Austria in 1884 (the last remnants of the Holy Alliance) for a period of three years. He had hoped to do more for the cause of European peace; but his death in 1894 left this task to his son, Emperor Nicholas II, on whose initiative the first Peace Conference at The Hague was called in 1899.

XI

NICHOLAS II

(1894-1917)

THE reign of the Emperor Nicholas II, last "Autocrat of all the Russias," is fully considered in other chapters of this book. The object of this one therefore, is merely to give a general sketch of his reign chiefly in connection with important events such as the Russian-Japanese War, the first Revolution (1905-1906), the Great War and the Revolution of 1917.

Nicholas II was a man of great personal charm, a scholar, a model husband and parent. Vastly more refined than his predecessor, he lacked his forcefulness and resolution and was easily influenced by his surroundings.

Unlike his father, too, he had no definite policy, either domestic or foreign. These, however, were determined for him, to some extent, by extraneous influences such as the international complications of the early twentieth century, which reacted unfavourably on Russian foreign relations and had very definite repercussions on domestic affairs. But it must be admitted that Nicholas II never showed himself adequately equipped to deal with difficulties, scarcely, if at all, greater than those which his father had surmounted.

The first years of the new reign saw little more than a continuation and development of the policy pursued by Alexander III.

Thus in 1897 the restoration of the gold standard by Witte, Minister of Finance, completed the series of financial reforms initiated fifteen years earlier. By 1900, too, the Great Siberian railway was completed,¹ an achievement which gave a great impetus to Russian trade in the Far East.

In her foreign relations Russia, while strengthening her entente with France, pursued a policy of general European pacification, which culminated in the famous Peace Conference of 1899 at The Hague. This meeting, suggested and promoted by Nicholas II, was convened with the view of terminating the race in armaments and setting up machinery for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. The results of the Conference were less important than expected because of the mutual

¹ Except for the section around Lake Baikal.

distrust existing between the Great Powers. Still there is no doubt it was the first step towards a better order in matters international.

During the Conference, if not earlier, it became apparent that the chief factor militating against Russia's peace enterprise was the Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria and Italy. The Russian Government was forced to the conclusion that unless a similar understanding were reached between Russia, France and Germany its efforts would be in vain. This view was powerfully urged by Witte, and under his influence a *modus vivendi* was elaborated, which provided for Austro-Russian cooperation in the Balkans (1897-1907).

Russian-Japanese War

Russia now turned her attention to the Far East. Here a new factor had appeared, in the shape of the new remodelled and vigorous Japan. At Germany's initiative Russia, together with France and Great Britain intervened in the Sino-Japanese War (1895). By depriving Japan of what she had fairly won, this inflamed a national resentment against Russia which meanwhile had concluded a treaty with China, whereby, in exchange for a loan, she received railway concessions in Manchuria and a lease of the Liaotung peninsula and Port Arthur; Great Britain at the same time occupied Wei-Hai-Wei (on the opposite side of the Yellow Sea) and Germany Kiaochao.

As a result of the growing friction between Russia and Japan, the latter opened hostilities against Port Arthur in January 1904, without any formal declaration of War.

Russia, in spite of the many warnings given her by the events of recent years, was caught absolutely unprepared. Her military forces in Manchuria consisted of only two army corps; the fortifications of Port Arthur were not yet completed and its garrison was not at full strength. The Russian fleet was far inferior to the Japanese, both in numbers and in technical equipment.

The war lasted for over eighteen months, and the Russians suffered an unbroken series of reverses. Port Arthur, blockaded by sea and besieged by land, fell to the Japanese after nine months of heroic resistance; the Russian armies were heavily defeated in two pitched battles, Laoyang and Mukden—her naval forces in Eastern waters were either immobilized or destroyed in detail—and the "Armada" dispatched from the Baltic under Admiral Rozhdestvensky was almost entirely annihilated at the battle of Tzushima (May, 1905).

It must be said that until the very last weeks of the war the Russian army, owing to the difficulties of transport, was inferior to the Japanese in numbers and equipment. When at last, in the summer of 1905, the Russian Command in the Far East was prepared to take the offensive, domestic events—the beginning of the first Revolution—forced the Russian Government to accept American mediation and conclude the Treaty of Portsmouth.

The Japanese War was highly unpopular in Russia. Her people did

not understand its aims and saw no reason for the sacrifices demanded of them. The military disasters added to this feeling of discontent. Revolution, smouldering under the surface, broke out sporadically in strikes, mobilization revolts and acts of terrorism.

The First Revolution

At the time of the Japanese war there were three revolutionary parties: The Workers' Socialist-Democratic Party (Marxian), the Socialist Revolutionary Party (of agrarian leanings) and the Constitutional Democratic Party (Cadets), the latter recruited from the liberal section of the intellectual classes. All these were then secret societies. The Workers' Socialist-Democratic Party is of particular interest, since it produced the present rulers of Russia. In 1903, at a Party congress in London the W. S. P. broke into two groups: the majority—who, led by Lenin, voted for a *guerre à outrance* against the Capitalist order in Russia—were subsequently called Bolsheviki (from the Russian *bolshe*—greater); the minority, under Plechanov, stood out for a programme of cooperation with the liberal-bourgeois elements of the country and were called Mensheviki (from the Russian *menshe*—fewer). The programmes of both parties were definitely under Marxian influence and their propaganda was addressed only to the factory workmen.

The Socialist Revolutionary Party, called itself a peasant party. It was a descendant of the Populist movement of the eighties and of the various Russian revolutionary groups which had been active in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Their programme was chiefly concerned with land reform, and their propaganda with the villages. Both parties had an important sprinkling of Jews in their membership; this was due to the limitations imposed on that race, which had forced a large number of them to leave the country. The revolutionaries found themselves, in consequence, assured of sympathy and financial support from international Jewish circles.

The Government had long known of the revolutionaries and their activity, but as the latter was chiefly directed from abroad, it had great difficulty in suppressing it.

In order to counteract the work of the revolutionaries the Government through its secret agents organized sections of workmen designed to promote a purely economic programme. This effort, however, culminated in disaster. On Jan. 22nd, 1905 (Bloody Sunday) several thousands of workmen, led by the priest Gapon and carrying ikons and national flags, marched to the Winter Palace with a petition for the Emperor. A good deal of mystery surrounds the whole event. The Tzar at that time was not in residence at the Palace, a fact of which the leaders of the demonstration could not have possibly been unaware. The workmen, however, were genuinely persuaded that they were on a peaceful errand. It is very likely that they were the dupes both of the revolutionary agents, who had penetrated their organizations, and of the Okhrana (Secret Police) which desired to bring matters to a head

in order to get a free hand. In any case, the Government used armed force to disperse the demonstrators, many of whom were killed. Horror and consternation gripped Russia at the news of this event, unprecedented in her history. It had a far-reaching effect on the working classes, who were won over to the revolutionary creed practically *en masse*.

After this disaster the organized revolutionary movement took a more decisive turn. A council of Workmen Deputies was formed in St. Petersburg with Trotzky-Bronstein as its leader. Strikes paralysed industry and communications, revolts broke out in the army—even in the Guards; and peasant risings, accompanied by the sacking and burning of private estates, daily increased the difficulties of the Government at a time when it was making desperate efforts to continue the war with Japan.

At last the Government saw it had been beaten: almost simultaneously it issued an Imperial Manifesto (Aug. 19, 1905) granting a constitution (which provided for a consultative Duma) and accepted American mediation in the conflict with Japan.

These concessions, however, came too late to satisfy public opinion, and the Government saw itself compelled to retreat further. On Oct. 30, 1905, an Imperial Manifesto was issued promising:

(1) fundamental public (civic) liberties: inviolability of the person, liberty of opinion, organization, speech and assembly.

(2) an electoral law on democratic lines.

(3) the enactment of all laws through the representative institutions.

In addition to this, a new method of selecting the Cabinet was instituted by the creation of a new office: that of the Prime Minister (President of Council of Ministers), to whom the appointment of his colleagues was henceforth to be entrusted, subject to Imperial consent. Count Witte became the first Prime Minister.

The Manifesto of Oct. 30th, 1905, was a decided step towards an understanding with the liberal elements of society. Unfortunately, Witte failed in his efforts to gain the confidence of the liberal opposition. The reason for his failure must be looked for in the history of Russian political parties. Forced to work underground, they had evolved a type of theoretical politician who had no opportunity of becoming a practical legislator or administrator. These parties, moreover, could not immediately forget the persecution to which they had been so recently subjected; and, in consequence, they distrusted the Government's sincerity. To that must be added the fact that the two Socialist parties were not disposed to abandon their revolutionary activities, which had as their aim the complete and sweeping overthrow of the Imperial regime. The bourgeois parties, too (of which the Octobrists¹ and the Cadets were the most important) could not at a moment's notice sever their connection with the more radical groups, with whom they had been previously allied in anti-governmental activities.

¹ Formed in November 1905, this Party comprised the more moderate (Monarchist) liberals.

The accusations of insincerity levelled at the Government were ill-founded. The majority of the first Duma was definitely hostile to the Government, yet the latter showed no intention of going back on its word. Even Count Witte's dismissal from office and the appointment of Goremykin (a bureaucrat of the old school), chosen for his reactionary sympathies, did not shake the Tzar's decision to seek an understanding with the Legislature. However, the Duma showed no more inclination to work with Goremykin than with Witte, and the Tzar saw himself once more compelled to change his Prime Minister. Accordingly Stolypin, Minister of the Interior in Goremykin's Cabinet, became head of the Government.

Stolypin

Stolypin was, perhaps, the only great Russian statesman since the days of Alexander II. To firmness of purpose, he joined great administrative ability, a moderately liberal mind, and deep foresight. There can be no doubt that if he had risen to power earlier, and remained longer at the head of the Government (he was assassinated in September 1911) the Revolution of 1917 might never have occurred.

At first Stolypin sought to cooperate with the Duma, but failed—in particular, over a project of land reform introduced by the Cadets and designed to expropriate practically all privately-owned estates in favour of the peasants. The Duma was dissolved. Stolypin, although urged both by his colleagues and by a considerable section of public opinion to alter the electoral law, firmly refused to take so drastic a step. He fell back on the prerogative of the Crown and in this manner initiated his celebrated land reform. The law abrogating the peasant communes was promulgated in November 1906. Each peasant was empowered to assume personal ownership of his share in the communal land. Simultaneously, the Peasants' Bank was empowered to finance the purchase of private estates for partitioning among the peasants; a vast scheme for the colonization of Siberia and Turkestan was launched and large areas of Crown lands were made available for purchase and settlements by peasants. This reform was followed by the abolition of all restrictions upon the civic status of the peasants; the payments for the communal lands—and their arrears, if any—were remitted; and the Government put forward a programme for the development and improvement of agriculture. As the result of this policy, by 1917 there were already over 1,500,000 peasant families settled on their own land.

Stolypin's experience with the second Duma (1907) was not more fortunate than with the first and after dissolving it he was reluctantly forced to alter the electoral law in favour of the more moderate elements of the electors (landowners, merchants and the middle class). There was a great deal of justification for this step, as cooperation with the Duma (as originally constituted) had proved impossible. The first Duma had even gone the length, after it had been dissolved by Imperial ukaze, of inciting the country to revolt against the Government. Moreover, its

projected legislation could only have proved acceptable to revolutionaries, and entirely disregarded the fundamental principles of the Constitution of 1905.

Stolypin's amended franchise proved an unfortunate necessity, as it still more alienated the liberal elements from the administration. However, the third Duma, with a moderately conservative majority, was responsible for legislation which greatly advanced the cause of peace and order in Russia.

Stolypin showed great firmness in suppressing terrorist activities. The courts-martial instituted to deal with cases of terrorist assassination passed about 3600 death sentences between 1906 and 1912. There is a tendency among ignorant or prejudiced historians to compare Stolypin's "White Terror" with the Bolshevik Terror. There is absolutely no ground for such a comparison. Stolypin's courts-martial dealt exclusively with murderers and their associates; they were never directed like the Bolshevik "terror" against a particular class, or against every person who might be in opposition to the existing regime.

His policy gave Russia internal peace and much improved standards of living and welfare. His agrarian reforms, which aimed at creating a prosperous farming community as a bulwark against revolution, at the same time, were designed to remedy the real grievances of the peasantry. Under his regime education, industry, and commerce acquired a new impetus. His cooperation with the third Duma was undoubtedly one of the most prosperous periods which Russia had seen for many decades past.

Curiously enough Stolypin, in spite of all he achieved, was not popular. The radicals feared and distrusted him; the conservatives were afraid of his advanced ideas; the Tzar, while reposing more trust in him than in most of his ministers, still tolerated him merely as a necessity. The revolutionaries, on the other hand, feared him for two main reasons: he had shown his unflinching determination to crush their terrorist activities, and his policy of reforms was greatly diminishing the chances of a successful revolution. Probably the second reason was the mainspring of the many attempts against his life. The final tragedy, however, is involved in a great deal of mystery for the murderer—a revolutionary—was proved to have been closely connected with the Okhrana.

Russia and the World War

The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908 by Austria, supported by Germany, was the first clear indication that a European crisis was approaching. It really marked the last stage in the race of armaments that began with the Treaty of Berlin (1878).

Europe was divided into two armed camps—the Triple Entente (Russia, France and Great Britain) and the Triple Alliance (Austria, Germany and Italy).

The policy of "armed peace," which could be better called a "policy

of menacing gestures" was bearing its fruit. In 1907 a second Peace Conference, convened at the suggestion of President Roosevelt, met at The Hague. Here Russia again proposed a general disarmament. This met the same fate as its predecessor—between Germany's uncompromising hostility, Britain's hesitation in choosing whether to support Germany or Russia, and, above all, the spirit of mutual distrust which permeated the conference.

The Agadir incident, the French occupation of Morocco, the Italo-Turkish War and the Balkan Wars of 1911 and 1912—all following in quick succession—created an atmosphere full of electricity. The assassination of Archduke Franz-Ferdinand at Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, was the spark that kindled the pyre.

The Austrian ultimatum to Serbia provoked Russian intervention: and in consequence the other European Governments saw themselves also compelled to enter the dispute. The efforts made by St. Petersburg, London and Paris on the side of peace met with no success.

Following Austria's attack on Serbia (July 28, 1914) Russia had no choice but to mobilize part of her army on the Austrian border. This was followed by a German ultimatum calling on Russia to stop her preparations within 24 hours (July 29, 1914). Immediately after this Germany and Russia both ordered a general mobilization (July 31, 1914). On August 1st Emperor Nicholas made a last effort to avert war by addressing himself personally to the Kaiser, but the same evening the German Ambassador informed Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister, that Germany had declared war on Russia.

Russia accepted the war with great enthusiasm. The country rallied unanimously to the Tzar's call; the Legislature in extraordinary session expressed itself entirely in agreement with the Government; the Zemstvos passed patriotic resolutions and formed themselves into a union for assisting the Government in supplying the army's needs; mobilization was carried out with unprecedented smoothness; and a general strike in progress in St. Petersburg stopped on the day war was declared.

Feeling ran high in favour of the Serbs, for whom so much Russian blood and efforts had been spent in the past. There is no doubt that if the Government had decided not to fight it would have been faced with a very ugly situation at home.

The Slavophil policy proclaimed by the Government soon after the opening of hostilities gave a new meaning and impetus to this feeling. Russia rejoiced at the intention therein declared, of giving extended autonomy to a united Poland, and of freeing the Slavonic nations under Hapsburg rule (Czechs, Slovaks, Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, etc.).

But under the surface, from the very beginning, there lurked grave dangers.

Russia's armaments were not complete. It is interesting to note that the Allies (Russia, France and Great Britain) had all three passed legislation, shortly before the War, regarding armament programmes

scheduled for completion by 1917. Of all the belligerents Germany alone had forestalled the rest, reaching the zenith of her war preparedness in the summer of 1914. But while this comparative unreadiness for war was a matter of the most serious concern for France and Great Britain, for Russia it was a tragedy, as her industry, unassisted, was incapable of supplying the demands of her army, while her geographical position made it extremely difficult for supplies from abroad to reach her in sufficient quantities.¹

However, Russia began the war in an optimistic spirit. With Great Britain and France as her allies it seemed quite likely that it would be over before the shortage of munitions and equipment could be seriously felt.

Operations started with an Austrian flank attack on the Russian army in Poland. At first the Russians, whose mobilization was much slower than that of their enemies, were forced to retreat; but the arrival of reinforcements allowed the Commander-in-Chief Grand Duke Nicholas, to pass to the offensive in the end of August and to inflict on the Austrians a serious defeat, as the result of which half Galicia was occupied by the Russian forces.

This first offensive against the Austrians was followed by another in October (the Ivangorod operation) which drove them out of southwestern Poland to take shelter behind the fortifications of Krakow.

Meanwhile, however, the news from the Western front was disappointing. The French had been unable to immobilize the Germans on their frontiers. The violation of Belgian neutrality, which finally brought Great Britain into the War, gave Germany the opportunity of effecting a wide encircling movement with her right wing, and so to threaten Paris. The French counter-offensive in the Vosges miscarried. In their hour of peril the French urged the Russian High Command to relieve the pressure on them by a diversion against the Germans. Owing to the personal intervention of Emperor Nicholas this was done. He ordered the Commander-in-Chief to send the 1st and 2nd Russian Armies into East Prussia. Accordingly these two Armies invaded East Prussia without proper preparations, and with the inevitable result that even before they could effect a junction the 2nd Army (under General Samsonov) was defeated in a three-day battle by Field Marshal von Hindenburg.

However, this Russian sacrifice (some 90,000 men) was not in vain. Alarmed by the Russian advance, the German High Command not only dispatched to East Prussia several reserve divisions intended for the Western front but was forced to withdraw several more from France. As a result the Germans could not extend their right wing sufficiently to envelop Paris—thus giving Joffre and Gallieni the chance of a new counter-offensive, which culminated in the German defeat at the Marne.

¹ There were only two ports available for the purpose—Arkhangelsk, frozen a great part of the winter and Vladivostok, with a single track railway some 12,000 klm. long linking it with the front.

It is thus apparent in the light of further developments that the Tzar's decision was farsighted and justified. It is to be regretted that Russia was not destined to profit by it, or even to obtain general recognition of the outstanding service she had rendered to the Allied cause at a critical moment—a service which, actually, decided the outcome of the War.

In their turn the Germans, immobilized in France but not hard-pressed by the Allies, decided to reverse their War Plan and to switch over their offensive to the more active front—the Russian.

The victory in East Prussia was followed by a concentration of German reserves in the East and a strong German offensive in Poland. The German advance had almost reached Warsaw, when, simultaneously with his drive against the Austrians further south, the Grand Duke counter-attacked (middle of October 1914) and after a week of severe fighting drove the Germans back to their frontiers. Further north the Germans were also heavily defeated in the forests of Avgustovo.

It was precisely at this period that the Russian armies began to experience a shortage of munitions and arms. However, the Allied command in the West, still incapable of active operations on a large scale, and fearful of a renewed German offensive in France, insisted that Russia continue her operations against the Germans.

The Russian G. H. Q. very reluctantly agreed, though at that time the Russian army needed a respite very much more than her Allies.

During the winter of 1914–1915 Germany continuously increased her armies on the Russian front. Two thirds of the Austro-Hungarian army were there. It must also be remembered that Turkey declared war on Russia in October, 1914, and that part of the Russian army had to be diverted to the Caucasus and later to Kurdistan and Persia.

The continuation of the Russian offensive after the battles of Ivan-gorod, Warsaw and Avgustovo in November 1914 did not bring any material success and, as on the Western front, the opposing sides dug themselves in. Russia's one chance of success lay in a speedy termination of the War, for her industries were inadequate to supply the necessary munitions, and in the placing of munition orders abroad she had not received from her more fortunate Allies any special privileges—or even that equal share to which her efforts and losses fully entitled her.

Severe fighting continued on the Russian front throughout the winter of 1914–1915. Early in the following spring the Central Powers launched their offensive on the Eastern front. They had an overwhelming superiority in material, and a considerable preponderance in forces.

The entry of Italy into the War on the side of the Allies had not altered the latter factor appreciably, as the Austrians were able for a time to hold the passes in the frontier mountains without diverting any considerable forces from the East. Nor did the abortive Allied attack on the Dardanelles divert any Austro-German forces from the Russian front.

The attack came at a moment when the Russian munition crisis was at its most acute stage. In the summer of 1915, about 39 percent of the Russian soldiers were *unarmed*. Under those conditions the German advance became almost a contest between high explosive and the bayonet—a contest to which there could only be one outcome. By the end of the summer the Russian army had fallen back to the line Riga-Dvinsk-Pinsk-Tarnopol-Chernovtzy.

The whole brunt of the 1915 campaign, it may be noted, was borne by Russia almost unsupported, as her allies in the West were unable to give her any such effective assistance as she had them in 1914.

The Russian retreat of 1915 had grave domestic repercussions. Popular opinion accused the Government in general and the War Office in particular of gross inefficiency and held them entirely responsible for the unprepared state of the Russian army. This, while partly true, was yet a gross distortion of the facts. However, the Duma constituted itself the champion of public discontent; and its majority, organized into the so-called progressive block (Cadets and Octobrists, as well as some other moderate groups), demanded the appointment of a "responsible Cabinet" enjoying the confidence of the country—by which term was meant a Cabinet responsible to the Legislature and not to the Crown.

The majority of the higher Army Commanders (including the Grand Duke Nicholas), the Zemstvos and the greater part of the general public sided with the Duma. The Tzar, on the other hand, very much under his wife's influence and of that of the Court and reactionary circles, would not yield to these demands; the Duma was only assembled for very short periods, and effectively muzzled. Goremykin, whose antagonism to the representative bodies was well known, was again appointed Prime Minister. To block any interference with the conduct of the War, the Tzar ultimately took the decision to assume the command of his armies in person.

This step was the greatest mistake of his reign. It was designed to revive patriotism and confidence and to put an end to the rumours that certain elements surrounding the Tzar were contemplating a separate peace with the enemy.¹ In practice, however, the actual conduct of military operations naturally passed to the Tzar's Chief-of-Staff, General Alexeyev, one of the most remarkable soldiers of the War, but much less popular in the Army than the Grand Duke Nicholas; while the Tzar's nominal command was assumed at a time when the position of the Russian army was at its worst, so that public opinion made him responsible for subsequent reverses. The Emperor's long absences at G. H. Q. from his capital and seat of Government also had a bad effect; for in his absence affairs of primary importance were referred to the Empress—and her well-known dislike of the Duma (in which she saw merely an institution limiting her husband's authority) and her opposition to every attempt at conciliating public opinion by concessions, led

¹ These rumours were absolutely unfounded; throughout the War and until his tragic death Nicholas II was rigidly loyal to the Allies.

to a complete lack of confidence in Russia's rulers. The frequent changes of ministers, the manifest determination not to let the great public bodies have any share in the conduct of the War, and the Government's failure to do more to alleviate public suffering created a general atmosphere of distrust and gloom.

It was in such troubled circumstances that the campaign of 1916 began. During the preceding year Russian industry had done great things, and it was now able to provide about 50 percent of the material needed for the Army. Foreign munitions were coming in through Arkhangelsk, Vladivostok and the newly built port of Murmansk (in the Arctic Ocean). The Russian army found itself, for the first time since the beginning of hostilities, almost as well equipped as the enemy. In 1916, moreover, the Allied operations acquired a more concerted character than previously, and Russia could expect better cooperation from the West than she had experienced in the previous eighteen months.

The first Russian operations of 1916 were not successful—an offensive against the Germans in the centre, timed to coincide with an offensive in the West, failed owing to the weather, which made it impossible to follow up the advance of the troops. It ended by the Russians seizing and keeping the first lines of the German defenses.

At the same time the Austro-German Command, not counting on Russia's speedy recovery after the reverses of 1915, had planned to crush Italy. It was to relieve the latter Power that Brussilov began his celebrated offensive in May 1916. It was entirely successful; the Russians broke through the Austrian lines in many places and compelled them to beat a hurried and disorderly retreat. After only a few weeks of fighting the enemy had lost over half a million prisoners and practically all their artillery. Eastern Galicia was re-occupied and the enemy was also expelled from part of the Russian territory.

It was at this time that Rumania, very much against Russian wishes and chiefly under French pressure, entered the War on the side of the Allies.

It was well known to the Russian High Command that the Rumanians were in no way prepared, and it was feared that Rumanian intervention would merely mean a drain on Russian resources. Unfortunately these views proved only too well founded. The Rumanians were unable to resist the Austro-German attack and the Russian High Command found itself forced to send over ten army corps to their assistance. The 1916 campaign ended by the German occupation of the whole of Rumania.

It must be said that for the Germans the defeat of Rumania proved a Pyrrhic victory, which drained most of their reserves in men; henceforth their decline began, and from this point of view the French insistence upon Rumania's entry into the War was justified. Nevertheless, while facilitating the ultimate defeat of Germany, it also precipitated Russia's collapse.

This ineffective ending of the 1916 campaign produced a bad impression on public opinion. Again, it was felt, Russian lives had been

squandered in an effort to assist the Allies with no adequate efforts on their part (the Allied offensives in the West had not been successful, nor had they caused the withdrawal of any German forces from the Eastern front).

Moreover, Russia's internal difficulties were growing; there was a shortage of food in the larger cities, and a general shortage of labour (Russia had mobilized over 15,000,000 men); the relations between the Government and the Duma were becoming more and more strained; society was full of rumours, grossly exaggerated or utterly untrue, about court intrigues. Among these was the persistent rumour of Rasputin's influence, through the Empress, on affairs of State—an influence which, it was hinted, made him the real ruler of the country. As he was suspected of being a German agent, or at least, of holding pro-German views, the disquieting effect of such rumours can easily be imagined.

Rasputin, an obscure peasant who possessed great hypnotic power, had undoubtedly gained a considerable ascendancy over the Empress, chiefly through being able to alleviate the sufferings of her son the Tzarevitch Alexis, heir to the throne, who was afflicted with haemophilia. Through this influence he was able to procure some favours from the Court, and people in high position often sought his friendship. Moreover a group, chiefly composed of society women, regarded him as a prophet, and even a saint; this to the St. Petersburg public—who well knew the Empress's fervently devotional character—was additional proof of his omnipotence. Another section of society accused Rasputin of immoral relations with female devotees. Rasputin, owing to the high tension of the time, acquired an exaggerated importance and his murder by a well known scion of the nobility (with the complicity of a Grand Duke and a conservative member of the Duma) only served to strengthen the impression of his importance and to justify the wildest rumours about the influence he exercised over affairs of State.

At the end of 1916, the Empress's participation in State affairs was publicly criticized in the Duma—which was at once prorogued. At the same time a plot to depose the Emperor was discovered. Disaffection had gone so far that some members of the Imperial family were implicated in this together with members of society, men in high official positions and officers of the Guards. So startling was the list of plotters that the Government did not dare publish it; the persons implicated were sent to the Front or forbidden to reside in the capital.

On March 19, 1917, the Emperor at the G. H. Q. received a telegram advising him of food disorders in St. Petersburg. At that time no one imagined that these disorders would take a revolutionary turn and lead to the overthrow of the Russian throne. Headquarters were busily engaged in the preparation of a Russian offensive—to start early in the spring in conjunction with a general offensive in the West, which it was hoped would end the War by the autumn. The equipment and supplies at the disposal of the Russian army were better than ever before. There were more men ready to fight.

The Revolution of March 1917 dashed all these hopes, Russian and Allied, to the ground.

Revolution of March 1917

The first news of the St. Petersburg food riots received by the Imperial Headquarters at Moghilev did not alarm anybody. The Tzar left the authorities in St. Petersburg to deal with the situation. The following days, however, brought more alarming information; Rodzianko, President of the Duma, informed General Alexeyev that anarchy was gaining ground and that only the appointment of a responsible Cabinet could pacify the country. The Grand Duke Michael (brother of the Tzar) and Prince Galitzine, Prime Minister, telegraphed to the same effect. In fact only one alternative presented itself—that of using force to crush the movement. But the troops in the capital were unreliable. They consisted of raw recruits, and a large proportion were mobilized workmen from the capital's factories; the latter were known to hold revolutionary sympathies.

The Tzar, although loath to yield to the popular demand for a responsible Cabinet, yet adopted no measures to crush the revolt, then confined to the capital. Under these conditions the Government, and the military and civil authorities in St. Petersburg, soon found themselves unequal to the task of keeping order. The mob was left to its own devices. Until the evening of the 12th, the Duma hesitated to break with the falling regime and merely formed an Emergency Committee, composed of several Liberals and Conservatives, and one Socialist (Kerensky) to watch over the situation.

Simultaneously with the formation of the Duma's Emergency Committee, a Soviet (Council) of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies was formed. Tcheidze, a Socialist Democrat and a member of the Duma, was elected its chairman; the Soviet peremptorily demanded the Emperor's abdication.

On March 13th, when concessions and wise measures might have still saved the situation, the Tzar left G. H. Q. for Tzarskoe Selo (a suburban Imperial residence) thus cutting himself off from contact with events. No definite instructions were given to General Alexeyev, who temporarily assumed command.

The Tzar was unable to reach his destination. On the 14th he arrived at Pskov, the Headquarters of General Ruzsky (commander of the Northern Front). Here he was met by two representatives of the Duma Committee. These explained the situation in the capital, informed him that the Duma had assumed supreme authority on the 13th and demanded his abdication. The Tzar, with no one to advise him, and anxious for the fate of his country, capitulated; he abdicated in favour of his brother, the Grand Duke Michael, and appointed Prince Lvov (President of the Union of Zemstvos) Prime Minister and the Grand Duke Nicholas Commander-in-Chief. He was then taken to Tzarskoe Selo, virtually a prisoner.

The Tzar's abdication was the final signal for the complete collapse of the regime. It is a tragic fact that on the day of his fall Nicholas II found himself friendless and without supporters. His relatives, ministers, generals, administrators and courtiers, with very few exceptions, had yielded to the Revolution even before his abdication. Russia accepted the event as marking the decadence of the age-old principle of Imperial Power; the refusal of the Grand Duke Michael to accept the Crown finally shattered the people's deep-rooted faith in the Monarchy. . . .

This sudden acceptance of the Revolution by Russia should not be ascribed to any feeling of disloyalty, especially on the part of those who were closely allied to the regime. Disillusionment ran high as the consequence of truly startling mismanagement, which had proved the whole administration to be hesitating and incapable. Nor would it be fair to lay the whole blame on Nicholas II personally. Like Louis XVI he became the scapegoat for wrongs done before his time, and fell as the result of events which he neither caused nor controlled.

The fate of the Emperor and his family was a tragic one. Removed by the Provisional Government to Tobolsk, they were transferred by the Soviet Government to Ekaterinburg in July 1918. There, on instructions from Moscow, they were foully murdered on the night of July 18. During their last months of life, the Imperial family set a fine example of Christian fortitude and humility. The last of Russia's Autocrats went to his grave a martyr.

XII

THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

THE Provisional Government of Prince Lvov was composed of members of the Duma, of liberal and even conservative (Monarchist) opinions. It contained only one Socialist Minister—Kerensky, destined to play so prominent and inglorious a part in the next ten months.

From the very first the new Cabinet was forced to compromise with the power of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. No such obligation lay with the Council. A characteristic clash happened on the very first day of the new regime.

The Provisional Government issued a decree announcing an amnesty to political prisoners (most of whom had been already liberated by the revolutionary mob, together with criminals of all descriptions); the restoration of civic liberties (freedom of speech, assemblies etc.); the abolition of all class distinctions, privileges and limitations; the convening of a Constituent Assembly at the earliest possible opportunity to decide upon the form of Government and the new constitution of the country; and the institution of universal suffrage. In addition, under pressure from the Soviet, *it promised not to send the troops that had taken part in the overthrow of the old regime to the Front, abolished the*

old police and instituted a special Committee to prosecute members of the former Government and administration.¹ It also proclaimed its determination to honour Russia's obligations to the Allies and to continue the war to a victorious end.

The same day the Soviet, without even consulting or informing the Government, issued its celebrated "order No. 1," the instrument responsible for the complete subsequent disintegration of the Russian army. This established Soldiers' Soviets for every military unit; abolished the commanders' disciplinary prerogatives; ordered the Soviets to exercise political control over the commanders; warned the rank and file to obey no orders, even from the Government, unless sanctioned by the Soviet; and gave the soldiers a right to demand the dismissal of any commander.

It was apparent from the very beginning, that the Provisional Government had no real authority. If the Soviets did not seize power immediately, it is because they still were not sure of the troops at the Front, and were apprehensive of disclosing their real aims for fear that the more moderate elements of society would organize and crush them.

The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies of St. Petersburg, consisting of some 2,500 members, elected haphazard from the factories and military units of the capital, was entirely under Socialist control. The majority consisted of Socialist Revolutionaries; next came the Socialist Democrats, a divided party: the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks—the former led by Lenin and Trotzky, who had arrived from abroad with German connivance. The Bolsheviks were in so hopeless a minority that during the first few months after the Revolution their presence aroused no uneasiness in official or political circles. But they soon became, owing to their untiring activity and uncompromising policy, the champions of Soviet authority against that of the Provisional Government.

Stimulated by St. Petersburg's example, Soviets arose all over the country, becoming daily more numerous and more powerful.

The Provisional Government will always occupy a lamentable and undignified place in Russian history. Consisting, with very few exceptions, of political theorists, it never succeeded in dominating the situation. Instead of acting, it talked. The few measures which it enacted passed unnoticed among the flood of proclamations, speeches, and eloquent appeals to the people which it poured forth. To a nation accustomed to an autocratic Government all this spoke eloquently of weakness and very soon the masses went completely out of hand.

It must be said in extenuation that the difficulties facing the Provisional Government were very great, and that the domestic troubles were intensified by the hardships of war. The Government, yielding to the revolutionary storm, threw away all chance of cooperation with the servants of the old administration, the corps of officers in particular, on

¹ It is curious to note that of the many people examined by the Commission not one was found guilty.

the ground that such were suspected of Monarchist sympathies. This was a grave mistake. The officers' corps, for example, had greatly changed and was now recruited from all classes of society, the only qualification for an Army commission being education—the greater majority of the corps remained unflinchingly loyal to the National cause, in spite of all the indignities they suffered at the hands of the revolutionaries. Much the same can be said about the civil services.

In the course of time the Provisional Government underwent a series of purges, the bourgeois members being gradually replaced by Socialists. Prince Lvov, a man of no real ability, very soon retired from active politics and was replaced by Kerensky. Unfortunately, Kerensky, although posing as a revolutionary leader, was no more than a puppet, completely at the mercy of events. His plans of a democratic reorganization of the army, and a general Russian offensive that would establish the Government's prestige, failed miserably. The lamentable result of the "Kerensky offensive" in Galicia (July 1917), and the subsequent rout of the Russian forces on every sector of the Front, exhausted the hope and courage even of those who had hitherto kept a stout heart in the thick of the storm.

The ever-increasing power of the Soviets was clearly demonstrated at their first Congress (July 1917).¹ This took place in the teeth of the Government's opposition for the elections for the Constituent Assembly were impending. The Government rightly feared that the latter's prerogatives would be usurped, but it was not strong enough to forbid the Congress, which as a demonstration was entirely successful. The Soviets in the eyes of the nation became the fountain-head of revolutionary activity and inspiration.

It is true that the Government succeeded (August 1st) in suppressing a Bolshevik rising in St. Petersburg, and that after the Galician disaster it attempted to reinstate discipline into the army and to stem the flood of Bolshevik propaganda at the Front. The reintroduction, for this purpose, of capital punishment produced an immense impression, and the High Command saw its authority, for a few weeks, actually upheld by the Government. A new Commander-in-Chief—General Kornilov—was appointed with exceptional powers in military matters and with the Government's authority to reestablish discipline at all costs.

Unfortunately Kerensky—whom Russia had aptly nicknamed the "Persuader-General"—soon became fearful of Kornilov's growing popularity, which manifested itself clearly at an all-party conference at Moscow in August 1917, where the Commander-in-Chief's appeal for measures of greater severity and a firmer regime produced a great impression. From that day on Kerensky started the complicated game of playing off the Soviets against Kornilov, and the latter against the Soviets. Things came to a head, when Kornilov attempted and failed (September 1917) to suppress the Soviets and set up a military dic-

¹ Of some 600 members, 105 were Bolsheviks.

tatorship in St. Petersburg. It is said that Kerensky originally agreed to the plan, but withdrew his consent at the crucial moment. General Krymov, who was in command of the troops to be used for the seizure of the capital, committed suicide; Kornilov and his immediate colleagues were arrested; and Kerensky appointed himself Commander-in-Chief.

Whether Kerensky double-crossed Kornilov or not, his position with the Soviets was not improved. The Bolsheviks, the real power behind the Soviets, made capital of the incident, which was the last effort on the part of the forces of law and order to turn the tide of the approaching social upheaval—and as a result the Government lost any prestige it still possessed.

Meanwhile, the disintegration of the army continued with alarming rapidity (there were over 1,000,000 deserters in September 1917); the financial position of the country was catastrophic, prices had risen enormously; supplies were running short; transport was utterly disorganized; the peasants, forestalling the legal expropriation of private estates, were dividing land and destroying property; and industry was becoming paralyzed by the complete collapse of labour discipline.

It was in these conditions that the elections for the Constituent Assembly took place: and, owing to the intrigues of the Soviets—who had, unbidden, taken charge of proceedings—they gave a tremendous majority to the Socialist parties (the Bolsheviks still being inferior to any other Socialist group). The first meeting of the Assembly was appointed for December 12, 1917.

In view of this the Bolsheviks called a second Congress of Soviets for November 7 and prepared for a *coup d'état* on that date. This time their plans entirely succeeded.

With incomprehensible blindness Kerensky allowed the Bolsheviks to prepare their blow unmolested. On November 7th ¹ pro-Bolshevik troops in St. Petersburg occupied public buildings and put up posters proclaiming immediate negotiations for peace, expropriation of private estates, control of industry by the workers, and the establishment of a Soviet system of Government.

Too late, Kerensky decided to act—or rather to speak about the necessity for action. He then fled from St. Petersburg on the plea of collecting troops for use against the rebels, leaving his colleagues to resist as well as they could. As the garrison had gone over to the Bolsheviks, and the only loyal troops at the disposal of the Government were feeble detachments from the Military schools, there was practically no resistance. The members of the Government ran for cover and Lenin, returned from Finland (where he had been hiding since the abortive rising of August 1st), became President of the Council of People's Commissars.

The Soviet era dawned over Russia.

¹ October 25th old style.

XIII

THE COMMUNISTS IN POWER

The Constituent Assembly

DESPITE many portents, the Bolshevik Revolution came on the whole as a complete surprise to Russia. The country regarded the October ¹ events as a mere episode. It is safe to say that the Communists themselves, with the doubtful exception of Lenin, did not imagine their luck could last.

But everything conspired to favour the new Government and its allies. The agents of the Provisional Government offered no resistance, either in the capital or the provinces; the army at the Front, faced by a foreign foe, could not intervene and was, in fact, being fast disintegrated by propaganda; while the workmen, the reserve troops and the peasantry showed, on the whole, sympathy with the new regime—whose slogan “peace and land” and promises of far-fetching Socialist reforms did a lot to attract popularity. Moscow alone stood out against the usurpers; and its streets for over a week resembled battlefields. However, the Reds triumphed.

But even now the new rulers could not feel secure; it must be noted that the Constituent Assembly elections had already taken place, and had given an overwhelming majority to the Social-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks. The Communists had no illusions as to their fate in the event of the Constituent Assembly establishing its authority over the country; and in this they did no more than share the country's own conviction.

The Assembly, however, proved a clay-footed idol. On January 18, 1918, after a single sitting it was dispersed without resistance at the order of the Government.

This was a terrible blow to the more moderate parties. The Bolshevik slogan of “peace and land” exactly met the aspirations of the peasantry; they had had enough of fighting and deserted in huge numbers, hurrying home to be in time for the promised division of land. The workers were openly in sympathy with the Bolsheviks. This left the intelligentsia and property-owning classes alone in the field against Bolshevism.

The Civil War that broke out in 1918 was not occasioned by any indignation on the account of the Reds' high-handed action; it was the result of two factors that had little in common—the aversion of the intellectuals (the officers in particular) to Bolshevism, and the forces of national separatism. The vacillating policy pursued by the Provisional Government since March 1917, had greatly loosened the links uniting

¹ The Revolution took place on October 25, 1917 *old style* (according to the Greek calendar) corresponding to November 7th. The term “October Revolution” has become synonymous with the Bolshevik Revolution, in spite of the change of calendar effected by the Communists.

the country into one body: separatism was making headway in the Ukraine and the Cossack lands, to say nothing of those parts of the Empire inhabited by non-Russians—such as Estonia, Latvia, Finland, etc.

Those who were adverse to the new (Communist) regime could thus be divided into two very different groups: One comprising the property-owning classes (who had been deprived of their all by the Bolsheviks), the officers, the civil servants and all those devoted to the ideals of the Russian State as constituted before the October Revolution; the other, the national separatist groups, which desired complete separation from Russia. It is easy to see that, no matter how antagonistic these two groups might be to Communism, their aims were absolutely dissociated. The unity of the Russian State could only be reestablished in one of two ways: either by a restoration of the Monarchy or by federation. Neither alternative appealed to the anti-Bolshevik groups; and this circumstance explains the absence of cooperation in the Civil War which broke out in many parts of the country, in 1918. It must be noted also, that the majority of the population—the peasantry—stood entirely aloof from the activities of both groups, and remained during the initial stages of the Civil War absolutely neutral.

During the first three months succeeding the October Revolution, the anti-Bolshevik movement was chiefly confined to the Ukraine and the Cossack lands (Don, Kuban, Terek and Orenburg). Whereas, the Ukraine and the Kuban Cossacks desired independence, the remainder of the Cossack territories pursued a more complicated policy: they strove for autonomy (federalism) while at the same time proclaiming their intention of re-creating a United Russia, freed from Bolshevism. In addition to this, General Alexeyev, the former Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Armies, formed in December 1917, a Volunteer Army on the Don. This Volunteer Army took as its slogan the restoration of a "united and undivided Russia." It did not aim at restoring the Monarchy; but neither did it sympathize with the federal scheme encouraged by the Cossacks. Its ranks were soon filled by demobilized officers and by volunteers from every class of society, who shared its ideals.

The Peace of Brest-Litovsk

Meanwhile, the peace negotiations with the Austro-Germans at Brest-Litovsk, initiated by the Communists on Dec. 22, 1917, had been broken off (Feb. 18, 1918)—owing to the Ukraine (where a separatist Government had been formed) having concluded peace without consulting the St. Petersburg Government. One of the conditions of this peace was that the Central Empires should occupy the Ukraine in order to safeguard it from Bolshevik aggression. War broke out, in consequence, between the Ukraine and Russia; the former was completely defeated; her capital—Kiev—fell in February 1918.

The Germans, however, in pursuance of the treaty re-captured Kiev

on March 1st; and two days later peace was concluded between the Communists and the Central Empires. The Germans halted on the line Narva, Lake Chud and the Dnieper, although continuing to advance further east in the Ukraine itself, where they soon reached the banks of the Don. This advance encouraged the Cossacks to revolt against the Red regime, and an independent Don Cossack state was proclaimed.

At this time the Volunteer Army of some 4,000 men with two former Commanders-in-Chief at their head¹ was vainly striving, in alliance with the local Cossacks, to liberate the Kuban region from the Bolsheviks. It was ultimately compelled (spring 1918) to retire into the Don region. But here new complications arose.

German Occupation

The Don had accepted help from the Germans, but the Volunteer Army refused to have any dealings with them. This precluded any general movement against the Communists, as the Ukraine was entirely controlled by the Germans and the Don dependent on their benevolent neutrality. Until the Armistice of November 11, 1918 the Volunteer Army and the Don and Kuban Cossacks limited their activities to freeing the Northern Caucasus from the Bolsheviks—an objective which they managed to attain towards the end of the year.

During the summer of 1918, the Germans had also occupied the Baltic provinces (Latvia and Estonia) and Finland. What did Russia's allies do in the meanwhile?

The Allies

The collapse of the Russian front and the opening of the Russian "granary" to the Central Empires was of the gravest concern to the Allies. It became imperatively necessary to counteract German activity in Russia; and accordingly British forces were landed at Arkhangelsk and Murmansk. The British Government also recognized the Volunteer Army as a belligerent and provided General Denikin (who had succeeded to its command after General Kornilov's death) with ammunition and supplies.

In addition to this, 40,000 Czechoslovaks (former prisoners of war in Russia and now on their way to France via Vladivostok) were organized into an army corps and halted on the Volga, which they occupied from the Kama to Samara.

This force, however, was badly organized and supine. In its rear and almost in its sight, the Imperial family imprisoned at Ekaterinburg (now Sverdlovsk) was butchered (July 1918) under orders from Moscow.² Conjointly with the Czechoslovak troops a new White army was formed, that of the KOMUCH³ on the Volga. During the autumn

¹ General Alexeyev and Kornilov.

² The seat of Government was transferred from St. Petersburg to Moscow early in spring 1918.

³ Abbreviated from the Russian "Committee of the Constituent Assembly."

of 1918 Siberia was freed from the Communists, while an Allied force—chiefly Japanese—landed at Vladivostok. The Siberian Government joined hands with the KOMUCH and formed a Directory consisting mostly of Social Revolutionaries.

Position of the Bolsheviks in Autumn 1918

Towards the autumn of 1918 the position of the Bolsheviks had become desperate; the German troops in the Ukraine, the Allied forces at Arkhangelsk, Murmansk and Vladivostok and the White Armies on the Don, in the Caucasus, in Siberia and on the Volga hemmed them in on all sides. To this must also be added various internal troubles: risings in Yaroslavl and Moscow (organized by the Social Revolutionaries), peasant insurrections, etc.

But the lack of concerted action among their opponents, and the impossibility of reaching any understanding between the Austro-Germans and the Allies, gave the Soviet Government time to reinforce the Red Army, and put ultimately about half a million men into the field. After the armistice of November 11, 1918, too, the Austro-Germans in Russia became in turn, the victims of revolutionary propaganda. Their armies melted away and were only partially replaced by Ukrainians, Poles, Latvians and Estonians—the latter supported by the Russian Volunteer Army of General Yudenitch.

Campaign of 1919

The Soviet Government now took the offensive and attacking the Ukraine re-occupied Kiev in January, 1919. Incidentally, the Reds organized a massacre of the bourgeoisie in Kiev, during which some 11,000 persons perished. Meanwhile, mixed detachments of French and Greek troops had been landed in Odessa and the Crimea; but these were soon driven into the sea by the Red forces.

Beyond the Volga, and in Siberia, the Directory had been superseded by the Government of Admiral Kolchak, who assumed the title of Supreme Ruler (Regent) of the Russian State, "until such time as a freely-elected Constituent Assembly, sitting in Moscow, should determine the political structure of the country." His armies, however, were soon forced to retire from the Volga to the Urals (Spring 1919).

After seizing Kiev and the Ukraine, the Soviet Government launched an attack against the Don and soon occupied two-thirds of its territory. At this moment Denikin's Volunteer Army came to the assistance of the Don Cossacks. Its offensive proved entirely successful. The Bolshevik forces were expelled from the Don; and towards the end of the summer the Whites had reached a line running through Tzaritzin (on the Volga), Voronezh, Orel, Chernigov, Kiev and Proskurov (on the Galician border).

The situation on the Eastern front (Admiral Kolchak's) was less favourable to the Whites; after a successful advance to the Volga, Kolchak's armies were defeated by the Reds (under Kamenev,

Tukhachevsky and Frunze) and forced to retreat to the Urals once more. And as a final blow, an attack by General Yudenitch's Volunteer Army on St. Petersburg failed at the last moment, when his troops were on the outskirts of the city itself (September 1919).

Risings in the White Rear

The Red successes in the field were chiefly due to the conditions prevailing behind the White lines. The peasants were dissatisfied with the land policy of the Whites; nor were the Whites able to restore law and order. Attempts to mobilize the population for the White armies led to peasant revolts, shortage of food and commodities, and a state of general chaos. The position was no better in the Red camp; but the Red leaders governed with a ruthless hand and were entirely united. In the White camp, union was conspicuous by its absence.

The position of Admiral Kolchak's armies was the worst; the whole zone of the Siberian Railway was in open revolt in the autumn of 1919 and Kolchak was forced to retreat from the Urals towards Irkutsk.

Moreover, the newly-formed border States—Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland—showed no inclination to come to terms with the various White armies, which proclaimed, as their leading principle, the restoration of a "united and undivided Russia." While, for example, Yudenitch—who depended on the Estonians for supplies, etc.—undertook to recognize Estonian independence, Denikin and Kolchak did not. On the other hand, the Cossacks and the Ukrainians were at loggerheads with Denikin; matters eventually culminated in an actual battle on the Dnieper, between the Ukrainians and the Whites. The latter were victorious in this strange conflict; but their victory banished all hope of further Ukrainian support.

Retreat of the White Armies

The stage was now set for the final defeat of the White armies. Yudenitch retired into Estonia, where his army was disarmed and disbanded (Spring 1920).

On the Arkhangelsk front, where the British had been replaced (August 1919) by a White army under General Miller, the Whites were forced to retreat to the sea and finally compelled (February 1920) to abandon their last stronghold in the North.

Kolchak's retreat towards the end of 1919 became a rout. He was finally surrendered by the Czechoslovaks¹ to the Revolutionary Committee of the town of Irkutsk and shot (February 7, 1920). The remnants of his army retired to Eastern Siberia. Large numbers of his soldiers perished of cold, others were taken prisoners by the Reds, and only a small fraction reached the borders of China.

Denikin's Volunteer Army held out longer than the rest, since it was composed, to a great extent, of former officers who, as fighting material, proved infinitely superior to the Red levies. However, in March 1920,

¹ With the consent of Gen. Janin, the High Commissioner of France in Siberia.

the Red Generalissimo Tukhachevsky drove it from the Don into North Caucasus. This also the Whites were soon forced to evacuate for the Crimea, abandoning most of their material and a large proportion of the troops. Only the Crimea remained in White hands.

The Polish War of 1920

At this moment the Poles, who had hitherto remained inactive, launched an attack on the Reds and occupied Kiev (May 1920).

General Wrangel, who had replaced General Denikin at the head of the remnants of the Volunteer Army in the Crimea, also successfully attacked the Red forces massed against him, and reached the lower Dnieper and the Don.

The Reds, at this juncture had to devote all their attention to the Poles; after concentration they counter-attacked and drove Pilsudski's troops helter-skelter to the gates of Lvov and Warsaw (June 1920). The Red advance was, however, too precipitate; and the armies of Tukhachevsky and Budenny found themselves out of touch with their supply and ammunition bases.

The Polish counter-attack near Warsaw broke through an enemy entirely deprived of ammunition; and as a result the Reds were forced to retreat to the Dnieper.

On Sept. 14, 1920 the Reds concluded an armistice with Pilsudski. This sealed Wrangel's fate in the Crimea. The Reds were now free to concentrate enormous forces against him; and after the most stubborn fighting seen in the Civil War, they at last overwhelmed the remnants of the Volunteer Army. All that was left of it, together with some tens of thousands of the civil population, who had sought refuge in the Crimea from all parts of Russia, was evacuated in Russian and Allied shipping to Constantinople, thence to disperse throughout the world as homeless refugees.

On November 16, 1920 the last White Russian soldier left his native soil. This day marks quite definitely the end of the Old Russian state. The Reds were left sole and undisputed masters of the country.

PHYSICAL SURVEY

I

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

THE territory of Russia (U.S.S.R.) is the largest continuous expanse of land under one political Power. It is true that the total area of the British Empire at the present time is almost double that of the U.S.S.R.; but the British possessions are spread all over the globe, and comprise numerous discrete units. The largest of the self-contained territories owned by Britain are her uninterrupted chain of African possessions (extending from Egypt to South Africa), and Canada, neither of which exceeds 10 million sq. klm. in area.¹ As against this, the present U.S.S.R. territory is a single unit, having an area of 21,636,600 sq. klm. The total area of the United States (with Alaska and other possessions) is about 6,018,415 sq. klm.

Russia (U.S.S.R.) is watered by rivers which are amongst the largest in the world, *e. g.* the Volga, Obi, Irtysh, Yenissey, Lena and Amur. The largest lake on the globe, the Caspian Sea, is Russian,² and has an area of 438,000 sq. klm. The fourth and seventh largest lakes on the planet are also Russian; *viz.*, the Sea of Aral (68,000 sq. klm.) and Lake Baikal (35,000 sq. klm.), the largest fresh-water lake in Russia. The three Russian plains—the Russian, West Siberian and Turkestan—represent, if taken together, one of the largest plain areas in the world, and most decidedly the largest under one Power.

Russia, however, is by no means a flat country. Together with the largest plains, it possesses some of the highest mountains in the world. The peak of Beluchi (in the Altai) reaches a height of 4,800 metres above sea level. Elbruz in the Caucasus, rises to a height of 5,629 metres. In the Pamirs and in Russian Tian-Shan, the number of peaks above 5,000 metres runs into two figures.³


Some of them rise to a height of 7,000 metres, for example Khantengri, (6,997), Kaufman Peak (now renamed Lenin Peak) in the Zaalai Ridge (7,144) and Garmo Peak in the Pamirs (7,495). This height is only exceeded by the summits of the Karakorum in the Himalayas which attain almost 9,000 metres. No others of the world's highest mountains can rival the above-mentioned heights in Russian Turkestan: for example,

¹ 1 kilometre equals 0.6214 mile (roughly 0.6 mile).



² With the exception of an insignificant part of the south shore which belongs to Persia.

³ One metre equals 39.37 in. roughly, 3.25 ft.

PHYSICAL MAP I



1914
1920



BELOW SEA-LEVEL

0-100 M. ABOVE SEA LEVEL

200-500 M. " " "

500 M. AND MORE " " "


FRONTIER OF USSR.

PHYSICAL MAP II

SCALE



1: 28,500,000



the highest peak in the Andes (Aconcagua) only reaches 7,040 metres.

In spite of the absence of natural boundaries on many of the frontiers of the U.S.S.R., their general character must be regarded as advantageous to the Soviet Union. The main fact is, that the material resources of the U.S.S.R.'s neighbours are inferior to those which it itself possesses. Thus, the population of the U.S.S.R. is 161 millions as against 100 millions for its western and southern neighbours. The latter are divided into 8 States (from Finland to Afghanistan).

The position in the Far East is more complicated. The thinly populated Russian Far East is very difficult to defend against possible aggression by the thickly populated states of Eastern Asia. One of the chief factors of defense here is the severe climate, and in particular the very rigorous winter; easily borne by the Russian, it would prove an insurmountable obstacle to colonization by a people more sensitive to cold.

The physical position of Russia with relation to the sea cannot be considered satisfactory. Some parts of Russia are further from the sea than any other places in the world: Semirechie (Kazakstan) is more than 2,400 klm. distant from the sea. No other country contains points more than 1,600–1,700 klm. away from the sea.

The sea coast of the U.S.S.R. is, in a political and naval sense, divided into four separate parts. The maritime communication between the Black Sea and the Baltic ports is very unfavourable (in war time it may be impossible); neither is the journey from the Baltic to the White and Arctic Seas an easy one. The route by sea between the above mentioned waters and those of the Far East is exceptionally difficult. All this has had a fundamental significance in Russian history. It has weakened Russia's military position considerably, and has hindered the development of the Russian seafaring trade.

These conditions can only be partly overcome. The most that can be done in the circumstances is the establishment of safe maritime communication between the White Sea and Russian Far Eastern waters. The route along the northern shores of Siberia (from the borders of Finland to the borders of Korea), however, exceeds 25,000 klm. and is not practicable the greater part of the year. The development of ice-breaking, a practice chiefly created by Russian sailors, might greatly improve matters and establish a regular trade route via the Arctic waters.

This matter was alluded to by Mendelev in 1906: "If even a tenth part of that which was lost at Tsushima had been expended in attempting to reach the North Pole, our fleet would probably have arrived in Vladivostok, avoiding the North Sea and Tsushima; but more than this, we should have had sailors experienced in the mining of obstacles and submarine navigation, who would be capable of subjugating both nature and their enemies by bold and cautious foresight. To further the progress of our navigation and make it secure and successful, it is necessary, in my opinion, to make the conquest of the Arctic Ocean our chief aim."

Some countries possessing a divided sea coast have been able to remedy this without too much trouble; thus the United States by build-

ing and securing the control of the Panama Canal have united their Atlantic and Pacific coasts; Germany by building the Kiel Canal united the Baltic to the North Sea. No such devices avail Russia. The existing canal-routes between the Baltic and the White Sea, the Baltic and the Black and Caspian Seas do not permit the passage of seafaring craft. It would not be impossible to create direct communication between the Baltic and the Arctic waters; but this would be an undertaking on a colossal scale, necessitating enormous funds and a technical development which the country does not as yet possess. The project has, however, been proposed on several occasions in the past and the future may see its execution.

II

AGRICULTURAL RESOURCES

Climate

From an orographical point of view the area of Russia consists of:—

1. Three low-lying plains (Russian, West Siberian and Turkestan);
2. Low mountainous regions separating them from one another (the Urals, and the hilly region of Kazakstan);
3. The low mountainous regions between the Yenissey and the Pacific Ocean; and
4. The high mountainous regions to the south and east (the Crimea, Caucasus, the northern ridges of the Pamirs, the Altai and Sayan mountains and the hilly regions of the Baikal, the Amur and the Pacific Coast).

This continuous continental area presents certain climatic peculiarities. The greater part of it enjoys a definitely continental climate, characterized by a hot and short summer and a very severe and long winter. Owing to the hot summer, many comparatively southern forms of life are to be found to the northward. They occur, for instance, in the so-called "polar zone": a region where the mean temperature in January is lower than at the geographical Pole, *e. g.* in northeastern Yakutia, and in the basins of the rivers Iana, Indigirka and Kolyma. Extremely low January temperatures are here combined with comparatively warm summers (the mean temperature in July exceeds $+15^{\circ}$ C.).

Since Russia forms a single continental mass, its climate is uniform over the greater part of its extent and differs considerably from the typical climate of either Europe or Asia. The annual rainfall (and snow-fall) over the greater part of Russia, exceeds 300 millimetres; while there are very few Russian districts where this exceeds 600. In Europe the average rainfall exceeds 600 millimetres, while in Asia there are many regions having a rainfall of over 600 millimetres and also many others with considerably less than 300. An even more characteristic feature of Russia's climate as opposed to those of Europe and Asia, is the great difference between the mean temperatures in the hottest and

coldest months of the year. This difference is on the average 25° C.—while in Yakutia it reaches 65° C. In Europe and Asia, it is exceptional for this difference to amount to as much as 25° C. Only a few districts in Russia conform to the European or Asiatic standards in this respect. They are as follows: the climate of the southern shores of the Crimea is similar to that of the regions bordering the Aegean Sea and the Sea of Marmora; that of the lower reaches of North Caucasus closely resembles the climate of Hungary, Rumania and the middle and lower Danube districts; the climate of the Caspian and Black Sea littoral differs little from that of Central China and South Japan; the Murmansk coast has a climate which may be compared with the Scandinavian countries: Northern Norway, Iceland, and the Faroe Islands.

Effect on Agriculture

Climatic conditions greatly influence the distribution of vegetation and soils, and thus determine the character of Russian agriculture.

Russian agricultural economy is faced with a *relatively (or even absolutely) hot summer, a severe winter and a short vegetation period*. These conditions determine the composition of the crops. Winter wheat for instance only grows south of the line connecting Riga, Rostov-on-Don, and the northwest coast of the Caspian Sea. In Eastern Siberia no winter crops are possible.

The area of Russia may be divided, from north to south, into four horizontal zones; corresponding to the four basic belts of the *tundra, forest, steppe and desert*.

These zones are characterized by the following basic conditions:

<i>Zones</i>	<i>Yearly average relative humidity at 1 p.m.</i>	<i>Monthly average relative humidity at 1 p.m. during the driest month of the year</i>	<i>Mean temperature for July</i>
Tundra	80% & higher	65% & higher	14.5° C & lower
Forest	68%–79%	50%–64%	13.5° C– 19.5° C
Steppe	56%–67%	35%–49%	19.5° C– 24.5° C
Desert	55% & lower	34% & lower	24.5° C & higher

The Zones

The progressive change, from north to south, of the types of vegetation in these zones is due to the gradual decrease in humidity and the increase in average temperature. The general character of their soil and vegetation is shown in the following table:

Sub-division of Vegetation

- A. The Tundra
- B. The Forest

Sub-division of Soil

- Morasses
- Silicious soil, divided into two sub-zones;

C. The Steppes

1. The northern (or concealed) silicious soil.

2. The primary silicious soil.

The following sub-zones of the "Black soil belt," (humus):

I. The Wooded Steppe.

1. Northern (degraded humus),

2. Limestone humus,

3. Heavy humus;

II. The Prairie Steppe.

1. Humus proper,

2. Southern humus;

III. The Wormwood Steppe.

Chestnut humus,

Red and grey soils, sand and saline deposits.

D. The Desert

Each of these sub-divisions has its own forms of cultivation. In the tundra only cattle-breeding (reindeer farming) can be carried on; no land cultivation or afforestation is possible.

In the northern sub-zone of the silicious zone (forest) only afforestation is possible. Agriculture—in the sense of cultivation of land for regular crops—becomes possible in the more southerly parts of the silicious zone. From here the arable area stretches through the steppe zone. In the desert zone it becomes again impossible, except under special conditions.

The two silicious sub-zones, together with the wooded steppes, form the belt where cattle-breeding, afforestation and agriculture are all carried on. The "black soil belt" (humus) because of its fertility is particularly adapted for agriculture.

In the treeless steppes, afforestation is generally impossible.

In the desert regions agriculture, unless accompanied by irrigation, is impossible. Two sub-divisions of this zone must be noted: the grassy desert, and the true desert. In the grassy desert (semi-desert pastures) cattle breeding is still possible. In the true desert, even this is impossible.

The following table shows, approximately the area of the various zones:

	<i>In millions of hectares</i> ¹
I. The basic agricultural and grazing areas within the zones of forest and steppe	400
II. Forests within the basic agricultural area.....	100
III. Forests in the forest zone of the north.....	600
IV. The tundra and hilly regions of the north.....	550
V. Semi-desert grazing land.....	200
VI. The deserts and mountains of the south.....	150
Total	2,000

¹ 1 hectare = 2.7 acres.

The first category includes not only land which is actually cultivated, (of which there is not more than 150-170 million hectares) and grazing land, but also such waste land as might be brought under cultivation. There is comparatively, a great deal of such land, both in the steppes of the northern part of Kazakstan, and in the forest regions of West, Central and East Siberia and the Far East—in plots that could easily be cultivated.

Agriculture

Each item of the above table presents a series of problems. The area under the first heading takes the lead in the agricultural life of the country, as it includes all the most fertile lands. The majority of these are to be found in Russia proper, as the arable area of Siberia and the Far East is considerably smaller in comparison.

As already stated, the basic agricultural area forms part of two geographically different zones—the forest and the steppe. In consequence, different methods of cultivation have to be employed. The cultivation of root-crops and clover can be undertaken in the forest and at places in the wooded steppe zones. In the treeless steppes, the cultivation of root-crops and clover presents many difficulties. Many fertilizers used in Europe are not suitable here. This zone demands special methods of farming; and Russian agronomy has been studying such for many decades.

In the treeless steppe natural conditions favour the cultivation of cereals exclusively. This requires a comparatively small outlay of capital: crops are sown without manure and, in some cases, local conditions render the use of fertilizers actually harmful to the crops. Here, successful farming depends, to a great extent, on the rational employment of mechanical methods for the preservation of humidity.

Wheat is the staple crop of the treeless steppe. Further north, rye is the main cereal. The wheat of the steppes is known for its high quality: in certain districts it contains over 20% of albumen. In fact all the crops cultivated in the steppes are very much richer in albumen, sugar and fats than those grown in countries with a less continental climate. The same holds good for other crops—and their richness in albumen, sugar, and fats gradually increases towards the centre of the continent. Proportionately however, the total yield of the harvest (calculated per unit of the sown area) decreases. When taking into account the lower proportionate yields of the Russian harvests (as compared with Europe) it must be noted that this is partly due to natural conditions; *e. g.* remoteness from the sea.

Forests

The importance of the Russian forest reserves is quite unique in world economics. The area of the Russian forests exceeds those of the U.S.A. and Canada combined. Russian timber is rich in lignine and is regarded as very good building material. The reserves of timber are extremely

vast and in some parts of the country have not yet been touched. The export trade of the Communists, however, has depleted those very considerable forest areas which were nearest to transport facilities. Timber was cut down regardless of measures of afforestation, which are only now being re-introduced. The principal trade timber is pine, fir, cedar, oak, aspen and birch.

Cattle Breeding

The grass-desert regions of Turkestan have for many centuries been the pastures of innumerable herds of cattle owned by the local nomads. New methods of breeding are now being introduced by the Soviet Government in the so-called Sovkhoz farms, in these regions. The conditions here much resemble those of South America and Australia; the Government is justified in regarding these regions as the "meat and wool base" of the U.S.S.R. However, owing to the severity of the climate only the coarser kinds of wool can be produced here.

Any extensive economic utilization of the tundra gives ample scope for conjecture. Under present economic conditions both the tundra and the desert are waste lands¹ which, by their mere existence, act as obstacles to economic progress. Reindeer breeding, of course is possible here; but this industry is at present in its infancy.

Cotton

As regards cotton, in the years immediately preceding the War, there was not, in spite of the unusually rapid increase in the cultivation of cotton both in Turkestan and Transcaucasia, sufficient grown to meet the needs of Russian industry. Of the half million tons required, nearly 50% was imported. At the present time the area under cotton cultivation has nearly trebled compared with pre-War times, although the actual yield has decreased. There is ample scope in these regions for a further extension of cotton cultivation. It has been estimated that the rivers of Turkestan alone can irrigate an area of at least twenty million hectares. American species of cotton are mostly cultivated.

Lately, an attempt has been made to introduce Egyptian cotton in Tadzhikistan; and quite recently steps have been taken to cultivate cotton further north—in North Caucasus and the south of the Ukraine.

Furs and Game

In conclusion, mention must be made of the abundance of fur-bearing animals and game, principally to be found in sparsely-populated places—in the tundra, the virgin forests of the North, and in the grass desert. Hunting in the steppes (practiced mainly by the nomadic tribes) and hunting and trapping in the North constitute the principal local means of livelihood. The North is the main hunting ground; but it cannot be

¹ Although even now the rationalization of reindeer breeding in the tundra might give good results.

said, considering the vastness of the country, that either fur-bearing animals or game are very plentiful. It has been estimated, for instance, that during the pre-War years there were killed, in the best game areas of Russia proper (Arkhangelsk, Vologda and Olonetz):—

	<i>Per Hectares</i>
1 bear	100,000
1 fox	14,000
1 stone-marten	25,000
1 hazel hen	80
1 blackcock	700
1 squirrel	160
1 ermine	2,500
1 hare	500
1 partridge	350

However, these insignificant results as compared with the area do not prevent hunting and trapping from constituting one of the main features in the economic life of the North. The part which Russia has played, and is playing, in the world's fur-market is well known. Before the War there was no noticeable decline in the Russian pelt market as a whole. At present, owing to the great pressure brought to bear upon the fur trade by the Communists for export purposes, the natural resources of this industry are being rapidly exhausted. This branch of national economy, like many others, requires to be systematically rationalized by the introduction of longer close-seasons for fur-bearing animals, the establishment of rearing farms and sanctuaries, etc.

III

MINERAL RESOURCES

INTRODUCTION

Russia proper is not particularly rich in mineral deposits; such are, according to contemporary standards, of only secondary value (brown coal, peat, iron ore, brown schist, spheroid siderites, low grade phosphorites, small deposits of sulphur pyrites, etc.).

As regards the more valuable mineral resources these are mostly to be found in the regions lying to the south, southeast and east of Russia proper—and, in a few cases, to the north.

In consequence, it is not difficult to distinguish two elements in the problem of Russian industrialization:—the question of emancipating the central regions from imported foreign raw materials and fuel by means of a rational utilization of their second-rate natural resources; and that of establishing a new industry based on the first-class industrial resources of the outlying regions.

A. COAL

Soviet statistics previous to 1931 established the figure of 558,000,000,000 tons as the general geological reserves of coal of the U.S.S.R.¹ These reserves, however, might be doubled, or trebled—or, perhaps, increased tenfold—if sufficient supplementary grants were made for detailed geological prospecting in certain given districts. The difficulty, however, is that the time has not yet come for such detailed geological research work in remote regions where coal has recently been discovered. In this connection mention should be made of the inaccessibility of the area between the middle and lower Yenissey, and the middle and lower Lena. From data to hand, this area promises to be one of the world's richest coal fields. There are here, possibly, one to two million square kilometres of coal fields, at present almost uninhabited and unexplored.

Central Siberia

In the seventies the well known Siberian explorer, A. Chekanov, investigated the coal deposits found at intervals along the Lower Tunguzka,—a tributary of the Yenissey (outcrops of coal are to be found for about 2,000 klm. along the banks of this river). In 1895 extensive coal deposits were discovered on the middle Angara. At present no doubt exists that these deposits, although separated from each other by many hundreds of kilometres, all belong to the same great coal basin. This coal field, the Tunguz basin, owing to the enormous extent of its seams, occupies the first place in the world for size (its area is at least one million square kilometres). At all points (as yet few in number) where investigations have been carried out, coal seams of considerable commercial value (up to 6 m. in thickness) have been discovered. The total reserves are estimated, according to the data at present obtained (1931) at tens of millions of tons. In the earlier estimates of the coal resources of the U.S.S.R. this coal basin was credited with only 66 million tons.

In the east, and in the basin of the Viluy (a tributary of the Lena) and the Markha—the Tunguz basin approaches the Yakut coal basin. Outcrops of coal, extending for several hundred kilometres, are to be found on the banks of both these rivers. The total area of this basin may be estimated at several hundred thousand square kilometres. The best known coal fields are at Zhigansk. Here, on the banks of the Lena, south of Zhigansk, are situated eleven seams about one metre in thickness. This coal, containing but little sulphur and leaving a comparatively small residue of ash, is very suitable for furnaces.

At present there is no reliable information as to the extent of these coal fields further north—in the basins of the rivers Iana, Kolyma and Indigirka. But the reserves of the Yenissey and Lena coal-basins (the

¹ According to statistics published in 1913, the U.S.A. coal reserves were computed at 3,839,000,000,000 tons, those of Canada at 1,235,000,000,000 and those of China at 997,000,000,000.

Tunguz and Yakut basins) make it possible to affirm that the coal reserves of the U.S.S.R. are second to none in the world.

This coal zone extends further south and is bounded in the east by Lake Baikal and on the west by the upper Obi. Between Lake Baikal and Nizhneudinsk, the Siberian railway runs through the coal fields of the so-called Yakutsk basin. Its area is about 25,000 square kilometres. The seams lie near the surface; and in some places open workings are possible.

The quality of the coal varies considerably, from brown coal upwards. Its thermal capacity is 6,000–6,500 calories. The general reserves of this coal basin have been variously estimated at from 50 to 150 billion tons. In any case, the Yakutsk coal basin is one of the largest in the world, although it cannot pretend to be one of the richest.

To the west of the Yenissey the Siberian railway runs through the Kansk and Krasnoyarsk-Achinsk coal basins (brown coal). The area of these basins covers some 750,000 sq. kilometres and the reserves are estimated at several billion tons.

To the southwest of Achinsk, again quite close to the Siberian railway, another brown coal basin is situated, called the Chulym-Urup. This basin occupies an area more than 15,000 klm. Borings executed at one point of the basin disclosed a 3.6 metre seam of coal at 57 m. below the surface, and one of 5.7 metres at 93 m. The resources of the region have not yet been estimated. These three basins, taken together, surpass any other brown coal field in the world except the North American.

Kuznetzk

Two hundred kilometres west from Achinsk lies the Kuznetzk coal-basin.

The reserves of the Kuznetzk basin are fairly well known. According to the most recent information, they amount to about 400,000,000,000 tons.¹ The seams lie some 200 m. below the surface, and some are as much as 15 m. thick. The average calorific value is approximately 7,500 calories; but some varieties of the coal give 8,000 calories. The basin possesses coal of every type, from "light" (containing 12% of volatile substances) to coking and "heavy gas" coal (up to 40%). In 1929, deposits of sapropelitic coal were discovered in the northern part of the basin. This coal yields up to 65% of coal-tar; this enables it to be very profitably converted into liquid fuel.

There is no doubt that the region between Irkutsk and Tomsk (situated on the northern fringe of the Kuznetzk basin, the so-called Sudzhensk basin) is one of the richest in coal to be found anywhere in the world. In the varieties of coal present, it surpasses the richest coal fields of Europe. The extent of its reserves of coal undoubtedly surpass all others in the U.S.S.R.

The exceptional richness of this area is enhanced by the fact that

¹ According to some estimates, the reserves of the Kuznetzk coal fields amount to 1,000,000,000,000 tons ("Pravda"—August 26, 1931).

immediately to the north of it (at about 100 klm. distance) is the southern fringe of the splendid Tunguz basin (see above), while immediately southward of it lies the Minussinsk coal field. This is situated on the Yenissey, several hundred klm. above Krasnoyarsk, and has an area of 650 square kilometres. The total thickness of the working strata is about 50 metres, and the calorific value of the coal is 7,000 calories. Its reserves were estimated, in 1915, at several tens of millions of tons. In the early twenties of this century this estimate rose to 6,000,000,000 tons, and at the present time investigators suggest the figure of 14,000,000,000 tons. (1931.)

Transbaikalia

As compared with such richness the scarcity of coal in the territory lying to the east and west of this region is striking.

To the east which, at present, plays only a secondary part in the economic life of the U.S.S.R. the Transbaikalian Railway, runs through coal fields; but these are not of any great importance; they have very little horizontal extension, and consist of small isolated and self-contained basins. The coal is exclusively brown, and its calorific value varies from 4,500 to 6,000 calories. The total reserves of brown coal in Transbaikalia were estimated, in the early twenties, at 200,000,000 tons; but they are now put at 300,000,000. Owing to the lack of mineral fuel in Transbaikalia, these coal basins have been, and are being, worked fairly thoroughly.

Amur

The Amur Railway runs through coal fields which are even less important. It touches, however, an extensive brown-coal basin in the region where the Bureia river falls into the Amur. As early as 1911 the coal reserves of part of this area were estimated at 187,000,000 tons.

Vladivostok is surrounded by coal fields, producing both black and brown coal. This coal is, generally, remarkable for its high calorific value (7,000–8,000 calories). Some of the smaller coal fields are already being worked. The reserves of these coal fields are estimated at about 50,000,000 tons.

Sakhalin

The coal fields of Sakhalin are more important. In the northern (Russian) half of this island in some parts the coal strata are to be found at the surface; in others, they lie deep, but coal is to be found all over the island and a continuous line of coal fields is situated all along the western shore of the Russian portion. All these coal fields can be worked by galleries straight from the seashore. Its calorific value is from 8,000 to 9,000 calories; the quality varies considerably. The resources of Russian Sakhalin are at present estimated at several billions of tons. Nature herself seems to have intended Sakhalin to become a great coaling station. The export of Sakhalin coal may prove of importance not only to

the Russian Far East but also to other parts of the Pacific seaboard which are poor in coal. Hitherto, however, the absence of natural harbours on the western shore of the island has impeded the development of its coal industry.

To the west of the meridian of the Upper Obi stretches the area of the three plains: Turkestan, West Siberia and Russia proper. This area is very scantily provided with coal. The contrast between it and the rich coal fields to the east of the upper Obi and Yenissey is very remarkable.

Russia Proper

In the whole of this wide extent only three coal-basins (and those *not* particularly important) have, so far, been located. One of these, the Don, has long been known; and has for many decades, played an important part in Russian national economy; the second, the Karaganda, has only been worked since 1930; and the importance of the third, the Pechora, is at present problematical. The Moscow and Ural coal fields are of second-rate quality. In other parts of the area, only very small coal fields are to be found.

Pechora

Prospecting carried out between 1923-1925 discovered in the region included between the tributaries of the right bank of the upper and middle Pechora, "an enormous coal basin." In this basin three coal strata have already been explored. The thickness of the seams is up to 8 metres, and the calorific value (according to samples) from 4,000 to 5,500 calories. These samples were taken from outcrops of the seams; the coal from the deep seams is expected to be of better quality and higher in calorific value. The area of these deposits is approximately 40,000 sq. klm. The Pechora basin has not, so far, played a part in the industrial development of the U.S.S.R., and its reserves have so far not been estimated.¹

Don

This basin, situated to the north of the Sea of Azov and the lower Don, occupies an area of 22,760 sq. klm. From 30 to 40 seams are worked. Production is hindered by the fact that most of the seams are not very rich; another unfavourable circumstance is that the seams of coal are separated, in the majority of cases, by considerable strata of barren soil. The coal of the basin exhibits great variety in its quality and chemical composition, every conceivable species of coal being represented. Generally speaking, the quality of the Don coal is high, its calorific value being about 7,000 calories. The Don basin cannot be regarded as producing really first-class mineral fuel, in the usual sense of the term. Don coke, although quite suitable for blast smelting, is inferior to that used in England and Germany, for it contains a much

¹ See article on Industry.

larger proportion of sulphur and other residue. In order that, during smelting, the sulphur may not mix with the iron it is necessary to add a great deal of limestone in the furnace; and, in order to melt this, yet more coke must be added. Hence, the total expenditure of coke per ton of iron smelted is abnormally large, and the cost of production correspondingly increased.

In 1913 the general reserve of coal in the Don basin was estimated at 56,000,000,000 tons. This estimate did not include the coal of the extreme western part of the basin, the so-called Grishin region. At present, in the light of supplementary information obtained during the last eighteen years, the resources of the Don basin may be estimated at some 70,000,000,000 tons. In addition, there are also the untapped resources of the western and northern borders of the basin, where the coal deposits are covered by various thick strata of chalk and tertiary formations.

Karaganda

During the last two years it has been ascertained that the part of the steppe zone beyond the Urals also possessed a coal field, the Karaganda basin, equal, or possibly even superior to that of the Don. Its importance was only realized after a survey made in 1930 and 1931.¹ In only a part of this basin, reserves of 15,000,000 tons have been discovered, and thirty workable seams located. Their average thickness is about 2.5 m., but some range up to 8 m. The calorific value of the coal is more than 7,000 calories.

These discoveries have revolutionized the whole problem of supplying coal to Turkestan, the plains of West Siberia and the adjoining countries. So far as is known, both the mountains of Turkestan and the Caucasus are comparatively poor in hard mineral fuel. Among those of Turkestan three of some value are situated in Ferghana, the Narin, Shurab and Kizil-Kiga coal fields, of which the first is situated north, and the second and third south of the Ferghana valley. Among the Caucasian coal fields the most important are the Tkvibuli basin near Kutais (western Transcaucasia) and the Tkvarcheli on the shores of the Black Sea, 30 klm. from the coast town of Ochamchiri (the estimated reserves of this basin are 100–150 million tons).

The Mangishlak coal field on the eastern shore of the Caspian, is more important. Its outcrops cover 400 sq. klm. and there are seams of over 1 metre in thickness. The calorific value of the coal is about 5,000 calories.

Moscow

One of the main factors which have hitherto hampered the development of Russian industry is the very second rate quality of the coal produced in the Moscow district and the Urals.

The majority of Moscow coal is of very low calorific value (from 3,000

¹ Previously only one important coal basin—the Ekibastus—with reserves of coal estimated at 500,000 tons was known. It is situated on the left bank of the Irtysh river, in the environs of Pavlodar.

to 3,300 calories). This coal will not yield coke; furthermore, owing to the amount of water it contains, it deteriorates rapidly if exposed to the air, while it is also liable to ignite spontaneously; consequently, it cannot stand either prolonged transport or exposure to the air. In these circumstances, it is principally used as fuel for electric power stations—or burned for the sake of the by-products. The character of the coal seams, too, presents certain obstacles to the economical working of the mines. The coal of the Moscow district is seldom found in continuous horizontal seams—it occurs chiefly in “pockets.” It may be noted also that the aggregate coal-reserves of this area are now estimated at 6,000,000,000 tons.

The Urals

As regards the coal of the Urals, this is found in two parallel belts, one on either side of the mountain ridge. On the western slopes the belt is of comparatively small extent, stretching parallel with, and about 100–120 klms. east of the Kama river between Solikamsk and Perm (Kisselev basin).¹ On the eastern slope coal of various kinds is to be met with in many places. Many of these coal fields, however, could not be profitably worked, their extent being both limited and uncertain: but this does not apply to the brown coal of the Cheliabinsk basin (on the border of the Urals and Siberia) which is of more importance.

The thickness of the seams is considerable (*e.g.* in the Cheliabinsk basin there are some seams 7 metres thick). The anthracite coal of the eastern slope has a calorific value of about 8,000 calories, whereas that of the Cheliabinsk brown coal is approximately 6,000.

Within the last few years, the total coal-reserves of the Kisselev and Cheliabinsk basins have been approximately estimated at 2,000,000,000 tons. This amount, as compared with the other natural and industrial resources of the Urals, is insignificant. In addition, some kinds of Kisselev coal will not yield coke; and for smelting, Kuznetzk coal must be added to it.

B. IRON

According to returns for 1910, the reserves of iron in Russia proper were as follows:—

<i>Ore</i> (in millions of tons)	<i>Equivalent of</i> <i>Pig-Iron</i> (in millions of tons)	<i>Iron content</i> <i>of the Ore</i> (in %)
The Urals282	135	40%–63%
Central Russia789	316	40%
South Russia536	233	40%–61%
Caucasus 14	8	50%–60%

¹ The Pechora coal field is possibly the continuation of this basin to the north.

As regards central Russia, however, the reserve of iron ore is of small industrial value—owing to the wide distribution of the ore, the scanty character of the deposits, and its low iron content.

In the south, the most important iron fields are those of Krivoy Rog (62% contents of iron) and of Kerch (40%). In 1910 the former was estimated to have an ore-reserve of 86,000,000 tons, and the latter one of 450,000,000 tons.

In 1910, the corresponding figures for Asiatic Russia were insignificant. They are subjoined.

	<i>Ore</i> (in millions of tons)	<i>Smelted Iron</i> (in millions of tons)
The Kirghiz Steppe	7	4.2
Eastern Siberia	14	7.6
The Far East	6	3

Prospecting between 1910 and 1916 increased the estimated ore reserves of the Urals by 50% (to approximately 400,000,000 tons), and discoveries were made which profoundly affected the Siberian iron industry. In the Telbes iron field, situated directly south of the Kuznetzk coal basin, prospecting carried out in 1914 and 1915 by the Kuznetzk Coal Mining Company showed a definite reserve of 11,000,000 tons and a probable further reserve of 16,000,000, totaling some 27,000,000 tons. Prospecting was continued in 1916 and additional large fields of high grade iron ore (60 to 63%) discovered.

Recent geological researches (1931 and 1932) have had similar good results. "New and great horizons have been opened with regard to the ore-base of the Kuznetzk mining region in connection with the new discoveries made by the geological expeditions. According to preliminary calculations the reserves in the basin of the river Tomi are estimated at not less than 150,000,000 tons of high-grade ore, containing more than 60% of iron."¹ Further research estimates these reserves at 200,000,000 tons. These investigations have therefore increased eight-fold the figures given for the reserves of iron ore in the region lying south of the Kuznetzk basin.

"The importance of these discoveries is enhanced by the fact that during 1931 enormous deposits of iron ore have also been discovered in East Siberia. The research work of a single summer sufficed to show that the total resources of iron ore in East Siberia were something like 500,000,000 tons. The existence of several great concentrations of iron-ore deposits was confirmed. One of these, Sosnovy Baetz, (with reserves amounting to nearly 120,000,000 tons of ore)—lies on the southern fringe of the Yakutsk coal basin; and another several hundred kilometres to the north of the first, in the basin of the river Ilim on the southern boundary of the Tunguz coal basin. Here the Korshunov ore

¹ "Pravda"—September 2, 1931.

field holds not less than 111,000,000 tons. The total reserves of the ore fields of the Ilim and the neighbouring basin of the Angara river amount to some 200,000,000 tons or so.”¹

The discovery of first-class iron ore reserves in the southern portion of the Kuznetzk coal field and in the basin of the Angara is of extreme interest to any student of the natural industrial resources of the U.S.S.R. It has already been stated how very rich, judging by world standards, is the coal area between the upper Obi and Lake Baikal. It has now been found that this is equally rich in first class iron ores. Whereas the Krivoy Rog ores have to be transported 480 kilometres to the Don basin, here, the corresponding distance is only 60–100 kilometres; and the Kuznetzk coke is undoubtedly better than that of the Don.

The Urals

The reserves of iron ore in the Urals were estimated, in the first half of 1930 at not less than 1,000,000,000 tons. An estimate of the iron ore reserves of the Orsk region (in the southern Urals) drawn up within the last few months, radically modifies the former calculations. The results of investigations in 1932 have surpassed all expectations. In the area investigated, alone, the reserves of iron ore amount to 400,000,000 tons and those of Magnitogorsk to 300,000,000. The ore contains, on an average, 40% of iron. Hematite, containing 60% and more of iron, has also been found in this region. The reserves of the hematite in one district alone amount to about 30,000,000 tons. Outcrops of magnetic hematite containing 70% of iron, have also been found.

These discoveries increase the known reserves of iron ore in the Urals by about 50%, from 1,000,000,000 to 1,500,000,000 tons.

South Russia

New ore deposits have been discovered in the Kheper area.² Investigations carried out in 1929–1930 have confirmed the existence here of reserves of phosphorite ore totalling some 130,000,000 tons.

During the last few years more has also been learned about the well-known Kerch and Krivoy Rog ore fields. The reserves of Kerch estimated in 1910 to be 450,000,000 tons, are now put at more than 2,000,000,000 tons. In the Krivoy Rog, they were estimated at 260,000,000 tons in 1916, and in 1929 at 466,000,000 tons. Further surveys in the district have now raised the figure to about 800,000,000 tons.

C. WATER-POWER

As with coal and iron, the water-power of the U.S.S.R. is chiefly to be obtained in places remote from the centre (Russia-proper)—in the northwest, south and east. The Leningrad area, which is poorly endowed

¹ “Pravda”—September 2, 1931.

² The Kheper is a tributary of the Don.

with other resources, has been richly provided by nature with facilities for obtaining hydro-electric power. It is surrounded on all sides by considerable concentrations of water-power: the Ivanov rapids on the Neva, the rivers Svir, Volkhov, Narova, etc.

Total Reserves

The total reserves of water-power in the U.S.S.R. have been estimated at 41,300,000 h.p.,¹ and by another expert at 64,800,000. These estimates however, cannot be regarded as final. Thus, for instance, the Kuznetzk and Altai regions were credited, with some 4,000,000 h.p., but more recent calculations have increased this to 20,600,000.

To the economist, however, the most important fact is that, so far no attempt has been made to exploit the great majority of these resources.

Principal Sources of Water-Power

The main sources of water-power (16,000,000 h.p.) are in the Caucasus.

Another noteworthy region is the basin of the Dnieper with 1,100,000 h.p. Of this, 820,000 h.p. will shortly be utilized by means of the great hydro-electric power station, *The Dnieprostroy*, planned for completion in 1932. Reserves of over 2,000,000 h.p. are also available in the Leningrad-Arkhangelsk area.²

According to calculation, the possible efficiency of the hydro-electric installations, per sq. klm. of surface, in the various areas is as follows: (in h.p.)

The Lena-Baikal area	6.0
The Kuznetzk-Altai area	6.8
The Turkestan area	7.3
The Caucasian area	35.9
The Dnieper area	5.2
The Northwest area	4.8

Water-Power in the Central Regions

All these areas surround the enormous territory of Central Russia and the lands bordering upon it, a territory whose water-power is inconsiderable both actually and by comparison. This circumstance may partly be explained by the flat nature of the Russian plain: but it is somewhat remarkable that this comparative lack of water-power should be shared by the neighbouring low hilly regions—*e. g.* the Urals and the hilly country of Kazakstan. In these areas, the available water-power is estimated to be as follows:

¹ I. Moskovitinov, "The Water-Power of Russia." Leningrad, 1923.

² A part of this is utilized by the *Volkhovstroy*, a hydro-electric station on the Volkhov river.

<i>Area</i>	<i>Total available water-power (in thousand h.p.)</i>	<i>H.P. available per sq. klm. of surface</i>
Northeast	1,400	1.5
Western	300	1.1
Central	355	1.1
Viatka-Vetluga	240	1.2
Central Volga ¹	330	1.4
Ural	500	0.7
Southwestern	325	1.1
Central Black Soil	270	2.3
Southeastern	370	1.1
West Kirghiz	900	1.0
East Kirghiz	1,100	1.3
Obi	1,100	0.6

¹ Here the building of a hydro-electric station has been in progress for several years. Its completion has been put off several times owing to the deficiency of the original plans.

These data show very clearly the poverty in water-power (especially per sq. klm. of surface) of the Russian and West Siberian plains, and the neighbouring regions.

D. OIL

General Reserves

Professor Ramsin of the "engineers' trial" fame, a well known fuel expert, estimated in the middle twenties, the total reserves of oil in the U.S.S.R. at 2,874,000,000 tons. In the conditions prevailing at that time this credited the U.S.S.R. with 37% of the world's total reserves. Professor Strizhov, another fuel expert, considered that this proportion should be estimated at at least 45%.

It is interesting to note, that, several years before Ramsin, an eminent Russian expert on oil-fields, D. Golubiatnikov, estimated the reserves of Russian oil at a far more modest figure—1,137,000,000 tons. This figure was obtained by adding the computed reserves of the separate old oil-fields, as follows:—

	<i>mill. tons</i>
Baku (Apsheon Peninsula and Sviatoy Island).....	933
Emba (N. E. Shores of the Caspian).....	107
Grozny (N. E. Caucasus).....	96
Maikop (N. W. Caucasus).....	1

This estimate is by far the most authoritative so far as it concerns the Baku region, particularly since its author has an intimate knowledge of that oil field.

New Prospecting

In the Maikop region D. V. Golubiatnikov estimated the reserves of oil at about 1,000,000 tons; but rich oil-bearing strata have since been discovered here. It is anticipated that 1,200,000 tons of oil will have been obtained during 1932, more than the total reserves listed in the previous

estimate. By 1933, it is planned to raise the output of Maikop oil to 4,000,000 tons.

It must be noted also that the oil fields which are known to exist in western Turkmenistan, on the shores of the Caspian, and also in the plain of Ferghana, do not figure at all in Golubiatnikov's estimates. Their reserves according to information supplied in 1931 are estimated at 90,000,000 tons.¹

Broadly speaking, it has been established that the known oil reserves of the U.S.S.R. vastly exceed (possibly even one hundred-fold) that country's yearly output of oil (about 25,000,000 tons); and also that there exist a series of regions known to be oil-bearing, although not yet thoroughly explored.

The Caucasian Oil-Zone

Along the entire length of the Caucasian range—some 1,000 klm.—oil occurs in the form of oil-wells, and frequent gas gushers. The Caucasus represents only a part of a great oil-bearing zone which continues on the other side of the Caspian Sea, through the Island Cheleken, Ferghana and the Salian Steppe to the borders of northern Persia.

The local population has, from time immemorial, obtained oil from wells sunk in this vast oil bearing zone. During the Russian industrial "boom" of the late sixties and early seventies of the last century, oil was obtained, in commercial quantities by means of borings both on the N. W. slopes of the Caucasian range and on its S. W. slopes, in the Apshe-ron Peninsula. The first of these oil fields has since declined—work ceased there in 1905. The second flourished in the most remarkable manner becoming, and remaining, the centre of the Russian oil industry. During the industrial boom of the nineties the Grozny (now called the Old Grozny) region in the N. E. Caucasus was worked for the first time (1893). During the industrial boom of the second decade of the century, the centre of activity here was spread to the so-called New Grozny oil fields, lying to the south of the former (1913).

At that epoch also attempts were made to develop the Maikop region (in N. W. Caucasus), but at the time these attempts were unsuccessful through lack of capital. There is reason to believe that the Communists are accomplishing what individual enterprise failed to effect: to found an important oil industry in the Maikop district. They are also making efforts to organize oil-production in Georgia, where oil was discovered in 1869.

Baku's Potentialities

It must, at the same time, be emphasized that the original and existing oil fields, Baku and Grozny, have not yet, regarding each as a whole, attained their maximum possible output. It may be pointed out too, that while the oil fields of the Baku region are being exhausted, the efforts of geologists discovered, even before the Revolution, that under the whole

¹ "Pravda" of Nov. 24, 1931.

of the well-known Baku field, and only a little deeper, lies a "new" Baku, in no way inferior to the other. According to D. V. Golubiatnikov, indeed, the "new" lower Baku is possibly better than the "old" upper one. While the lower section is characterized by the more or less continuous presence of oil, the upper possesses large reserves of oil at three points only, at Bibi-Eibat, in the Sabunchin region and at Surakhani. The lower oil-bearing stratum, with an average thickness of not less than 400 metres, contains 54 oil seams.

Other Oil Fields

The oil fields east of the Caspian and the plain of Ferghana—of which the former was opened up as early as 1870, and the latter at the beginning of the twentieth century—have, so far, played only a secondary role in the Russian oil industry. Their extensive reserves, however, make it quite possible for them to be more fully developed, although they will scarcely come up to "Baku" standards.

The Caspian-Ural Oil Fields

A very brilliant future, however, is probably in store for the oil-bearing region which extends over a vast area (about 80,000 sq. klm.) between the N. E. shore of the Caspian Sea and the southern Urals. The extreme S. W. oil fields of this zone lie almost on the shores of the Caspian, surrounding the estuaries of the Ural and Emba rivers. The one to the extreme N. E. is situated on the upper reaches of the river Dzhusa to the north of the Orenburg-Tashkent Railway and not far from the town of Orsk in the southern Urals.

In this area there are more than twenty oil fields, probably of great commercial value—a fact which indeed has already been partly proved by borings. In three of them, those nearest to the Orenburg-Tashkent Railway (*i. e.* the most easterly), deep boring was started during the last years of the pre-Revolutionary industrial boom. The borings, however, had not yet reached the productive stratum at the outbreak of the Revolution—when the work was discontinued. Further to the S. W. lies a belt of oil fields (along the middle course of the rivers Uila, Sagizha and Emba) equidistant from the railway and the Caspian Sea. These oil fields have as yet not been thoroughly explored although some of them, judging by borings, are very promising.

Gushers

The number of known oil fields increases towards the Caspian Sea. In this district is situated (to the south of the lower Emba) the oil fields where—for the first time in this region—an oil gush occurred during the prospecting in 1899. At that time Russian industry was approaching a crisis, and the discovery was not fully utilized. A second gush occurred in 1910 at Dos-Sor near Guriev. At that time Russian industry was booming and the event served as the signal for the awakening of the whole region. The industrial value of this district cannot, however, even

yet be regarded as finally determined—notwithstanding that its output of oil has been maintained for twenty years and has amounted to several hundred thousand tons annually.

Ural Oil Fields

Surveys carried out during 1931 and 1932 showed that there is another large oil field lying along the western slopes of the Urals. This oil field can be divided into three groups: the Ukhta basin, between the rivers Pechora and Vychegda, the Chussov basin, on the middle Kama, and the Sterlitamak basin, on the river Belaya. There is no doubt that these oil fields are very rich in oil and gases, the latter being emitted in large quantities. Their commercial value, however, cannot be as yet estimated. The Ukhta basin is very inaccessible and the Chussov only very superficially explored. The Sterlitamak is undoubtedly the most promising one, lying close to the northern limits of the Caspian oil fields (Grozny and Emba). The development of these fields cannot take place in the near future; they must be regarded as fuel reserves.

Whatever the future results of prospecting, the regions situated along the southern mountainous borders, from the Caucasus to Ferghana, and those to the northeast of the Caspian Sea, will, for a long time, continue to play the principal role in U.S.S.R. oil production. These regions are well enough equipped for the purpose.

E. LIGHT METALS

Russia Proper and the Urals

Russia proper is extremely poor in light metals; a fact which has had a marked influence on her history. Some insignificant deposits of copper and silver in the northern territories were known at an early period; but these were insufficient to allow of a light metal industry being developed on a commercial scale.

The situation was radically changed during the eighteenth century, when great deposits of light metals, particularly copper, were discovered in the Urals. Mining operations there afforded large quantities of ore containing from 12% to 20% of copper: and the output of these mines enabled Russia to assume first place among the world's copper-producing nations, a position which she held for a very long period.

But by the end of the nineteenth century the old copper mines in the Urals were almost exhausted; and early in the twentieth they were reduced to working pyrites containing but 2% to 3% of metal.

The technical success obtained in working this ore stimulated the search for similar deposits elsewhere; and between 1910 and 1916 such were discovered, in considerable quantity, between Verkhoturie and Cheliabinsk (on the eastern slopes of the Urals). In the twenties the total reserves of copper here were estimated at 1,500,000 tons. Considerable deposits of silver, lead and zinc were also discovered in the same

region. Some copper deposits have also been found in the Don basin, together with others of galena and of zinc-blend.

The Caucasus

The Caucasus is rich in light metals. Silver, lead and zinc abound in the basin of the river Ardon (N. Caucasus), while large deposits of copper ore have been located in Transcaucasia.

One of the most important copper-bearing areas here stretches from Tiflis to the shores of Lake Gokcha. The most important mining centre is Allaverd, on the railway between Tiflis and Erivan. The ore contains up to 4% of metal, and its extent is very considerable.

North of Tiflis, on the slopes of Mount Kazbek, another important copper area has recently been discovered. The reserves of ore here are estimated at over 500,000 tons, with a metal content of no less than 10%.

There is still another copper area on the southern borders of Transcaucasia—in the environs of the town of Ordubad—but this, as yet, has not been worked.

Turkestan

The results of a recent geological survey of Turkestan (1930–1931) are of great importance to the U.S.S.R. copper industry. Very considerable deposits of copper, lead and zinc have been discovered at Kara-Mazar (Ferghana). This discovery will probably make Turkestan the light-metal centre for the U.S.S.R.

According to Soviet official data this region will provide industry with at least 500,000 tons of metal a year.¹ As a beginning, it is proposed to erect smelting works here capable of producing 75,000 tons of copper, 150,000 tons of lead, and 125,000 tons of zinc yearly.²

Kazakstan

Kazakstan, also, is rich in light metals. Before the Revolution the Spassky works in the Nura basin and the Atbasar works (an English concern) were obtaining a yield of 10% to 20% copper from local ore. It was considered, at the time, that the reserves in this area were insignificant; but the survey of 1931 discovered very important deposits of copper ore in the southern part of Kazakstan. Smelting works are being erected, near Lake Balkash, capable of producing 150,000 tons a year. Important deposits of silver and lead in the same region are also being developed. In addition the Atbasar works are being modernized, and will be rendered capable of producing up to 75,000 tons of copper a year.

Altai

The deposits of light metals in the southern Altai are very rich. The most important light metal centre here is the Ridder area; where, before

¹ "Pravda." November 13th, 1931.

² "Pravda." August 23rd, 1931.

the Revolution, the reserves of metal were estimated at 50,000 tons of gold, 350,000 tons of silver, 400,000 tons of zinc, 200,000 tons of lead, and 16,000 tons of copper. A new geological survey is being carried out, and it is known that, as a result of its work, these estimates will be greatly increased. However, the precise figures have not yet been established.

Siberia

The whole of Siberia is very rich in deposits of light metals. Most of these, however, have scarcely been reconnoitred. The three most important areas here are:

1. The copper ore deposits in the basin of the Yenisey (the Minussinsk and Uriankhay districts);
2. The silver, lead and zinc deposits of Transbaikalia and,
3. The polymetallic region of Sikhota-Alin on the Pacific coast, (north of Vladivostok).

1. The Minussinsk district is extremely rich in copper pyrites, distributed over a large area between the Siberian Railway (Marinsk) and the Sayan mountains. The manufacture of copper here dates from the Bronze Age, the metal being exported eastward to China and westward as far as Hungary. Before the Revolution, only two insignificant smelting works existed in this district. At present, the district is being surveyed with a view to extensive developments.

In 1913 valuable copper deposits were discovered across the Russian-Chinese border, at Uriankhay. The territory at that time was under a *de facto* Russo-Chinese condominium. It is now the Tannu-Tuva People's Republic, a state completely dominated by Soviet influence. The copper deposits here are important; but as yet no efforts have been made to develop them.

2. The silver, lead and zinc deposits of Transbaikalia are located in the fork between the rivers Shilka and Argun (which join to form the Amur). These deposits have been worked since the second half of the eighteenth century, and an important industry was developed here in the nineteenth. The Soviet Government is surveying the region with a view to increased production; but as yet no estimates of the reserves are available.

3. The lead and zinc deposits of Sikhota-Alin differ from those elsewhere in the U.S.S.R. through their proximity to the sea. Here, before the Revolution, lead and zinc were exported to Japan and Europe from the Tetukhe mines—it being unprofitable to transport the ore by rail to Russia, while no smelting works existed locally.

As the result of the 1930-1931 survey, the U.S.S.R. reserves of light metals (copper, lead and zinc) have been estimated at some 12,000,000 tons. Further intensive researches are being conducted. In the middle twenties—on the eve of the inauguration of the Five Years Plan—the

corresponding estimate was no more than 4,000,000 tons; *i. e.* 1,000,000 tons of zinc, 1,500,000 tons of lead, and 1,500,000 tons of copper.

F. OTHER MINERALS

The following table gives a general idea of the deposits of other minerals on the territory of the U.S.S.R. Only those of definite commercial value are enumerated.

1. *Aluminum*

The principal reserves of this metal are located near the town of Tikhvin to the southward of Leningrad; they are estimated at some 300,000 tons, and the planned yearly production is to be about 20,000 tons.

New deposits have been discovered (1931) in the Khibiny mountains (Kola Peninsula), believed to be very extensive.

2. *Antimony*

Deposits of commercial value are located in Transcaucasia, and in the basin of the Amur (eastern part). Small deposits are also to be found in the Don basin, and in Ferghana.

3. *Arsenic*

The most important deposits (those in the province of Kars) have been ceded to Turkey by the Soviet Government. Other deposits of commercial value are to be found in central Caucasus. A certain amount of arsenic is also produced, as a by-product, in the mercury mines of Nikitovka (Don basin), and new deposits have been discovered in northwest Transcaucasia.

4. *Asbestos*

The reserves of asbestos in the Urals are estimated at several millions of tons. It is also found in Uriankhay, in the environs of Irkutsk, and in northern Turkestan.

5. *Barium*

Almost inexhaustible reserves of this are to be found in western Transcaucasia; and there are other deposits in the Lake Onega region and in the Altai mountains.

6. *Beryllium*

Deposits have been found in Transbaikalia.

7. *Bismuth*

Deposits of considerable value have been discovered in Transbaikalia.

8. *Graphite*

Enormous deposits are to be found in various parts of the country; the more important are:

In southern Ukraine. (Krivoy Rog);

In the northern Urals and the basins of the rivers Ilych and Pechora;

In the Tarbagatai mountains (north of Tianshan);

In the Tunguz coal basin;

In Kamchatka; and

In Transbaikalia.

The reserves of this mineral amount to thousands of millions of tons.

9. *Boron*

Boron is being extracted from the waters of the Kerch, Baku and Emba oil fields; and from the mineral waters of North Caucasus and Transcaucasia.

10. *Bromine*

Bromine occurs in the same localities as those given above for Boron.

11. *Cadmium*

Cadmium is to be found in the zinc deposits of the Ridder mining area (Altai); and in very large quantities, in the Tetukhe mines of Sikhota-Alin.

12. *Chromium*

The Ural mountains contain the world's largest deposits of ferrous chromium. They are distributed over the eastern and western slopes of the central Urals. Deposits have also been discovered lately in Armenia (Transcaucasia).

13. *Cobalt*

Cobalt is to be found in Transcaucasia (in the Tiflis-Gandzha copper fields) and has also been discovered (1922) in the central Urals.

14. *Fluorine*

Fluorine is produced chiefly from fluorspar, found in the central Urals and in Turkestan (near Tashkent). New deposits of this have also been discovered in Transbaikalia.

15. *Glauber's Salt*

The world's largest deposits of Glauber's salt (decahydrated sodium sulphate) are located in Karabugaz Bay, on the eastern coast of the Caspian. The reserves here are estimated at 500,000 tons. There are other deposits in North Caucasus, and near Tiflis; as well as in other salt-mining areas.

16. *Gold*

The most important deposits of gold are in the Urals; in the hills of the middle Yenisey basin (the two Tunguzka rivers); the Altai and Sayan mountains; in Transbaikalia; in the basins of the rivers Vitim, upper Amur, Zeya, Selendzha, Bureya; in the basin of the Lena; in the mountains of the Okhotsk littoral; and in the Chukotsk Peninsula. Some gold is also to be found in Kazakstan. Before the War, gold mining was only carried on in the Urals and the Altai mountains; but alluvial gold was obtained in the Yenisey basin, and in Transbaikalia. Since 1917, large deposits of alluvial gold have been discovered in the basins of the rivers Tympton and Aldan (Lena basin).

The total annual production of gold in pre-War years amounted to some 50 tons. The present yield is unknown.

17. *Iodine*

Iodine is obtainable from the seaweed of the Black, Caspian, Japanese and White Seas; its production, however, has only been definitely organized on the Murmansk coast of the White Sea. Efforts are now being made to organize an iodine manufacture at Baku.

18. *Lithium*

Lithium is to be found in the central Urals and Transbaikalia. The reserves in the latter locality are the more extensive.

19. *Magnesium*

Magnesium is to be found in the lakes of southern Ukraine (environs of Odessa) and those of the Crimea and lower Volga region.

20. *Manganese*

The manganese reserves of the U.S.S.R. are very extensive. The Chaitur mines in Transcaucasia are the richest in the world, with reserves of at least 250,000,000 tons. Nikopol, on the lower Dnieper, is another important manganese centre (50,000,000 tons). Manganese has also been discovered in the Sikhota-Alin mountains.

21. *Mercury*

The most important centre for mercury production is Nikitovka, in the Don basin. The reserves here are estimated at thousands of tons. Important reserves also exist in Daghestan (North Caucasus); and in 1930 large quantities of mercury bearing ores were discovered in Ferghana.

22. *Mica*

Mica is to be found in the White Sea littoral and in the Kola Peninsula. It also occurs in large quantities in the Sayan and Baikal mountains, and in the basin of the river Vitim.

23. *Mineral Wax*

Mineral wax is to be found throughout the Caucaso-Ferghana oil-bearing area.

24. *Molybdenite*

Molybdenite has been found in Transbaikalia (1916); and, recently, in the Sikhota-Alin mountains.

25. *Nickel*

Nickel occurs in the copper-bearing area between Verkhoturie and Cheliabinsk (central Urals). The centre of production is Sverdlovsk (formerly Ekaterinburg) where the reserves are estimated at over 50,000 tons of ore, containing from 0.9% to 3% of metal. Other deposits, in the Urals, contain up to 7%. In the early twenties important nickel deposits were discovered in the basin of the lower Yenissey. In 1931 new deposits were also discovered in the southern Urals—the Khalilov Mines (near the town of Orsk), estimated at 165,000 tons. Production was started here at the end of 1931.

26. *Phosphates*

Between 1909 and 1917 large deposits of phosphates (P_2O_5) were discovered throughout Russia proper, the reserves being estimated at some 5,500,000,000 tons. But their quality, with two exceptions, was low—the primary matter containing not more than 18% of phosphate. The exceptions were the Podolian deposits (containing up to 55%) and the Kama deposits (29%).

In 1923 considerable deposits of apatite (phosphate-content 34%) were discovered in the Khibiny mountains of the Kola Peninsula. Apatite is an excellent raw material for the manufacture of super-phosphates. Production was started in 1930, and has developed very rapidly; and a new town, Khibinogorsk, with 50,000 inhabitants—has sprung up. The reserves of apatite here are estimated at 1,000,000 tons. ("Pravda," August 15th, 1931.)

27. *Platinum*

Platinum is found in the Urals (annual production in pre-War years about 2.5 tons). New deposits have recently been discovered in the basin of the lower Yenissey.

28. *Potassium*

Potassium, in large quantities, was discovered in the basin of the river Kama in 1916. The reserves here are believed to be the largest known. Production, however, was only started in 1931—the yearly manufacture of 220,000 tons being planned. Potassium has also been discovered in the southern Urals, and in the basin of the Ural river.

29. *Salt*

Salt (cooking) is produced at the salt lakes of the Black and Azov sea littoral, and in the Crimea and the lower Volga regions, as well as in Turkestan, the basin of the Yenissey, Transbaikalia, and the basin of the Lena.

Deposits of rock salt are to be found in the Don basin, in the mountains east of the lower Volga; in Transcaucasia, on Cheleken island (Caspian Sea), and in the central Urals (Solikamsk). Rock salt has also been discovered recently in the basins of the Yenissey and Lena rivers.

30. *Spar*

Iceland spar of very high quality occurs near Bargusin in Transbaikalia, and in the basin of the Viluy river (a tributary of the Lena). Various deposits of inferior quality are located in the Crimea, and in the basin of the Kuban river (N. Caucasus).

Feldspar is to be found on the White Sea littoral; also in the southern Urals and the Lake Baikal region.

31. *Strontium*

Strontium is produced in Ferghana. Important deposits have been discovered in the region of Karabougaz Bay (Caspian Sea).

32. *Sulphur*

The most important mines are those of Turkestan (north of Askhabad). Other mines exist in Daghestan and the Crimea. The Askhabad deposits are supposed to be the richest in the world.

33. *Talc*

Talc occurs in large quantities in the central Urals.

34. *Thorium*

Deposits are found in the basin of the lower Dnieper (Ekaterinoslav, now Dnepropetrovsk), in the Altai mountains, and south of Lake Baikal.

35. *Tin*

Until 1852, tin was mined in Transcaucasia. Since then, work has been discontinued as unprofitable. The old mines are now being surveyed with a view to re-starting production.

36. *Titanium*

Important reserves of titanium ores have been discovered in the central Urals.

37. *Trass (Puzzolana)*

This mineral is the chief constituent of the Karadag Mountain in the

Crimea. The reserves here are estimated at 130,000,000 tons. In quality, it surpasses the Italian puzzolana.

38. *Uranium and Radium*

The only locality of any importance for the production of radium and uranium is Ferghana (the Tuia-Muiun mine). In 1922 the total radium content of this mine was estimated at from 15 to 20 gr.

39. *Vanadium*

Vanadium has been discovered on the western slopes of the central Urals and in Ferghana.

40. *Tungsten*

Small deposits are to be found in the central Urals, in Transbaikalia, and in the Amur basin.

41. *Building Stone*

Russia proper is extremely poor in good building stone (the sandstone of central Russia is not found in large quantities and is of inferior quality). Hence until the eighteenth century wood was the chief material used for building. Since then brick has been largely employed. Stone, granite, and Olonetz marble were used only for Government buildings, or those of historical importance (churches, museums, galleries, etc.). It is doubtful whether building stone will be ever found in large quantities in the U.S.S.R. Of course, such regions as the Caucasus, the Crimea, the Urals, and other mountainous districts have building stone in plenty. But the future of building in the U.S.S.R. lies in the development of the brick and cement industries.

On the other hand, the Urals and the Caucasus abound in decorative minerals such as labradorite malachite, porphyry, coloured marbles, lapis-lazuli, etc. These, however, are only useful for decoration.

42. *Peat*

The reserves of peat in the north are extremely large. In Russia proper the peat areas occupy some 18,800,000,000 hectares, the best being those of the Moscow and Leningrad regions, in the development of which peat may play a very important role. It is proposed to use it extensively as fuel for the power-stations.

43. *Slag*

The reserves of combustible slag, in the Leningrad, lower and middle Volga territories, are very considerable. These reserves are estimated at 10,000,000,000 tons; and their occurrence in these regions, poor in local fuel, is of great importance. At present, however, owing to the low calorific qualities of this fuel its manufacture is very limited.

CONCLUSION

The resources of the U.S.S.R. may be stated as unsurpassed by any other single country, the British Empire excluded. The mineral resources are located, with the exception of the Urals, on or near her southern or eastern borders—the mountainous ridges of the Caucasus, of Turkestan and Siberia. In the latter country the basins of the Yenisey and Lena, where enormous reserves of best quality coal and iron ores have been recently located, lie in the frigid zone where the earth is permanently frozen at a depth of from 2 to 4 metres from the surface. This undoubtedly constitutes a certain obstacle to the commercial development of these mineral reserves. The extremely rigorous climate of these regions must also be remembered. But the time for their development has not yet come. The most important discoveries of the last few years are those of the Kuznetzk and Karaganda coal basins, the light metal deposits of Kazakstan and Turkestan, and the iron ore deposits located immediately to the south of the Kuznetzk coal basin.

As to rubber, important experiments have been carried out with a plant, originally discovered in the Kara-Tau mountains of Kazakstan (east of Alma-Ata), which bears the name *TAU-SAGIS* meaning mountain-gum. It is reported to contain up to 45% of latex, yielding 95% pure rubber. Experimental plantations have been established in the Tashkent and Ferghana regions, in Transcaucasia and the Ukraine. The results so far have been proclaimed satisfactory and it is now proposed to build a rubber factory near Tashkent to start operations in September 1932. The planting of 100,000 hectares with tau-sagis has been decided and great hopes for "rubber-independence" are being nursed in Soviet industrial and political circles. It is as yet early to form a definite opinion on the possibilities of the tau-sagis rubber to supply the needs of the U.S.S.R.

NATIONALITIES

I

NUMBER AND RACIAL ELEMENTS OF THE POPULATION

ACCORDING to the census of January 1897, the population of the Russian Empire totalled 128,924,289 and was divided into the following nationalities:

<i>Nationality</i>	<i>In thous.</i>	<i>% of popula- tion</i>	<i>Nationality</i>	<i>In thous.</i>	<i>% of popula- tion</i>
Great Russians	55,637	43.30	Moldavians	1,122	0.67
Ukrainians	22,415	17.41	Swedes	340	0.29
White Russians	5,886	4.57	Tartars	3,738	2.91
Poles	7,931	6.17	Kirghiz	4,084	3.18
Jews	5,063	3.94	Bashkirs	1,439	1.12
Germans	1,790	1.40	Mordvins	1,024	0.79
Lithuanians	1,658	1.29	Chuvash	844	0.66
Letts	1,436	1.12	Votiaks	421	0.33
Estonians	1,003	0.78	Cheremiss	375	0.26
Georgians	1,352	1.05	Kurds and other Iranian		
Armenians	1,173	0.91	tribes	247	0.19
Lesguins	601	0.47	Turkish tribes in Siberia...	440	0.33
Circassians and Chechens	491	0.42	Turkomans	281	0.21
Sarts	969	0.75	Buriats	289	0.22
Uzbeks	727	0.57	Yakuts	227	0.17
Tadzhiks	350	0.30			

By January 1, 1914, the population of the Russian Empire had increased to 181,182,545.

The census of 1926 established the population of the U.S.S.R. at 146,637,530 and subdivided into one hundred nationalities.

THE POPULATION OF THE U.S.S.R. ACCORDING TO THE 1926 CENSUS

<i>Nationality</i>	<i>Number in thous.</i>	<i>Nationality</i>	<i>Number in thous.</i>
Russians (53%)	77,791	Bulgarians	111
Ukrainians	31,195	Letts	142
White Russians	4,739	Lithuanians	41
Jews	2,600	Finns	135
Poles	728	Estonians	155

<i>Nationality</i>	<i>Number in thous.</i>	<i>Nationality</i>	<i>Number in thous.</i>
Karelians	248	Svans	13
Veps	33	Armenians	1,568
Izhors	16	Turks	1,707
Moldavians	279	Abkhazians	57
Tats	29	Georgian Jews	21
Persians	44	Aysors	10
Kazaks	3,968	Kurds	55
Kirghiz	763	Yezids	15
Gypsies	61	Talysh	77
Kazan Tartars	2,917	Bulgars	33
Crimean Tartars	180	Karachay	55
Mishars	243	Circassians	79
Krishens	101	Ossetines	273
Bashkirs	714	Ingush	74
Teptiars	27	Avars	169
Chuvash	1,117	Laks	40
Mari	428	Chechens	319
Votiaks	504	Karakalpaks	146
Zyrians	227	Uzbeks	3,905
Permaks	149	Tadzhiks	979
Bessermans	10	Turkomans	764
Mordvins	1,340	Central Asian Jews	19
Germans	1,239	Arabs	29
Kalmuks	129	Kipchaks	34
Nogay Tartars	36	Tarranchas	53
Nogaibeks	11	Kuramas	50
Kabardins	140	Uygurs	43
Khakos	46	Dungans	15
Buriats	238	Iranians	9
Yakuts	31	Baluchis	10
Voguls	6	Altaians	41
Ostiaks	22	Shors	13
Samoyeds	15	Kamchadals	4
Tunguz	38	Chinese	10
Chukchis	12	Kumiks	95
Koraks	7	Dargins	109
Greeks	214	Lesguins	135
Crimeans	15	Tabassarans	32
Georgians	1,821	Caucasian Jews	26
Mingrelians	243	Koreans	87
Adzhars	72	Other nationalities	94

The Principal Branches

At the end of the nineteenth century the Great Russians numbered 55,637,000 or 43.30% of the total population of Russia. By 1926 they had increased to 77,791,124 (53%).

The three principal branches of the Russian race—Great Russians, Ukrainians, and White Russians—together number 113,725,023 or 80% of the total population of the U.S.S.R.

Non-Slavonic Races

The non-Slavonic population of the U.S.S.R. is composed of many different races. After the Slavonic, the most important group of nationalities is the Turkic—Tartar group—often called the “Russian Moham-

medans"—which embraces about 20 millions. These can be divided into four groups.

1. *Northwestern Turks (Volga)*: Kazan Tartars, Mishars, Bessermans, Bashkirs, Teptiars, Kirghiz, Chuvash.

2. *Southeastern Turks (Turkestan)*: Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, Tarranchas, Kipchaks, Uygurs, Kuramas, Dungans, Karakalpaks, Iranians, Baluchis; the Azerbaijan (Caucasus), Crimean—and Nogay—(Lower Volga) Tartars, also belong to this group.

3. *Northeastern Turks (Siberia)*: Yakuts, Altaians, Khakos.

4. *Caucasians*: Kabardins, Bolkars, Ossetines, Ingush, Karachay, Circassians, Chechens, Avars, Kumiks, Tabassarans, Lesguins etc.

The common bond uniting these nations is the Moslem faith—Kazan (on the Volga) and Baku (on the Caspian) are their chief religious and cultural centres; both these cities played an important part in Pan-Islamic movements.

Next come the peoples of the Ugro-Finnic group, numbering about 4,000,000; with the exception of the Western Finns, their cultural level is very low. They are either Orthodox, Protestants (the Western Finns) or heathens. The number of Finns has been greatly diminished by the separation of Finland, Estonia and Latvia from Russia.

These nations can also be divided into four groups.

1. *Western Finns (Baltic littoral)*—Karelians, Estonians, Chud, Letts, Izhors, and Finns proper.

2. *Northern Finns (Kama Region)*—Lopars, Votiaks, Permiaks, Zyrians (now called Komi).

3. *Eastern Finns (Volga)*—Mari (previously known as Cheremiss) and Mordvins.

4. *Ugro-Finns*—Samoyeds (Arctic Region), Voguls, Ostiaks, etc. (Siberia).

The Mongol group is not very numerous, but at present plays an important part in the Russian Far East, being closely related to nationalities across the border of the U.S.S.R. Most of the Mongols are Buddhists. They number about half a million (this does not include the Mongols of Red Mongolia, and of the Republic of Tannu-Tuva, regions not incorporated in the U.S.S.R., although closely allied to it and practically under its sway), and consist of the Kalmyks (N. Caspian littoral) the Buriats, Kamchadals and Oirats (E. Siberia). To these must be added a small number of Chinese, Koreans and Japanese.

Apart from these groups stand some of the nationalities of Transcaucasia; the Armenians, Georgians, Mingrelians, Lazians, Svans, Abkhazians, Aysors, Kurds and Persians. With the exception of the two latter nationalities, the majority are Christians.

An important part is played in the Union by the Germans (1,200,000) and Jews (2,500,000).

In concluding this survey it is interesting to note the increase of the U.S.S.R.'s populations since 1926, when it was 146,637,530. By 1929 it had risen to 153,930,800, and by 1932 to about 160,000,000.

II

THE CULTURAL AND POLITICAL STATE OF THE VARIOUS NATIONALITIES

(1900-1917)

AT THE end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, there was a noticeable development of consciousness among the non-Russian nationalities. The Revolution of 1905 acted as a stimulant to nationalist activity among the various peoples of the Empire—in particular, the Poles, Lithuanians, Estonians, Latvians and Finns. The nationalist movement was much less prominent in the Ukraine, White Russia, Georgia and Armenia, and it was hardly noticeable among the “backward races” of Turkestan, North Caucasus and Siberia.

After the failure of the 1905 Revolution a Russification reaction set in, which led to strained relations between the Government and the non-Russian nationalities. As a result, a great deal of anti-Russian feeling accumulated; and this led, in 1917-18, to the rapid formation of various independent States on the borders of the U.S.S.R. Thus the study of the former citizens of the Empire, today the peoples of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland are beyond the scope of this work.

White Russia

From ancient times, White Russia had been the arena of a conflict between Polish and Russian cultures. The White Russian upper classes mostly submitted to Polish culture, and became Roman Catholics; while the majority of the peasants remained Russians and Orthodox. This has been a source of continual strife between the Russian and Polish elements almost to the present day.

White Russia's wealth resided in its timber but the very size of its vast forests, surrounded by bogs and far from both the sea and the great trade-routes, had a deterrent effect upon trade and industry. The country's remoteness from the great cultural centres too, and its limited population, rendered it unable to keep pace with the general cultural and economic development of the Russian Empire.

White Russia's tragedy lay in the fact that the bulk of the Russian population had insufficient land to be economically independent, as the Polish land-owners possessed over half the total area.

The spiritual needs of the White Russians were ministered to by both Russians and Poles, while trade was chiefly left in the hands of the Jews. It is not surprising, therefore, that the White Russian nationalist

movement began much later than the other similar movements in Russia; or that it achieved very little either in the political or cultural spheres.

The Ukraine

Quite another picture is presented by the Ukrainian nationalist movement. It had behind it a great historical tradition, and soon spread beyond the borders of the Empire into Galicia—inhabited by Ukrainians (Ruthenians) while it now influences Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia (Carpathian Russia).

Ukrainian nationality is not based merely upon a political history—it can also point to many achievements in the sphere of culture; and although the Ukraine, on its own initiative, was united to Russia in the seventeenth century, many subsequent efforts were made by powerful factions to establish national independence with the help of the Poles, Turks and Swedes.

The nineteenth century saw a renaissance of Ukrainian culture, and many of its representatives became prominent in art, science and politics. Some of them, such as Gogol, Skovoroda, Gnedich and Kostomarov, formed part of the general Russian culture. Others—such as Kotliarevsky, a dramatist, and Shevchenko, the national poet—were Ukrainians first and foremost. On the whole the Ukrainian movement, both in and outside Russia, was not anti-Russian; but it bore a definitely federalist character.

Dragomanov, a historian and philosopher who died at the beginning of this century was the most eminent representative of these Ukrainian tendencies. He unequivocally insisted upon the cultural independence of the Ukraine and proposed to reconstruct Russia on a federal basis, without altering her status as a single Power. Many cultured people and various societies in the Ukraine subscribed to these sentiments; but they met with opposition from those who either thought there could be no independent Ukrainian culture or who wanted political independence as well.

The Ukrainian Revolutionary Party, the first Ukrainian political party, was founded early in this century. Out of this party came the Socialist Federalists, who demanded the federation of the peoples of Russia, with an autonomous Ukraine forming part of the Russian State, and the Ukrainian Social Democrats, who joined the Russian Social Democrats as an independent group. In 1905 the activity of the Ukrainian Nationalists was renewed; it manifested itself in the Duma elections, in an extensive nationalist propaganda among schools and in the organization of political unions and artistic societies.

These federalist tendencies, however, did not triumph. For the bulk of the Ukrainian population their country was an integral part of the Russian Empire; a part organically connected with it in all departments of life. Russia's economic advance was reflected in the Ukraine, which kept pace with her in railway and port construction, output of

coal, and activity in the metal and sugar industries—all largely due to Russian capital. Statistics show, too, that the percentage of literacy was much the same for the Russian and Ukrainian Provinces.

Over-population in agrarian districts, the most pressing problem of the Russian Empire, was as prominent in the Ukraine as in Great Russia. What is more, it was solved in the same way—by emigration to Siberia and Turkestan; a fact demonstrating the close relations of the Ukraine with other parts of the Empire. During the decade 1896–1907 emigration from the Ukraine exceeded that from any other region.

The official persecution of the Ukrainian language, literature and art, which assumed a severe form after the Revolution of 1905, stimulated a strong protest in those Ukrainian circles which stood for national independence; separatist tendencies grew rapidly among the educated middle class. But the upper classes, consisting largely of Russians and Poles, were merely fighting their own battles: the mass of the population—the peasantry—remained unaffected by the struggle.

Georgia

Georgia, small in territory and population, has a very ancient and interesting history. She first came into touch with Russia by way of Byzantium in the tenth century; and, during the Mongol Conquest, in the thirteenth. The common history of Russia and Georgia begins in the days of Catherine the Great and Alexander I, after Georgia's voluntary union with Russia. Georgians have since taken a prominent part in the life of the Empire.

Georgia's nationalist revival began in the nineteenth century, and took a literary form. The new Georgian literature based itself on classical examples—the golden era of Georgian literature proper was from the tenth to the thirteenth centuries. The theatre developed side by side with literature; and, towards the end of the nineteenth century, politics began to interest the Georgians—especially the nobility and the intelligentsia.

The Social Democrats played a great part in Georgian life. They attracted both the cultured classes and the representatives of the clergy, and were very closely connected with the Russian Social Democrats.

The Revolution of 1905 gave a stimulus to Georgian nationalist tendencies, hitherto rather weak. The Georgian Social Democratic Party demanded cultural autonomy; but no separation from the Russian State was contemplated. This was chiefly due to the fact that the more energetic Georgians sought a wider field for their activities—they were interested in Empire politics, and thought imperially. Local politics could not satisfy them. It is chiefly due to the vacillations of Russian policy in Transcaucasia that Georgian nationalist activity was diverted to the revolutionary camp.

Armenia

Armenia, Georgia's neighbour for 2000 years, has been known to

history from Biblical times. The Armenians trace their origin from Haika, son of Togarmah (Genesis x, 3) and they call themselves Haikans. They adopted Christianity in the third century; and from then onwards religion played a leading part in the history of the nation. Surrounded by the Mohammedans of Persia, Turkey, Kurdistan and Azerbaijan, Armenia maintained her religious and national character through the centuries, being supported in her national struggle by the Orthodox East, Russia in particular.

Armenia was once a powerful state. Her sons still show great ability as statesmen. The closest associate of the Russian Emperor Alexander II was Count Loris-Melikov, an Armenian, and many grand viziers of the Ottoman Empire were Armenians. But the Armenians' lot was hard. During the whole of the nineteenth century, and in the first two decades of the twentieth, there were continual collisions with the Mohammedan world—especially with Turkey. The whole world rang with horrible accounts of Armenian massacres.

Until the end of the last century, the Armenians believed that the all-powerful Russian Empire would save them from the Turks and Kurds and give them some prospect of peaceful development. The failure of Russia (for international reasons) to secure autonomy for the Turkish Armenians after 1878 led the Armenian nationalists to the conclusion that extreme measures must be taken to save the Armenian people. The Armenian revolutionary movement began at the end of the nineteenth century. At first directed against the Turks, it soon became involved in the Russian revolutionary movement as well.

The Armenians became convinced that it was not Russia as a country, but Russia's autocratic Government, that was unwilling to protect Armenia against the Turks. A strong and energetic Armenian Revolutionary Party—*Dashnaktzutun*—was formed, and became very popular. By 1905 this Party had drafted its programme, chiefly following those of the Russian Socialist parties. Its general tendencies were federalist.

Armenian revolutionaries, however, were not the sole representatives of Armenian political opinion. The clergy, and numbers of the wealthy Armenian bourgeoisie were eminently loyal to the Russian Government, and waited patiently for reforms. The Armenian masses on the whole regarded Russia as their second fatherland.

Azerbaijan

The third Transcaucasian country, Azerbaijan, is populated by Tartars. Their religion divides them from both the Georgians and Armenians, as well as from the Russians; and in the past they did not regard the Russians as allies and defenders (the Georgian opinion) or saviours (as did the Armenians) but as enemies and intruders. Their allegiance to Moslem culture strengthened Russo-Tartar antagonisms in Transcaucasia. The Azerbaijanians, however, soon realized that the Russian Empire offered them advantages they could never enjoy under either Turkey or Persia. Russian capital developed their country to a

wonderful extent. The Baku Tartars greatly profited by the development of the oil industry: and their economic prosperity enabled them to assist other Mohammedans in Russia.

The revolutionary movement in Azerbaijan took a definitely economic trend. When the War broke out, there were two camps; the European, consisting of the upper urban classes; and the Asiatic, which comprised the proletarians and peasants—who were completely under the influence of beys, mullahs and revolutionary workers. The revolutionary movement in Transcaucasia, however, was not so much under the direction of Azerbaijan revolutionaries as of Armenian and Georgian.

Other Nationalities

The Northwestern Volga Tartars, came into the closest relations with the Russians. The close proximity of the two peoples (the Tartar population is 50% of the present Tartar Republic) strengthened the relations between Russians and Tartars, but did not lead the Tartars to abandon their religion or customs; Tartar culture developed under strong Russian influence, but was always based on Islam. The bulk of the population—the peasants—were on the same level as their Russian neighbours. Tartar trade and industry occupied an important place in Russian economic life. Kazan¹ was the centre of Tartar religion and culture: its influence spread all over the Mohammedan population of the Empire. The Tartar share in Pan-Islamic movements never outweighed the native loyalty to the Russian State. In this region, nationalist tendencies were very slow to appear.

The Government's policy of Russification, however, assisted this development. In 1908 a Special Commission to elaborate Measures against Mohammedan influence in the Volga Region was formed. The measures adopted were particularly directed against the "Mekteb" schools (by the substitution of Russian schools) where Tartar children were taught religion, reading and writing. These Tartar schools not only influenced the local population but also remote tribes such as the Chuvash, the Kirghiz, the Tadzhiks and the Turkomans. The Special Commission took steps to strengthen the position of the Orthodox Church, to enforce the teaching of Russian, and to influence the Tartar mind by administrative measures. These measures had their effect upon other Mohammedan districts also, and aroused a great deal of opposition.

The Kirghiz

The largest nation amongst the Northwestern Turks were the Kirghiz (including Kazaks and Karakirghiz) who numbered four millions. The Kirghiz until recently lived a semi-nomadic tribal life. Previous to the Revolution there were three Hordes, Great, Middle and Small; their chief occupation was and still is cattle breeding. A widespread illiteracy

¹ Kazan was at the same time an important centre of Russian culture—the seat of one of Russia's oldest Universities.

prevents any speedy cultural advance. Until 1916 there was no registration of Kirghiz marriages, births or deaths and the first Kirghiz newspaper, "Kazak," was only published (at Orenburg) in 1912. Its readers were Kirghiz of the upper class and clergymen.

The conscription of Kirghiz as army labourers during the War resulted in a serious rebellion (1916), only put down with difficulty.

The Bashkirs and Chuvash

The Bashkirs are now an agricultural tribe. In 1861 they were settled as peasants and lost a large proportion of their lands, being transformed, by Government decree, from nomads into farmers. The agrarian revolutionary movement which developed among the Bashkirs in the twentieth century was led exclusively by Russian revolutionaries.

Closely related to the Bashkirs are the Chuvash. Their language (of Turkic origin) and their blood are strongly diluted by a Finnic admixture. In manners and customs they are Tartars: they shave their heads and wear the Tartar cap—although they belong to the Orthodox Church. They do not differ greatly from the Russian peasants among whom they live.

The Uzbeks Etc.

The Southeastern Turks (Turkestan) are composed of Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, Tarranchas and other smaller tribes. The Uzbeks are the descendants of nomads who settled on the irrigated land in Turkestan. Their principal occupation is agriculture—chiefly cotton-growing. They derive their name from Khan Uzbek, who ruled them in the fourteenth century. In the fifteenth, a portion of the tribe detached itself from the Uzbek State and travelled to the northeastward, where they became known as Kazaks, or Kaizaks (*i. e.* freemen). Those who remained loyal to the Khan retained the name of Uzbeks, and later subjugated the Tadzhiks, who from ancient times had occupied the territory of which they were now dispossessed.

In order to secure firm control of the region, the Russian Government broke up the nomadic life of the tribes and promoted their settlement. Much was done by the Government to pacify and develop the region, but the local population saw itself compelled to surrender to Russian emigrants an important proportion of the territory where it had formerly wandered nomadically.

The Northeastern Turks form the smallest group, the weakest and least cultured. It consists of Yakuts, Teleuts, Oirats (Altaians), Shorts, Khakos and others. The Yakuts call themselves Sakha-Lar, and speak an old Turkic dialect. The majority are Orthodox, but they retain many pagan customs. They are agriculturalists, cattle breeders, and traders. So successful are they in this latter occupation that they are sometimes called the Jews of East Siberia.

Unlike the Yakuts, the Oirats are backward. They occupy themselves with agriculture. In this region the Teleuts (nomads), Shorts (agricul-

turalists) and many other tribes also led, until the Great War, a very primitive existence.

The Crimean Tartars, related by blood to the above-mentioned tribes, are comparatively highly cultured. Many very interesting historical remains (the town of Bakhchisaray and others, for example) have been preserved in the Crimea. In the latter pre-War years there was a renaissance of Tartar culture, stimulated by archeological excavations and the spread of education.

Caucasian Mohammedans

The group of Caucasian Mohammedans consists of many diverse tribes inhabiting North Caucasus. The origins and languages of some of them are still obscure. The most cultured and numerous are the Kabardins (a handsome and warlike race) who with the Bolkars and Karachays inhabit the mountain gorges in the region of Kashtan-Tau and Elbruz. Another cultured tribe are the Ossetines. The Chechens are a warlike and predatory race, who composed the bulk of Shamil's army—the last defender of North Caucasian independence.

Little need be said about the other minor nationalities of the Russian Empire, as their importance in the State was not great, and their low cultural level excluded them from any appreciable share in the country's life.

III

THE REVOLUTION

THE Provisional Government proclaimed a policy of toleration towards national aspirations, and the free cultural development of all the nationalities of Russia; but, being pre-occupied with disastrous events at the front and internal discords, it did nothing really constructive.

This hesitating policy resulted in rapidly strengthening the separatist tendencies to an extreme degree.

The Revolution was hailed by the minor nationalities of the Empire as the beginning of a new national era. Few among them desired to break away from the Russian State. On the contrary, the majority considered themselves a component part of one great organism. But the activity of the separatists, the lethargic policy of the Provisional Government, war weariness and Communist propaganda soon produced a marked change in public opinion.

The revolutionary and national problems entered upon new phases. The Finnish Sejm (Legislature) was the first to raise the question of the right to secede from Russia. The Provisional Government dissolved the Sejm and strengthened the armed forces in Finland. Some months later, the Soviet Government saw itself forced to concede Finnish independence.

The Provisional Government, it is true, proclaimed the independence of Poland; but as Poland was then occupied by the enemy, who had already proclaimed Polish independence themselves, this gesture of the Provisional Government was more or less irrelevant.

The Ukraine underwent many changes, coming under about twenty different political regimes within two years. In April 1917 the All-Ukrainian National Congress was summoned. It elected an executive body called the Central Rada, and resolved to demand the autonomous organization of the Ukraine. The Provisional Government did not agree with this resolution. A conflict arose, which ended in the defeat of the Rada: whereupon the Ukrainian nationalists addressed the people over the heads of the Central Government. A few days after the fall of the Provisional Government, the Ukrainian Rada proclaimed the Ukrainian People's Republic, but still did not envisage a complete severance from Russia. It was only at the beginning of 1918 that the full independence of the Ukraine was proclaimed. In turn, the Ukraine had then to submit to a German invasion, to occupation by Denikin's Volunteer Army; and, finally, to inclusion within the Soviet Federation as the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

White Russia's fate was somewhat similar; but there, in addition to the Germans, the Poles took a hand—endeavouring to create a Polish White Russia. Finally part of it was united to the Soviet State as the White Russian Socialist Soviet Republic (B.S.S.R.),—the rest being occupied by the Poles.

The fate of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan is very instructive. Previous to the War and the Revolution, the idea of separation from Russia was never mooted. Attempts by spies to spread Turkish propaganda during the War met with no success. The people looked upon the Revolution as an all-Russian affair, for which all the nationalities in the Empire were responsible. When the Provisional Government was overthrown, regional administrations were established. They were meant to be merely temporary, pending the convocation of an All-Russian National Constituent Assembly. These administrations had but a brief existence. Local politicians, fearing anarchy and Bolshevism, and acting under external pressure (occupation by Germany and the menace of a Turkish advance) proclaimed the independence of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. These proclamations, in the two former cases, were not popular, nor did the Azerbaijan Tartars particularly desire independence. Subsequent events, such as the Armenian-Tartar massacres, a Georgian-Armenian conflict and a Turkish invasion, sufficiently showed the disadvantages of separation. The restoration of State unity, in the form of the Soviet federative system, was accepted by Transcaucasians as a necessity.

IV

NATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE U.S.S.R.

ON NOVEMBER 2, 1918, the Soviet Government issued a declaration of the Rights of Nationalities in Russia. Its four chief points were as follows: 1) the equality, and sovereignty of all nationalities, 2) the right of free self-determination up to complete independence, 3) the abolition of all national and religious privileges and limitations, and 4) the free development of minorities and ethnographical groups in Russia.

The Declaration recognized that the Republic was a free union of free nations, and that this union was established by treaty (1923) between the R.S.F.S.R. and the other Soviet Republics.

The mainstays of Soviet federalism are: 1) the control of all units of the Federation through the organs of the Communist Party and 2) the maintenance of superior strength in population, wealth and resources of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.), the mainstay of the Union. It is interesting to compare the latter, from a political, cultural and economical point of view, with the three other more important republics—the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (Uk.S.S.R.), the Transcaucasian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic (Z.S.F.S.R.) and the White Russian Soviet Socialist Republic (B.S.S.R.).

On one hand is the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic, with a territory of 19,648,160 sq. kilometres, and 105,568,800 inhabitants; and on the other, the Ukraine, with a territory of 451,828 sq. kilometres and a population of 30,350,000, White Russia with a territory of 126,792 sq. kilometres and a population of 5,171,000, and Transcaucasia, with a territory of 185,968 sq. kilometres, and a population of 6,146,000.

In addition to the natural predominance of the R.S.F.S.R. the centripetal tendencies in other Republics, being stronger than the centrifugal, render the Union a fairly stable body. Even the Transcaucasian Republic, notwithstanding the Georgian revolt of 1926, regards its union with the Russian Republic as, on the whole, a guarantee of peace and a protection against external enemies—Turkey, especially. The White Russian Republic is still more closely attached to the R.S.F.S.R. This leaves only the Ukrainian Republic to be considered.

A section of the Ukrainian, and also of the foreign Press, over-emphasize the state of separatist feeling in the Ukraine, and gives a misleading impression as to the true state of affairs. There is no doubt that the separatists are chiefly political refugees abroad, and have no real influence with the Ukrainian population. In addition, the disproportion, in numbers, national resources and economic power, between the Ukraine and the R.S.F.S.R., does not favour Ukrainian separatism.

TERRITORY AND POPULATION OF THE NATIONAL REPUBLICS (JANUARY 1, 1931)

<i>Territory</i>	<i>Area in sq. klms.</i>	<i>Population</i>	
		<i>Total</i>	<i>per sq. klm.</i>
<i>U.S.S.R.</i>	21,171,521	153,930,800	7.3
<i>R.S.F.S.R.</i>	19,648,166	105,667,800	5.4
Bashkir Autonomous Socialist Republic	151,840	2,807,300	18.5
Buriat-Mongol Autonomous Socialist Republic.....	376,392	546,600	1.5
Daghestan Autonomous Socialist Republic ¹	56,747	807,300	14.2
Kazak Autonomous Republic.....	2,983,564	6,816,900	2.3
Karelian Autonomous Republic.....	145,226	278,100	1.9
Kirghiz Autonomous Republic.....	196,740	1,048,900	2.3
Crimean Autonomous Republic.....	25,880	755,300	29.2
German Volga Autonomous Republic ²	27,152	610,200	22.5
Tartar Autonomous Republic.....	67,153	2,646,700	39.4
Chuvash Autonomous Republic ³	18,309	912,100	49.8
Yakut Autonomous Republic.....	4,023,307	281,000	0.07
<i>U.K.S.S.R.</i>	451,829	30,350,500	67.2
<i>B.S.S.R.</i>	126,792	5,171,100	40.8
<i>Z.S.F.S.R.</i>	185,968	6,146,700	33.2
Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic.....	85,896	2,412,000	28.1
Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic.....	29,964	960,800	32.1
Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic.....	69,259	2,773,900	40.1
<i>Uzbek S.S.R.</i>	309,843	5,520,300	17.8
<i>Turkoman S.S.R.</i>	449,000	1,074,400	2.4
<i>Tadzhik S.S.R.</i>	161,300	1,036,000	6.4

(Published by the Central Statistical Department of the U.S.S.R.)

V

CULTURE

Education

FEDERAL principles are largely embodied in the Soviet educational system, where the use of the local language is made compulsory. This is a radical departure from tradition. Before Count Ignatiev's reforms, tuition in any other language than Russian was hardly countenanced, save in a few exceptional cases. Even the reform of 1915 only introduced tuition in the mother tongue for elementary schools and in a limited degree.

According to the constitution of the U.S.S.R. the responsibility for all cultural work rests upon the Federal Republics; although the Central Government lays down the general lines of education and hygiene, on principles which cannot be altered by local legislation.

The following table shows the literacy of the general population both in Russian, and in local tongues.

¹ This Republic was included in the North Caucasian Territory in November 1931.

² This Republic is included in the Central Volga Territory.

³ This Republic is included in the Nizhni-Novgorod Territory.

NATIONALITIES

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<i>Nationality</i>	<i>% of literate</i>	<i>Of these only in national language</i>	<i>Nationality</i>	<i>% of literate</i>	<i>Of these only in national language</i>
Russians	45.0	99.7	Estonians	72.4	77.3
Ukrainians	43.3	51.9	Karelians	41.4 ¹
White Russians	37.3	40.2	Veps	35.7 ¹
Jews	72.3	55.5 ¹	Izhors	60.9	23.1
Poles	53.8	52.3	Moldavians	27.6	38.7
Bulgarians	51.5	39.6	Greeks	50.3	21.4
Letts	74.5	66.3	Gypsies	8.3
Lithuanians	70.5	28.1	Tartars	33.6	92.5
Bashkirs	24.3	40.0	Cauc. Jews	19.7	22.8
Mishars	25.6	83.9	Georgians	39.5	98.3
Krishens	29.2 ¹	Armenians	18.2	80.9
Teptiars	24.3 ¹	Turks	8.1	96.2
Nagays	7.1	27.4	Abkhazians	11.3	42.9
Nagai-Beks	42.0	28.8	Chuvash	32.2	89.6
Kabardins	6.8	23.7	Cheremiss	26.6	69.4
Balkars	5.3	15.9	Votiaks	25.6	75.5
Karachays	9.2	Zyrians	38.1	56.2
Circassians	16.9	36.6	Permiaks	26.1 ¹
Ossetines	31.2	38.5	Besermens	16.6	54.6
Ingush	9.1	13.9	Mordvins	22.9	28.9
Chechens	2.9	29.8	Germans	60.2	91.7
Avars	6.8	85.6	Kalmuks	10.9	38.3
Laks	8.4	87.1	Karakalpaks	1.3	66.3
Kumiks	11.1	81.3	Tadzhiks	2.2	69.9
Dargins	4.9	79.0	Cent. Asian Jews	24.2	79.6
Lesguins	7.1	Kipchaks	1.4	94.8
Tabassarans	1.6	Kuramas	2.4	13.2
Dungans	8.6	40.1	Kirghiz	4.6	93.2
Baluchis	0.3	58.8	Uzbeks	3.8	98.0
Shorts	11.5	44.4	Turkomans	2.3	91.1
Buriats	23.2	Arabs	1.2	10.8
Voguls	6.2 ¹	Tarranchas	8.5	91.4
Samoyedes	2.8 ¹	Uygurs	4.6	53.7
Chukchis	0.6 ¹	Iranians	7.9	9.6
Kamchadals	39.6 ¹	Altaians	40.0	8.5
Georgian Jews	32.9	25.0	Khakos	12.9	3.0
Aysors	25.2	44.0	Yakuts	5.8	85.7
Kurds	3.7	2.3	Ostiaks	6.9 ¹
Yessids	2.1	10.4	Tunguzes	7.8 ¹
Talish	3.0	Koriaks	5.9 ¹
Tats	5.9	Chinese	42.1	85.2
Persians	14.1	46.4	Koreans	39.8	86.6
Kazaks	7.1	96.5	Total in the U.S.S.R.	50.8	83.0

These figures cannot be considered apart from the quality of the work carried out. This, it must be confessed, is not very high. At the XVI Congress of the Communist Party (1930) it was stated that the agricultural experts sent to Central Asia could not make themselves understood by the people. And in most other minority regions not only agricultural experts, but even doctors, teachers, and engineers had a similar experience. Trade union, political, and economic Soviet workers, moreover, are frequently in the same position.

¹ In Russian.

The Press

A great effort has been made to "nationalize" the Press. It is regarded as a sure weapon of Communist propaganda; and every means of using it to reach the population is being exploited to the full. In particular, the publication of newspapers in the various languages of the Union is important; in 1930 there were published 356 newspapers in Russian and 249 in other languages.

Anti-Religious Propaganda

All religions—Christian, Mohammedan, Jewish etc.—are persecuted. Information derived from the U.S.S.R. reveals an awful condition of spiritual decadence and moral decline. The Union of the Godless, numbering over 4,000,000 members, is responsible for active propaganda among the population. The following table shows the distribution of the Union by nationalities, according to Soviet data (1930).

THE UNION OF THE GODLESS

<i>Nationality</i>	<i>Number in thous.</i>	<i>Nationality</i>	<i>Number in thous.</i>
Russians	2,000	Moldavians	1
White Russians	40	Kazaks	3
Ukrainians	460	Chuvash	5
Jews	200	Armenians	3
Tartars	45	Karelians	1.01
Bashkirs	20	Bolkars	0.1
Mari	2	Letts	3
Poles	5	Lithuanians	0.1
Buriats	4	Bulgarians	0.5
Germans	20	Circassians	0.5
Ossetines	1	Ingush	0.51
Georgians	3	Finns	0.7
Uzbeks	25	Arabs	0.02
Turks	5	Samoyeds	0.02
Greeks	0.1	Turkomans	1.5
Mordvins	3	Kirghiz	1.52
Karalims	0.05	Chechens	0.6
Votiaks	1.1	Tadzhiks	0.3
Oirats	0.5	Estonians	0.5
Zyrians	0.5	Chinese	0.5
Yakuts	0.1	Koreans	0.25
Kalmuks	0.5	Uygurs	0.02
Avars	0.75		

(Figures for 1930, as published by the Central Statistical Department of the U.S.S.R.)

VI

THE COMMUNISTS

THE most important element in the Union is the Communist Party. As the ruling Party, it has manifold duties in the Union. So far as federation goes, they can be reduced to the following: 1) maintenance of

the Union, 2) the preservation of its Communist character, 3) control of the administration, and 4) Communist education of the proletariat.

The task is not an easy one. Quite apart from the question of separatism there is a very definite clash between the principles of national autonomy and the aims of Communism.

The combination of internationalism and nationalism in Communist policy is further complicated by the stipulation that all Party members must be of proletarian origin. This must ultimately result in the predominance of one principle over the other; and experience suggests that nationalism will prove the victor. Proletarians undergo "a change of heart" when they attain influential positions in the Party. The local Communists begin gradually to consider themselves the representatives of national minorities as a whole, rather than of their proletariat.

NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN 1927¹

<i>Nationality</i>	<i>Members and Candidates</i>	<i>Nationality</i>	<i>Members and Candidates</i>
Total	1,060,860	Germans	5,226
Russians	688,855	Ossetines	4,431
Ukrainians	122,928	Estonians	3,602
Jews	45,346	Mordvins	3,653
White Russians	32,646	Lithuanians	2,577
Armenians	18,088	Bashkirs	2,442
Georgians	16,136	Finns	1,810
Tartars	14,711	Lesguins	1,493
Uzbeks	13,295	Koreans	1,257
Letts	12,198	Tadzhiks	1,359
Kazaks	11,950	Kabardins	1,134
Poles	11,158	Persians	1,124
Turks	10,841	Bulgarians	759

The majority of the Communist Party is Russian. This corresponds to the predominance of Russians in the Union. The percentage of Communists amongst Russians, however, is not so large as that of Communists in other nations of the Union. There are only 72 Communists to every 10,000 Russians, while the Georgians number 88 per 10,000, the Armenians 116 and the Jews 155. The Ukrainians and White Russians have lower proportions—39 for the former and 69 for the latter. It is interesting to notice the number of women, of various nationalities, in the Party. One seventh of the members of the Union Party are Russian women; Ukrainian women comprise a tenth, Jewesses a fourth, Armenian and Georgian women about one eighteenth, while (owing to their particular customs and religions) practically no women figure on the rolls of the Asiatic nationalities, such as the Uzbeks, Bashkirs and Tadzhiks.

Another peculiar feature is the high percentage of Communists who belong to nationalities living on the Eastern and Western frontiers of the Union—Estonians, Letts, Lithuanians, Poles, Chinese and Koreans.

¹ No later detailed figures have been published.

This is a result of Soviet policy—a Communist, of any nationality, may prove a useful weapon for the Government across the border.

Table No. 8 shows the national composition of the organization known as the Lenin Union of Communist Youth.

NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF THE UNION OF COMMUNIST YOUTH

<i>Nationality</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Nationality</i>	<i>Total</i>
Russians	1,436,463	Estonians	3,084
Ukrainians	300,965	Letts	2,595
Jews	98,323	Karelians	2,790
Georgians	66,727	Kabardins	2,784
Armenians	52,375	Finns	2,520
White Russians	58,403	Avars	2,507
Turks	57,882	Kumiks	2,555
Uzbeks	50,157	Lesguins	2,416
Tartars	39,050	Abkhazians	1,775
Ossetines	12,739	Permiaks	1,261
Kazaks	52,145	Adzhars	2,102
Chuvash	14,928	Greeks	2,527
Kirghiz	13,447	Circassians	1,590
Poles	8,276	Moldavians	897
Bashkirs	9,549	Karakalpaks	1,256
Koreans	6,028	Ingush	1,074
Turkomans	9,950	Yakuts	1,127
Tadzhiks	6,911	Karachays	1,002
Mordvins	5,660	Dargins	1,078
Buriats	3,890	Laks	603
Mari	3,937	Bolkars	654
Germans	4,849	Oirats	671
Votiaks	4,351	Khakos	480
Zyrians	4,044	Others	40,968
Chechens	3,728		
Kalmuks	5,017	Total in the U.S.S.R.	2,409,864

(Official Soviet Data for 1930.¹)

VII

THE FIVE YEARS PLAN

IN THEIR endeavour to build up a Socialist country entirely independent of the Capitalist world, the Communists were obliged to resort to centralization—which stands in direct contradiction not only to the general principle of national autonomy, but to the nationalist policy which they themselves proclaim. While associating various economic enterprises with different regions of the Union, they set local authority entirely aside, in favour of Moscow's. Hence conflicts between Union and local interests are frequent.

The richest reserves of natural resources are located in the R.S.F.S.R. The Five Years Plan accordingly devotes the greater proportion of its capital investments to that Republic, much to the discontent of

¹ The total in 1932 is estimated by the Soviet Press to have reached 5,000,000.

the others, especially as it affects not only possible revenue but also employment.

Figures published by the Soviet Government in 1929 establish that the workers (the proletariat proper) were 2.75% of the total population of the Union. In the R.S.F.S.R. they were 3.5%, in the Uk.S.S.R.—2.50%, in the B.S.S.R.—1.25% and in the Z.S.F.S.R.—1.5%. The proportion was less than 1% in all other Republics. Since 1929 conditions have changed still more in favour of the R.S.F.S.R.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, let it once more be emphasized that Soviet Federalism differs greatly from any other kind of federal system in the world. It is a transitory stage in the evolution towards a purely Communist society; and the federation of national proletarian minorities is merely a tactical variation in applying the principle of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat.

The national aspirations of the many races and nationalities of the U.S.S.R. forced the Communist leaders to adopt this method as far back as 1918. Hence the federal structure of the Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R., as well as many other concessions to federal ideas in the field of politics, culture and even economics.

But while preserving an appearance of federation, the Communists persistently strengthen the central authority by every available means. In the political sphere the authorities of the Federal Republics merely execute instructions received from Moscow, which alone controls foreign relations and trade, questions of defense, the financial policy of the Union and its police force (OGPU). In the cultural sphere (education), under cover of regional autonomy, Moscow supervises programmes elaborated by the Central Government; in the economic field, local interests are everywhere subordinated to those of the Union.

And behind all stand the Communists, the true rulers of the U.S.S.R. The Communist Party—a formidable guardian in the strictest sense of the word, of the unity of the U.S.S.R.—is the chief force that at present holds it together. In this task it utilizes the natural bonds that unite the peoples of the Soviet State no less than it does measures of administrative and political compulsion.

Yet Communism appears, at the same time, to be the Union's principal weakness. The proportion of the proletariat (proper) to the population in general is so small that the only safe method of government for the rulers of the U.S.S.R. is an absolute dictatorship. The attitude of the bulk of the population (of all nationalities) remains, if not openly hostile, at least definitely distrustful of the Communist regime, and jealous of the vast privileges enjoyed by the proletariat.

In spite of all measures of severity, anti-Communist feeling manifests itself in every form and shape. In the Federal Republics this, very often, takes a nationalist character. In certain instances it may even take an

anti-Russian turn; although, quite apart from theoretical Communism, the perpetual community of political, economical and cultural interests emphasizes the necessity of union between the nationalities of the U.S.S.R.

Note: A few words must be said about the peculiar position of Bessarabia. This Province of the Empire was ceded to Russia by Turkey in 1812. Its population at that time consisted of some 240,000 Moldavians, Bulgars, Greeks and Russians. In 1856, by the Treaty of Paris, Russia was compelled to restore Lower Bessarabia (the estuaries of the Danube and Pruth) to Turkey, but recovered it again after the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-78.

By the returns of the census of 1897 the population of the Province was about 2,000,000 and in 1917 it was estimated at 2,700,000—the Moldavians constituting about half and the Russians about a quarter.

Bessarabia had greatly prospered under Russian rule; a century of peaceful development with the assistance of Russian capital had made of it one of the richest Provinces of the Empire.

After the March, 1917 Revolution a Provincial Council—Sfatul Tarii—was established in Kishinev; this body displayed federalist tendencies but was decidedly hostile to Rumanian pretensions to the Province.

At the end of 1917 the Rumanian Government, profiting by the disintegration of the Russian army and by the presence of Rumanian troops in Bessarabia (reorganized in the Russian rear after their defeat by Mackensen), occupied the Province with the assent of a minority in the Sfatul Tarii. A Rumanian proclamation to the people gave the assurance that no annexation of the Province was contemplated. On March 27, 1918, however, Rumanian soldiers occupied the Council Chamber and the members of the Sfatul Tarii were coerced into passing a resolution in favour of incorporation with the Rumanian Kingdom, the vote being taken openly and by name. A few hours later the whole administration was taken over by the Rumanian military, while the few members of the Council who had had the courage to protest against this action were summarily executed.

The occupation of South Russia by Bolshevik troops in the spring of 1918 forced the Rumanians to agree to return the Province to Russia, the treaty being signed by General Averescu on behalf of the Rumanian Government. The Reds were, however, obliged to retreat north of the Ukraine by the advance of the Germans; the Rumanians, who had concluded a separate peace with the Central Empires in 1917, abrogated their agreement with the Reds.

In 1920 (Oct. 28) Belgium, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan recognized the Rumanian annexation of Bessarabia; the United States, however, refused to be party to this transaction. No Russian Government has ever recognized the Rumanian claim to Bessarabia and there is no difference of opinion on the subject among the Russians at home or abroad.

The anti-Russian policy pursued by the Rumanians in the Province

is well known and has led over a hundred thousand people to emigrate into the U.S.S.R. where they were settled in the so-called Moldavian Autonomous Republic. Several popular risings occurred in the Province, the most serious being that of Akkerman in 1924.

Thus Bessarabia remains to this day a sore point of Eastern European politics. Torn between the Rumanian oppression and the fear of a Red regime the Province still awaits the decision of its destinies.

THE JEWISH QUESTION

I

THE HISTORICAL PAST OF THE JEWS IN RUSSIA AND THE ORIGIN OF RUSSIAN LEGISLATION RESPECTING THE JEWS

THE catastrophic collapse of the Russian Empire, and the formation of independent States on its Western borders, brought about the dispersal of the hitherto united six million Russian Jews, and made a sudden break in the long line of their historical development—a break which reduced this people to a state of unprecedented cultural and economic decline.

The Jews came into contact with Russia as early as the tenth century, when Jewish settlers from the Judaic Kingdom of the Khozars (the Black and Caspian Sea littoral) came to Kiev. However, until the end of the eighteenth century there was no Jewish problem in the strict sense of the word. The Jews settled in the Russian and Ukrainian towns suffered occasional persecutions, owing to religious fanaticism; there were occasional pogroms in the Ukraine (under Russian rule since the middle of the seventeenth century); but on the whole the relations between the Jews and the Christians were satisfactory and the former suffered no legal limitations. Jews occasionally rose to important positions in the Russian State, *i. e.* the Vice-Chancellor under Peter the Great was a Jew, Shafirov, who was subsequently raised to a barony.

The position changed radically when Russia in the reign of Catherine the Great, acquired large Polish territories, thickly inhabited by Jews.

The latter had come to settle in Poland in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, flying from persecutions generally meted against them under the guidance of the Roman Church in the Iberian Peninsula, Germany and the Holy Roman Empire. The Jews suffered various legal disabilities under the Polish regime and it is this that Russia inherited in the three successive partitions of Poland.

The first took place in 1772 when Russia obtained the ancient Russian province of Polotzk (White Russia)—thus, for the first time, adding to her possessions a territory which had been inhabited for centuries by a large, settled Jewish population. Empress Catherine approached the Jewish question with the tolerant ideas prevalent in that age of enlightenment; and the only reason which kept her from granting the Jews full permission to live where they liked in the Empire, and equal rights with the Christian population, was her wish not to make sensational

changes in internal policy. This was very natural in the case of a monarch who realized that her own legal position was anomalous. In an Imperial manifesto to the inhabitants of White Russia announcing the new order, and confirming the old rights of all classes of the population, special mention was made of the Jews; who, however, were promised only the same rights—which were indeed few—as they had enjoyed under Polish rule. The words of the manifesto, however, speaking of her Majesty's humanity and the impossibility of excluding "only them" (*i. e.* the Jews) "from the general act of grace," raised radiant hopes among many of the Jews.

The Councils of the Elders

The peculiar autonomous organization of the Jews found expression in the so-called Councils of the Elders (Kahal), constituted in every town or hamlet possessing a Jewish community. The Council of the Elders had jurisdiction over its own race in matters of litigation (provided both parties were Jews), as well as in fiscal transactions relating to the collection and payment of State taxes (*e. g.* poll-tax, land tax, etc.). Later, this right of distributing and collecting taxes was much abused by the local Councils of Elders, and this resulted in the decline and final abolition of this institution (1844).

When, in 1778, the provincial constitution was introduced into White Russia, by which the legal position of the urban population was regularized and guilds of merchants brought into being, some of the richer Jews enrolled in these guilds with a view to gradually freeing themselves from the strict and troublesome authority of the Councils. Many of them were honoured by being elected to public positions by their fellow citizens; but this provoked the opposition of their trade rivals and of the Roman Catholic clergy, leading to appeals in St. Petersburg. In spite of this, the Empress held firmly to her broad, liberal views with regard to the Jews and paid no attention to complaints; thus encouraged, the Councils of the Elders frequently petitioned the Empress, begging particularly for the removal of the disabilities which forbade their living in the villages. In her anxiety to form a strong and solid middle-class in Russia, Catherine had forbidden (1782) the urban population to settle in rural districts. The whole Jewish population came automatically under this edict. By the irony of fate this comparatively innocent decree of the Government, although at the time not put into effect, was destined to be the origin of one of the most serious restrictions upon the Jewish community and lasted until the Revolution of 1917.

The Distilleries

To the same period may be referred the notorious question of the distilleries. This industry had been in Jewish hands for many generations, since it was customary for the Polish nobility to farm out many of their seignorial prerogatives to the ubiquitous Jews. One of the most important, that of distilling and selling spirits, thus fell entirely into

the hands of the Jews. The latter were apparently attracted to this business by its quick returns: a very important factor, considering that the Jew lacked the usual rights of citizenship and was entirely dependent on the landowner—who was quite capable of breaking the contract, seizing the Jew's earnings, and turning him off the estate. In many cases the farming-out of distilleries, owing to keen competition, ceased to be remunerative; but it was difficult for them to obtain release from their obligations to the landowners. The landowner might oblige his distiller to sell a minimum quantity of vodka for which he was made liable. The Government, in order to end this and also the publicans' activities as money lenders, forbade the Jews to sell spirits in the villages, but allowed them to do so in the towns.

The Pale of Settlement

The Jews were not at liberty to settle in every locality of the Empire. In addition to the Polish provinces and parts of the Ukraine the *Pale of Settlement* had at that time been extended to include the Provinces of Kiev, Chernigov and the district of Novgorod-Seversk. In 1793 and 1795 it was again extended by the addition of a vast territory, including Lithuania, Curland, Volhynia and Podolia, ceded to Russia after the second and third partitions of Poland. The density of the Jewish population on the western frontiers of the Empire began to be a danger to itself and a nuisance to the Government—which therefore endeavoured to transfer the surplus population to the empty lands of New Russia, where new towns were rapidly springing up. In order to exercise indirect pressure on the Jews, double taxation was imposed upon them in the western Provinces; those who consented to remove to the south were immediately released from this burden.

The Jews were given the right of voting in municipal elections; but in order to placate the Roman Catholic electors, who were dissatisfied with the political successes of the Jews under the new regime, the Jewish vote was limited to one-third of the total number of electors. A special curia was formed from the Jews eligible for election; a measure which, on the whole, did not satisfy the Jewish population, who in some cases, would have preferred a well-meaning Christian deputy to a Jew. In Lithuania, where the Polish element prevailed in the towns, the disabilities of the Jews remained the same as they had been under Polish rule. A similar situation arose in Curland, where the German burghers jealously guarded the ancient privileges which had come down to them from the days of the Livonian Order; a feature of whose statutes was the complete denial of rights to the Jews. In Poland, the landowners sided with the Polish burghers in upholding the Jewish disabilities. Thus the reform did little to lighten the burden of the race.

The Village Jew

The Jews, although they had never actually been serfs, had for centuries lived in the villages in a state of oppression and degradation. It

was not to be wondered at, therefore, that the landowners came, in time, to look upon them as their menials; and the Russian Government's endeavours to give them the rights of citizenship was as distasteful to the Polish nobility as the liberation of their Christian serfs would have been.

On July 28, 1797, a new ukaze was published which had the effect of removing the Jews, who were ruining the peasants by their questionable business dealings, from the villages. The Councils of Elders, seriously alarmed, convened a great Jewish congress at Ostrog in Volhynia, which decided to send representatives to St. Petersburg who should appeal directly to the Emperor (Paul I). It is not known, however, whether anything resulted from this deputation, or even whether it was actually sent. However, the Government again refrained from enforcing the law.

II

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Alexander I

ALEXANDER's accession to the throne, on which Russia set such high hopes, seemed also to presage amelioration in the conditions of the Jews. Alexander I was disposed to regard the Jewish problem as a State question of the first importance. A Committee for the Welfare of the Jews was formed, comprising both prominent officials and personal friends of the Emperor. The well-known statesman, Speransky, was greatly interested in this Committee's work. He recommended that the Jews should be uplifted by developing their moral and spiritual culture, by encouraging education among them, and by reducing their disabilities as much as possible—while promising them speedy and complete equality with the rest of the population in the event of the success of these measures. The Committee listened favourably to the representations of the Councils of Elders (1802). Its opinions were divided, however, some advocating complete and immediate equality for the Jews, others recommending a more gradual transition and qualified reservations, *i. e.*, discriminating treatment of the various categories of the Jewish population, in accordance with their importance in regard to the general interests of the State.

Two tendencies were, therefore, apparent in the Decree for the Regulation of Jewish Affairs of December, 1804, which was brought forward by the Committee and confirmed by the Emperor: and which, for a short time, constituted the fundamental character of Jewish rights in Russia.

While maintaining an attitude of disapproval towards the activities of the Jewish publicans and usurers in the villages, the Decree in every way encouraged the Jew to undertake agricultural work. The regulations which prescribed their removal from the villages of the Polish Provinces,

were confirmed, and the final term for this fixed (according to locality) as either January 1st, 1807, or January 1st, 1808. On the other hand, they were invited to settle anywhere in New Russia¹ and were promised that, if their colonization proved successful, the Provinces of Astrakhan and North Caucasus would be included in the Pale of Jewish Settlement. The assistance and protection of the Government was promised not only to the agriculturists, but also to those engaged in trade and manufacture, who were all freed from double taxation.

The Decree made the question of the complete equality of the Jews dependent on their willingness to conform to the general practices of the Empire, and endeavoured to restrict the functions of the Councils of Elders to purely religious (and, to a certain extent, fiscal) matters. Great importance was attached in the Decree to the speedy establishment of schools for Jews; where, instead of Talmudistic dogmas, they were to be taught the language of the country, foreign languages and the sciences. The Jews were also encouraged to depart from many of their obsolete customs which were founded entirely on superstition and which gave offense to their neighbours (the wearing of side ringlets, strangely-cut clothes, etc.).

The beginning of the nineteenth century was marked by an intensive emigration of the Jews to New Russia—where towns, villages and colonies sprang up with truly American rapidity. At the same time, however, the Government insisted on enforcing the laws relative to the transfer of the Polish Jews from the villages to the towns in the Polish Provinces. Instructions to this effect were sent to the local authorities; the Jews were forcibly removed to the towns—where they became a burden upon the already impoverished Jewish community. The threat of French invasion after the campaigns of 1805 and 1807, put an end to these expulsions. Since then there has been no recurrence of such mass movements in Russia; although the prohibition preventing Jews from settling in villages remained in force until the Revolution.

Nicholas I

It is interesting to note that the Decembrists, on the whole, adopted an anti-Semitic attitude. It is difficult to estimate how the revolt of December 14, 1825 would have affected the Jews had it been successful; but Pestel, the author of a draft constitution, proposed their entire removal from Russia to territory in Asia Minor, especially acquired for this purpose.

The reign of Nicholas I is by far the most memorable in the history of the Russian Jews since they first came under the dominion of the Tsars. This monarch was keenly interested in his Jewish subjects and wished them well; but the history of Russian Jewry during his reign proves once more how the best intentions, too drastically carried out, may become a source of dire calamity to those whom it is sought to benefit. The Emperor—who was personally inclined, if not to grant the Jews

¹ Black Sea Littoral.

complete civil equality, at least gradually to give them certain privileges—made these favours dependent on the rapidity with which the Jews could abandon their seclusion and join in the general social life of the country. One of the most potent means of bringing the Jews into closer contact with the native population was the application to them, in 1827, of the recruiting laws. No fault, naturally, was to be found with the actual measure; but the manner in which it was carried out formed, in effect, one of the most barbarous persecutions to which the Jewish race had ever been subjected since its dispersal.

In order the more successfully to attain the object of the measure, the age of the Jewish recruits was fixed at from 12 to 25 years, instead of the normal 20 to 35. A mutual guarantee for providing recruits was established in the communities; and as the parents of young boys naturally hid them, Jewish boys were rounded up in the streets, no attention being paid to any plea of their insufficient age.

In 1840 a Committee for the Reorganization of the Jews was formed, but seems to have served no practical purpose. A new regulation was issued at this period, by which the quota of Jewish recruits for a given number of the population, was increased five-fold as compared with that of the Christians.

In 1844 the civil authority of the Councils of Elders was officially and finally abolished. About the same time increased activity was shown in the establishment of Jewish schools. In this work Lilienthal (who died in the eighties in America, where he was Rabbi at Cincinnati, Ohio) took a particularly active part, as did the Minister of Public Education, Count Uvarov. The funds for building such schools came mainly from the so-called peddling dues,—which remained in force until the Revolution, and which were a peculiar form of indirect taxation. They included a tax on *kosher* meat and some other articles of consumption; these dues were usually paid to the Government by private individuals, mostly Jews, to whom they were farmed out. The wearing of Jewish dress was also taxed—naturally, since the Government made every effort to do away with it.

Montefiore in Russia

In 1846 the well-known philanthropist, Sir Moses Montefiore, an English Jew, visited Russia. He was ceremoniously received by the authorities; and during his stay in the capital he presented an extensive report on the subject of the Jewish reforms to the Minister of the Interior, Count Kisselev. The Government gave him every facility in his journeys through Russia. Count Kisselev, himself—although he considered that there was a great difference, not to the latter's advantage, between European and Russian Jews—held most liberal views with regard to the Jewish question. However, Nicholas I considered it necessary to exercise the utmost caution in gradually granting to the Jews the rights of citizenship, and still more as regards giving them the right to enter the services of the State, or to hold official posts.

The "Catchers"

During the last years of Nicholas I's reign a fateful gloom pervaded the towns within the Pale of Jewish Settlement. The enlistment law held the Jewish population in a cleft stick. On the one hand, the Jews (and only they) were obliged, as a fine for the non-payment of taxes, to provide additional recruits over and above their already "normal" five-fold quota; on the other hand, the forcible recruiting of the best workmen bled the Jewish population white and made it impossible for them to pay their taxes regularly. Special agents went along the streets looking for boys; these so-called "catchers" (who were mostly Jews) entered the houses, pulled boys of 8 to 10 years old from their hiding places and tore them away from their screaming and weeping mothers.

Alexander II

The accession of Alexander II inspired the most radiant hopes among the Jews. Count Kisselev again brought forward his liberal schemes. The Minister for the Interior, Count Lanskoj, and Count A. G. Stroganov, the Governor-General of New Russia, went still further by proposing the complete abolition of all Jewish civil disabilities and all restrictions upon Jewish settlement. The liberation of the serfs in 1861 had also its repercussion upon the Jewish question. The landowners of Great Russia, who had lost their right to the labour of the serf craftsmen (tailors, bootmakers, carpenters, locksmiths, etc.) tried to attract Jewish artisans to their estates, and were highly incensed when the police sent these back to the Pale of Settlement.

Somewhat more guarded and evidently influenced by former suggestions with regard to differential treatment and its gradations, were the opinions given on the Jewish question by Count Bludov, another well-known official of the first years of Alexander II's reign. About this time, the idea of differential treatment began to make headway even in the more well-to-do Jewish circles.

The cultural and habitual aloofness of the Jews gradually began to be relaxed. An ever-increasing number of Jews adopted the Russian language and Russian customs; an atmosphere was created which made for the spread of education, the desire for a better knowledge of Russia and the promotion of a better understanding of the Jews by the Russians. An important periodical devoted to Jewish interests, entitled "Razsvet" (The Dawn), was published in Russian. Some zealous adherents of these new tendencies considered it useless, and even mischievous, to retain the German-Jewish dialect (Yiddish). An enlightened Jew (an expert on Jewish doctrine, law and customs and an official censor of Jewish publications) attached to the Governor-General of New Russia suggested that the printing of Yiddish books be prohibited. This measure was not carried out in a drastic manner, but provincial governors in the south sometimes forbade the publication of books, and the performance of plays in Yiddish. As a matter of fact the authorities

turned a blind eye to most of these restrictions; but many, nevertheless, were not actually repealed until the Revolution.

All attempts at an immediate improvement of the Jews' legal position were hindered by the attitude—timid rather than unfriendly—of the Emperor Alexander II. For instance he would not allow Jewish soldiers, who had completed the long-term service of Nicholas' days, to settle where they liked unless they had been baptized. At the same time, however, Jewish doctors were permitted to enter the Army Medical Service. In the decree establishing the *Zemstvos* no limitations were imposed upon the election of Jews as members of the *Zemstvos* in Provinces within the Pale of Settlement; but the regulations governing municipal elections enacted that not more than one third of any town Council were to be Jews.

In examining all these vicissitudes of the Jewish question, it may be noted that a social movement was beginning to make itself felt, among the Jews themselves, which tended to meet the views of the Government. From the early seventies onwards the attendance of Jews in the schools established for them, which had been reorganized and greatly improved, showed a marked increase. This was largely due to the influence of N. I. Pirogov, the well-known physician and educator. In 1879 all Jews holding the diplomas of higher educational establishments were granted the right to domicile anywhere in the Empire.

The "Pogroms" ¹

In 1881 the first wave of pogroms swept over the south of Russia—that at Elizavetgrad being particularly fierce. Those who took part in these pogroms were not confined to the roughest part of the population (the rabble of the towns and, on market days the peasants of the neighbouring villages), but comprised also the more advanced and—from a revolutionary point of view—"reliable" elements, such as railwaymen. It is an established fact that one of the early classics of pogrom literature in Russia is a proclamation by the Executive Committee of the Party of People's Freedom (the predecessors of the Social-Revolutionaries), calling upon its members to attack the landowners *and Jews*. What was more significant, however, was that at about this time some of the young men of the Jewish intelligentsia began, to the Government's great surprise, to join the revolutionary movement.

The 1882 Reforms

The disorders in the south once again recalled the Government's attention to the Jewish question. A conference was convened at the Ministry of the Interior. The resulting output of regulations, which subjected the rights of the Jews to difficult (and sometimes even offensive) restrictions, consisted of a mass of heterogeneous provisional instructions and circulars which could be—and, in 1915 and 1916, actually were—rescinded by a simple stroke of the Minister's pen.

¹ Anti-Semitic riots.

The Committee drafted regulations with regard to the expulsion of the Jews from villages on the strength of decisions to be taken by village meetings; for which decisions—unlike the common practice in such cases—a simple majority, however small, was sufficient. The Minister of Finance, N. K. Bunge, protested against these regulations. A compromise was arrived at—the Jews were forbidden to settle in the villages or to acquire property there, with an exception made for those already possessing such rights. According to established rules these rights descended also to their heirs; but as the families increased and the holdings became divided—and, also, through marriages with unprivileged persons—legal complications arose, the settlement of which caused the Government a great deal of trouble.

It is of interest to note that the sale of intoxicants by the Jews was eventually permitted; this regulation remained in force until Witte's financial reform (1895), which established a State monopoly for the distilling of spirits and for their sale at a uniform price. This act automatically did away with the Jewish public-houses.

The well-known "provisional regulations" of May 3, 1882, definitely established and confirmed (in principle) the status of the Russian Jews, which remained practically unaltered until the Revolution. The last manifestation of liberal tendencies with regard to the Jews on the part of administrative and official circles were the decisions of the special commission under the presidency of Count Pahlen (1883–1888) affirming the desirability—in principle—of granting the Jews full rights of citizenship; but these decisions were not confirmed in higher quarters, and remained a dead letter.

The First Revolution

It is a singular fact that all this remained unchanged by the Revolution of 1905. The Duma made absolutely no alteration in the legal status of the Jews. Those orators of the Duma who belonged to the extreme reactionary parties denounced the Jews from the tribune; while the deputies of the Left defended them very feebly. There were but few Jewish deputies in the Dumas (two only in the fourth). Not a single restrictive decree was rescinded, although from time to time, new ones were added. In the practical application of the few rights still left to the Jews and in all disputed questions the authorities—in nearly every case—interpreted the law restrictively. Local administrative bodies often paid little attention to instructions from above, but established in relation to the Jews under their jurisdiction an independent system of oppression.

Even more distasteful to the wider circles of the Jewish population than the restrictions with regard to domicile were the disabilities connected with education. Whereas formerly the Government had endeavoured in every way to attract the Jews to the schools in order to teach them Russian, and even to give them a rudimentary knowledge of the sciences, from the beginning of the nineties—when the desire for edu-

cation was firmly rooted among a considerable portion of the Jews, and numbers of Jewish scholars flocked to the schools in the Pale of Settlement—the Government suddenly changed its tactics and began to limit the enrollment of Jews in the higher, special, and later, even in the secondary educational establishments. In the last years before the War, the ratio of Jewish pupils in the secondary schools of the Pale of Settlement (in towns where the population was mainly Jewish) was not more than 15% of the Christian pupils—a proportion which was reduced to 10% outside the Pale and to 5% in the capitals, while in the higher educational establishments of the capitals, (many of which were entirely closed to the Jews), it barely reached 2%.

It was possible to evade these restrictions upon secondary education by combining private tuition with examination as an "outside pupil." Accordingly, within the Pale such outside pupils were almost entirely young Jews. The examinations were extremely difficult, and were made more so by discrimination against the Jews. Higher education did not even offer this alternative—while in 1911 the quota limitation of the secondary schools was made to include outside pupils also. Numbers of Jewish students flocked to foreign Universities—where they lived in great poverty and squalor, continually worked upon by the propaganda of revolutionary agents. Having, after untold hardship and privation, concluded his studies, the young Jew was again faced, on his return to Russia, with a terrible reminder of his lack of civil rights in such forms as a quota scheme regulating the State examinations for obtaining diplomas, restriction of domicile, etc. In addition to the minority who had obtained higher education abroad, and those who had been fortunate enough to be accepted by the Russian Universities under the quota scheme, there were many who held no school certificates, and who had been debarred from going to the universities just when they were beginning to appreciate the advantages of education. They were readily infected by the revolutionary virus and from among them came the half educated and semi-cultured Jews, who later, in the long-expected cataclysm, joined the Communist Revolution with irreconcilable rancour and vindictiveness.

It is from this class of semi-intelligentsia that the Soviet regime draws its most reliable officials, entirely devoted to the new order, willing to fill every imaginable post for the supervision of "politically unreliable" elements, and to enforce Communism with even more devotion than the old order had enforced limitations against them.

The Beylis Case

The last event which crowned thirty years of State oppression directed towards restricting the rights of the Jews and debarring them from participating in the general development of the Empire, was the notorious Beylis case at Kiev (1911-1913). In this lawsuit an innocent person was accused, on very flimsy evidence, and with the help of the criminal element of the town, of a horrible ritual crime. The mainstay of the ac-

cusation was the baleful legend of the ritual murders of Christians by Jews. The trial ended in an acquittal, in spite of the Government's efforts to convict Beylis.

III

THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE JEWS IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE WAR AND THE REVOLUTION

THE fundamental restrictions on the Jews in Russia immediately preceding the War were:

a) Restriction of domicile to the Pale of Settlement, embracing but a small part of the territory of the Empire. The Pale of Settlement included the Provinces of:—Bessarabia, Grodno, Ekaterinoslav, Kovno, Minsk, Moghilev, Podolia, Poltava, Taurida, (without the southern coast of the Crimea), Kherson (without the town of Nikolaev), Chernigov, Kiev (without the town of Kiev) and Kholm, Vilna, and Vitebsk, as well as the Polish Provinces. It was greater in area than any one European country, but this consideration loses its effect when it is remembered that in most Provinces the Jews were not allowed to live outside the towns.

There existed, nevertheless, certain groups of individuals who permanently or temporarily enjoyed the advantage of being allowed to live outside the Pale, and even in the capitals; these were: persons holding university degrees, specialists (doctors, engineers, lawyers, etc.) while exercising their profession, students who had successfully overcome the obstacles of the quota (while at school); merchants of the first guild (so long as they paid guild dues and income-tax); soldiers serving with the colours; descendants of Crimean War veterans (1854–1855); qualified artisans, holding trade certificates (only while plying their trades) and a few others.

b) Complete inability to enter Government service. This with very few exceptions, was rigorously enforced.

c) Restrictions upon entering the service of the Zemstvos except as doctors.

d) Restrictions upon entering the profession of the law; the quota regulating the enrollment of Jews as solicitors' clerks closed this career to the majority of Jewish aspirants.

e) In the army no Jew could hold officer's rank. A special form of mutual guarantee was instituted for the Jews in respect of military service: if any man failed to report at the proper time at the recruiting station, his place was filled up from among those who had been given exemption for family reasons. Failure to report at the proper time, besides being a legal offence, was punishable by a heavy fine (levied exclusively on Jews).

f) The Jewish quota for the State schools was established at 10% only (5% in the capitals).

g) Inability to acquire landed property in places outside the Pale of Settlement or, with some exceptions, in the villages within the Pale. Exceptions were also made for the Jewish Agricultural Colonies scattered over the whole area—these will be more fully dealt with later.¹

The War and the Jews

The Imperial Government during the last years of its existence showed a definite tendency to remove these restrictions. The Pale ceased to exist from the very first days of the War, when hundreds of thousands of refugees from Poland and Lithuania, and among them innumerable Jews, fled in terror before the enemy invasion, and spread over the interior of Russia (about 20 Provinces of the Pale of Settlement were in the zone of military operations). In these circumstances it was impossible to discriminate between the refugees; and the sword of war cut the Gordian knot of the domicile question. Later in the War about a quarter of a million Jews were called up for military service, and fought side by side with their Christian fellow-citizens. Young Jews invalided out of the army, their relatives and the relatives of Jews killed in action—saw the school quota abolished for them. The removal of educational restrictions on the Jews proceeded rapidly with the appointment of Count P. Ignatiev as Minister of Education. He did his utmost to repair the injustice which, until then, had been meted out to Jewish students.

Great is the power of national inertia, while the national memory is short. The deeply tragic history of the last decades of the Imperial regime will always it may be, remain associated in most Jewish minds with memories of harsh injustice. Very few will remember that Russia was the *first Christian State* where, as early as the eighteenth century, the principle of "equal rights for the Jews" was commended from the Throne. In the purblind party struggles between the Jews and their Christian opponents and enemies, it has already been forgotten that one of the last acts of the dying regime was the removal of most Jewish disabilities.

In concluding the history of the legal disabilities of the Jews it must be stated that the generally accepted legend that these were only removed by the Soviet Government is entirely misleading. As a matter of fact the complete and comprehensive removal of restrictions was one of the first acts of the Provisional Government (March 1917).

Statistics of the Jewish Population of the Empire (Census of 1897)

In 1897, the total Jewish population of the Empire was returned as 5,189,401 persons of both sexes (4.13% of the population). Of this total 93.9% lived in the 25 Provinces of the Pale of Settlement. The total pop-

¹ All these restrictions held good as long as a Jew remained faithful to his religion. Every disability disappeared automatically when a Jew embraced some other religion.

ulation of the Pale of Settlement amounted to 42,338,367—of these 4,805,354 (11.5%) were Jews. At the beginning of the War the number of Jews in the Empire had grown to about 6,500,000.

IV

THE CONTEMPORARY POSITION OF RUSSIAN JEWRY

THE extensive participation of the Jewish intelligentsia in the Russian revolutionary movement goes back some 40 years. The rise of revolutionary feeling among the Jews should, apparently, be attributed to a psychological reaction brought about by the anti-Jewish policy of Alexander III's government. It was, however, only at the beginning of Nicholas II's reign, and under the influence of the general spirit pervading the country, that the pent-up revolutionary stream began to flow. Numbers of Jewish youths joined the revolutionary parties, especially those who had failed, owing to the quota system, to gain the longed-for admittance to schools. The Jewish revolutionaries were mostly of the poorest classes on whom the burden of disqualification naturally fell most harshly; and their sense of racial humiliation became subconsciously merged into rancorous hatred of the existing social system.

The Bund

Naturally, the revolutionary-minded intelligentsia were only too ready to involve the working classes in this movement. In 1897 a Union of the Jewish workmen of Lithuania, Poland and Russia was formed under the name of the *Bund*. Its influence over the Jewish masses was, however, negligible. During the 1917 Revolution most of the members of the Bund joined the Communists, and the rest were expelled or exiled.

Many Jews were prominent in the Russian revolutionary parties. Of the two principal ones—the Social Revolutionaries and the Social Democrats—Jewish sympathies clearly tended towards the right wing of the latter (the Mensheviks). Both the founders and leaders of the Menshevik section of this Party, Martov and Axelrod, were Jews. The programme of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, relating to the peasants' movement and the agrarian question mostly, attracted less attention. There were also many Jews in the moderate liberal parties.

The Revolution

The Jews, perhaps, more than any other section of the population maintained the Revolutionary tradition through the years of pacification that marked the Stolypin regime and hailed the "great and bloodless" Revolution of March 1917 with enthusiasm. The great bulk of the Jews were, however, moderate socialists and at first their membership of the Bolshevik Party was small.

Among the leaders of the Communist Party there were, of course,

Jews,—Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotzky, Ioffe and others. But they were “internationalists,” and the Jewish population could not regard them as champions of their national cause. Most of the Jews put their faith in the Provisional Government. They were not much affected by the ideological discussions among the various parties in the capitals, and paid little heed to the ominous signs of an approaching catastrophe.

For a time, and until the spirit of those who opposed the Communist tyrants was broken, the Jewish intelligentsia of the capitals and the large towns in no way lagged behind the Russians in resisting them. There were many Jews among those who sought to avenge the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly and the disgrace of Brest-Litovsk. Thus the president of the Cheka, Uritzky, himself a Jew, was murdered by a Jew, Kannegiesser, while Dora Kaplan, who wounded Lenin, was also a Jewess.

Nor was separatism popular among the Jews. Forcible severance from Russia was not desired by most of the Jews; still the proclamations of separatist groups promising every kind of self-determination and all the blessings of this world sounded sweet in the ears of the radical Jewish intelligentsia. In the Ukraine in particular the Jewish participation in the separatist movement was strong. Many Jews even look somewhat leniently upon the fact that the most terrible pogroms to which the Jewish race has ever been subjected were organized by Ukrainian Socialists and separatists fighting against the “Imperialism of Moscow.”

In Russia proper, meanwhile, where the Soviet power had been successful in its struggle on several fronts, the small body of Jewish intelligentsia living outside the Pale of Settlement quickly lost its animosity against the Soviets, and adapted itself to the fact of the astounding political success gained by the Communists over their enemies. The fact that the leaders of the White anti-Communist movement had at the time of its greatest success condoned much injustice and oppression with regard to the Jews (anti-Semite agitation in the White Press, disorderly conduct towards the Jewish population, etc.) greatly affected the situation.

The Appeal of Communism

All this was, of course, made the subject of increased agitation among the Jewish population, and especially the intelligentsia, at the time of the final triumph of the Communists.

It is not to be wondered at that Communist propaganda was so extraordinarily successful among the Jewish intelligentsia. The bewilderment and uncertainty of judgment to be noticed among them, due to their sudden break from the century-old religious and intellectual traditions of their race, naturally predisposed them to the acceptance of a social Utopia. The campaign against purely idealistic science, and the destruction of the spiritual elite of the population, in some unaccountable way flattered the morbid self-esteem of the half-cultured provincials who had been denied education by the old regime. The enormous growth of Communist bureaucracy absorbed the whole of the available Jewish

intelligentsia—partly by the chances it offered of escaping death from famine, and partly because it seemed to be a form of actual State service and participation in power, so dear to these step-sons of the old regime who had always been bereft of rights. Naturally, the *elite* of the Jewish race in Russia declined to have any dealing with Communism; and in consequence it was either destroyed or compelled to emigrate. The members of the different opposition parties (Mensheviks and Revolutionary Socialists, not to mention the bourgeois Zionists), are still persecuted quite as virulently as their non-Jewish colleagues. It is a remarkable fact that this procedure, in spite of all protests by those friends of the persecuted who live beyond the reach of Communist authority, has not impelled the great majority of the Jewish intelligentsia outside the U.S.S.R. to take any outstanding part in denouncing the Communists.

This may be to a great extent (though not entirely) explained by the conditions under which the Jews at present live in those parts of the Pale which have been separated from the U.S.S.R. Hemmed in by the frontiers of several new States, the Jewish population of a considerable part of the Pale of Settlement found itself unexpectedly cut off from the economic and intellectual life of a great Empire. The anti-Jewish chauvinism of the new nations brought about such conditions of life for the Jews as made their old pre-Revolution life in Russia appear a lost paradise.

Jews in the U.S.S.R.

In Soviet territory, on the other hand, the economic position of the Jewish population is tragic. The Draconian laws of the Soviets offer hardly any economic independence to artisans, and none whatever to traders. Masses of the Jewish population are not only deprived of civil rights (as they were under the old regime) but even of the elementary, human right to obtain food:—35% of the Jewish population belongs to the category of the so-called “deprived” (disenfranchised), whereas the average percentage of disenfranchised in the whole country does not exceed 6%. Whole categories of the Jewish population (*e. g.* teachers and rabbis) are deliberately condemned to die of hunger. Furthermore, the systematic persecution of the Jewish religion, which is carried out in a coarse and offensive manner, insulting to racial dignity, deserves special comment.

One would have thought, in such a terrible situation as this, that as Jews are scattered all over the globe, the whole world would be ringing with Jewish denunciations of Communism. What a short time ago seemed inevitable (the Beylis case) has now become impossible. The frontiers of the U.S.S.R. are carefully guarded, and nothing but praise of Communism may cross them. Far more important is the marked difference in their present position; whereas formerly the authority which oppressed the Jews was something strange and foreign to them, something in which they were never called upon to take part, now things are different: the unheard-of despotism which is slowly starving the Jewish

population to death is, in most cases, represented in the towns by full-blooded Jews, fanatically devoted to the Soviet power. For most Jewish artisans and tradesmen the existence of this regime means physical destruction; but on the other hand thousands of the semi-intellectuals and social failures in the small towns have tasted unlimited, uncensored power. From the statistics given later, it will be seen that the percentage of Jews in the Communist Party is not as great as is generally supposed; but there is no doubt that no other section of the community has contributed to it so many whole-hearted and undoubtedly "reliable" fanatics.

Contemporary Statistics of the Jews

According to the census of 1926, the total number of Jews in the U.S.S.R., is computed at 2,672,398 of whom 59% live in the Ukraine, 15.2% in White Russia, 22% in Great Russia and the remaining 3.8% in different Federal Republics. The following table shows the social (professional) composition of the Jewish population at that time:

<i>Social Groups</i>	<i>%</i>
Workmen	14.8
Peasants	9.1
Artisans	18.9
Government clerks	23.3
Liberal professions	1.6
Traders	11.6
Unemployed	9.3
Persons of indefinite and unproductive professions.....	11.4
	100.0

Investigation has established that some 400,000 families (*i. e.* approximately 1,200,000 persons) stood in need of outside assistance—which they could not obtain.

Unfortunately, more detailed results of the census of 1926, so far as the Jews are concerned, are not available, and the following particulars have been taken from the returns of the former (1923) census, as given in a Soviet publication.¹ According to these particulars, the total number of Jews in the U.S.S.R. was given, in 1923, as 2,454,000; a figure which indicated a slight increase in the Jewish population between 1923 and 1926. From the following considerations it will appear, however, that these figures are open to considerable doubt in view of the general mortality of the Jewish population in the U.S.S.R.

An analysis of the census of 1897 shows, for the present territory of the U.S.S.R. a total Jewish population of 2,504,000—which gives, for 1923, an absolute decrease of 50,000. The natural increase in the population for the same period is estimated at 1,140,000; figures which, taken together indicate a decrease of 1,190,000 Jews. In attempting to explain

¹ "The Jewish population of the U.S.S.R." Moscow, 1927.

this, the number of Jews who emigrated during the period is given at 600,000, while the victims of the pogroms of 1918-1920 are estimated at 100,000. If to this are added several tens of thousands who fell in the War, or who were reported missing, there still remains, however, a deficit of more than 450,000 persons, concerning whom the authors, owing to the Soviet censorship, do not dare give the only true explanation—the rapid dying out of the Jews through the Revolution, the Civil War and, especially, the present deadly economic policy of the Soviet regime.

In comparing the censuses of 1897 and 1926, the most interesting facts that emerge concerning the Jewish population are: the sharp decrease in the numbers of traders, professional workers, industrialists, farmers and trade employees, and the appalling growth in the number of persons having no fixed occupation. Another very important fact brought out by the census of 1923 is the mass flight of the Jews from the villages to the towns.

Even more illuminating, with respect to the decline of the Jewish population in the U.S.S.R. are the interesting tables given in Soviet publications, which show the percentage of the Jewish population, for various towns, in 1897 and 1923. From the particulars of the two republics—the Ukraine and White Russia—in which most of the Jewish population (nearly 75% of the U.S.S.R.) is to be found, it will be seen that in the great majority of towns the number of Jews shows a great decrease in 1923 as compared with 1897.

In the Ukraine the greatest decrease of the Jewish population since 1897 is found at Moghilev-Podolsk (29%) and Berdichev (28%). Almost the same decrease is to be seen in the large Jewish communities of Tulchin, Elizavetgrad, Bela-Tserkov, Nezhin and others. Certain towns—Vinnitza, Proskurov, Uman and Chernigov—show a slight increase as compared with 1897; although this, without doubt, is actually a decrease as compared with 1913. In a few districts, of the Ukraine only, there may be noticed an unexpected increase in the Jewish population, mainly in the large industrial centres (which had formerly been outside the Pale of Settlement—*e. g.* Kiev), where the Jewish artisans have gathered in search of work. Thus in the Artemov (Bakhmut) district the Jewish population is 3.88 times as great as in 1897, in the Kiev district 2.88 times (in Kiev itself the increase has been from 32,000 to 123,000) in the Mariupol district 2.88 times, and in the Krivoy Rog district 1.99 times; on the other hand, in other towns the decline of the Jewish population is breaking all records. Information is available showing that the Jewish population in Elizavetgrad decreased from 31,812 in 1920 to 18,871 in 1923; and in Odessa from 190,135 in 1920 to 130,041 in 1923. The proportion of the Jewish population to the whole population of the Ukraine fell from 7.8% in 1897 to 5.3% in 1923. Even the imper-turbable Soviet statisticians were aghast at such fluctuations of the population, and could think of no better explanation for it than a (mythical) repatriation of alien subjects! . . .

In White Russia the total decrease of the Jewish population of the

towns between 1897 and 1923 is 8%. In the Moghilev district the decrease amounts to 22%, in the district of Polotzk to 40%, and in that of Slutzk to 22%. A slight increase (but only in comparison with 1897, *i. e.* taking no account of 26 years of natural increase) is noticeable in the districts of Vitebsk—15%, and Minsk—2%.

Only in the R.S.F.S.R. is there a marked increase of the Jewish population—from 252,000 in 1897 to 443,000 in 1923. This increase is not due to any gradual improvement in living conditions, but to emigration from the Pale of Settlement. A great increase of the Jewish population is particularly noticeable in the capitals: in Moscow, in 1923, there were 87,000 Jews (as against 8,000 in 1897) and in Leningrad—52,000. This increase may be almost exclusively ascribed to an influx of young Jews from the Pale—adherents to and sympathizers with Communism—in search of administrative and technical posts.

It may be well to give here a few particulars of the part taken by the Jews in the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. In 1922 Jews constituted 5.2% of the Party, in 1927 4.3%, in 1929 3.5%. The percentage of Jews in the total population of the U.S.S.R. is approximately 1.8%.

Among the urban population the number of Jewish Communists per 1,000 was 20, whereas for the rest of the population it was 32. The special Jewish section of the Communist Party was dissolved in 1930.

V

JEWISH AGRICULTURAL COLONIES

a) Jewish Agriculture Before the Revolution

THE decree of 1804 encouraged the Jews to settle on the land, and the first Jewish colonies soon arose in the Odessa and Kherson districts of New Russia. The Jewish colonists were given allotments of land, granted state loans, and allowed to pay diminished taxation for a certain period of years. By the second decade of the nineteenth century, great distress was felt among the colonists, owing to maladministration and the venality of local officials; some of the colonists even died of starvation—but were replaced by others. During the reign of Nicholas I the colonists were given further privileges (amongst others, the exemption of young boys from military service). From 1830 onwards the colonists were forbidden to engage in any other work. In 1835 new Crown lands were allotted to them, and they were permitted to purchase, and lease, privately-owned land. Colonies were also founded, during the forties, in the western Provinces and that of Ekaterinoslav; and, in the fifties, in Besarabia. In 1847 a special fund was opened for the settlers. The average allotment of land in New Russia was 30 hectares¹ per household and 20 hectares per household in other places.

Early in Alexander II's reign, certain restrictions were enforced upon

¹ 1 hectare = 2.7 acres.

the Jewish colonists. In 1859 the further allotment of land was stopped, as the colonization of New Russia was nearly completed. In 1865 the colonists were permitted to follow other occupations. They became subject to the general law of conscription introduced in 1874. From 1872 onwards commissions visited the colonies for the purpose of inspecting them; many farms were found to have been abandoned by their owners who had engaged in other professions elsewhere; their land was consequently confiscated (sometimes as much as 90% of the whole extent of land occupied by a colony was thus taken back).

From the seventies onwards, the Jewish community showed renewed interest in colonization. In 1880 an organization arose called the Association for Manual and Agricultural Labour among the Jews which had at its disposal funds amounting to several hundred thousand rubles.

A great blow was dealt to colonization by the notorious Regulations of 1882. In 1887 the Government Settlement Fund, amounting to Rbles 1,000,000 was abolished by the Treasury; but by 1900 the colonists in New Russia had succeeded in acquiring additional land, and again became more flourishing. From 1908, however, further allotment of land was stopped.

According to the census of 1897, there were within the Pale of Settlement 158,000 colonists of both sexes (approximately 3.3% of the Jewish population of the Pale) and almost 6,000 outside the Pale. In the provinces of Minsk, Bessarabia, Kherson and Taurida the colonists formed 3.5% of the Jewish population and in the Caucasus as much as 19%.

The total number of Jewish colonies in the Russian Empire, according to data supplied by the Association for Jewish Colonization, founded in 1871 in London by Baron Hirsch, was 296 (of which approximately 250 were outside Poland) possessing 130,000 hectares of land, of which 79% were allotments, 17.7% private property and 3.3% rented from landowners. The greater proportion, both of the land and the colonists, was in the Kherson and Ekaterinoslav Provinces (52.8% land and 35.8% colonists). In the next half century the population of the colonies had increased from $2\frac{1}{4}$ to $2\frac{1}{2}$ times, while the individual allotments had diminished from 30 to about 12 to 14 hectares. Some of the colonists had lost their lands, and others had no horses; but on the other hand there was a marked concentration of property, while some of the colonists had become labourers or taken up outside trades. The colonies, nevertheless, did not, in general, lose their purely agricultural character. Side by side with colonists lived Jewish artisans who worked both for them and for the neighbouring peasants.

b) Colonization After the Revolution

The War, and still more the Revolution, dealt a hard blow to the prosperity of the Jewish colonies. During the revolutionary pogroms several colonies were completely destroyed. Upon the conclusion of the Civil War, a great tendency to return to the land was noticeable among the Jews of the small towns: the despotism established by the Com-

munists in economic conditions fell hardest upon the small Jewish middleman and artisan. In White Russia there were no prospects at all; but in the steppes, on the contrary, there were some possibilities, as after the expropriation of the landowners many farms remained uncultivated. Beginning in the autumn of 1922, many families of the poorest Jews went to the south in order to escape certain death by famine.

The Soviet Government endeavoured to take this movement under its control, and even promised its support on condition of financial help from foreign Jews. In 1924 a Committee for the settlement of the working Jews on the land (Comzet) was organized. In 1925 the Ozet, a similar non-party Jewish organization, was formed. Jewish colonists were granted an important privilege by the Soviet Government; they were allowed to accept as colonists even those Jews who, before the Revolution, had not belonged to the working classes; a privilege enjoyed by no other section of the population.

The hotheads among the Comzet proposed to settle 100,000 Jewish families on the land in the course of ten years. The colonization scheme of the Communists awakened the interest of the American Joint Distribution Committee; which had proffered help to the ruined Jews in the East of Europe during the first years after the War, and had formed the so-called Agro-Joint Committee for the Support of colonization in the U.S.S.R. Lands for settlement were found in the districts of Krivoy Rog, Kherson, Mariupol (Zaporozhie), Odessa and in the North of the Crimea. About this time Jews from Bokhara began to settle on the land (in the territory of the Uzbek Republic, and Jews from the Caucasus in the Daghestan region). A Utopian scheme was at one time proposed to found an autonomous Jewish Republic in the Crimea—a scheme which naturally came to nothing. Another plan, even more fantastic, was started in connection with a place called Biro-Bydzhn in the Far East (details of which will be given further on). Several village settlements were also established in Volhynia, mainly for the cultivation of hops. Furthermore, the Jews were granted several desolate sandy islands in the estuary of the Dnieper (comprising some 26,000 hectares) for vineyards and orchards (the land is absolutely unsuitable for cereals).

The following are a few particulars of Jewish colonization from 1925 to 1930:—

<i>Parts of the Soviet Union</i>	<i>Number of families settled</i>
Ukraine	6,556
Crimea	3,254
White Russia	2,522
Caucasus	713
Uzbekistan	567
Biro-Bydzhn	337
Other parts of the U.S.S.R.	466
Total of families settled.....	14,415

About 3,000 families per year were thus settled on the land. The allotments of land in 1927 amounted (on the average) to 10.2 hectares per household. Up to January 1st, 1928, there were 113 head of draught and 82 head of domestic cattle for every 100 households; and 65 out of 100 colonists had built themselves houses.

In 1928 the Soviet authorities concluded a treaty with Agro-Joint according to which both parties undertook to make a grant of \$8,000,000 for Jewish colonization. No information is available as to how far the parties have carried out the treaty. In any case, it will be seen from the following data that the Soviet Government had no objection to letting the burden of this plan of colonization be borne by others:

SPENT ON JEWISH COLONIZATION BETWEEN 1925-1928

	<i>Rbles.</i>
By the Treasury of the U.S.S.R	4,280,000
From bank credits	1,500,000
By Jewish foreign organizations	15,055,630
Total	20,835,630

The average amount thus spent per household was approximately Rbles 1,500.

Up to 1928 the land granted to the settler by the Government amounted to:

<i>Parts of the Soviet Union</i>	<i>Hectares</i>
Ukraine	164,334
Crimea	131,623
White Russia	17,926
Other parts of the U.S.S.R.	22,300
Total	336,183

The Government promised a further 109,000 hectares in the Crimea. This would have entirely exhausted the land-fund available for Jewish colonization.

There is no definite information extant concerning the allotment of settlers' lands according to crops. Among the colonists wine-making and oil-pressing were apparently the chief occupations, because owing to the starvation prices which the Government gave the peasants for the corn they commandeered from them, the growing of corn was a waste of effort.

On the whole the colonization scheme has not relieved the situation of the Jews.

c) Biro-Bydzhan Plan

After the failure of the Crimean Plan, the Comzet still continued to cherish the idea of founding an autonomous republic for the Jews on


U.S.S.R. territory; and, for some unaccountable reason, fixed upon the unexplored and somewhat desolate region of Biro-Bydzhn in the Far East, lying along the Amur river and the Amur Railway, about 200 klm. west of Khabarovsk. In 1927 an expedition—under the leadership of Bruck, a Jewish agricultural expert—was sent to the Biro-Bydzhn region, and made a fairly favourable report on its possibilities for colonization. On March 28th, 1928 the Praesidium of the TZIK of the U.S.S.R. agreed to hand over the region to the Comzet for colonization by Jews.

In official Comzet circles it was estimated that in the Biro-Bydzhn region there were more than 87 million hectares of land suitable for cultivation, and that within the next ten years it should be possible to open up 25 million hectares (actually, a population four times as great as the whole Jewish population of the U.S.S.R. would hardly suffice for this). Sceptics meanwhile declared that the region comprised only 17.5 million hectares of arable land but that machinery would have to be extensively introduced. They therefore estimated the average expenditure for settling a family at Rbles. 3,500.


The Soviet Government transferred to the Biro-Bydzhn project nearly all its available settlement funds, but the Agro-Joint did not show the same amount of confidence in the scheme. It was soon discovered that the conditions of climate and soil were unsatisfactory (the mean temperature in winter is round about $-21^{\circ}\text{C}.$; and as there is very little snow, the ground freezes to a great depth). Whatever the reason may be out of the 654 families of settlers who arrived in the Biro-Bydzhn region in 1928 only 337 had settled down.

The Biro-Bydzhn project still remains a controversial question—one frequently discussed—both in the Soviet Press and also in Jewish publications abroad. So far, however, there is no reliable information as to its practicability.

ADMINISTRATIVE MAP 1



ADMINISTRATIVE MAP II



PART TWO—POLITICAL

POLITICAL STRUCTURE

I

SPECIAL FEATURES OF RUSSIAN POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

The Powers of the State

THE political structure of the Russian State exhibits a series of peculiarities permeating its whole history: beginning with the Moscow period, passing through that of the Empire, and ending with the Soviet-Communist period.

If, with Herbert Spencer, one divides human societies (states) into two fundamental types—military and commercial—then the Russian State undoubtedly belongs to the former category. In this sense there is a radical difference between the Anglo-Saxon world and the Russian. The liberal methods of English administration are alien to the political history of Russia, where the State has always exercised a firm, wide-spread, and “parental” sway over the people. The monarchical form of government, originally common to most other political societies, was developed in Russia to the pitch of absolute sovereignty.

The authority of the Throne, in every absolute monarchy, has always relied for support upon the governing class. In most of the monarchies known to history this class has either been composed of the great landed aristocracy or the upper urban middle-classes, the latter being enlisted by the Throne in its struggle against the power of the great feudal lords. A characteristic feature of the early Russian monarchy was its prolonged but successful struggle with the landed aristocracy without relying upon the bourgeoisie of the towns; the crown relied on the dvorians and officials, both designated by the generic name of “servants of the State.”

In the opinion of Kliuchevsky (the best-known Russian historian), so late as the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the special privileges of separate groups and classes were still largely undefined. Legislative authority in Moscow fully recognized the economic (fiscal) privileges enjoyed by various classes, but regarded these as serving not so much the interests of these classes as the aims of the State. In other words, such were regarded as a definite method of ensuring the performance of certain duties imposed by the State, and not as a means of safeguarding

class interests. These privileges were obtained by the personal efforts of individuals, and were conferred upon these individuals by the State. Simultaneously, the State imposed upon such persons corresponding responsibilities.

The Origin of Class Legislation

The Russian State, which did not recognize any rights as inherent in mere citizenship but made such rights dependent on the fulfillment of various duties, distributed the latter anything but impartially. This distribution became the basis for the class organization of the State. At the time when the Russian Empire was founded, Russian society was divided into various classes, which existed until the Revolution of 1917. The most privileged class was that of the nobility, which from the middle of the eighteenth century onwards began gradually to lose its exclusively official character. Special significance attaches to a ukaze, published in 1785, by which the nobility were freed from compulsory State service. The nobility received the permanent right of entering—and resigning from—the service of the State as they pleased. They were exempt from some forms of taxation (*e. g.* the poll-tax). They were entitled to acquire property, and to enjoy *the right of owning serfs*. The property of the nobility was inviolable, while they could dispose of it freely. In a word, the only “Declaration of Rights” contained in the laws of the Empire was a declaration of the rights of the nobility.

Other classes enjoyed rights to a lesser extent. The priesthood formed a separate class, exempt from the poll-tax, immune from corporal punishment, and subject to special jurisdiction; the priests were, however, restricted as to the acquisition of property. The merchants, also, had certain class privileges (the right to own serfs, exemption from the poll-tax, and immunity from corporal punishment). The serfs were almost devoid of rights. It would appear that the only “privilege” assured to them by law was freedom to marry.

Another manifestation of this class structure was to be found in the corporate organization of the upper classes. From the time of Catherine II onwards, the nobility of each Province constituted a body possessing a definite legal status. This body held periodical assemblies, and was governed by elected Marshals of the Nobility. Such bodies were not restricted to managing the internal affairs of their own class but were also charged with certain public duties, such as the election of persons to sundry posts in the administration, and the police.

The merchant class, also, had a special guild organization but took no official part in State administration. It is very significant that, although the priesthood was included in the privileged classes, it was debarred from corporate organization and was almost entirely subject to the authority of the administration.

Class organization *per se* was not, of course, peculiar to the Russian Empire; but its actual form differed appreciably from that of other western States. As has already been shown, class—social standing—in

Russia was much more a return for State service than a hereditary right. On the other hand a characteristic feature of the Russian State in the days of the Empire was the enormous difference in the mode of life between the upper class and the lower—the so-called “common” people. From the time of Peter the Great onwards, the upper classes had lived the life of educated European society, shared its interests, and followed its fashions. During the Napoleonic era, they frequently spoke French better than they did Russian. The Russian masses, on the contrary, were still living a life entirely free from Western influences, and based on purely national traditions.

Property Relations

The outstanding feature of Russian political history has been internal colonization. Russia came into being by the gradual spreading of her population over the face of a whole continent. To the north, south and east she was bounded by stretches of sparsely inhabited lands, on which her ever-increasing population laid hands. The Russian colonist was accustomed to consider land as belonging to nobody in particular, as “God’s land.” He was devoid of that feeling of attachment to a particular plot of land which is the psychological basis of the idea of ownership. Spurred on by economic necessity, he wandered afield and took possession of steppe or forest, sometimes dispossessing their nomadic inhabitants, sometimes settling down peaceably among them. When such territories became over-populated, the surplus population moved on further.

This peculiar form of colonization was not conducive to strengthening the principle of private landownership, as was known to the *lex Romana* and to Western Europe. European explorers, on landing in America, found themselves more or less in the same situation as the Russian colonists; but the conquerors of America possessed a deeply rooted respect for private property, whereas the idea that *the land belonged to everyone and no one, that it was common or God’s land*, was inborn in the Russian people.

Furthermore, the whole trend of State property regulation, even in its more modern forms, has not been conducive to developing the idea of private property. In ancient Russia only a certain proportion of the land, the so-called “patrimonial land,” was privately owned by the upper classes. The rest of the land, the so-called *pomesties* were a form of recompense, given by the State to its officials for services rendered. The State had as much right to resume them as to confer them. The struggles between the Moscow Tzars and the landed aristocracy broke the power of the patrimonial landowners, and served to establish the principle that all the land was owned by the State in the person of the Tzar. Similarly, the peasantry had no sense of ownership with regard to the land. As early as the end of the sixteenth century the peasants living within the boundaries of the State gradually became serfs of the State, or of those to whom the State had given the land.

Properly speaking, the idea of private landownership was only introduced in Russia with the rise of the Empire. As soon as the nobility were freed from compulsory service, the right of dealing as they liked with their own land became one of their fundamental privileges. But the peasants still remained serfs, living on land belonging to the landowners and ignorant of what it meant to have absolute ownership of one's own plot; so foreign was the principle that they firmly believed the proprietors had no real right to the land.

Revolutionary Movements

The economic and social life of the lower orders in Russia could not be called either easy or attractive. The peasants suffered most before their emancipation (1861). Russian literature abounds in descriptions of the harsh oppression suffered by the serfs whose fate, property, lives even in some cases, depended on the whim of their masters. A deep feeling of dissatisfaction was firmly rooted in their hearts and sometimes manifested itself in fierce peasant revolts.

A characteristic feature of the old Russian revolutionary movements is that they bore a social and economic, rather than a political, character. Monarchy was so much an article of faith with the people, that the risings were not directed against the Monarchy itself but against the administration. Peasant-risings, therefore, were frequently led by a usurper, or a "false Tzar," who adopted the name of a dead monarch. The idea of a republic, which presented itself so naturally to the Bohemian peasants in the Hussite wars and to the Puritans of Cromwell's time, was unknown to the Russian masses. Their revolts were directed primarily against the landowners and the State officials. The fundamental points of their programme were a forcible redistribution of the land, the destruction of the upper classes and the subsequent establishment of the dictatorship of the poor over the rich.

Revolutionary tendencies, however, developed among not only the lower orders but also the aristocracy. This very definitely took an anti-monarchist character.

It was in the reign of Nicholas I that Russian Radicalism and Socialism originated. The doings of men like Alexander Herten (who went to London and founded the first periodical denouncing Russian autocracy) or Michael Bakunin (who began his revolutionary activities in Russia and took part in many revolutionary outbreaks all over Europe) make it clear that the relentless warfare waged by the Imperial Government against the spirit of revolution had not only failed to destroy this, but had, in a sense, added fuel to the fire.

Unity and Separatism

Russian history exhibits the working of two opposite principles—centralization and decentralization. Usually, only the former has attracted the attention of historians, the latter remaining in the shade as a lost cause; it was only the Revolution of 1917 which made decentralization

again a question of practical politics. Disruptive tendencies had, however, always existed, sometimes breaking out and causing extensive disturbance. The Russian State was founded by colonization and conquest—and it would be futile to imagine that the population of the colonized territories accepted Russian rule without any friction or put aside all “separatist” aspirations.

Russian historians were accustomed to regard these tendencies in the manner of St. Petersburg officialdom, which looked upon them as “unrest” and “disorders,” unworthy of serious attention. Russian unity was considered a foregone conclusion and separatism as an incomprehensible anomaly.

Russian dominion over the numerous tribes naturally presupposes their conquest by physical force; but it would be a mistake to think that such were the only methods employed to keep all the races of Russia under a single and undivided authority. The widely diffused opinion that Russia was nothing but an “agglomeration of stolen provinces” is not strictly true. Russian civilization evinced immense power of assimilation, a process which evolved from the multi-racial elements of Russia a certain uniform type. Even in early days the conquered Finnic and Turkic races were not destroyed by the Slavs but became an organic part of Slavdom. The same was the case with the Tartar element, which was absorbed and assimilated by Moscovy. Russia not only succeeded in ruling conquered nations but enlisted their nationals among her administrative class and placed them in positions of authority. In this fashion the Tartars successfully penetrated into the ruling class of Muscovite Russia and even that of the Empire. This was also the case with the Caucasian tribes, which became organically united to the Empire. It would be an unheard-of thing for an Arab or a Hindu to hold Cabinet rank in England; but Russia has had, for example, Georgians as military commanders and Armenians as ministers. The Russian world was formed by the merging of many races and many cultural ideas into a single super-national civilization. This explains why, in spite of the acute separatism shown during the Revolution, unity was preserved.

II

THE POLITICAL CONDITIONS AND STRUCTURE OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

The Stabilization of the Empire in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century

THE political history of the Russian Empire may be divided into three periods:

1. The period of construction—from the reign of Peter I to that of Catherine II (1689–1762).

2. The period of stabilization and full development—from the reign of Catherine II to the end of Nicholas I's reign (1762–1855).

3. The period of decline—from the death of Nicholas I to the Revolution of 1917.

The foundations of the State were laid in the second of these periods; and it continued to exist, almost without alteration, until the Revolution of 1905, while it maintained its outward form until the fall of the Empire in 1917. The territorial expansion of the Empire attained its maximum during this period.

At the same time the internal political structure of the Empire assumed definite form. The authority of the Throne attained its highest power, pomp, and dignity; and the fundamental institutions and organizations surrounding it became firm-rooted. In the time of Nicholas I the fundamental laws of the Empire were first codified by Count Speransky. The autocracy of the Russian Tzar attained its definite and ultimate form; the Emperor, indeed, became a potentate who, as Peter the Great said: "was answerable to none for his actions." According to the old fundamental laws of the Empire, all authority in the State was vested in a single person, the Monarch. As the Emperor was, naturally, unable to perform in person all the multifarious functions of the Throne, State institutions were formed, which were, however, only executive organs of the Monarch's will. They were established, and their authority conferred, by the Emperor, who could, at any moment, act independently of them. These higher institutions of the State included the Council of Empire (the Council of State), established by Alexander I, and the Senate, which was a legacy from Peter the Great. The actual administration was handed over to the ministries: and the ministers became the confidential agents of the Emperor's will. At this time the Empire was divided, for purposes of administration, into Provinces, districts (*Uyezds*¹) and communes (*Volosts*), as first established by Catherine II. The system of administration was several times modified between the end of the eighteenth and the first quarter of the nineteenth century. Finally, a system of centralized administration became established, according to which the whole state machinery of the Empire was directed from St. Petersburg. To each Province was appointed a Governor, responsible to the central administration and carrying out its instructions. Local autonomy and self-government were, at this time, very much restricted. Such rights were only enjoyed by the upper classes—especially the nobility, and were limited to purely class interests.

The Empire retained the character of a military state, the army being the chief force behind the Throne. The bureaucracy was organized, to a considerable extent, on military lines: officials wore semi-military uniforms and were subject to semi-military discipline. The fundamental peculiarity of this vast organization was the fact that, in spite of its specifically national character, it had been slavishly copied from

¹ The literal translation of "*Uyezd*" is "Riding."

Western models. The pattern imitated had been mainly German, or, rather, Prussian. This tendency towards German ideals had been apparent even in the founder of the Empire, Peter the Great; and since his day German influence had become one of the most powerful single factors in Russian history. Curiously enough, Western influence was, if one may so style it, retrospective. Towards the middle of the nineteenth century Russia was hopelessly behind Europe in almost everything—administration, economics, education, etc. Russia's defeat in the Crimea opened the eyes of Russian society and of the Government itself to the colossal defects of the existing regime.

The Era of Great Reforms, and After

The most important of the reforms introduced during the reign of Alexander II was the long overdue emancipation of the serfs (March 3, 1861).

The abolition of serfdom shook the position of the nobility as the leading class; it deprived them of economic power and emancipated the peasants from their patriarchal authority. The influence of the nobility was further reduced by the new Law Statutes of 1864, under which their right of appointing law officers was repealed. The reform of the police in 1862 limited the landowners' authority locally; and the reform of rural and urban self-government (1864 and 1870) did away with their exclusive influence in the Provinces. The main feature of the new institutions was the granting to the whole population, through the *Zemstvos*, of a large measure of local autonomy—strictly limited, however, to economic matters, public health, and education. The functions of the *Zemstvos* were definitely separated from those of the local representatives of the Government.

The representation of the *Zemstvos*, according to the Act of 1864, was established on the principle of dividing the whole population into three categories (*curiae*) of electors (which did not entirely coincide with the division into classes of Russian society); a curia of landowners, one of urban electors and a special peasant curia. To the first category belonged the owners of a specified amount of land (the extent of this being separately determined for each Province) or the possessors of real estate not less in value than Rbles. 15,000. The urban curia consisted of owners of industrial and trading concerns having an annual turnover of not less than Rbles. 6,000, and the owners of real estate in towns to the value of from Rbles. 500 to Rbles. 3,000. This new enactment did away, to a great extent, with the idea of class, substituting for it the principle of economic qualification. In the peasant curia, however, representation remained on a class basis.

The membership of the *Zemstvos* in the beginning of the twentieth century was, roughly, as follows: 45% were nobles, officials and priests, 38% peasants and 17% all other classes.

In general, class distinctions were levelled. Strictly speaking, only nobility was hereditary; the other class distinctions were a personal

rank which could be gained or lost.¹ This circumstance made it easier to pass from one class to another. Rights co-extensive with those of the nobility could be granted to anyone of good educational status and ability who entered the service of the State: and this substantially lowered the prestige of the nobility in the eyes of the country. Their place was gradually occupied by a class known, in Russia, as the educated or intelligentsia. Considerable numbers of them found a place in Russian society from the beginning of the sixties onwards. Actually, the intelligentsia soon became the dominating factor in Russian political life and so continued until the Revolutions of 1917. From this class came the leaders of the 1917 Revolution.

After the era of the great reforms Russia still remained an autocratic Monarchy. The extent of the Imperial power was essentially unchanged. The Monarch continued to be the sole source of law and authority.

Council of Empire

The highest legal and advisory institution, under the Emperor, was still the Council of Empire. According to its founder, the Council was established "in order to place the strength and well-being of the Russian Empire on a steady legal foundation." It was re-modelled more than once, but its composition and character remained substantially unaltered. The last legislation relating to it, previous to the Revolution of 1905, was "The Institution of the State Council 1886" (Code Vol. I part 2). It consisted of persons appointed by the Emperor himself. The number of members varied at different periods. Upon its establishment in 1810 there were 35 members; in 1890 there were 60. Ministers were *ex-officio* members of the Council. The Emperor either presided in person or appointed a deputy from among the members.

The main duty of the Council of Empire was the preliminary investigation, in the wide meaning of the term, of laws (their promulgation and abrogation, etc.). Yet, by its constitution, many questions of legislation were excluded from its purview. In this sense individual Ministers, the Committee of Ministers, and the higher military and naval authorities, had equal rights with the Council.

The endeavour to establish an exclusive monopoly of legal and consultative functions by the Council of Empire was a characteristic feature of moderate Russian liberalism and constitutionalism. By this means it was hoped to guarantee, in the Empire, the maintenance of the principle of official legality—according to which no act of Imperial authority could become law until it had been passed by the Council. On the basis of this, Russian legal literature attempted to differentiate between the *laws* of the Empire and mere *ukazes*, which might indicate merely the Emperor's will and pleasure. These political aspirations, however, found no actual fulfillment either in legislation or in practice. The Council,

¹ A certain rank in the service of the State conferred hereditary nobility, by letters patent, on application to the Monarch.

therefore, remained till 1905 a consultative legislative institution but not the only one.

The jurisdiction of the Council was not confined to legislative matters. It was at the same time the highest administrative organization with which the Monarch could deliberate on most urgent and special State business, such as the declaration of war, the conclusion of peace, etc. To it were also submitted the preliminary drafts of the State Budget and other financial operations of paramount importance. It exercised judicial functions in specially important cases of administrative jurisdiction. It was, finally, empowered by special Imperial decree to deputize for the Emperor in the event of his absence.

The Senate

The Senate, established by Peter the Great and subsequently re-organized more than once, was finally put on a permanent basis by Alexander I. Although the Senate had no right of direct access to the person of the Emperor, and (unlike the Council of Empire) was not composed of official personages of the highest rank, it nevertheless played a very important part in the life of the Empire. As the law provided no direct definition of the special functions of the separate State institutions, the powers of the Senate were somewhat heterogeneous. Thus, it took part in legislation, inasmuch as it was responsible for the publication of the laws. It also enjoyed various administrative rights, such as the investigation of cases concerning class privileges and the supervision of the proceedings of several subordinate organs.

Its main functions, however, were judicial. According to the legislative code of Alexander II, the Senate was the highest court of the Empire. As such, it exercised control over all legal institutions and officials throughout Russia. In this capacity, too, the Senate was largely concerned with the interpretation of the Code; and its decisions upon points of Russian law were as authoritative, as the written law itself. In Russian popular opinion, both liberal and moderately radical, the Senate was the State institution which possessed the greatest authority. It was considered "the guardian of the law" and with great dignity upheld the system of judicial organization introduced in Russia during the period of reforms.

The Cabinet

Executive authority was vested in the various ministries. Ministers were appointed at the pleasure of the Emperor and were personally responsible to him. They had direct recourse to Imperial authority through possessing the right of "personal report in audience."

Uniformity in the administration of the various ministries was assured by their being subordinate to the will of the Monarch. Furthermore, there was a tendency to unite the ministers into one corporate body, and thereby ensure uniformity.

Local Administration

The local administration of the Empire went through a series of changes in the course of two centuries. The principle of centralization represented by the Provincial Governors, the sole representatives of the supreme power, came gradually to be limited by what could be called departmental decentralization. For in the course of time the various ministries established local branches in the Provinces which acted independently of the Governors and were directly responsible to their superiors in St. Petersburg. The partial introduction of self-government in the sixties added to this the principle of local autonomy. In the second half of the nineteenth century the Governors really became the representatives of the Ministry of the Interior and for ceremonial purposes only represented the Emperor.

At the beginning of the twentieth century the Empire was divided into 49 Provinces in Russia proper; Arkhangelsk, Astrakhan, Bessarabia, Chernigov, Ekaterinoslav, Estland, Grodno, Kazan, Kaluga, Kharkov, Kherson, Kiev, Kovno, Kostroma, Kurland, Kursk, Livland, Minsk, Moghilev, Moscow, Nizhni-Novgorod, Novgorod, Olonetz, Orenburg, Orel, Penza, Perm, Podolia, Poltava, Pskov, Riazan, Samara, St. Petersburg, Saratov, Simbirsk, Smolensk, Taurida, Tambov, Tver, Tula, Ufa, Viatka, Vilna, Vitebsk, Vladimir, Vologda, Volhynia, Voronezh and Yaroslavl. To these must be added the Territory of the Don Cossacks. Russian Poland was subdivided into 10 Provinces: Kalish, Keltse, Lomzha, Liublin, Petrokov, Plotzk, Radom, Suvalki, Sedlitz, Warsaw; Finland into 8 Provinces: Abo-Bierneborg, Kuopio, Neiland, St. Mikhel, Tavasthust, Uleaborg, Vasa and Vyborg; the Caucasus into 9 Provinces: Baku, Black Sea, Daghestan, Elizavetpol, Erivan, Kars, Kutais, Stavropol, Tiflis and two Cossack Territories: Kuban and Terek; Siberia into 4 Provinces: Irkutsk, Tololsk, Tomsk and Yenissey and 4 Territories: Amur, Maritime, Transbaikal, Yakut and the Island of Sakhalin, which was an independent administrative unit; finally, Central Asia was divided into 9 Territories: Akmolinsk, Ferghana, Samarkand, Semipalatinsk, Semirechensk, Syr-Daria, Turgaisk, Transcaspian and Ural. Total, 97 administrative units.

The Provinces were divided into *Uyezds* (called Circuits in the Territories); the Uyezds in turn were divided into smaller administrative units—Volosts (called Settlements in the Cossack lands and Ulus in the Mohammedan.

Since the reforms introducing self-government the administrative units of the Empire could be divided into two distinct groups: (1) *Those Provinces in which Zemstvos had been introduced*. At the beginning of the twentieth century this was the case with 34 Provinces. As already stated, the Zemstvos administered local education, medical service, roads and some other matters. In such a Province, the Governor had the right of control over local self-government: it was his duty to scrutinize the decisions of the Zemstvos, not only from the point of view of legality

but also of policy. Besides this control, the functions of the Governor included the supervision of the local police, finance and taxation. The administration of justice, education, ecclesiastical matters, military affairs, posts and telegraphs, railways and means of communication of State importance, was not directly subordinate to the Governor. They were administered from the centre by means of special institutions, agencies of the corresponding departments in St. Petersburg. (2) *Those Provinces in which Zemstvos had not been introduced.* In Siberia, Central Asia, the Caucasus, Finland and Poland the Governors, in addition to their other functions, had the duty of performing those elsewhere delegated to the Zemstvos.

In order to deal with matters not directly delegated either to the Governors or the Zemstvos, the Empire was divided into fifteen Educational Circuits, fourteen Military Districts, twelve Law Circuits and nine Districts of Communications.

At the head of each division was an official directly responsible to the ministry concerned (*e. g.* Curator of the Educational Circuit, Commander of the Military District, etc.). By reason of his position, such an official sometimes ranked higher than a Governor. The administration of the Empire was not thereby rendered any easier.

Finally, some Provinces and Territories were united under the authority of a special representative of the Imperial power, who bore the title of Governor-General. The duties imposed on this high official by the laws of the Empire were very characteristic survivals of that patriarchal life which ruled pre-Revolutionary Russia (Code, Vol. II, part I, par. 408-462). The Governor-General was "*the upholder of the inviolability of the rights of the Autocracy.*" His duty was to take all necessary measures to put an end "*to luxury, lavishness, dissipation and prodigality.*" He had to see that "*the nobility lived a decent life and set a good example to the other classes.*" He had to take care that the young men received an education in the "*rules of religion, the highest morality and the feelings of loyalty to the Throne and the Fatherland*"; that everyone, to whatever class he belonged, "*should earn his living honestly and usefully.*" In a sentence, the Governor-General was the direct local representative of the Emperor's patriarchal authority, and his appointment was made at the sole discretion of the Crown.

At the beginning of the twentieth century there were ten Governor-Generalships in Russia: Warsaw (uniting 10 Provinces of Poland), Vilna, Irkutsk, the Caucasus, Kiev, Moscow (Moscow Province alone), Amur, Steppes, Turkestan and Finland. As will be seen from the above list, the Governor-Generalships were established in places of special political importance (Moscow) or of strategic and political importance (Poland, Finland, and the Caucasus). The Governor-General's powers were very wide; he was empowered to supervise and direct every branch of the administration in his jurisdiction; he had the exclusive right of declaring localities *under martial law, or in a state of siege*. The introduction of these conditions meant the abrogation of the usual jurisdiction

and the subjection of the population to emergency laws. On the strength of this the Governor-General could prohibit any person from living in any locality, could close down any industrial or trading enterprises, modify the usual legal procedure (transfer cases from civil to military courts), and prohibit all meetings—either public or private; he possessed the right of extraordinary arrest, of levying fines, of sequestering property and suppressing newspapers.

The administration of the lower units—the Uyezds, conformed, on general lines to that of the Provinces. An essential difference was, however, that in the Uyezd central authority was not personally represented. In the Uyezd the police, the courts of justice, the Zemstvos, excise agents, etc., were under the direct jurisdiction of the corresponding organs in the Province, of which they constituted sections.

The still smaller administrative divisions of the Empire, the Volosts, possessed institutions of peasant self-government, starting with the Village Meeting (general meeting of householders) which elected the Village Elder. The organs of the Volost were the Volost Meeting (composed of Village Elders), the Volost Elder (elected), the Volost Office and the Peasant Law Courts. The non-peasant classes were neither included in these peasant institutions nor subordinate to them.

In the reign of Alexander III the peasant institutions were put under the control of special officials—the Land-Captains—who combined administrative and legal functions and were directly responsible to the Governors. The Land-Captains, together with the representatives of the Uyezd police, were the chief officials through whom the State came into direct contact with the peasant population of the Empire.

Town Administration

The system of self-government in the towns, introduced during the era of great reforms and later modified and restricted in scope (1892), allotted the performance of various local and municipal duties (municipal economy, town planning, administration of the poor law, hospitals, elementary education, etc.), to the elected organs of self-government, the Town Dumas, and their administrative bodies, the Town Councils. Municipal self-government, like the Zemstvos, was under the control of the Governors not only from the standpoint of legality but also of policy. Other municipal matters, as well as governmental business, were under the jurisdiction of the Governors. Municipal self-government had been introduced in all large and medium-sized towns of the Empire in 1874. In smaller towns a special simplified form of self-government was introduced in 1892.

III

CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS

The Revolution of 1905

THE social and political movement antagonistic to Russian autocracy attained its highest development during the first years of the twentieth century. Owing to the reverses of the Japanese War, public unrest took a definitely revolutionary turn in 1905. The Government at first tried to compromise, and promised the convention of a consultative Duma (August 1905); but it soon saw itself forced by continued disturbances to make further concessions.

On October 30th, the Emperor was compelled by the turn of events to issue a manifesto establishing:—

1. The inalienable rights of civic freedom based on the liberty of the person, conscience, speech, assembly and association.
2. The franchise for all classes of the population.
3. The fundamental principle that no law could come into force without the approval of the Legislature, and that the representatives of the people should be given the opportunity of exercising active control over the legality of the activities of the authorities.

The provisions of the manifesto were gradually legalized by subsequent enactments. On December 11th, 1905, a ukaze extending the franchise for the Duma was issued. On February 20th, 1906, another ukaze was published ordering the revision of the statutes of the Duma and of the Council of Empire, which became the Upper Chamber. On April 23rd, 1906, the new Fundamental Laws regulating the relationship of the Monarch to the newly established legislative bodies were promulgated. On April 27th the first Parliament was convened.

The Moscow rising in December, 1905, marks the zenith of the First Revolution; it was quelled by the timely arrival from St. Petersburg of some units of the Imperial Guards, after which the wave of revolution began to subside. The principal elements of Russian society rallied round the Monarchy, which began to feel itself once more on firmer ground.

The Constitution of the Empire After 1905. The Emperor

The State organization of the Russian Empire after 1905 was characterized by the following features. At the head of the State was a hereditary Monarch. His authority, as defined by the law of April 23rd, 1906, was "supreme and autocratic" (article 4). The former term defines the position of the Monarch among the other organs of the State, the latter indicates that the power of the Throne is not derivative, and does not originate in some power superior to it (*e. g.*, that of the people).

The power of the Throne in matters of legislation was now exercised

through two parliamentary chambers, the State Duma and the Council of Empire (article 7). The person of the Emperor was sacred and unassailable (article 5): and the Emperor was still, in the legal and political sense of the term, answerable to no one. As regards his financial position, he was only nominally dependent upon Parliament; since part of the Budget was permanently fixed.

In the field of legislation, the right of initiating ordinary laws lay with the Emperor; while the fundamental laws, according to the constitution of 1906, could *only* be changed at his initiative. This meant that constitutional action was vested exclusively in the Emperor. He had the unconditional prerogative of sanctioning laws, while without his assent no bill could become law (article 9). No conditional restriction of the Imperial sanction was provided nor were any terms or conditions placed upon the Imperial veto. Therefore, while sharing his authority with Parliament the Emperor predominated over Parliament.

In the field of government the Emperor enjoyed exclusive prerogatives. He was the *head* of the administration, as may be seen from the text of article 10 of the Fundamental Laws of 1906:—"the exclusive right of government is, within the confines of the Russian State, vested in the Emperor." In some branches the Emperor exercised direct control; in others, he deputed his authority to the institutions or individuals concerned, who acted in the name and under the orders of the Emperor (articles 80 and 81). In other words, the Emperor bore the whole responsibility of government. From this resulted, first of all, the important circumstance that the Government was responsible to the Crown alone (articles 17-19). All higher officials were appointed by the Crown. According to article 12 of the Fundamental Laws, the Emperor was the supreme authority in all relations with foreign powers. He alone could declare war or conclude peace (article 13). He was the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces (article 14). The Emperor could place under martial law or a state of siege any parts of the Empire, he had the sole right of minting money, of concluding foreign loans and of ordering military credits in time of war, and he was "the supreme defender and upholder of the established faith and the guardian of the Orthodox Church."

Finally, judicial authority in the Empire was administered, in the name of the Emperor, by the duly constituted law-courts (article 29). The Emperor appointed the judges and other law officers; he alone had the right to bring higher officials to justice. The Emperor, further, had the right of commuting or revoking sentences, of granting free pardon, and of stopping legal proceedings.

The Legislative Orders. The Duma

The Russian Parliament consisted of two chambers, the State Duma and the Council of Empire.

Elections to the parliamentary institutions of the Russian Empire were not based on the principle that the franchise derives from the

right of every individual citizen to share in the government of the State; Russian citizens enjoyed the franchise partly through belonging to some definite profession, partly through possessing property rights, which gave them concomitant political rights. Only the peasantry, as a class, was formed into a special electoral curia.

Besides the peasant curia, the electoral law established the following categories of electors:—1. the landed proprietors, who owned land to an amount determined for every Province. This amount fluctuated between 55 and 880 hectares. In this curia of landowners were also included those who possessed other real estate besides land. Finally, the so-called small landowners belonged to this curia; *viz.*, those who owned land or other real estate in amounts below the established figures. The latter took part in the elections in the landowners' curia through their representatives; each representative being elected by a group of small landowners whose property amounted, in the aggregate, to the established standard of value.

The Russian priesthood, as a class, had no electoral franchise; but they took part in the elections if the Church owned land or other settled property in the Uyezd.

2. Urban electors of the first category. Among these were included persons who owned property in towns with a population of over 20,000. The value of such property was fixed at a minimum of Rbles. 3,000, or, in smaller towns, at not less than Rbles. 300. In this category were also included the owners of large shops and industrial undertakings. 3. Urban electors of the second category. To this category belonged all the small urban landowners, as well as persons who rented lodgings in their own name, employees in various businesses and officials. 4. Factory workmen. To obtain a vote, a factory-worker had to be employed in a factory having at least 50 workmen. Thus the workmen in all the smaller undertakings were deprived of the right of voting in the workmen's curia. It will be noticed that this curia was not so much based on the idea of class or property qualification, as upon a purely professional foundation.

All persons, other than peasants, without property were deprived of the franchise. The following categories were also ineligible for it:—women, men under 25 years of age, students, army officers, men serving with the colours, and the nomadic tribes.

Moreover, the electoral law did not grant the direct vote except in a few special cases. The elections to the State Duma were indirect and the number of gradations were determined separately for each electoral curia. Members of the State Duma were elected by the Provincial Assemblies. These Assemblies consisted of representatives, elected at Uyezd Electoral Congresses. Representatives to these were in their turn elected in lower grades of Electoral Congresses. In the peasant curia, for instance, the method of election was as follows: each village elected its representatives at a village meeting, one for each ten house-

holders. These representatives formed a conference of the Volost, at which representatives to the Uyezd Electoral Congress were chosen. The Uyezd Congress elected its representatives to the Provincial Assembly, and this last elected the deputies to the Duma. Thus the elections in the peasant curia were in four stages. There were two stages for the curia of the landowners and urban electors of the first and second categories, and three for workmen. Direct elections were only held in the large cities (St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev, Odessa and Riga), which sent separate deputies for each curia of urban electors.

The Provinces did not all return the same number of representatives to the Duma. The electoral law (1905) according to which the elections for the first and second Duma took place, gave a disproportionately large number of seats to the purely Russian Provinces. As amended in 1907, the electoral law reduced the representation of non-Russian territories still further. Poland, for example, was now represented by only 14 deputies instead of 37, and the Caucasus by 10 instead of 29. European Russia had one deputy to every 279,000 of its population, Siberia one to 492,000, Poland one to 795,000, and the Caucasus one to 1,065,000. The Central Asiatic territories, with a population of over 9 millions, were left without any representation at all.

The theoretical fairness of the electoral law was further impaired by the fact that the various curiae did not elect the same number of electors. The method of election, as laid down in the law of December 11th, 1905, gave preference to the peasants. The law of 1907, brought about a reduction in the total number of electors, besides causing a redistribution of electors among the different curiae, preference being given to the landowners. The following table shows the distribution of the electors of the different curiae in the 49 provinces of Russia proper.

	1905		1907	
	Actual Figures	Proportion	Actual Figures	Proportion
Landowners	1972	32.7%	2644	51.3%
First category			688	13.2%
Towns	2354	22.5%	570	11.0%
Second category			1168	22.4%
Peasants	2505	41.4%	114	2.3%
Workmen	208	3.4%		
	6039		5184	

The Council of Empire

The Upper Chamber of the Russian Parliament was the Council of Empire. This bore a more definitely class and bureaucratic character than the Duma. It was composed of both elected and appointed members, in equal proportions. The elected members served for a term of

¹ The law of 1905 had only one curia for urban electors.

9 years, one-third retiring every three years. A candidate for election must have attained the age of forty, and must hold the certificate of at least a secondary school. Electors to the Council of Empire were divided into 5 curiae.

1. *The Clergy*, represented by six members, three from the White and three from the Black (monks). The manner of their election more resembled an appointment by the highest ecclesiastical authority, viz. the Holy Synod.

2. *The Provincial Zemstvos* elected one member per Province. The property qualifications for election were three times those of the land-owner curia for the Duma. In other words, this class of representatives in the Council included the largest landowners of the Empire.

3. *The Provincial nobility* elected two electors per Province; who, upon assembling in St. Petersburg, elected from among their number 18 members of the Council of Empire.

4. *The trading and industrial community* (exchange committees, chambers of commerce, etc.) elected deputies, who in their turn elected from among their number 12 members to the Council of Empire.

5. *The Academy of Science*, and each of the Universities, elected three electors, who elected six members to the Council of Empire.

Out of 98 elected members of the State Council, 56 were chosen by the Provincial Zemstvos from among the large landowners, who belonged mostly to the nobility; and 18 members were elected directly by the Assemblies of the Nobility. Consequently the nobility could count on 74 votes out of 98. This predominance of the nobility was unjustifiable, for by the time of the first Revolution the nobility had undoubtedly lost their former preeminent social importance.

The other half of the members of the Council were appointed by the Crown. Membership of the Council was the highest bureaucratic honour; a member by appointment ranked among the highest officials of the Empire. This made the Council of Empire a semi-bureaucratic institution, sensitive to administrative pressure. A list of the appointed members of the Council was published every year. The Government reserved the right, when publishing this list, to omit any names it wished, and to substitute others. In this way there was formed a special category of "non-sitting" members of the Council,¹ who bore their rank as an honorary title but were not entitled to sit or vote. Taking advantage of this rule, the Government more than once transferred appointed members of the State Council from the active to the honorary list.

It was sufficient for an appointed member of the Council to express views opposed to those of the Government for the latter to remove his name from the Council for the following year. The Government could also, at the beginning of each year, pack the Council by new appointments at its discretion, to conform with its own views.

¹ The number of "non-sitting" members was not limited.

Administration in the Twentieth Century

There were no essential changes, after the 1905 Revolution, in the system of local administration. The Empire continued to be governed by the same Governor-Generals, Governors, Land-Captains, etc. Nor did the 1905 Revolution cause any change in the system of self-government of the Empire. Zemstvos and Municipalities remained, as before, centres round which there gathered the local elements mildly antagonistic to the Government. During the first Revolution, however, and afterwards during the years when the new constitutional regime was being established, there arose within the Zemstvos (and, to some extent, in the Municipalities) tendencies which were frankly revolutionary.

The physical force of the Empire was concentrated in the army at the head of which were the Imperial Guards. The officer's corps of the Guards and some officers of the army regiments were men who belonged to the privileged and propertied classes. Military service, especially in the Guards, had become a tradition for many of the noble families. The first Revolution left the army, especially the officer's corps, very little affected. The rank and file proved, on the whole, loyal to the Empire, in spite of several local mutinies, principally in the navy.

The peasantry, little affected by the political side of the first Revolution, continued to be the backbone of the Empire; for them the Russian Tzar was still the "Father," the embodiment of the highest justice and truth. They were still convinced, at that time, that the social evils from which they suffered came from the landowners and officials. They therefore remained monarchists at heart, in spite of taking part in revolutionary movements. The soldiers of the Guards regiments which broke up the Revolution of 1905 were the sons of Russian *muzhiks*.¹

At the same time, however, great changes took place in the life and psychology of the Russian peasantry. The boom in industry caused great masses of the peasants to move from the land and settle in urban factories. From the ranks of the peasantry appeared the Russian workman, who was transformed into a great social power. The Russian industrial workman did not lose touch with his village. Often he owned land and a house there and could, if he wished, become a peasant again. Many peasants migrated to the factories, the towns and the large industrial centres during the winter and returned to the soil in the spring. Town life changed their psychology and destroyed their patriarchal outlook. When they went back to the villages, their urban experience led them inevitably to become the village intelligentsia. Thus it came about that the Russian proletariat gradually occupied a leading place among the intelligentsia of the villages. Town life, revolutionary propaganda, and the policy of the Government gradually sapped the Russian workman's primitive virtues and turned him into a revolutionary and a Socialist.

The victory of the Monarchy over the first Revolution was far from being either decisive or conclusive. The Monarchy continued to lose

¹ Russian for peasant (male).

ground. Want of confidence in it spread, in one form or another, among all classes of Russian society. The peasantry only lost their monarchical sympathies very slowly, but the new bourgeoisie were not wedded to the ideal of monarchy, which had not guaranteed to them sufficient importance or privileges. The landed nobility was divided; and opposition to the Government had been an age-long tradition among them. There remained the bureaucracy; and even here anti-monarchist, or even revolutionary, tendencies gradually appeared.

National aspirations did not see their fulfillment in the new parliamentary institutions. For the peasants Parliament was an unfamiliar institution "invented by the upper classes." Owing to the peculiarities of the electoral system, also, the peasants were too far removed from it, and were deprived of the possibilities of electing a sufficient number of their representatives as members. It may even be doubted whether they made any deliberate effort to do so. The elections of the peasant curia in its lowest stages were carried out more under administrative encouragement than by free personal initiative. The few peasant deputies who secured election to the Duma did not feel at home there, and laboured under the impression of being unwanted.

The workmen, too, were very inadequately represented in the Duma. The Party with which they were most in sympathy—the Social Democrats—only existed unofficially, or, at most, semi-legally. The group of Social Democrats in the Duma numbered only a few members, who were under police supervision as members of a revolutionary organization. A considerable section of the Social Democrats boycotted the Duma altogether and refused on principle to take any part in the elections. The Social Revolutionaries were in the same position, although their extreme right wing sat in the Duma as the "Labour and National Socialists' Party." For the Socialists the Russian Parliament, as represented by the Duma and Council of Empire, was but a caricature of real constitutional authority.

The more moderate bourgeois Constitutional Democrats regarded the Russian Parliament only as a stage on the road towards Western democracy. They aimed at establishing in Russia a fully parliamentary regime, similar to that of European democracies. They took their seats in the Duma in order to bring about the fulfillment of their hopes as soon as possible. Thus among the circles of educated Russian society—the intelligentsia—the considered opinion was gradually formed that the new parliamentary institutions were a form of *pseudo-constitutionalism*. The new Russian regime existed—so to speak—as a compromise between the forces of the old and of revolution. How long such a state of affairs might last, no one could pretend to know.

It is open to question what the final outcome would have been if the fateful War of 1914, which completely upset all human calculations, had not come so soon. The political compromise effected in 1906—a compromise which had not yet become stabilized, but was only tending to become so—was suddenly tested by an unprecedented war against

enemies who far surpassed Russia both in their technical and economic development. It is just as difficult to imagine what would have happened to the Empire had the War been won; *but in any case, the state of compromise must have been terminated*. All the more was it found impossible to maintain this compromise in the face of military disaster, and the vacillation shown by Imperial authority during the War.

IV

THE REVOLUTION OF 1917

THE World War did not affect the legal side of the constitution of the Empire. The response of the nation to the call to arms was spontaneous and splendid. The regime had not enjoyed such a measure of popularity for many decades as it did in 1914.

Even the opposition circles (the Socialists excepted) rallied round the Throne in Russia's hour of need. It seemed that the political hatchet was buried for ever; the Imperial regime, after seven years of economic prosperity and political reforms, had everything at its disposal, during the first months of the War, to assure for itself a long period of internal peace. It did not, however, pass the test of the War—a test imposed on it by international events over which it had no decisive control.

The terrible reverses of 1915, the obvious unpreparedness of the army, the insufficiency of Russian industry and the unprecedented drain on the nation's blood and resources resulted in war-weariness and general discontent. The vacillations of the Government did not help to restore confidence.

In March, 1917, the reserve troops in St. Petersburg joined the workmen of the capital in open revolt. The Government, unable to deal with the situation, abandoned the helm. The food-riots immediately took on a more serious aspect, for the Socialists assumed control of the masses. On March 15th, the Tzar abdicated—and with him fell the Monarchy which during the last three hundred years had led Russia to greatness.

The Tzar's abdication took the Duma no less by surprise than the rest of Russia. The majority in the Duma was formed by the so-called "progressive" bloc, which consisted of Cadets, Octobrists, and other moderate (monarchist) parties, excluding both the extreme Right and Left. Thus in March 1917 the representatives of Russian constitutionalism were suddenly called to pilot the country through the stormy and uncharted waters of Revolution.

It is not without interest to note how the Revolution was received by Russian constitutionalists. On the evening of March 12th, the President of the Duma, Rodzianko, sent a telegram to the Tzar, in the name of the Duma, demanding that he should immediately appoint a responsible person, enjoying the confidence of the country, to form a new Government. The Revolution was therefore considered as a stepping-stone from

"pseudo-constitutionalism" to European parliamentarism, based on the Monarchy.

One of the leading members of the Cadet Party, P. N. Miliukov, very clearly described what was, at the time, not only the attitude of the Party he represented but the view held by moderate opinion in general. In a speech he delivered on March 15th to a crowd of people and soldiers collected in the Duma he said:—"The old despot, who has brought Russia to the verge of ruin, has to abdicate or he will be deposed. Authority will be transferred to the Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovitch as Regent. The heir to the Throne is Alexis" (cries and uproar: "that is the old dynasty"), "yes, gentlemen, it is the old dynasty, which perhaps neither you nor I like; but it is now not a question of like or dislike. We must answer the question:—How is the State to be constituted? *We see this as a parliamentary and constitutional monarchy.* It is possible that others see it differently; but if we are now to argue this out, instead of at once deciding the question, the country will be plunged into civil war, and the regime that has just been destroyed will be restored. . . . As soon as the danger is over, and peace is established, we shall prepare for a Constituent Assembly based on universal, direct, equal and secret suffrage. The freely-elected representatives of the nation will decide who is best fitted to express the general opinion of Russia—ourselves or our opponents."

Meanwhile, the opponents mentioned by the leader of Russian constitutionalism were by no means inactive. One of the characteristic features of the Revolution was that from its inception two separate directing centres were formed. Side by side with the Committee of the Duma, the Socialist parties had organized a provisional executive—the "Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies"¹; in it was crystallized the spirit of social revolution, as opposed to the bourgeois principles of constitutionalism, parliamentarism and liberal democracy. The subsequent course of the 1917 Revolution is the history of the conflict between constitutionalism on Western lines, which the Provisional Government endeavoured to set up in Russia, and social revolution, led by the radicals and Socialists, and backed by the traditional elements of Russian unrest—the peasants in search of land, the nations of the Empire in their quest for national self-determination, etc.

The history of the Provisional Government may be divided into four periods:—

1. The period when it existed as originally formed (March 15th to May 15th). During this period it carried through a series of democratic reforms, among which were the introduction of equal civil rights for all, preparation for the establishment of new local self-government on democratic lines, and the abolition of the death penalty. The Government also issued a proclamation to the Poles, pledging itself to grant Polish independence,² and a similar manifesto promising Finland a new

¹ Soviet is Russian for Council.

² On the basis of a union with Russia of all the Polish lands.

form of Government. This period is characterized by the growth of anarchy and the gradual decline of authority. At the same time, at the seat of the administration the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies gradually became the chief centre of "the nation in revolt." The Soviet succeeded in placing the Provisional Government under its control; and even, by means of constant organized pressure, in forcing that body to carry through certain of its demands. A first step in this direction was the demand that the Provisional Government should reverse its foreign policy and put an end to the War. Pressure on this point and agitation among the workmen and soldiers, became so great that the ministerial offices of the Provisional Government had to be reshuffled.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Miliukov, a champion of "War to Victory" resigned together with several other members of the cabinet. Socialists took their places (in the first cabinet there had only been one—Kerensky).

2. The period of the first Coalition Government (from May 15th to July 15th).

During this period the Provisional Government merely reflected the will of the Soviet, where left tendencies (Bolshevism) were steadily gaining ground. The Government, however, influenced by the "bourgeois" ministers, tried to base itself on the right wing of the Soviet; and a conflict arose in its midst. The Socialist Ministers, coming under fire of their left wing Soviet associates, were compelled to pursue a double-faced policy. This led to further anarchy; an armed revolt in St. Petersburg in July, 1917, was suppressed with great difficulty.

3. The Second Coalition.

The direct result of the events in July was a new and very protracted crisis in the Provisional Government. The "bourgeois" ministers, belonging to the Constitutional Democratic Party, resigned—and no cabinet could be formed till the end of the month. The crisis was complicated by the catastrophic disasters at the Front and by the pressure constantly exerted on the Government by the Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies. Finally, on July 24th, a new Coalition Cabinet was formed, composed of eleven Socialist and seven "bourgeois" ministers, with Kerensky at its head. In connection with the formation of the new Cabinet the Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies demanded from the Government an undertaking:—

I. To take no action against the Soviet;

II. Not to countenance any deviation from the programme of "democratic peace";

III. To take no action against the Bolshevik Party;

IV. To take decisive action against the "counter-revolutionaries";

V. To carry out, as quickly as possible, a political programme, including the nationalization of the land, and a general plan of organization of national economy and labour on Socialist lines, etc.

4. The fall of the Provisional Government.

The second Coalition Cabinet collapsed in August 1917. After several

unsuccessful attempts to revive it, Kerensky was compelled (early September, 1917) to concentrate authority in the hands of a Council of Five—the so-called Directory—consisting of himself, Nekrasov, Tereschenko, Verkhovsky, and Verderevsky. This was done on the definite understanding that the Council of Five should, at the first opportunity, be supplemented by representatives of the other parties. On September 14th, at a meeting of the Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, a resolution brought forward by the Bolsheviks was passed by an overwhelming majority. This resolution included the following demands:—the immediate proclamation of a democratic republic in Russia; the immediate expropriation of private lands; the immediate proposal to all belligerent nations that peace should be concluded; the abolition of the death penalty at the Front; the renewal of full liberty of political propaganda in the army and navy; the suppression of bourgeois newspapers; the introduction of the principle of the self-determination of nationalities; the election by the rank-and-file of all military commanders; and the dissolution of the Duma. Kerensky—and the Directory of which he was head—decided to accede to some of these demands. On September 15th the Provisional Government, through the Directory, decreed the new form of government. Later, the entire high command of the Army was dismissed and the Bolshevik leaders—arrested at the time of the July revolt—released. These concessions very much enhanced the prestige of the Bolsheviks, and still further weakened the position of the Provisional Government. Finally, at the end of September, the vacancies in the Cabinet were filled by new ministers, among whom were included several representatives of the bourgeois parties (Konovalov, Smirnov and Tretiakov). By this means the third and last Coalition Government was formed. It began its work in almost catastrophic circumstances. A wave of disorders and pogroms swept over all Russia. The Government searched for supporters on which it could rely but could not find any. The "Pro-Parliament" (consisting of representatives of all parties) which it convened was not a success. This institution consisted of 550 members; the bourgeois political parties had 156 seats; the representatives of the nationalities numbered 27, and the Socialists 367, all members of the Soviet. The Bolsheviks held 53 seats, but decided to absent themselves. The endless meetings of the Pro-Parliament resulted in fruitless discussion and no action whatever. On November 7th (October 25th, old style)¹ the Bolsheviks overthrew the Provisional Government. The latter had done nothing of any note during the eight months it had been in office.

¹ Hence the term "October Revolution."

V

COMMUNIST THEORIES

THE Bolsheviks, having seized power, actively initiated the programme which, for decades past, they had been preparing. The most radical changes were introduced into the legislation governing marriage, family life, economic conditions, etc. In a few words, they realized all the wild dreams of the Russian radicals of the sixties of last century, whose successors had retained, up to the Revolution of 1917, the Marxist principles unimpaired.

The distinctive ideas of Lenin, the intellectual leader of Communism, and of his closest followers and successors among Russian and European Marxists, may be epitomized in the view that World Capitalism has reached the last stage of its effete Imperialistic development. Capitalist economy, according to Lenin's doctrine, had reached a point in its existence when the question of its destruction—the so-called “break-up” which entered into the social conception of Marx as a necessary element—no longer appeared as a distinct theoretical possibility but as an inevitable event of the near future. Leninism and Stalinism, which succeeded it, are essentially based upon the theory of a sudden social change, consequent upon the full development of World Capitalist economy which contains already in embryo all the conditions necessary for a swing-over to Socialism. Under these conditions the working class must take up an active attitude, seize political power by direct action and organize a new Society.

Orthodox Marxism considers the State as a historical transitory form which will have no place in the Socialist world of the future. This principle should not be mistaken for a condemnation of the discipline every State imposes on its citizens; the Marxists maintain that Socialists society will need more discipline and not less, and that compulsion will be a natural characteristic of its regime. The absorption of the individual by the collective body of society and “organized labour discipline” will demand greater sacrifices and more submission from man than the “bourgeois organization” of the world has ever demanded. But, of course, the New World will be chiefly governed by self-imposed discipline of the conscious masses, and then the necessity for any kind of instrument of coercion, of which the State is the most powerful, will disappear. All this, naturally, applies to some remote future. At present the bourgeois State must give way to the proletarian, and bourgeois oppression to the Dictatorship of the Proletariat.

This view of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat has been officially and clearly explained in the “Introduction” to the “Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.,” published in 1919: “The proletariat, in the October Revolution, seized power and broke up the bourgeois State, which had

served for the purpose of oppressing the workmen as a class. . . . Without special regulations, without codes, the armed nation has dealt and is dealing with its former oppressors. In the progress of the fight with its enemies the proletariat makes use of one form or another of oppression, but it does so, at first, without definite method, as the individual case demands, and not in an organized manner. The experiences of the struggle, however, leads it to organization, to the establishment of a system, and *gives birth to new legislation*. . . . In the interests of the economy of resources, correlation and centralization of separate actions the proletariat *must draw up rules for controlling its class enemies* and evolve a method of fighting its opponents and learning how to conquer them."

Western jurists very often fail to realize that Soviet law is something quite different from what is usually understood under the term "law." The accepted standards of Soviet law do not recognize any *rights of the people*, they are mainly standards of compulsory discipline, which establish duties. These duties are purely conditional, and are not based on any inviolable principles or demands. Therefore, the standards of Soviet law are those of *purely technical feasibility*. According to Soviet theory, these standards governed the life of the people in a state of primitive Communism. The original form of the standards of a primitive society was custom, which was nothing more than "*technical rules for the conduct of social life*." Communist society, in the future, must live on the basis of similar technical standards, which lie at the root of the dictatorship of the working classes. Therefore "rights" and "laws," according to Soviet interpretation, have no inherent higher aims and aspirations; they deny the elements of duty and equity, and all that is higher and incontrovertible. All these ideas are but an inheritance from bourgeois "fetishism and hypocrisy," which can find no place in a proletarian society. In the latter, law is everything that serves to destroy the old class of exploiters and to build up the new proletarian society. Therefore it is necessary to submit to this law in the same way as to any other practical rule or technical requirement. A quotation frequently made from a Soviet text book on law gives a characteristic view of this:—"Between the standards of Soviet law and the rules for the cultivation of market gardens, there is no essential difference of principle."

Soviet law is based on collective value, not individual which is *a bourgeois standard of theoretical equity*. The "rights of the individual," therefore, form a category far removed from the Communist conception. In these individual rights Marxist theory inclined to see a veiled class-interest favouring the bourgeoisie, and a political expression of their privileges. If the Soviet constitution, shaping itself upon old revolutionary models, begins by "asserting the rights of the exploited working classes," these rights are certainly not an expression of the principle of the legal rights of the individual. To examine carefully the Soviet "Declaration of Rights of the Labouring Masses," is enough to convince anyone that it does not deal with the establishment of rights or the

maintenance of liberty, but with the formulation of certain definite aims which Soviet authority has set itself, and which it intends to carry out inexorably. Reisner, the well-known Soviet jurist, authoritatively defines the Declaration thus:—"As a matter of fact, this is not a question of rights but of definite problems of Socialist organization."

The Declaration in particular, deprives the bourgeoisie of their rights of ownership by proclaiming the expropriation of private property as well as of financial and banking capital (Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R., Part I, par. 3): it deprives them of their political rights by stating that "at the time of a decisive conflict between the proletariat and their exploiters, the latter have no place in any official organization." (Ibid., par. 7.) In addition, the Declaration proclaims universal labour-conscription—which, naturally, is no sort of a right—and solemnly decrees the arming of the working classes, the formation of the Red Army, and the disarming of the well-to-do classes.

The Soviet State is, therefore, not so much concerned in limiting its authority as in extending it. The impulse that marked the first stage in the growth and development of Soviet power is indeed without parallel. To take a cursory glance at the extent of the Socialization planned by the Soviet is enough to obtain a clear idea of the growth and complexity of its activities. Between 1917 and 1920, the Communists abolished private ownership of: land, mineral wealth, forests, pedigree stock, house property in towns, building land, all industrial concerns whether owned by private individuals or companies, workshops employing more than five workmen, the whole estate of the Church, all shipping concerns, whether owned privately or by companies, all stocks of books and other printed matter, libraries, all theatrical properties, inventions, royalties, scientific, literary, musical and artistic productions, etc. Taking into consideration, in addition to this, that all banks were nationalized, decrees issued replacing private trading by State trading, and requisitions of all kinds made, the inference may naturally be drawn that Soviet legislation truly leaves little scope for individual rights.

Such was the Soviet State during the period of Militant Communism; *i. e.* until 1921, when economic difficulties supervened which brought about the introduction of the so-called New Economic Policy (NEP), permitting some freedom to private economic activity. It must be emphasized that this new freedom was confined to economic matters only. The regime of State control and pressure did not cease in the other spheres.

The juridical definition of these rights of freedom granted by the NEP may now be mentioned. It would be more correct to call them, not rights, but conditional concessions which made free trading possible *in so far only* as it was convenient to Communist policy. Therefore the regime of "freedom," granted by the NEP ceased as soon as Communist policy found this expedient. The NEP was abolished in 1927, and the Soviet State returned to integral Communism. It would be a mistake to think that the change from the NEP to the policy of Socialist construc-

tion abolished any rights, or destroyed any constitutional guarantees. Such rights had never actually existed—and, therefore, could not be abolished.

The introduction of compulsory labour in the U.S.S.R. has been much discussed. This is regarded, to a certain extent, as an innovation—as a new phase in the history of the Soviet State; regardless of the fact that the very essence of Soviet law, the “Declaration of the Rights of the Labouring Masses,” provided for universal labour conscription. What could this mean but compulsory labour? It may be affirmed that because of the inadequacy of Soviet organization the regime of compulsory labour was not, during the time of Militant Communism, sufficiently established; it may be said that, for reasons of expediency, it had not been put into practice during the period of the NEP. It cannot, however, be denied that it is a consistent outcome of thoroughgoing Socialization. Socialist construction is necessarily bound up with the systematic distribution of man-power. The juridical standards governing this method of distribution are a consistent development and corollary of the Soviet “Declaration of Rights.”

In accordance with this the State, when drawing up a plan of distribution of labour, has the right to transfer large bodies of workmen from one sphere of industry to another. This was done at the beginning of 1931, when all workmen with railway and shipping experience were compulsorily mobilized for transport work.

It may be affirmed that the Soviet State does not recognize the principle of the freedom of labour, and that compulsory labour is its main economic basis. This is specially noticeable in agriculture, where the members of Kolkhoz are actually “*adscripti glebae*.” It may, in fact, be said that in the Soviet Union certain forms of serfdom have been revived; the labourer is gradually becoming a serf of the State, and is used as the raw material of a plan of State economy which could not be worked in any other way.

From the foregoing, it will be seen that the regime of the U.S.S.R. is utterly unlike either the democratic or bourgeois conception of government. The peculiarities of Soviet legal principles and practice also serve to explain many features of Soviet administration, which will form the subject of the following chapters.

VI

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE SOVIET STATE

THROUGHOUT the Civil War the Communists remained the masters of central Russia, roughly the regions between St. Petersburg, Moscow, the Volga and the northern borders of the Ukraine.

It is from this centre that the Communists gradually reconquered and united under their sway most of those portions of the Empire which

had either become isolated or were in the hands of political bodies inimical to Bolshevism.

The new political entity which had been formed in the centre of Russia, and which was known as the R.S.F.S.R.,¹ was the nucleus of the present U.S.S.R. At first, it was a *Union of States*, loosely bound together. It gradually became a *Union State*, passing through the following stages. On June 1st, 1919, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTZIK) ratified by decree the union of the following Republics—Russian, Ukrainian, Latvian, Lithuanian and White Russian, with a view to combatting World Imperialism. Some States which, later, fell away from Russia were parties to this treaty.² New treaties were concluded in 1920 and 1921, determining the relations of the States which had been established on the territory of the Russian Empire. These treaties included the commercial and military treaty of September 30th, 1920, with Azerbaijan; and that of December 28th, 1920, concluded between the R.S.F.S.R. and the Ukraine. Thanks to these treaties, the respective military, economic, trade, financial and labour authorities, as well as those of communications and posts and telegraphs, were united in joint administrations. Similar treaties were concluded by the R.S.F.S.R. with White Russia (January 16th, 1921) and Georgia (May 21st, 1921). The separate Republics, in accordance with these treaties, were subordinated, in all important economic and military questions, to the All-Russian Executive Committee (VTZIK). Until the end of 1921 only the Ukraine had a representative in the VTZIK. The other Republics were not officially represented. Their delegates, however, took part in the work of the VTZIK from the end of 1921 onwards under a resolution of the III All-Russian Congress of Soviets. On March 12th, 1922, a treaty of alliance between Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan was concluded, forming the Transcaucasian Federation. On December 13th, 1922, the Constitution of these Transcaucasian Soviet Socialist Republics was promulgated.

On September 3rd, 1920, a treaty of alliance was concluded between the R.S.F.S.R. and Khorasm³; and, on March 4th, 1921, a similar treaty was made between the R.S.F.S.R. and Bokhara.

On December 30th, 1922, work was begun on the projected treaty for the creation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. On July 6th, 1923, this treaty came into force; and, on the strength of it, the new constitution of the Union was promulgated.

Federation and Centralization

The Dictatorship of the Proletariat is the most prominent characteristic of this Soviet State; and dictatorship, as a rule, entails centralization to a much larger degree than in any other form of

¹ Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic.

² The treaty and decree were largely academic; for, at the time, Latvia, Lithuania, White Russia and most of the Ukraine were occupied by anti-Soviet forces.

³ Khiva.

government. Yet events forced the Communists to select a federal constitution for the Soviet State. How were the principles of dictatorship and federation reconciled?

From the first, the Communist Party took up a purely tactical position on the general question of the federal structure of the State and on questions of local autonomy. It was for tactical reasons that the Bolsheviks stood for the principle of the widest local and national autonomy; for tactical reasons also, the principle of autonomy was subject, from the very beginning, to considerable restrictions. This contradiction, however, is easily explained. By supporting national self-determination, the Communists were encouraging revolutionary tendencies. By restricting it, the Party endeavoured to unite the international proletariat.

In relation to the problem of federation Lenin, and the Party led by him, had, in the past, adopted a negative attitude. "Marxists," wrote Lenin as far back as 1913, "are naturally opposed to federation and decentralization; for the simple reason that Capitalism tends, as it develops, to create large and highly-centralized States. Other conditions being equal, the proletariat will always consciously uphold the principle of a centralized State. It will always oppose mediæval nationalism, will always welcome the closest possible amalgamation of large territories, in which the struggle between the proletariat and bourgeoisie would best develop." Lenin brought forward the same anti-federal point of view in his pamphlet "The State and Revolution" (1917). In this he agreed with Engels, who defined the attitude of the Social Democrats towards federalism as follows:—"In my opinion the proletariat can only adopt a republican form of a highly centralized type." This point of view was shared by most Communist leaders.

Events, however, forced Lenin to reconsider his opinion, when Piatakov, President of the First Soviet Government of the Ukraine, very definitely expressed himself (VIII Congress of Soviets, 1920), as opposed to "the right of self-determination of nations." Lenin stigmatized Piatakov's point of view in the following ironical words: "What need is there for any self-determination when there exists a splendid TZIK in Moscow." To prevent his being taken seriously, he explained a number of tactical considerations showing that under certain conditions, federalism had its advantages. According to Lenin, "great caution should be exercised in this matter, as there is nothing worse than a distrustful nation. . . . The working masses of other nations, for instance, distrusted the Great Russians, considering them a nation of kulaks and oppressors. . . . National problems cannot be solved by enforcing economic unity. Such unity is, of course, necessary, but it must be attained by means of teaching, propaganda and voluntary consent. . . . This is why we must say to other nations that we remain internationalists to the end, and that we are striving for the voluntary union of the workmen and peasants of all nations."

Centralization must come later. It is stated in the preliminary draft

of the report on national questions presented to the Second Congress of the Communist International that:—"Federation is only a transitional stage on the road to *full unity* among the workers of the different nations." But "... federation has already shown its practical efficiency; both in the relations of the R.S.F.S.R. with other Soviet Republics and also, in the R.S.F.S.R. itself, with regard to nationalities which hitherto possessed neither national status nor autonomy (*e. g.*, the Bashkir and Tartar Autonomous Republics in the R.S.F.S.R., created in 1919 and 1920)."

The above mentioned situation, with regard to federation, was determined by the *de facto* disintegration of the Russian State. The separatism evinced in various parts of it imperatively demanded political recognition; and it may be remarked that the Soviet authorities, in the circumstances, showed great elasticity and adaptability.

The R.S.F.S.R.

In order to understand the complicated contemporary structure of the U.S.S.R. as a whole, it is best to begin at its centre, the R.S.F.S.R. Soviet jurists call this "the basic State"; "the centre of gravity"; "the prototype of the system." It is, indeed, a kind of political microcosm, whose features are reflected—with very little distortion—by the whole Union. Here the Soviet system developed; and from here it was transferred, preserving all its essential features, to the other parts of the Union.

The R.S.F.S.R. at first maintained its former subdivisions into Provinces, Uyezds and Volosts; but several of its parts became autonomous. Later, the Soviet Government undertook the task of dividing the R.S.F.S.R. into new administrative areas. The Provinces were merged into larger administrative units, which were termed Territories. Finally, in recent times, Uyezds have been abolished; Regions composed of several former Volosts becoming the sole sub-divisions of the Territory.

In addition to this, several parts of the R.S.F.S.R. have become national, autonomous republics, *e. g.* the Bashkir, the Buryat-Mongol, the Kazak, the Tartar, etc.

The political organization of these portions of the R.S.F.S.R. is different from that of the Territories and Regions. The Republics have at their head independent Central Executive Committees, Soviets of People's Commissars, as well as People's Commissariats. They are, therefore, separate States. Jurists differ greatly with regard to the question of sovereignty. Some consider it merely "decorative." In their opinion the status of the autonomous republics differs very little from that of the pre-revolutionary provincial Zemstvos. V. Durdinevsky, a prominent Soviet jurist, considers that this is not quite accurate and that "at least some of these republics are jealous of their national and sovereign status"; but, even in the opinion of this author, "these Republics cannot pretend to exercise complete sovereign rights." Another

Soviet jurist, Mazherovsky, is of the opinion that the question must be considered dialectically. "The Russian State," he says, "has not yet become a Federation in the full sense of the word, for the nations, in the process of assuming sovereign powers have not reached, either economically or culturally, the stage when they can organize independently or actively exercise their sovereignty. These nations are, however, growing and developing and are demanding the reconstruction of their State institutions on national lines; conjointly with their growth the principle of federation also develops." This last assertion does not correspond to the actual state of affairs. Throughout the R.S.F.S.R. (and later the U.S.S.R.) Soviet institutions have been modelled on a standardized type which disregards national particularities.

It is impossible, therefore, to judge the system of Soviet federalism from the point of view of established standards. This is proved by the solutions of the following three problems:—

1. *The repartition of authority between the component parts and the centre.* Central authority administers foreign affairs, foreign trade, military and political affairs by means of the so-called Commissariats (in Moscow). These Commissariats were, until the establishment of the U.S.S.R. (1923) called All Russian People's Commissariats and after—the Union People's Commissariats. Supplies, finance, national economy, labour, State control (Workers and Peasants Inspection), communications, posts and telegraphs in the R.S.F.S.R. were, and still are, under the joint administration of the local organs and the corresponding People's Commissars in Moscow. Finally, local administration, justice, education, health, social welfare and agriculture, were administered by the local People's Commissars of the Autonomous Republics. The Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R. makes no mention of the degree of dependence on Moscow of this autonomous administration. Article 49 of the Constitution, however, assigned to the jurisdiction of the Central Executive Committee (TZIK) of the R.S.F.S.R. the general direction of home politics, general legislation, organization of justice, court procedure, civil and criminal legislation, etc. Furthermore, Article 50 subordinated to its authority "all questions which it recognized as subject to its decisions"!

2. *The combination of legislative and executive authority.* The Soviet system does not acknowledge the separation of legislative and executive powers. It therefore follows that in entrusting to the local authorities certain spheres of activity, the Soviet system does not limit them to any one category of functions—legislative or executive. They possess full powers in the Soviet sense of the word. Possible conflicts of jurisdiction are solved by the authority of the Executive Committee of the R.S.F.S.R.—a fact that was not made sufficiently clear in the constitutions of the R.S.F.S.R., but which is quite clearly formulated in the more recent constitution of the U.S.S.R. In practice, possible discrepancies, or even anarchy, in legislation are abolished by the dictatorship of the Communist Party.

3. Finally, there is the question of the *constitutional changes in the relations between the central and local authorities*. Article 49 of the constitution of the R.S.F.S.R. reads:—"The establishment of the boundaries and powers of the component bodies of the R.S.F.S.R., as well as the settlement of disputes between them, lie within the competence of the Executive Committee of the R.S.F.S.R., as well as the general administrative distribution of the territory, the inclusion in the R.S.F.S.R. of new members and the right of secession from the Russian Federation." Taking into consideration that the establishment of the constitutions of the member States was in itself an act of the central authority, it must be admitted that the latter alone has the right of determining or modifying their jurisdiction.

Such is the organization of the "basic State" of Russia, in studying which it is always necessary to distinguish between the slogans and tactical methods, the actual state of affairs, and the policy of the Moscow authorities. Briefly, the main features are these:—advertisement of the widest possibilities of federation in programmes and slogans (adopted in the face of national "separatism"); a firm policy of standardized Sovietization, as manifested in the written law; and State institutions which ensure the supremacy of the Russian element.

VII

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.S.R.

HISTORICALLY, the greater part of all the Republics which form the U.S.S.R. arose as a result of the disintegration of the Russian Empire. They differ from the autonomous republics of the R.S.F.S.R. in that all went through more or less short periods of complete separation from the Russian State. Their regimes during these periods were, without exception, anti-Communist. The Reds conquered them by force of arms; and, partly forcibly and partly by taking advantage of the help of local Communists, introduced Soviet organization and thereby united them to Moscow. Until 1923, the general political position of these Republics was very similar to that of the autonomous portions of the R.S.F.S.R. The Federation possessed no special institutions, and no definition of the respective powers of the Federation and of its component members existed. The status of the latter varied considerably. The Constitutions of some of these Republics proclaimed them as entirely independent of the R.S.F.S.R. Of this type is the Constitution of the White Russian Socialist Soviet Republic, promulgated on February 4th, 1919, and supplemented on December 17th, 1920, at the II Congress of Soviets of White Russia. On March 14th, 1919, the Constitution of the Ukraine also declared it to be a State completely independent of the R.S.F.S.R. Their relations with Moscow were established partly "de facto," partly by special agreements which bore resemblance to international treaties.

In general, there was a tendency to centralize several important branches of government (*e. g.* that of defence) in Moscow, and to establish for others a uniform system of administration, while allowing a certain amount of self-determination in local and national questions. In this manner, a series of joint People's Commissariats was created by treaties with the other member States of the Federation.

Such an order was, of course, far from perfect, or even mutually convenient. After the Civil War modification became imperatively necessary. Reconstruction was carried out by the Treaty of Union on December 30th, 1922, which served as the basis for the new constitution of the U.S.S.R., promulgated on July 6th, 1923. The actual conclusion of the Treaty of Union was very ceremonious, and December 30th was declared a day of rejoicing throughout the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. According to Stalin the new Union was the "precursor of the coming World Socialist Republic." "We are setting the example of a proletarian State, which will lay the foundation stone of world-wide unity among proletarian Republics" declared another well-known Soviet leader, Frunze.

The Treaty and the subsequent Constitution of the Union were intended first of all to coordinate the relations between the member States: the R.S.F.S.R., the Ukrainian S.S.R., the White Russian S.S.R., the Georgian S.S.R., the Armenian S.S.R. and the Azerbaijan S.S.R. In addition, Bokhara and Khorezm were also recognized as members of the Union; although they did not take direct part in signing the Treaty but were declared to be "States in fraternal relations with the Union." In 1924 took place the complicated process of sub-dividing Central Asia; as a result of which two new republics—the Uzbek S.S.R. and the Turkoman S.S.R.—were established on the territory of Russian Turkestan (including Bokhara and Khorezm). At the III All-Union Congress of Soviets (1925), these Republics were recognized as new members of the Union, and the Treaty of Union correspondingly modified. In 1930, a seventh Federal Republic—the Tadzhik S.S.R.—was established.

The provision of the Treaty of December 30th, 1922, as customary with all similar treaties, established the general political foundations of the Union. These were more fully developed in the new constitutional law of July 6th, 1923. From a cursory examination of these acts it will be at once seen that the prototype of the new Union was the Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R. The Constitution of the Soviet Union exactly reproduces the general system of the supreme organs of the R.S.F.S.R.; except that, instead of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, there is the All-Union Congress of Soviets, from which is subsequently formed the Union Executive Committee and its Praesidium, and the Union Council of People's Commissars. The relations between the People's Commissariats of the Union and those of the member States are planned on lines identical with those within the boundaries of the R.S.F.S.R.: there are Union Commissariats, Joint Commissariats and Independent Commissariats, the whole system being extensively coordinated and unified. Each member State is ad-

ministered by its own Congress of Soviets, Executive Committee, their Praesidiums and Councils of People's Commissars. Furthermore, the Constitution established the Supreme Tribunal of the Union and the United States Political Department of the Union (OGPU).

To what category of states can the U.S.S.R. be assigned? It has been termed a *Union of States (Staatenbund)*, a *Union State (Bundesstaat)*, and a Federation. Owing to the peculiar structure of the Soviet, and in view of its as-yet amorphous political character, one cannot at present classify it with any existing type.

The U.S.S.R., judged by its formal constitution, belongs to the type of those federal states which are based on the principle of the delegation of sovereignty.

Article 3 of the Constitution reads:—"The sovereignty of the Federal Republics is limited only to the extent provided for in the present constitution, and only in matters allotted to the competence of the Union. Beyond these limits, each Republic of the Union exercises its powers independently." At the same time the Union represents a real legal entity—a *universitas*, not a *societas*. The new Constitution of the Union, like that of the R.S.F.S.R. has completely done away with the idea that the source of sovereignty is vested in the Soviets of the lowest grade; each Republic *per se* is a sovereign power. The Constitution invests the supreme organs of authority of the Union with supreme power. The Union of Soviet Republics has "direct" authority over the subjects, officials and the institutions of its member States.

Equally, the Union has the right of "direct" control over the legislative and administrative activities of the members of the Union. All these features establish the fact that the U.S.S.R. is a *Union State (Bundesstaat)*.

As regards the very important question of the repartition of sovereign rights in the U.S.S.R., it must be acknowledged that the powers of the Union are very great, and exceed the usual relations between a Union and its component members. The powers of the supreme organs of the Union are, in some way, wider than those of the supreme organs of the R.S.F.S.R. Comparing Article 49 of the Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R. with Article 1 of the Union Constitution, it will be seen that the latter includes all but two points (the right to alter the prerogatives of member States of the Union, and the right to change the general administrative division of their territory) of the prerogatives of the Executive Committee of the R.S.F.S.R. In addition, the following points are within the competence of the Union: 1. all general enactments concerning the principles of land-tenure, as well as of the use of the mineral wealth, forests and waters of the whole territory of the Union: 2. legislation with regard to emigration within the Union, and control over internal colonization funds: 3. the fundamental labour laws: 4. the general principles of education: 5. all general measures to promote national health: 6. the compilation of Union statistics. It may well be asked, what remains in the competence of the member States? In what sphere of competence,

in the material sense of this word, do they exercise their sovereignty independently? Apparently there is no special, entirely independent sphere of state activity possessed by the member States.

Taking into consideration that in Soviet legislation the right to promulgate general laws belongs to the Union alone, it must be concluded that the member States possess the right of legislation only in local matters. Their competence is thus mainly local; and their sovereignty can mainly be manifested only within the scope of the activities of the Independent Commissariats. In all other respects they are given general instructions by the central organs of the Union.

Finally, there remains the question of the right to alter the existing repartition of sovereignty. It has been shown that the Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R. assigned this to its supreme organs, whereas the Constitution of the Union excluded the corresponding enactments from the jurisdiction of the supreme organs of the Union. Any change in the repartition of sovereign rights is made dependent on a change in the Constitution itself. Alterations in the fundamental principles of the Constitution, however, are exclusively the prerogative of the All-Union Congress of Soviets. It must, therefore, be acknowledged that the right to change the system of repartition of sovereign rights belongs to the Union and not to the member States.

At the same time, the Constitution recognizes the right of every member State to secede from the Union at its discretion; a right which is specially emphasized by Soviet jurists who point out that the Union is the freest political organization in the world. It is true that the Constitution does not define the method of this withdrawal. It might be supposed that secession from the Union could be affected by a resolution of the supreme organs of the member States—in particular, of their Congress of Soviets. But the enactments of these Congresses of Soviets may be suspended, or even annulled, by the All-Union Congress of Soviets or by its Executive Committee. It may be asked, wherein lies the freedom of secession, when it may be either annulled or suspended? Actually, the freedom of withdrawal as announced in the Constitution is a pure fiction, preserved for purposes of propaganda.

VIII

THE SOVIET SYSTEM AND ITS ORGANS

General Scheme

Two separate principles underlie the theoretical foundations of the Soviet State, a dualism which explains many of the contradictions of Soviet life. These principles are Soviet democracy and proletarian (or Communist) Dictatorship. The first implies that the State is built up from below, from the base to the apex, the source of all power being the people. The second, on the contrary, invests the Communists, acting in

the name of the proletariat with supreme authority, and implies the organization of the State in the reverse order. The Soviet State could not reconcile these contradictory principles and had recourse to a purely superficial and mechanical method of adjusting their differences. It set up two kinds of State organizations—those of democracy, and those of the Dictatorship, the former having a constitutional—*de jure*—existence, the latter merely a *de facto* one. The organs of the Communist Party are therefore not mentioned in the Constitution of the U.S.S.R.

During the first period of the history of the U.S.S.R.—until about 1928—the Communist Party strove in every way to give the constitutional organs of the State full apparent responsibility; the Party remained in the shade and controlled the official organs “unofficially.” Since 1928 a gradual change of policy occurred; the Party concealed its dictatorial powers less and less. The constitutional organs appeared now in their true light—a mere screen for the activities of the Communist Party. This constitutional screen is organized as follows:—

- I. The primary organs of the U.S.S.R.—the Soviets (Councils) of Deputies, sub-divided into: Village, Urban, and Factory Soviets.
- II. The derivative organs of the Republic or of the Soviets, elected by them, and sub-divided into:—

A) Local organs:

1. Regional Congresses of Soviets and their Executive Committees.
2. Territorial Congresses of Soviets and their Executive Committees.

B) Central organs:

- a) Organs of the federal and autonomous parts of the U.S.S.R.
 1. The Congresses of the Soviets of the Federal and Autonomous Republics.

2. The Central Executive Committees and their Praesidia.
3. The Councils of People's Commissars of the federal and autonomous parts of the Union.

b) Supreme Organs of the U.S.S.R.

1. The Congress of the Soviets of the Union.
2. The Central Executive Committee of the Union with its two chambers—the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities.
3. The Praesidium of the Central Executive Committee of the Union.
4. The Council of the People's Commissars of the Union.
5. The OGPU.
6. The Supreme Court of the Union.

During the whole history of the Soviet State, this system has never been essentially modified. Herein, the Russian Revolution differs widely from the French, which was continually changing its constitution. This is not due to any special inflexibility inherent in the Russian character but to the purely secondary part assigned to the constitutional organs of the Soviet State; the constitution itself, from the beginning, was a blind, behind which the actual ruling power—the Communist Party—was concealed.

I. SOVIETS

Government by council is not new to Russia although it takes its origin rather from the popular assemblies of pre-Mongolian times—the Veche—than from any democratic doctrine. Councils were organized by Ivan the Terrible to administer local finances and justice; Peter the Great's Collegia were bureaucratic councils; the Zemstvos and Municipalities of the nineteenth century conformed to the council principle; and the peasant communes were governed by councils—the Village Meetings. The Russian revolutionaries adopted the council or Soviet system not because it was democratic but because it was familiar to the majority of the population.

The first revolutionary Soviet of Workers' Deputies was formed in 1905, at the time of the first Russian Revolution. The ideology of this first Soviet was distinctly pragmatic. "The Soviet of Workmen's Deputies," wrote Trotzky, "was formed, through stress of circumstance, in answer to the objective need for an organization which, while not having any traditions, would be authoritative; which would at once gather together the scattered hundreds of thousands of people almost devoid of organization; which would unite the revolutionary tendencies of the proletariat, would show initiative, and automatically exercise control. The secret of its influence lies in the fact that it arose as a natural organization of the proletariat in the direct *struggle for power* forced upon it by stress of circumstances." The pragmatic reasoning of Trotzky, whose mentality is exceedingly realistic, agrees with the comments of the far more theoretical Lenin. In his opinion, too, the Soviet—during the first period of the Russian Revolution—was not an established form of government. "The Soviet of Workers' Deputies was only a means for popular and revolutionary State-construction. This is manifested not only by its fighting the existing authority, but also by its search for new political forms." The process, in Lenin's opinion, consisted in:—

1. The seizure by the people of political power *without any right, law or restriction*.

2. "The spontaneous formation of new revolutionary organizations, such as Soviets of workers, soldiers, railwaymen, and peasants. In their social and political composition, they were embryonic organs of the dictatorship of the revolutionary elements of the nation, because the

Soviets *recognized no other authority or law and no standards except their own will.*"

The Soviets of 1917 arose approximately in the same way, and still on the lines of the old traditions of 1905. There existed no defined Soviet system and the part the Soviets played in the State was at first not at all clear. A few months later, however, the principles of Sovietism became much more precise. Two kinds of influence were brought to bear on them. The first was purely Russian and national and hence not easily understood by foreigners. It took its origin in the well-known anarchical tendencies of the Russian intelligentsia, and from its often erroneous interpretation of some peculiar features of the political life of the masses of the Russian people. "The Soviet regime," says Mikhailovsky, a Communist historian, "did not appear in Russia by chance. In its embryonic form it had long existed in the traditions and customs of the Russian people. It suffices to examine closely the only national organ of administration which existed in Russia for many centuries—the mir¹—to be convinced that at its root lie those principles which form the foundations of the Soviet system. . . . The Soviets of Workers' Deputies took root in Russia because they were nothing but the *urbanization* of the commune, the transfer of the age-long principles of the peasants' rural autonomy to the industrial centers."

Many plans and preliminary drafts of the Soviet Constitution, based on this standpoint, emanated in 1917, from the left wing of the Social Revolutionaries, who proclaimed: "Russia is a free Federation of Soviets. . . . For us the centre of power is not some supreme body or person, not even the labouring masses of Russia *but the Soviets, as being the actual bodies*, which defend the interests of organized labour."² *They are the source of authority.*"

How different were these ideas from those of the Communists, as embodied in the Soviet Constitution; yet some official commentators of the Soviet regime still hold almost similar views. In the opinion of some of them, the primary Soviets are, actually, the organs of supreme authority in the U.S.S.R. Every other institution in the Union is "only the concentrated energy of these Soviets." The study of the Constitution and practice clearly demonstrates, however, that this is not the case; these opinions are influenced by nationalist theories, which find no place in the mind of the actual legislators of the U.S.S.R.

The other influence, under which the ideology of the Soviet system was formed, is Western; for French syndicalism exercised undoubted influence upon the principles of Sovietism. The preliminary drafts and outlines of the Soviet Constitution clearly show this influence. The theoretical principles underlying it are best illustrated by a draft prepared by a group of Marxists in 1918, according to which the Soviet Republic is "*a free Union of the labouring masses organized on federal lines.*" In

¹ Commune.

² Declaration of Social Revolutionaries of the Left, 1917.

this draft, the principle of the Soviet system was not territorial or national but professional. This document indicates a view of the Soviet State which can be expressed as follows: the Soviet State is another and extended form of a professional or labour union. The difference between Soviets and professional or working-class associations consists only in the fact that the Soviets are a wider, more all-embracing form of labour organization. Therefore the idea that the primary members of the Soviet Federation are the professional associations is inseparable from the Soviet organization, and is expressed in the form of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat.

In practice, however, the syndicalist theory has found no expression in the Soviet Constitution; territorial and national principles form the base of the Soviet Federation, and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat has been replaced, by the dictatorship of the Communist Party. Moreover, the Soviet Union was not proclaimed as a Federation of professional organizations, but as a Federation of the Peoples of the U.S.S.R.

Village Soviets

An examination of the written law of the U.S.S.R. gives the impression that the Soviet system establishes a highly-developed organization of local self-government. In each large village—or, at least, in each group of villages—there is an elected body, invested with full powers of local authority. It is from this organization that there spring, by election, all the higher organs of the State.

In reality this is not so. From the very beginning of the Soviet regime, and until the present day, the Village Soviets have had a purely nominal importance, and the Soviet State, strictly speaking, possesses only to a very limited extent what may be termed organs of local self-government. This statement is based on conclusions arrived at by the Communist Party as far back as in 1923, on the strength of surveys of the work of the Village Soviets.¹ According to the data furnished by this inquiry, such Soviets often consisted only of a chairman. Under the most favourable circumstances they only numbered two or three members, or at the utmost ten. The activity of Village Soviets in the majority of cases investigated was nil; very rarely did it manifest itself, and then only in a feeble, insufficient and unsystematic way.

As an example of the attitude of the population to the Soviets, one of the surveys reported the following opinion of a peasant:—“I do not attend the meetings because they are no good. One learns nothing good by going. It’s all talk and quarrels.” This indifferent attitude of the peasants to the activities of the Village Soviets found expression in the exceptionally feeble interest shown by the peasants in the local elections held in the first years of Communist rule. Nevertheless, the results of the elections amply demonstrated the peasants’ lack of sympathy with Communism and the Communist Party. In their political composition the Village Soviets averaged, until 1929, 90% non-partisan members and

¹ During the NEP when a great deal more attention was paid to the peasants than is now.

only 10% Communists. In 1930 this percentage increased to 12%–14%. This can be partly explained by political conditions in the country. The peasants are not strong enough to resist the Communists actively and the election of an overwhelming proportion of non-partisan deputies and their subsequent absenteeism is a form of passive resistance. The Communist Party fully realized the seriousness of the position; and began to concentrate more political interest upon the village. “Face to the village” was the slogan of Soviet policy in 1924.

The question of reforming local administration, therefore, arose. The proposed programme of reform comprised two main features: 1. *Demonstrative democratization*. According to official instructions, the reforms should tend to bring into the orbit of the Soviets the whole working population of the villages, and to promote, by such means, “the development of the enormous creative power of the masses.” The new village administration was to convince the peasant that, as opposed to the Tzarist system, the peasants and workmen were now the ruling class of the State.

The class policy of the Soviet Government, nevertheless, gives rise to the following question:—Who are actually to be included in the term “working population”? Does the well-to-do peasant, the so-called kulak, come under this heading; or is it to be reserved for the poor peasants, the proletariat of the village, alone? The Communists themselves could not agree on the point. In 1925 moderate views prevailed which increased the electoral rights of the village bourgeoisie. Later, in 1927–1928, more extreme tendencies came to the fore. The Party declared the village bourgeoisie to be its chief enemy, and launched an active campaign against them. In 1928–1929 systematic war was waged upon the kulaks; and, finally, in 1930, the so-called “general line of action” prevailing, the Party accomplished an act unheard of in history—the complete economic destruction of the rich and well-to-do peasants as a class. This policy clearly marks the end of any democratic tendencies in the question of local village administration, and openly declares for the standpoint of dictatorship.

2. *Dictatorship of the Proletariat*. It would be a great mistake to regard the system of local administration in the Soviet State from the point of view of the Anglo-American system of self-government. In practice the local institutions, and foremost among them the Village Soviets, are organs of the dictatorship of the poor over the rich. When, in 1924, the question of the reform of village administration was being discussed, the Communists quite openly pointed out that the fundamental object of these reforms must be to establish in authority persons who would be loyal to the Communist Party. This was also the conclusion arrived at by the above-mentioned enquiry into the work of the Village Soviets. The Communist Party considered it imperative to establish actual administrative control over the activities of Village Soviets.

Under the influence of these two conflicting tendencies the Village Regulations (1924) were full of contradictions. Thus, it contains a

series of articles from whose text it follows that the supreme power in the village is vested in the general meeting of citizens. In this sense, the Village Soviet is nothing but the executive instrument of the general meeting: it carries out the resolutions of the general meeting; it transmits to the higher authorities all its resolutions, as well as the wishes and petitions of individual citizens; and it must give account of its work to the general meeting. Side by side with these provisions the Regulations contain others, in which the Village Soviet acts as the representative of the central authorities. The Village Soviet is "responsible for the struggle against the ignorance, epidemics and other negative conditions of village life"; it determines all measures relating to agriculture; it safeguards the rights of the peasants and labourers; it strives to improve the cultural and economic conditions of the labouring population of the village and struggles against ignorance, brutality, robbery of State property, bribery, usury and other contraventions of the law; it publishes and explains the enactments of the Government, as well as the decrees of the central and local organs of authority; it issues instructions to individual citizens or individual groups of citizens; it administers and polices the village; it fights against crime, and in such cases is bound to take all necessary measures for its suppression, including the arrest of the delinquent; it looks after the proper carrying-out of legislative enactments concerning the separation of the Church from the State and of the school from the Church; it issues permits for meetings and controls all social activities; and it administers the postal, telegraph, telephone and electric services. Finally, the Village Soviet convenes the Village general meeting. In a sentence, the Village Soviet is the lowest organ of the administrative and police authority.

It only remains to say a few words on the order of election to the Village Soviet. According to the Regulations of 1924, Village Soviets may be constituted in villages of not less than 300 inhabitants. Each hundred of the population elects one deputy. The minimum number of elected deputies is three, and the maximum—a hundred. Villages having fewer than 300 inhabitants may join with other neighbouring villages to form a Soviet. If these villages are more than 10 klms. apart then, by special order of the Regional or Territorial Executive Committee (TZIK), independent Soviets may be formed in them, even when the number of their inhabitants is less than 300.

The Village Soviets are elected for one year. Their meetings must take place twice a week at least. Representatives of local professional organizations, local officials and other persons may attend the meetings in a consultative capacity. The Village Soviet elects its own chairman; who, in the interval between sittings, carries out all measures passed by the Soviet and deputizes for the latter. The Village Soviet may have its own secretary; and in exceptional cases, if the district is densely populated, it can appoint an Executive Committee (Village TZIK).

The position of the Village Soviet has been considerably modified within the last three years, when the policy of Socialist construction was

introduced. A direct result of this is the process of agricultural collectivization. By 1931 a considerable number of localities of the Union had been completely collectivized; and in such regions a new institution arose, the administrations of the *Kolkhoz*,¹ which relegated the Village Soviets to the background. The latter became the organic representatives of the non-collectivized sector, and the Kolkhoz those of the Socialist sector. Competition, and even open conflict, arose between the Village Soviets and the Kolkhoz. The last Soviet elections, in the spring of 1931, were carried out under the influence of this struggle. The election campaign, according to the Soviet Press, was carried on under conditions of acute class-warfare between the kulaks and the poor peasants. In various parts of the U.S.S.R. the kulaks succeeded in breaking up election meetings. The decisive part in the struggle against the kulaks was played by members of the Kolkhoz, who actively rose against the Kulak elements and denounced them and their agents. In connection with these phenomena, the Party decided on the reconstruction of the Village Soviets for the purpose of making them conform fully with the new economic and political tendencies.

Urban Soviets

Until 1925 the Soviet State had, strictly speaking, no form of urban self-government. The old municipal governing bodies, established under the old regime and extensively reconstructed on democratic lines by the Provisional Government, were disbanded after the October Revolution. The Urban Soviets which arose about this time could in no way be considered the successors of the old Town Dumas. After the October Revolution the Urban Soviets became a fighting organization of the revolutionaries, intended to prepare the masses for the struggle against the bourgeoisie. In addition, they were also centres of revolutionary agitation and propaganda. Their activities did not include any economic functions. The Civil War forced the Soviets to direct all their energies to combatting the counter-revolution. An official inquiry into the activities of Urban Soviets up to the second half of 1921 proves that they were obliged to refrain from any active economic work, and to devote their attention to other questions; especially those in no way connected with urban affairs—questions of internal and foreign policy.

The above state of affairs found expression in law—the Urban Regulations (1922). It is enough to remark that the Urban Soviets had no executive organs and only held general meetings. All executive functions were delegated to the Provincial and Regional Executive Committees. The towns did not even have their own budgets.

It would be a mistake to consider this fact as the result of indifference shown by the Soviet Government. On the contrary, it was an act of very consistent policy; the Government feared that, if a permanent form of urban self-government were established, there might arise something resembling an organized opposition. There was, of course, far more op-

¹ Collective farms.

portunity for this in the towns than in the villages. In the towns there were still large numbers of anti-Communist intelligentsia who, although defeated, were not yet destroyed. Therefore it was less dangerous to turn Urban Soviets into organized Communist meetings than into centres of permanent economic and cultural activity.

This policy, however, was bound to have very unsatisfactory consequences for urban finances and led to a grave crisis in urban economics. Not only had the Urban Soviets no means of avoiding this crisis; they could not even prevent it from assuming alarming proportions. The re-establishment of urban economy became the urgent problem of the day; and under this necessity a plan of urban administration was drafted in the second half of 1925, and promulgated in October of that year.

The new Urban Regulations greatly extended the sphere of urban administration. According to the old Regulation of 1922, Urban Soviets existed only in towns of 10,000 inhabitants and over. The new Regulation enacted that they should be established in all towns and factory settlements irrespective of the number of the population. The new measure also increased the number of members in the Urban Soviets. Formerly towns of 25,000 inhabitants elected 25 deputies; according to the new Regulations this number was increased to 130; towns with a population of 50,000 had formerly only 100 deputies; their number was now increased to 200; in towns of over 50,000 inhabitants there may be established, with the consent of Moscow, special Soviets of the town districts, besides the general Urban Soviet.¹

The chief innovation introduced by the Regulation of 1925 was that special Executive bodies—the Praesidia of the Urban Soviets—were established within the Urban Soviets. The number of the members of the Praesidia fluctuated between seven and ten; while in Moscow and Leningrad it was fixed annually by the Central Executive Committees of the Union. These bodies, however, have no independent authority: they are *ex officio* incorporated with the respective Executive Committees of the Territories or Regions, where special sections for urban affairs have been formed.

The Urban Soviets were endowed with very wide budgetary, economic and administrative powers, not unlike those of the old Municipalities.

It must be remembered, however, that the Urban Executives depended, in the final instance, on the decisions of the respective Territorial and Regional Executives. It is owing to this that the Urban Soviets of the present day are rather political bodies than organs of town administration.

II. A. LOCAL GOVERNMENT

The history of the administrative subdivision of the U.S.S.R., during the fifteen years of its existence, may be divided into three periods. During the first, the Soviet Republic adhered to the system of the Empire.

¹ That of Moscow was fixed at 1,500 members in the last urban elections (1931).

Following this system, and starting from the Village Soviet, there were formed Volost, Uyezd and Provincial organs of administration.

Congresses of Soviets

On the usual Soviet plan, these were organized as follows: the highest authority, in each of these administrative units, was the Congress of Soviets (Volost, Uyezd or Province). The Volost Congress consisted of a limited number of delegates from the Village Soviets. From statistics of 1923, it appears that the Volost Congress consisted, on the average, of 53 delegates—one delegate representing some 350 citizens.

The Uyezd Congress of Soviets consisted of representatives from all the Volost Congresses of the Uyezd, on the basis of one representative to 2,000 inhabitants. Besides this, representatives of the Urban Soviets were also included in the Uyezd Congress of Soviets. The average number of delegates to the Uyezd Congress was 123. Of these (also on an average) 73.7% were elected by the Volost Congresses, 20.2% by the Urban Soviets, and 6.1% by the Factory Soviets, the small Factory settlements, etc.

Finally, the Provincial Congress of Soviets consisted of delegates from the Urban Soviets and the Soviets of the Factory settlements (one representative to 2000 electors) together with delegates of the Uyezd Congresses (one representative to every 10,000 electors). The average number of delegates to the Provincial Congresses was 250. Of these, according to Soviet statistics, 76.2% were elected by the Uyezd Congresses, 4.8% by the Volost Congresses, 17.1% by Urban Soviets and 1.9% by other bodies.

The various Congresses of Soviets had more or less short and formal sessions, held once a year and had no practical duties to perform. It was their part to decide upon the fundamental principles of local policy for the ensuing year, to pass reports, to confirm the decrees of other local authorities and to elect the latter. In conformity with the principle of delegated authority ruling throughout the whole Soviet political system, the actual administrative functions devolved on the Executive Committees (TZIK) elected by the Congresses. These exercised plenary powers for the Volosts, Uyezds and Provinces in the interim between the session of the respective Congresses.

The Executive Committees consisted of a very small number of members and were invested with considerable powers. Thus, as the text of the corresponding laws expresses it, the Executive Committees represented supreme authority in the Volost, Uyezd or Province, in the period intervening between successive Congresses.

The Executive Committee of a Volost consisted of three members and two deputies; but the membership could be increased by order of the Executive Committee of the corresponding Province. The Uyezd Executive Committee consisted of 11 to 15 members and 5 deputies; the Provincial Executive Committee, of a maximum of 25 members. In the Uyezds and Provinces there was a further subdivision—the Praesidium

of the Uyezd or Provincial Executive Committee. The Praesidium acted as substitute for the Executive Committee between sessions and were invested with full authority over the whole territory of the Uyezds or the Provinces. The Praesidiums consisted of 3 to 5 members.

Executive Committees

The discretionary powers of the Provincial or Uyezd Executive Committees were very considerable. According to the law of 1922, the Provincial Executive Committees gave effect to the decrees and instructions of the central authority. They entered into direct communication with the highest authorities of the corresponding Republic and their members were admitted to the meetings of the Executive Committee and the Soviet of the People's Commissars of the Republic. The Committees had the right to suspend or delay the bringing into force of enactments of the central authority if they found them unsuitable. They exercised supreme police authority and could use military force to ensure order and combat counter-revolution. In exceptional circumstances, they could proclaim martial law in the Province, subsequently reporting this to the Central Executive Committee of the Republic. Further, they had the right of arresting individuals and of domiciliary search; they supervised all commercial activities, the Press and theatrical performances; and they issued all kinds of official regulations.

The Provincial Executive Committee had wide powers of supervision over all government institutions and officials of the Province. They appointed these officials, discharged them and controlled their activities. They were invested with considerable powers in matters of economy, finance, etc. They appointed the judges, as well as the legal advisers¹ and carried out the verdicts of the courts.

In order to perform all these various functions, the Provincial Executive Committee were provided with 11 Administrative Departments, viz.:—the administrative, military, financial, agricultural, labour, education, social assistance, sanitary, urban, statistical and an OGPU Section. The heads of Departments were elected for one year, with the consent of the respective People's Commissariats.

The extent of the discretionary powers of the Executive Committees of Uyezds was very little inferior. The Uyezd Executive Committee carried out the instructions and enactments of the central and provincial authorities. It could not enter into direct communication with this authority, but communicated with it through the intermediary of the Provincial Executive Committee. In exceptional cases, the Uyezd Executive Committee had the right to hold up instructions of the Provincial Executive Committee, if these directly contradicted the instructions of the central authority. The Uyezd Executive Committee possessed complete control over the Uyezd police, and was also empowered to take exceptional measures for the protection of public order and the combatting of counter-revolution, to make use of military force, to subject the

¹ Defending counsels in Soviet courts.

population to administrative punishment, and to demand from the Provincial Executive Committee the proclamation of martial law. In other respects, it performed the same duties as the Provincial Executive Committee.

In order to carry out all the duties devolving on the Uyezd Executive Committee, special administrative departments were established under its jurisdiction.

The functions of the Volost Executive Committee were more restricted. It directed and controlled the activities of the Village Soviets and was also responsible for the protection of public order within the confines of the Volost. The Volost Executive Committees informed the Village Soviets of all decrees of the Central Government, and they were also obliged to inspect these Soviets periodically, and to furnish them with instructions.

The Volost Executive Committee was chiefly called to perform the duties of local police. It was its duty to combat crime within the confines of the Volost and it had power to issue compulsory regulations, to inflict administrative fines, to conduct administrative investigations, etc. It supervised commercial activities in the territory of the Volost, censored printed publications circulated in that area, etc.

Besides the functions described, the Volost Executive Committee performed various duties in connection with the fiscal, economic, agricultural, social, cultural, military, etc. administrations of the territory of the Volost.

The duties of the Volost Committee were divided among its members; matters of administration (in the strict sense of the word) and police functions were executed by the Chairman. There was a general office and also a separate office for the collection of taxes, attached to each Volost Committee. The general office was conducted by a secretary. All officials of the Volost were confirmed by the Executive Committee of the Province and Uyezd.

SECOND PERIOD

Reform of Local Government in 1925

The organization of local government reached its second stage of development when the Soviet Government proceeded with its elaborate plan of a new subdivision of the country. The old subdivisions were very artificial and did not correspond either to the geographical or the economic features of the country. The arbitrary nature of the existing boundaries was acknowledged in Russia long before the Revolution, and during the last ten or fifteen years of the Empire the problem of its reform became the object of numerous investigations which were taken into consideration by the Soviet Government when preparing its new plan.

On the other hand, purely political considerations also contributed to the transformation of the administrative subdivisions of the U.S.S.R.

The former division of Russia into Provinces, Uyezds and Volosts turned out to be too complicated to allow the Communists to ensure their administrative authority. The smaller units eluded, as it were, the authority of the Party. This is well illustrated by the fact that the lower one descended in the hierarchy of the administrative machinery, the fewer Communists one found in it. In 1925 the Volost Soviets consisted of about 10% of Communists and 90% of "non-party" members; the Uyezd Congresses had 62.3% Communists and 37.7% non-partisans; Provincial Congresses had 73.9% Communists and 26.1% non-partisans.

The phenomenon was not due to the ruling Party having insufficient power to introduce its partisans locally. Soviet electoral practice comprises many ways of intimidating the electors and of obtaining from them some pre-arranged result. These measures can be applied with equal efficiency to either the higher or the lower grades of elections—if there be an equivalent number of eligible candidates.

The fact was that at the time there was not a sufficient number of such candidates. The Party was not sufficiently numerous to be able to create majorities simultaneously in every grade of the administration. The simplest means of counteracting this was self-evident; it was only necessary to reduce the number of administrative units, so that a lesser number of Communists would suffice to control them.

This process began at the lowest stage, the Volost. In each of the Uyezds, several Volosts were united into one unit which received the name of a *Region*.¹ In 1925 such units were introduced throughout the R.S.F.S.R., the Ukrainian S.S.R. and the White Russian S.S.R. The number of administrative units was reduced to half (in some places to one-third) of those existing previously.

This reform was also determined by the New Economic Policy which led to considerable improvement in village life. The richer peasants (kulaks) began to play a considerable part in local affairs and the yearly elections to the Soviets became very lively and developed into a real political struggle, which tended to take an anti-Communist turn. But the increase in the size of the lower administrative units enabled the Communists to maintain their majority in the Committees, and, in some cases, even to increase it.

Along with the increase in size of the Volosts and their transformation into Regions, went a reshuffling of the Provinces; these were united to form the new administrative subdivisions—the Territories.

As an intermediate unit between the Territory and the Region, Districts (some of them called National Districts) were created, usually out of the former Provinces that went to form the Territory; local administration was remodelled to conform to the new subdivision of the Union; in place of the Provincial Congress of Soviets, with its Executive Committee and Praesidium, there was formed the new Territorial Congress of Soviets with its Executive Committee and Praesidium. The place of the corresponding Uyezd and Volost authorities was taken by

¹ Rayon.

District and Regional institutions. This was a change in name only; functions, status, authority, etc. remained unaltered.

THIRD PERIOD

Reforms of Local Government Since 1930

The XVI Congress of the Communist Party (June, 1930) decided: "To pay particular attention to the putting into force of the decision to abolish the Districts¹; to transfer their administrative functions, power and material resources to the Regional and Urban Soviets."

Arguments in favour of this new reform were brought forward by Stalin in a speech made on June 27, 1930. He raised the question in connection with the problem of the collectivization of peasant farms. "At present," he said, "the responsibility for the formation of collective farms has been transferred to the Regional administration. Are the Regional institutions supplied with the necessary number of indispensable workers to enable them to cope with their heavy task? There can be no doubt that they are insufficiently supplied with workers. Where is the solution? What must be done to remedy this deficiency and assure to the Regional institutions a sufficient number of the workers necessary in all branches of their occupations? Two things must be done:—1) the District must be abolished, because it forms an unnecessary partition-wall between the Territory and the Region. The Regional organization can be reinforced by the District workers thus set free; 2) the Regional organizations must be directly connected with the administration of the Territories. This will complete our task of administrative reform and draw the villages nearer to authority in its higher stages."

In the words of an official Soviet publication,² the decision of the Party to abolish the Districts was jubilantly received by the District administration. Nowhere had the gulf between the lower and the District Soviet machinery been so apparent as it was in the District organization itself; and none had felt more strongly the necessity for moving the centre of administration from the Districts to the Regions.

In spite of this, when the question was raised, objectors stated that it was impossible to abolish the District entirely and that at present this plan could only be applied to some of its component parts. As a matter of fact, the results of the reform, which was undertaken in the spring of 1931, indicate that it is causing a good deal of friction.

Generally speaking, the administrative subdivision of the U.S.S.R. has now a two-fold character, into Territories³ and Regions. At the head of the Territories, there are the Territorial Congresses of Soviets with their Executive Committees, Praesidia and administrative De-

¹ The National Districts excepted.

² Rule of the Soviets, August 17, 1930, No. 29-30.

³ The term *Territory* has been used throughout to designate both the Russian terms *Kray* and *Oblast*, the new administration units which have replaced the *Provinces*. There is absolutely no difference in their constitution and mode of administration and no definite reasons why two terms have been used.

partments. Their powers and duties correspond in detail to those pertaining to the respective organizations of the former Provinces—now abolished. At the head of the Regions stand the Regional Congresses of Soviets with Regional Executive Committees, Praesidia and administrative departments. The powers of the new Regional institutions are defined by law of January 1, 1931, which merely repeats the instructions, defining the powers and duties of the Uyezd Soviet institutions.

B. CENTRAL ORGANS

a) Organs of the Federal and Autonomous Parts of the U.S.S.R. The Autonomous Republics

The next stage in the administrative system of the Soviet State is the administrative institutions of the Autonomous Republics.

Many of the Autonomous Republics have no written constitution of their own; and for this reason, the composition of the Republican administration is defined in the text of the Constitution of that Federal Republic to which the Autonomous Republic belongs. As an example of this relation, the text of the Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R. (1925) may serve.

Paragraph 44 of part IV of the Constitution states: "The Administrative organs of the Autonomous Republics are formed on the basis of the provisions of the Constitution of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic. The principal administrative organ of the State in the territory of each Autonomous Republic, is the Republican Congress of Soviets; and in the intervals between its sessions, the Central Executive Committee elected by it. The Central Executive Committee, in its turn, elects among its members a Praesidium which acts for it in the intervals between its sessions. The Central Executive Committee of the Republic also elects the Soviet of the People's Commissars."

By law, the Republican Congresses of Soviets must be assembled once or twice a year. They were thus assembled up to 1928; when, conjointly with the introduction of a new policy—the Five Years Plan, the state institutions began to lose their importance, and to be supplanted by corresponding organs of the Communist Party. A session of the Republican Congress lasted, on the average, from three to five days. The local national elements were in the majority—and among them the Communists always predominated.

The programmes of the sessions are surprisingly uniform. Practically the same subjects are debated as have formed the subjects of discussion in the Regional and Territorial Congresses; the activities of the Government are summarized; a statement on the international situation is made; reports on industry, commerce, on the budget and on public education are presented. The Congress is not called upon to legislate. It listens to reports, approves the decrees promulgated by the Government, passes general resolutions and expresses certain pious hopes—generally inspired by instructions from the Communist Party. The

essential part of the activities of the Republican Congress is the election of the Executive Committee.

The Central Executive Committees of the Autonomous Republics meet about three times a year, a session lasting some days. The number of members varies considerably from 50 to 100. The Soviet Press pays little attention to the activities of the Central Executive Committees of the Autonomous Republics, a fact which indicates the insignificant position which these institutions occupy. They consist of reviewing such measures as have been put into force by its Praesidium and Council of People's Commissars; of debating questions of general policy; and of electing (usually reelecting) its Praesidium and the Soviet of People's Commissars. Actually, it is the last-mentioned authorities, the Praesidium and Soviet of the Commissars, which are the most important organs in the Autonomous Republics. Their subordination to the higher organs is purely nominal.

The government of an Autonomous Republic is carried out by the Soviet of People's Commissars of the Interior, Justice, Education, Health, Social Assistance, Finance, Labour, Internal Trade, and Workers' and Peasants' Inspection. All other matters are under the administration of the Soviet Union as a whole. As regards military matters, in each Autonomous Republic there is a separate Army Department, subordinated to the authority of the Commander of the Military District. A special department of the OGPU is attached to the Government, but its subordination to the Soviet of People's Commissars is purely nominal. In addition, there is a special department of the Union State Planning Department (Gosplan).

Of particular interest are the relations of the administration of the Autonomous Republics to the Government of those Federal Republics of which they form part. Of the Commissariats enumerated above, the Commissariats of Finance, Labour, Internal Trade, and Workers' and Peasants' Inspection are directly subordinate to the corresponding Commissariats of the Federal Republics. The appointment of the respective Commissars is made by agreement with the Commissariats of the Federal Republics. The remaining Commissariats, those of the Interior, Justice, Education, Health, Agriculture and Social Assistance, are considered to be entirely independent and directly responsible to the Council of People's Commissars of the Autonomous Republic and its Executive Committee.

The question now arises, what are the relations between these independent Commissariats of the Autonomous Republics, and the corresponding Commissariats of the Federal Republics? It would be a mistake to think that the Commissariats of the Federal Republics confine their activities to its subordinated Regions and Territories. Their authority is exercised also in the corresponding spheres of the Autonomous Republics. It is the duty of the organs of the Federal Republics to see that no deviation from established principles is permitted. As a matter of fact, all decrees promulgated by the Government of the

Federal Republics are equally binding upon the Regions, the Territories and the Autonomous Republics.¹

The Federal Republics

The organization of the Federal Republics, generally speaking, is identical with that of the Autonomous. The Federal Republics have their own written constitutions, which determine their political structure. These constitutions took as their model the original (1918) Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R. Some of them have since been modified, but not in principle. It has already been pointed out that the constitutional laws of the Soviet State are based on a standardized pattern which does not admit of any material departure being made from it.

The most recent of Soviet Constitutions—the 1925 Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R.—is thus typical of the rest.

The supreme authority in any Federal Republic is the Congress of Soviets: its composition is thus defined by the 1925 Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R.:—"The All-Russian Congress of Soviets consists of representatives of the Urban and Factory Settlements Soviets, on the basis of one deputy for 25,000 electors; and of the delegates of the Provincial (now Territorial) Congresses, reckoning one deputy per 125,000 inhabitants." The Congress of Soviets of a Federal Republic is convened for ordinary sessions not more than once a year at the discretion of the Central Executive Committee of the Federal Republic. This makes the Congress of Soviets dependent on its own Executive Committee. Extraordinary sessions may be called either by the Executive Committee or—in a locality containing not less than one-third of the whole population of the Republic) by a decision of a Territorial Congress of Soviets.

In practice, the Congresses of the Soviets of the Federal Republics are chiefly large ceremonial gatherings. Thus, for instance, at the VII All-Russian Congress of Soviets (1919), there were 2430 delegates; 1056 with a "decisive vote" and 1364 with only a "consultative." After the creation of the U.S.S.R. in 1923, the All-Russian Congress assumed the character of the local Congress of the R.S.F.S.R., and the number of its delegates was somewhat reduced to about 1600 deputies, of whom 90% to 95% belonged to the Communist Party; (at the XII Congress—1925—the proportion of Communists was reduced to 79.1%). The remaining delegates were almost exclusively non-partisan. Thus at the VII Congress there were 6.6% of non-partisan delegates, at the IX, 7.6%, at the X, 8.7%, the XI, 9.7% and at the XII 20.9%. Other political Parties were very sparsely represented; at the VIII Congress there were 1.7%,² at the IX—0.2%, X—0.2%, XI—0.1% and at the XII none at all. Since the XII Congress, no other Party has been represented. It may be noted that at the XI Congress, "all other parties" were represented by a solitary delegate, an Anarchist-Universalist.

¹ Some Autonomous Republics have been since 1931 incorporated into Territories.

² Social-Revolutionaries of the Left.

The activities of the Congress consist in listening to reports of the Government on the international and internal situations, in passing resolutions presented by the Government as to the policy of the immediate future, in sanctioning laws and decrees made by the State organs and in electing the Central Executive Committee. The last function is the only one of real importance, and is the only method of control the Congresses possess over their Executive Committees. This, however, is neutralized by the enormous majority of Communists always obedient to the decrees and instructions of the Party organs.

II. The Central Executive Committees of the Federal Republics are organs which, in their fundamental details, conform with those of the Central Executive Committees of the Autonomous Republics. Like these, they assemble in session and represent, as it were, local Republican parliaments. To them belongs the decision upon constitutional questions, questions of the organization of local government, fundamental principles of legislation, etc.

In order to explain the process of Republican legislation, one of the most important Soviet laws—the 1925 Constitutional Law of the R.S.F.S.R.—may be taken as an example. The XI All-Russian Congress of Soviets passed a decree relating to the modification of the 1918 Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R., so as to bring it into conformity with the 1923 Constitution of the U.S.S.R. A special Committee set up by the Congress elaborated a project and presented it to the Praesidium; which, in its turn, referred it to the Soviet of the People's Commissars of the R.S.F.S.R. It was next placed on the agenda of the last day of session of the XI All-Russian Central Executive Committee and passed by it. Last of all, it was submitted to the XII All-Russian Congress of Soviets (1925).

In this manner the initiation of the law and its ultimate sanction belonged to the Congress of Soviets; the latter, however, did not elaborate the law itself but handed it over to its Praesidium and the Soviet of the People's Commissars. Thus, in a great measure, the process of debate in the TZIK or Congress is simply a formality; it consists in pronouncing a certain number of official speeches, sure to be followed by unanimous acceptance. Soviet practice knows but a few cases where legislative proposals, on being debated in the Central Executive Committee of the Federal Republics, caused lively discussions. Such was the case, for instance, with the new marriage and family laws, submitted to the consideration of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee in October 1925. A whole series of members of the Central Executive Committee expressed opinions adverse to the code, considering it too radical.

It would be a mistake to think that all fundamental and important laws go through the same process. Many laws were decreed by the Praesidium or the Soviets of the People's Commissars of the Federal Republics and were subsequently passed by the Executive Committees at their next sessions. From the point of view of Western law, this is

very much as if the French Cabinet decided to modify the *Code Civil* on its own authority, instead of submitting its proposals for approval by the Chamber and Senate.

The Central Executive Committees of the Federal Republics are assembled, in the ordinary course, for three or four sessions per year. The number of members of the Central Executive Committee of the Federal Republics varies greatly. Thus the All-Russian Central Executive Committee consists, on the average, of 300 members and 134 deputy-members; that of the Ukraine—300 and 91; that of the Azerbaijan—160 and 67; that of Armenia—90 and 43. The Communists always predominate; although occasionally, by special instruction of the Party, a higher proportion of non-partisan delegates has been elected.

III. During the period between the sessions of the Central Executive Committee, its authority is vested in its Praesidium. Article 27 of the Constitution of R.S.F.S.R. (1925) says:—"The Praesidium is the supreme legislative, administrative and controlling organ of the R.S.F. S.R. in the intervals between the sessions of the Central Executive Committee."

The Praesidium of each Federal Republic usually consists of 10 to 20 members, elected from among the most influential representatives of the Communist Party. The term "Republican Government" is applied to the Praesidium conjointly with the Council of People's Commissars, in the absence of any definite distribution of functions between these two bodies. The Praesidium stands higher in the official hierarchy; and, ceremonially, is an authority comparable to the President of a (bourgeois) republic.

IV. Another body which, in the intervals between the sessions of the Central Executive Committee, does duty for the latter is the Soviet of People's Commissars. The general status of the Republican Soviets of People's Commissars is defined in the 1925 Constitution of the R.S.F. S.R. and repeated in the Constitutions of the other Federal Republics. The Soviet of the People's Commissars of a Federal Republic consists of a President, a Vice-President and the People's Commissars: of Home Trade, Labour, Finance, Supply, Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, Interior, Justice, Education, Health, Agriculture and Social Assistance. The People's Commissariats of the U.S.S.R. are represented in the Soviet of People's Commissars of the Federal Republics by special delegates. The Republican Soviets of People's Commissars conduct legislative and administrative work in the Republic. According to the text of the law, the Soviets of People's Commissars are subordinated to the corresponding Central Executive Committee and its Praesidium; which have the duty and the right to direct and control their activities.

b) The Supreme Organs of the U.S.S.R.

The supreme organs of the Soviet Union are based on the same scheme as those of the Federal and Autonomous Republics. According

to the Constitution of the Union (July 6, 1923), they consist of:—the All-Union Congress of Soviets, its Executive Committee, the Praesidium of the latter, the Union Soviet of the People's Commissars, the OGPU and the Supreme Court of the Union.

The Union Congress of Soviets

The Union Congress of Soviets is the supreme authority of the Union. It is composed of representatives of the Urban and Factory Settlement Soviets (one deputy to 25,000 electors) and of representatives of the Congress of Soviets of the Territories (one deputy to 125,000 inhabitants). If in any of the Federal Republics the subdivision into Territories does not exist, the elections take place at the Congress of Soviets of the said Republic.

The Congress of Soviets of the Union is convened in ordinary session not oftener than once a year, by and at the discretion of the Union Central Executive Committee. Extraordinary sessions can be called by special decrees of the Central Executive Committee or at the request of the Soviet of the Union, of the Soviet of Nationalities, or of two Federal Republics.

The 1923 Union Constitution with regard to the Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. repeats word for word the corresponding clauses of the Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R. The first Congress of Soviets of the Union was convened on December 30, 1922.

The official version of the origin of the Union was given by Stalin at the X All-Russian Congress of Soviets. The reason for it was, according to Stalin, the many deficiencies in the existing treaty relations between the R.S.F.S.R. and the other Republics. The desire for closer and better organized collaboration was the aim in view.

In December 1922, the Praesidium of the All-Russian Executive Committee received a series of resolutions passed by the Congresses of Soviets of the various Republics, concerning the formation of the Union. These resolutions were examined, in the first place, in the Praesidium of the R.S.F.S.R.; and the question was placed on the agenda of the X All-Russian Congress of Soviets. (December 26, 1922.) After Stalin's report, a resolution in favour of the measure was passed unanimously. The basis of the new Union was the principle of voluntary participation, constitutional equality and the option of free secession from the Union. Besides this, a resolution was passed to submit the draft of the Union Treaty to the Russian Executive Committee, as represented by its Praesidium, before its presentation to the first Union Congress; also, to elect a special delegation and empower it to ratify the Treaty of Union in the name of all the contracting parties, on the basis of such principles as might be established by the All-Russian Executive Committee.

This resolution demonstrates the special role played by R.S.F.S.R. and its organizations in the creation of the Union. Although the official version indicated the Uk. S.S.R. as the initiator of the Union, in point

of fact the R.S.F.S.R. actually carried out all the preparatory work of its formation.

On December 29th there assembled in the great Kremlin palace the Conference of the plenipotentiary delegations of the Soviet Republics. Kalinin was elected Chairman of the Conference.

The Conference examined and adopted the draft Declaration of the formation of the Union, as also the draft of the Treaty of Union. The formal affixing of signatures to this Treaty was deferred to December 30, on which day it was decided to call the first Congress of Soviets of the Union.

As arranged, this first Union Congress was opened on December 30. It may be asked: how was this possible, and when did the elections for it take place? The question is very easily answered. The All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which was in session at the time, was simply transformed into a Union Congress.

The first Union Congress was in session for one day only and held one meeting. Nine official speeches were pronounced and summed up by Kalinin in his concluding remarks. The Declaration of the formation of the Union, and the Treaty, were adopted unanimously.

The II Union Congress of Soviets was called in January 1924, again immediately after the XI All-Russian Congress of Soviets. The members of the latter also took part in the Union Congress but there were some supplementary delegates as well. At the XI All-Russian Congress there were 1143 delegates with a decisive vote, and 494 with a consultative. At the II Union Congress there were 1500 delegates with decisive votes, and 584 with consultative. Of this number, 77% of the delegates to the II Union Congress were delegates of the XI All-Russian Congress.

The III Union Congress was called in May 1925. It, also, followed immediately after the XII All-Russian Congress, the delegates to which were again embodied in it. This method came to be the rule and was accepted by the Party.

During the next seven years, only three Union Congresses were held. The IV Union Congress initiated the reconstruction of national economy on the basis of industrialization. The V Congress adopted the Five Years Plan. The VI Congress, held in March 1931, especially dealt with the question of a reform of the primary Soviets for the purpose of bringing their activities into conformity with the new economic problems. It must be added that all these enactments were passed in pursuance of detailed instructions from the Communist Party.

The elections for the last Union Congress took place under new regulations, which considerably modified the procedure established by the Constitution. This was done by a special decree of the Union Executive Committee (January 10, 1931)—another proof of the Executive Committee's predominance over the Congress. The new law assigns the elections of delegates to the Union Congress to the Congresses of the Autonomous Republics, Autonomous Territories and Territories. These

arrangements considerably increased the representation of the R.S.F. S.R. in the Union Congress.

The programme of the activities of the Union Congress is astonishingly reminiscent of those of all other Congresses of Soviets. The usual agenda comprise reports on Soviet economic policy, foreign relations, the Red Army, finance, the condition of industry, etc. With few exceptions, the Union Congress does not elaborate legislative measures but only sanctions laws drafted and enacted by other organs of the Union. It passes various resolutions which remind one very much of the corresponding resolutions of the Communist Party and are frequently exact copies of them. Considering that the same resolutions of the Party are repeated at all the other Congresses of Soviets, it may be said that the Congresses of Soviets in general—beginning with the lowest and ending with the highest—form, as it were, loud-speakers which the Communist Party finds both necessary and convenient for informing the population of its decisions and tactics.

*The Central Executive Committee of the Union*¹

A peculiarity of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. is that, by the law of July 6, 1923, the Executive Committee of the Union consists of two chambers, the Union Soviet and the Soviet of Nationalities. The first is representative of the Union as a whole, and the second of the component nationalities. This entails a departure from the standardized Soviet pattern, as the Central Executive Committee loses its organic connection with the Union Congress of Soviets. The latter elects only one Chamber—the Union Soviet; the other Chamber (Soviet of Nationalities) is directly representative of the Federal and Autonomous Republics and Territories.

The exercise of powers by the Union Executive Committee begins from the moment of the election of the Union Soviet and the confirmation of the membership of the Soviet of Nationalities by the Union Congress (pars. 14–15, Union Constitution). The sessions of the Central Executive Committee are divided into ordinary and extraordinary. The former are convened by the Praesidium of the Executive Committee three times a year. Extraordinary sessions are called by special enactments of the Praesidium, or of that of the Union Soviet or the Soviet of Nationalities, or, finally, at the request of the Central Executive Committee of one of the Federal Republics.

The programme of an ordinary session is published in the newspapers not later than one month previous to its opening. As distinguished from bourgeois parliaments, each session of the Central Executive Committee has, therefore, a definite programme and agenda prepared beforehand. The work of the session is conducted either in its two chambers separately, or at joint meetings.

Of all the organs of the Soviet State, the Central Executive Committee most resembles a European parliament; but as, in the Soviet State, the

¹ TZIK of the U.S.S.R.

principle of divided authority is not recognized, the discretion of the Executive Committee is not limited to matters of legislation. Articles 16-18 of the Union Constitution state that the Union Executive Committee examines all decrees, laws and ordinances promulgated by other authorities of the Union, it issues laws and decrees, edicts and regulations, uniting legislative and administrative functions. Article 18 of the Constitution specifically establishes that all decrees and enactments of general political and economic importance, as well as those modifying the activities of the organs of the Union, absolutely require confirmation by the Union Executive Committee. It would be a mistake to read this Article as implying that no other organ in the Union can issue enactments having the force of law. Such are promulgated also by the Praesidium of the Union TZIK, the Soviet of People's Commissars and other organs attached to the supreme organs of the U.S.S.R.,—*e. g.* the Supreme Council of Labour and Defence (STO). The enactments of these bodies are published side by side with the edicts of the Union TZIK; and have the same legal force. But the Union TZIK is alone empowered to suspend and annul the decrees, edicts and ordinances of all other Union authorities (with the exception of the Union Congress of Soviets).

The Soviet of the Union, as well as the Soviet of Nationalities, holds its meetings during the session of the Central Executive Committee. In both chambers the quorum is fixed at one-third of the total number of members. The Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities elect their own Praesidia, which are distinct from the Praesidium of the Central Executive Committee. The Praesidia are elected at the first meeting and number nine members. Each chamber is convened by an ordinance of its Praesidium and also by ordinance of the Central Executive Committee of the Union. A resolution adopted by both chambers has the force of law, whichever may have originated it.

In case of disagreement between the two chambers, the question is referred to a special mixed Committee consisting of representatives of both chambers in equal numbers. The Chairman of this Committee is appointed by the Praesidium of the Central Executive Committee. If the Committee reaches agreement, its resolution is submitted for confirmation to both chambers separately. If agreement is not reached, the question is referred to a joint meeting under the chairmanship of the President of the Central Executive Committee; the chambers vote separately. In case of continued disagreement between the majorities of both chambers, the whole question is referred to an ordinary or extraordinary session of the Union Congress of Soviets. This really constitutes one of the few cases when that Congress can exercise its functions of supreme organ of authority in the Union.

Both chambers communicate with other institutions exclusively through the medium of the Central Executive Committee. All questions in the chambers are decided by open voting and by a simple majority. The members of the Central Executive Committee have equal status.

They have the right of legislative initiative and the right of interpolation. However, in practice, no formula has been developed by which this latter right could be exercised; and there is no known occasion when such has been required. The members of the Central Executive Committee may be present, in a consultative capacity, at the meetings of its Praesidium, at all sessions of the Central Executive Committees of the Federal Republics and at the meetings of any central and local institutions. The only exception is in the case of secret conferences, attendance at which is conditional on permission being obtained from the Praesidium of the Central Executive Committee. The members of the Central Executive Committee have the right to demand every kind of information, except of strictly secret character, from all Soviet institutions.

Soviet legislation has created for the members of the Executive Committee special forms of responsibility: members of the Union TZIK can only be brought to trial with the sanction of its Praesidium. They may, however, be called as witnesses; but in certain special cases they may demand to be examined privately, or at their usual residence. Members of the Central Executive Committee cannot be arrested or subjected to domiciliary search or examination, without the express sanction of its Praesidium. Exclusion from the membership of the Central Executive Committee can only be effected by ordinance of the Union Congress of Soviets; or, in exceptional cases, by the Union Executive Committee—subject to confirmation by the next Union Congress. All members of the Central Executive Committee receive remuneration at a special rate. All these rights extend to the deputy-members of the Executive Committee; who, at the meetings of the latter, have only consultative votes. They receive a decisive vote only when actually deputizing for an absent member.

The Central Executive Committee has its presidential board, elected from the members of its Praesidium. This board has as many members as there are Federal Republics in the Union—seven. The chair is taken by the members of the board in turn. This board represents the Union on all official occasions.

The Praesidium of the Central Executive Committee of the Union

The Praesidium of the Central Executive Committee acts for the latter in the interval between its sessions. For this reason the Union Constitution terms it the Supreme Legislative, Administrative and Executive Organ of the Union (pars. 26 and 29). It now consists of 30 members.

As regards its powers, the Union Constitution shows a tendency to reduce these in comparison with those of the Central Executive Committee. According to par. 52 of the Constitution certain decrees and ordinances (see above) must be submitted to the Central Executive Committee of the Union. In a note to this paragraph, it is remarked that such enactments may be passed, in exceptional cases, by the

Praesidium, only provided that they are subsequently submitted to the Central Executive Committee for confirmation. This, however, bears an entirely perfunctory character.

Par. 30 of the Constitution and par. 47 of the Ordinance concerning the Praesidium characterize its functions as executive. The Praesidium watches over the application of the Union Constitution and the enactment of all the decrees, laws and enactments of the Union Congress of Soviets and of the Executive Committee by all the organs of the Soviet State. The Council, however, is not restricted to purely executive functions; it has the power to issue decrees, ordinances and regulations and it examines and confirms the draft decrees and ordinances prepared by the Union Soviet of People's Commissars, individual Commissariats, Central Executive Committees of the Federal Republics, their Praesidia and other authorities (par. 33). The Praesidium also exercises important controlling functions. It has the right to suspend the enactments of the Congresses of Soviets of the Federal Republics, provided that it reports such action to the Union Central Executive Committee (par. 32). It can also annul the decrees of the Union Soviet of People's Commissars and of the Soviets of People's Commissars of the Federal Republics (par. 31). The decisions of the Praesidium may, in their turn, be appealed against, during the session of the Union Central Executive Committee, by the Praesidia of the Union Soviet and Soviet of Nationalities or by the Central Executive Committee of the Federal Republics. The Praesidium acts as referee in cases of disagreement between Union Commissariats and Commissariats of the Federal Republics; and between the Central Executive Committees of the Federal Republics and their Praesidia (par. 35). The Union Constitution assigns to the Praesidium the right of amnesty and the exercise of mercy.

The Praesidium and the Union Soviet of People's Commissars are the Government of the U.S.S.R. just as the Praesidia and Soviets of People's Commissars of the Federal Republics are the Governments of the latter. There is no individual chief representative of Soviet authority: the Union Praesidium and the Union Soviet of People's Commissars are, as it were, the two collective heads of the U.S.S.R. However, the powers of these two bodies are not equal: the Praesidium is superior to the Soviet of People's Commissars. This can be seen from par. 31 of the Union Constitution which places the Union Soviet of People's Commissars under the control of the Praesidium.

The Soviet of the People's Commissars of the Union (VSNK)

The Soviet of People's Commissars—the Cabinet of the U.S.S.R.—is elected conjointly by the Union Soviet and the Soviet of Nationalities (par. 26). It is chiefly an Executive body (par. 37) and consists of a President, Vice-President and the People's Commissars of Foreign Affairs, Armed Forces, Foreign Trade, Communications, Water Transport, Post and Telegraphs, Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, Labour,

Home Trade, Finance, Supply, Agriculture, Heavy Industry, Light Industry and Timber.

The Union Soviet of Commissars directs the activities of the Union and Joint Commissariats; it examines and confirms all decrees and ordinances concerning general problems in the Union; it is responsible for the enactment of all laws and decrees; it presents laws and reports to the Central Executive Committee and its Praesidium for confirmation; it drafts international treaties and conventions and can confirm them if they do not require legislative ratification; and it draws up the budget of the Union and submits it for confirmation to the Central Executive Committee. Furthermore, questions relating to taxation, to conflicts between the Commissariats of different Federal Republics or their Soviets of People's Commissars and to complaints against the actions of the authorities are assigned to it by the Constitution.

As will be seen from this list the powers of the Soviet of People's Commissars are very wide. Its influence in the province of legislation is considerable. It may be said that every law in the Soviet Union must be scrutinized by the Soviet of People's Commissars. For the Soviet Constitution ignores the Parliamentary practice of passing laws in stages; the Union Executive Committee does not debate the laws or draw them up, but accepts laws drafted by a Special Drafting Committee of the Soviet of the People's Commissars. This Committee works under the immediate general guidance of the President of the Soviet of People's Commissars. It consists of a Chairman and four members, appointed by the Soviet of People's Commissars. Everything in the shape of a law which has been published in the U.S.S.R. has passed through this Committee.

Accepting the point of view which regards the legislative output as the result of two processes—drafting and enactment—it may be said that the first process is performed in the Committee, which represents the laboratory of Soviet legislation. After that the project is passed by the Soviet of People's Commissars, the Central Executive Committee or its Praesidium, or, in some cases, by the Union Congress of Soviets. Soviet legislation is very vague upon the question of when a draft bill actually becomes law. But it may roughly be accepted that the more important "first-class" laws are enacted by the Central Executive Committee, the less important laws by other organs (par. 18).

Three special Committees are attached to the Soviet of People's Commissars:

1. The *Committee for Consideration of Questions of Administration and Finance* is charged with the preliminary examination of questions connected with the budget, taxation, disputes between Government departments, appointments of officials, etc. It consists of a Chairman and seven members, appointed by the Soviet of People's Commissars. The decisions of this Committee are submitted for confirmation to the Soviet of People's Commissars, or the Council of Labour and Defence; and if they are not appealed against they become law. It is interesting

to note that, together with the supreme organs of the Union and those of the Federal Republics, the right of appeal is also vested in the President of the State Political Department (OGPU), the President of the Central Soviet of Professional Unions and the President of the Central Soviet of the Cooperatives Union.

2. Besides this Committee, there is the *Council of Labour and Defence*. Its functions are economic and financial; its duty is to co-ordinate economic, political and military questions. The members of the Council of Labour and Defence are appointed by the Soviet of People's Commissars.

3. There is another Committee which draws agreements for concessions; it also supervises the importation of foreign capital, foreign trade relations, the granting of concessions, the creation of mixed companies with foreign capital, etc.

United State Political Department (OGPU)

The institution which plays the chief role even among the principal organs of the Soviet Union is the United State Political Department—the world-famous OGPU.¹

The OGPU originated as far back as 1917, when it was called the Extraordinary Committee for Fighting Counter-Revolution, Speculation, Espionage and Banditism—the so-called Cheka (the first letters of the Russian for Extraordinary Committee). This was created in order to fight all elements that were, at the time, hostile to the Bolshevik regime. Its very name implies its provisional character. But such was its success in the field of safeguarding the new order, that it saw itself converted into a permanent State-institution under the name of OGPU (1922). Paragraphs 61–63 of the Union Constitution of 1923 thus determine the nature of this organ²:

“61. In order to combine the revolutionary efforts of the united republics in the fight with political and economic counter-revolution, espionage and banditism, a United State Political Department (OGPU) is created and attached to the Council of People's Commissars of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, the President of which enters the Council of People's Commissars of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics with an advisory voice.

“62. The United State Political Department of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics directs the work of the local organs of the State Political Department through its agents attached to the Council of People's Commissars of the united (Federal) Republics, acting in accordance with a special statute to be confirmed by legislative act.

“63. Supervision of the legality of the actions of the United State

¹ Abbreviated from the Russian *Obiedinennoe Gosudarstvennoe Politicheskoe Upravlenie*.

² “Soviet Union Year Book” 1928, London.

Political Department of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics is carried out by the Procurator of the Supreme Court of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics on the basis of a special resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics."

The aim of the OGPU can be summed up as the concentration of all the activities of the Communist State (it might be better to say, Party), directed against counter-revolution in every sense of the word: political, economic, social and spiritual.

The head of the OGPU,¹ selected from among the most trustworthy and prominent Communists, possesses the status of a member of the Council of People's Commissars, with a consultative vote on its board. The OGPU has its own departments attached to the Councils of People's Commissars of the Federal and Autonomous Republics, Autonomous Territories and Regions, called G.P.U., and branch offices in every Territory, Region and other administrative subdivisions of the U.S.S.R. as well as special branches attached to the Red Army and Navy, transport, social services, government departments (*i. e.* Glavlit, Foreign Trade, Foreign Affairs, etc.).

Its agents are everywhere—in the Trade Unions, the cooperatives, the industrial undertakings of the State, the collectivized farms (the Kolkhoz). . . . In a sentence, the OGPU has covered the U.S.S.R. with a fine mesh of its organization; it can justly say that it knows, hears, and learns all that comes within its scope; it is the most formidable organization of political control the world has ever known and possesses almost unlimited powers, being made practically autocratic by the deliberate vagueness of the law determining its functions.

In accordance with par. 63 of the Union Constitution, a special regulation for the OGPU was promulgated by the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. in 1924. This establishes the system of appointments to OGPU posts and the organization, special rights, functions and budget of this institution.

The Chairman of the OGPU is appointed by the Central Executive Committee. He is assisted by a board, whose members are nominated by the Council of People's Commissars and enjoy the same rights as members of the boards of People's Commissariats. The central institution is subdivided into special sections, varying in number, but usually five:—administrative, military and foreign, political (for home affairs), economic and cultural. Each of these has its representatives on the local boards of the OGPU and the respective organs of the State.

The officials of the OGPU hold, by law, a position equal in every way to that held by persons serving in the armed forces. They wear a special military uniform (secret agents excepted). The OGPU has its

¹ The first Chairman, Uritsky, was shot by Kanneguisser—a Socialist Revolutionary—early in 1918. He was succeeded by the famous Dzerzhinsky; and the latter, after his death, by Menzhinsky the present Chairman. It is curious to note that none of the three was Russian by nationality.

own troops, consisting of: the Corps of Frontier Guards, responsible for the political and economic security of the frontiers of the U.S.S.R.,¹ and the so-called Troops for Special Service (CHON) used in the interior for political purposes. The OGPU troops number some 100,000 to which must be added such military units as the detachments of the Railway OGPU and various local armed police bodies; no exact figures, however, have been published.

The OGPU has its own tribunals, prisons and concentration camps² (the famous Solovki Camp in the White Sea is one of them), and its own budget. As published, this is of little interest, as it merely details such expenditures as salaries of officials, maintenance of buildings, etc. The main OGPU activities are financed by sums which do not appear in its budget.

The enormous importance of the OGPU in the life of the U.S.S.R. is determined by the fact that its organs function alongside and independently of the normal institutions of the Soviet State; what is more, in many respects the power of the OGPU are wider than those of the administration, and the organs and agents of the latter are, in most cases (unless they hold posts of the highest order), under the "political supervision" of agents of the OGPU.

The OGPU has very wide administrative powers—the right of arrest without applying for a warrant, the right of exiling by a sentence of its own tribunals and, lastly, the right of capital punishment. All cases comprised within such vague terms as "political or economic counter-revolution," "espionage" and "banditism" are always withdrawn from normal justice and handed over to the OGPU; the latter may even demand that a case already being heard in an ordinary court shall be so transferred.

Thus the OGPU is the symbol and actual agency of that "organized political Terror" which the Communists proclaimed as one of the mainstays of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. The OGPU has faithfully and more than satisfactorily performed its allotted task. The numbers of those sentenced by its courts to death, imprisonment and deportation is colossal but will never be known, as the OGPU takes great care that no such information is ever allowed to leak out.

It is interesting to note that capital punishment was twice abolished in the Soviet State; first, on the third day of the accession of the Bolsheviks to power (November 1917),³ and again by a decree of the Council of People's Commissars (January 17, 1920). It was reintroduced on May 24 of the same year at the outbreak of the Polish War; and has since been practiced, in an enormous number of cases, by all the Soviet courts but chiefly by the tribunals of the OGPU. It is im-

¹ A zone 30 klm. wide along the frontiers is placed under the exclusive jurisdiction of the OGPU; and all persons accused of illegally crossing the frontier, of subversive propaganda, or of anti-Soviet sympathies are dealt with by special OGPU courts.

² See Chapter on Labour (Forced Labour).

³ This enactment revoked an order of the Provisional Government reëstablishing the infliction of capital punishment by military courts at the Front.

possible to estimate the number of executed persons accurately. Only unofficial figures exist and these vary very considerably. The total for the period 1918–1922 has been put as high as 1,200,000. This may even be an under-estimate. Since 1922 some 6,000 people were executed annually till 1928. In 1929 and 1930, during the process of agricultural collectivization, many thousands were summarily executed.

The number of those imprisoned or deported to concentration camps in the North and in Siberia has been estimated at 1,800,000 (1931).

In the opinion of the Communists, supported by most Soviet jurists, there is no fundamental difference between normal and OGPU justice. In practice, the latter acts more swiftly, and thus ensures a more efficient enforcement of the principle of dictatorship.¹ Even among the Communists there have been questions as to whether the Party (and the Government) control the OGPU, or the latter both Party and Government. . . .

The OGPU has extended its activities to cover every branch of Soviet life at home and abroad; in the latter respect its organization and powers have been well demonstrated by the kidnapping in broad daylight, on the streets of Paris, of General Kutevov, an anti-Soviet leader (January, 1929). The mystery of his fate remains—and will, it must be feared, remain—unsolved.

The Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R.

The Supreme Court of the Union represents a special organization attached to the Central Executive Committee of the Union. It consists of a series of sections, such as the Plenum of the Court, Civil and Criminal Section, Military Section, etc. The general duties of the Court as defined by a decree of March 23rd, 1923, consists primarily in "watching over legality within the confines of the Union." In this sense, the vigilance of the Court is concerned with the observance of the laws of the Union, and with the activities of the Central Executive Committees as well as of the Soviet of People's Commissars of the Union and of the Federal Republics. The Supreme Court is also the supreme judicial authority in the Union, to which all appeals against the verdicts of the Supreme Courts of the Federal Republics are directed in cases when such contradict the laws of the U.S.S.R., or when a conflict arises between the interests of different Republics. The Supreme Court has power, in certain cases, to annul the verdicts of other Courts of the Union, and also ordinances of the OGPU. Finally, the Supreme Court is empowered to bring to trial members of the Central Executive Committee, members of the Union Soviet of People's Commissars, and other high officials of the Republic.

The People's Commissariats of the Union

The People's Commissariats are departments (ministries) administering the various branches of the Government of the U.S.S.R. They

¹ See Chapter on Justice.

differ from the ministries of bourgeois countries in so far as they are divided into two groups: Union and Joint Commissariats. To the first belong: the Commissariats of Foreign Affairs, Armed Forces, Foreign Trade, Communications, Water Transport, Posts and Telegraphs, Heavy Industry, Light Industry, Supply and Timber.

The Union Commissariats have representatives in the Federal Republics; but these representatives are responsible only to the central authority. Candidates for the posts of representatives are proposed by the Commissariats of the Federal Republics or their Central Executive Committees and are appointed by the Soviet of People's Commissars of the Union. All ordinances and regulations of the Union Commissariats are binding for the whole territory of the U.S.S.R. In cases of conflict between the Union Commissariats and Federal Republics Soviet legislation gives the former very decided privileges.

The second group, the Joint Commissariats, are:—The Commissariats of Internal Trade, Labour, Finance, and Workers' and Peasants' Inspection. Their jurisdiction over the Federal Commissariats is very wide; not only do they issue instructions to the corresponding Federal Commissariats but control their execution: they can also suspend and annul such ordinances of the Federal Commissariats as contradict the laws or policy of the U.S.S.R. What is particularly important, the budgets of the Federal Commissariats and their general organization are determined by the Soviet of People's Commissars of the Union.

The fundamental defect of this system is the uncertainty of the relations between the Union and Federal Commissariats, which might manifest itself if any considerable friction were to arise between the central and the federal authorities; their disagreements might assume a serious form, one difficult of adjustment. The only existing safeguard is that all Commissars belong to the Communist Party, and are merely the mouthpieces of the Party's policy. It must be added that the same applies not only to the relations between the Commissariats of the Unions and Commissariats of the Republics, but to those between all other authorities of the Soviet State: whose activities and intercourse are possible only under a one-party dictatorship. It would be impossible under any other system, as the Constitution does not provide for any legal decision in case of disputes. As a matter of fact, the whole system in legislation, administration and constitutional guarantees is adapted to one purpose only: to serve as a screen and an obedient tool for the true Government of the U.S.S.R.—the Communist Party.

TABLE OF THE POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE SUB-DIVISIONS OF THE U.S.S.R. IN 1932

I. RUSSIAN SOCIALIST FEDERAL SOVIET REPUBLIC—R.S.F.S.R. (MOSCOW).¹

Territories

1. Central Black Soil or Central Chernozem (Voronezh).
2. East Siberian (Irkutsk), including:
 - a) Taimyr National District.
 - b) Evensk National District.
 - c) Vitim National District.
 - d) Katanga National District.
3. Far Eastern (Khabarovsk), including:
 - a) Chukotsk National District.
 - b) Koriak National District.
 - c) Okhotsk National District.
 - d) Dzhelatulak National Region.
 - e) Zeya-Uchur National Region.
4. Ivanov Industrial (Ivanovo-Voznesensk).
5. Leningrad (Leningrad, former St. Petersburg).
6. Lower Volga (Saratov), including:
 - a) Volga-German Autonomous Republic (Engels).
 - b) Kalmuk Autonomous Territory (Ellista).
7. Middle Volga (Samara), including:
 - a) Mordva Autonomous Territory (Saransk).
8. Moscow (Moscow).
9. Nizhni-Novgorod (Nizhni-Novgorod), including:
 - a) Chuvash Autonomous Republic (Cheboksary).
 - b) Mari Autonomous Territory (Yoshkar-Ola, form. Tzarevokokshaisk).
 - c) Votsk Autonomous Territory (Izhevsk).
10. Northern (Arkhangelsk), including:
 - a) Komi or Zyrian Autonomous Territory (Sytytyvkar).
 - b) Nenetz National District.
11. North Caucasus (Rostov-on-Don), including:
 - a) Daghestan Autonomous Republic (Makhach-Kala, form. Petrovsk).
 - b) Adyghey Autonomous Territory (Krasnodar, form. Ekaterinodar).
 - c) Chechen Autonomous Territory (Grozny).
 - d) Cherkess Autonomous Territory (Batalpashinsk).
 - e) Ingush Autonomous Territory (Ordjonikidze, form. Vladikavkaz).
 - f) Kabarda-Bolkar Autonomous Territory (Nalchik).
 - g) Karachai Autonomous Territory (Mikoian-Shakar).
 - h) North Ossetia Autonomous Territory (Ordjonikidze).
12. Ural (Sverdlovsk, form. Ekaterinburg), including:
 - a) Ostiak-Vogul National District.
 - b) Yamal National District.
13. Western (Smolensk).
14. West Siberian (Novosibirsk, form. Novonikolaevsk).

Autonomous Republics not included in the Territories

1. Bashkir (Ufa).
2. Buriat-Mongol (Verkhneudinsk).
3. Crimean (Simpheropol).
4. Karelian (Petrozavodsk).
5. Kazak or Kazakstan (Alma-Ata, form. Verny).
6. Kirghiz (Frunze, form. Pishpek).
7. Tatar (Kazan).
8. Yakut (Yakutsk), including:
 - a) Anabar National Region.
 - b) Bulun National Region.
 - c) Tukulan National Region.
 - d) Viluy-Markha National Region.
 - e) Zhigan National Region.

¹ Names in brackets—capitals.

II. UKRAINIAN SOCIALIST SOVIET REPUBLIC—UK.S.S.R. (KHARKOV).

Territories

1. Dniepropetrovsk (Dniepropetrovsk).
2. Donetsk (Artemovsk, form. Bakhmut).
3. Kharkov (Kharkov).
4. Kiev (Kiev).
5. Odessa (Odessa).
6. Vinnitza (Vinnitza).

Autonomous Republic

Moldavian (Tiraspol).

III. WHITE RUSSIAN SOCIALIST SOVIET REPUBLIC—B.S.S.R. (MINSK).

IV. TRANSCAUCASIAN SOCIALIST FEDERAL SOVIET REPUBLIC—Z.S.F.S.R. (TIFLIS).

1. Armenian S. S. Republic (E-rivan).
2. Azerbaijan S. S. Republic (Baku), including:
 - a) Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic (Nakhichevan).
 - b) Nagorny Karabakh Autonomous Territory (Stepanokert).
3. Georgian S. S. Republic (Tiflis), including:
 - a) Abkhazian S. S. Republic (Sukhum).
 - b) Adjar Autonomous Territory (Batumi).
 - c) South Ossetia Autonomous Territory (Zkhinvali).

V. TURKOMAN SOCIALIST SOVIET REPUBLIC (TURKMENISTAN)—TUR.S.S.R. (ASHGABAD).

VI. UZBEK SOCIALIST SOVIET REPUBLIC (UZBEKISTAN)—UZ.S.S.R.—(TASH-KENT).

VII. TADZHIK SOCIALIST SOVIET REPUBLIC (TADZHIKISTAN)—TA.S.S.R.—(STALINABAD FORM. DUSHAMBE), including:

1. Gorny-Badakhshan Autonomous Republic (Khorog).

Note. The People's Republics of Tuva (former Uriankhai Territory) capital Krassny and Mongolia (former Outer-Mongolia, province of China) capital Ulan-Bahtor (former Urga) though not included into the U.S.S.R. are entirely under Soviet control as "allied" States.¹

IX

THE COMMUNIST PARTY

Programme

PARAGRAPH I. of the All-Union Communist Party's Statutes (enacted at the All-Russian Party Conference in August 1922),² says: "Any person accepting the programme of the Party is a member of the Party." Bukharin, in his statement on "the foundation of the Party's Programme," at the VIII Party Congress (March 1919), stated: "One of the principles of revolutionary Marxism consists in building our pro-

¹ See Map.

² The Party Congress is the supreme organ of the Communist Party. Its resolutions are binding, and express the "sovereign will" of the majority, against which there is no appeal but to another Party Congress. The Party Conference, on the other hand, is not a Party organ in the strict sense of the word. It is usually called before a Congress. The resolutions adopted by a Party Conference bear the character of advisory regulations and directives, having no binding force before confirmation by a Party Congress.

gramme on the basis of a concrete analysis of the epoch, in which the working class is called to act, to fight, and to achieve victory. For this reason it is quite natural that, in the theoretical introduction which must be contained in every programme, it is indispensable to give an analysis of the epoch which we are living in, to consider not only Capitalism in general and not only the general tendency and general laws of Capitalistic development but to give an analysis of those most recent phenomena in the province of the development of Capitalism, which in popular newspapers, pamphlets, agitational and propagandist speeches are generally associated under the one name of 'Imperialism'."

In this respect the Communist programme does not differ from those of other Socialist Democratic Parties. It contains verbatim extracts from the old programme of the Russian Social Democrats referring to the general Socialist theory. To these is added an analysis of the new epoch and "the fundamental problems of the Proletariat of the Union."

The peculiarity of the Communist programme consists chiefly in the exclusive position which the Party occupies in the U.S.S.R. Bukharin, in the above mentioned statement, remarked: "Up to the present, the programmes of all Socialist Parties were in the nature of demands made to a power foreign to them (the bourgeoisie). We, on the other hand, are not a Party endeavouring to destroy an existing order; we are actually in power, endeavouring to create that order for the accomplishment of which we have seized and hold power. In other words, we do not address our demands to a foreign or hostile body but to ourselves."

The only portion of the programme which preserves its general importance unimpaired to this day is the Introduction, which develops the theory of revolutionary Marxism (as explained by Lenin), and the practical deductions to be drawn from this theory. To the latter belong: 1) the proclamation of the Soviet system as "the universal form of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," uniform for all countries in which the proletariat would seize and hold power; 2) the assertion that "Productive Communism" is the ultimate object of the social development of human society, and the comparison of this system with "primitive Communism," whose purpose was the establishment of universal equality and the repartition of wealth; 3) the promulgation of a system of distribution, which would replace the system of free commercial exchange. In this respect, par. 13 of the programme says—"the purpose is the organization of the whole population into a nexus of cooperative communes capable of distributing all necessary products with the greatest speed, regularity and economy, and the minimum expenditure of labour, under the control of a central organ of distribution."

The majority of the remaining points of the official program of 1922 must be regarded as no longer in harmony with modern political tendencies. At the Party's yearly Congresses and Conferences, various readjustments to conform with current events have been drafted and adopted.

Organization

As regards the organization of the Communist Party, this is defined by the Statutes adopted by the Party Congress in 1922. The Statutes require from members, besides implicit acceptance of the Party programme, that they should participate in the work of one of the Party organizations, submit to its ordinances and pay a membership fee. Admission to membership is conditional upon a preliminary period of candidature. This stage is designed to give a "thorough acquaintance with the programme and the tactics of the Party," and to test "the personal qualities of the candidate." The duration of the candidature period for workers, soldiers and sailors (of proletarian origin) is six months; for peasants and small craftsmen—one year; for all other persons—two years. Further, different conditions governing transfer from candidature to membership are established for these three categories. For the persons belonging to the first two, the recommendation of three Communists who have been members of the Party for not less than three years is required; for persons of the third category the recommendation of five Communists who have been members for not less than five years. Admission to membership takes place at a general meeting of the local branch of the Party, and is confirmed by the local Party Committee.

"The constitutional principle of the Party organization," says par. 10 of the Statutes, "is *democratic centralization*." This somewhat obscure statement is explained by the Bolsheviks as follows: the Party is based on the strict subordination of the lower organs to the higher, the Central Executive Committee being the supreme authority. On the other hand, this subordination does not abolish the democratic principle; inasmuch as all organs of the Party, beginning with the lowest and ending with the highest, are constituted on an electoral basis and are entirely autonomous in the decision of local questions—within the limits of general directions emanating from the highest Party authority. This should be accepted with certain reservations, as Stalin's speech at the XIII Party Congress (1924) shows: ". . . But our Party does not make a fetish of democracy, does not look upon it as something absolute, existing independently of time and place. On the contrary, democracy is not suited for all times and circumstances, and there are moments when it is impossible and undesirable to act on democratic lines."

The Cell

The Communists particularly insist that the system of democratic centralization rests upon the Party cell, the primary organ of the whole structure. "Having as its fundamental purpose the organization of the masses for the overthrow of World-Capitalism and for the building of a Communist society 'in our time,' the Party needs to keep in constant touch with the people and enter into their daily life—in the factories, in the villages, etc. The cell enables it to do so. It is through the cells

that the Party can directly influence the masses, inspire them with 'revolutionary enthusiasm,' and direct them in the ways of Communism. In addition, the cells enable all members of the Party to take a direct part in political work. With its assistance, the Party is enabled to interest the population in the general plans of Socialist construction. What is more, every action of the Party can, by this means, be directly explained to the masses. For these reasons the Party cells were always the principal object of the Party's concern. To encourage and improve the activities of the cells—such is the most important and constant problem of the Party.”¹

The Party cells consist of not less than three members, and are established in every branch of public life—the factories, Government departments, schools, barracks, villages, etc. A cell is directly dependent on the local Party Committee, under whose supervision it performs its work, and to which it is obliged to report periodically.

The work of the cells has three main objectives: 1. Internal: political education of members, assistance to them in acquiring knowledge and understanding of Marxism, encouragement of activity benefitting the Party. For this purpose the cell organizes schools of political education, Marxist or Lenin clubs, etc. It also organizes lectures, reports, debates on problems of current politics, on the theories of Marxism, the ordinances of the Party and important Government measures. 2. External work among the masses. This is regarded as the most important vocation of the cells. They are recommended periodically to organize open meetings, at which all topical questions interesting the masses must be debated. The most advanced among non-partisans are invited to take part in the organization of these meetings and are gradually drawn into the orbit of Communist influence. The cells are recommended to select the most reliable among them and to promote such to the more responsible posts in the local administration. For recruiting non-partisan sympathizers, it is considered desirable that the cells should take the initiative in forming all kinds of non-political associations, etc. The life and activities of these associations revolve constantly in the orbit of cell influence and supervision. 3. Finally, participation in the general work of the Party throughout the Union and in local administration. In this respect, the duties of the cells are very varied: they are called to assist in perfecting the Government machinery; to uphold Soviet authority and disseminate propaganda in its favour; to fight the “class enemy”; to watch the elections to the Soviets; and, generally, to supervise the activities of the local State institutions and officials.

Party Hierarchy

The higher organs of the Communist Party are organized territorially: by Regions, Territories, Autonomous, Federal Republics. In each of them the highest is the Congress and its Executive. Finally, the highest organization of all is the Union Party Congress and the Central

¹ Party Regulations, 1925.

Executive Committee elected by it. The latter elects a permanent body, the Political Bureau (Politbureau), in charge of all the political work of the Party, the Organizing Bureau (for general organization purposes), the Central Control Committee and an Executive Secretariat.

The Communist hierarchy closely resembles the system of administration of the Soviet State, with its Soviet Congresses, Executive Committees, Praesidia and Soviets of People's Commissars. The relations between the Party organizations are approximately the same as between the various Government organs. The Congress of the Party is called once a year; to pass the reports of the Executive Committee, examine and modify the programme of the Party, define its tactics for the current year, and elect the Central Executive Committee. This latter represents the Party in every way, organizes and supervises its various establishments and institutions, distributes its forces and funds, etc.

The Politbureau and Secretariat

The Politbureau and Secretariat are the most influential and powerful among the permanent organs of the Party. Actually, the Politbureau is the principal nerve-centre of the Communist Party, as well as of the whole country. It is most intimately connected with all local Party organizations. In this connection, it is very important to note that the liaison is established through the Secretariats of the local Party organs. It is this that forms the operating base of the Politbureau.

The secretaries of the higher organs of the Communist Party—such as the Executive Committees of the Federal and Autonomous Republics and other political and administrative sub-divisions of the U.S.S.R., as well as the Secretariat of the Central Executive Committee, are appointed by the respective executives from among the most trustworthy and distinguished members of the Party. The secretaries are usually members of these executives—which serves greatly to enhance their importance in the Party ranks and to establish them in positions of extensive and undisputed authority. Furthermore, the Politbureau has a predominant influence in the appointment of the secretaries of various grades throughout the Party organization. Thus the chairman who is at the same time Secretary General of the Party (at the present moment, Stalin) can exercise almost autocratic authority over the Communist ranks.

Theoretically this is not so; the Secretary General, like any other officer of the Party, depends on "democratic" election by the Communist rank and file. But in practice Stalin has been able, for many years now, to rule the Party—and, through it, the U.S.S.R. He has established an order which may be called "the regime of Stalin's secretaries," by appointing to every key-position Communists devoted to his views and obedient to his will. In the course of many fluctuations both within the Party and in the more general field of Communist policy with regard to the U.S.S.R. (opposition of the Left and Right, changes in the policy of collectivization, etc.), Stalin's group—a party

within the Party—has demonstrated a capacity of conducting affairs with flexibility, authority and force, which has established them as the dictators, for the time being, of the U.S.S.R.

Membership of the Party

The Communists call themselves the Party of the Proletariat. It is interesting to see how far this title is justified by facts, as illustrated in official statistics. Up to 1904 the Bolshevik Party consisted of 61.7% of workmen, 4.7% of peasants, 27.2% intellectual workers and 6.4% of persons of other categories. The Party's composition did not vary greatly between 1905 and 1917. At the beginning of the Revolution the Party consisted of some 45,000 to 50,000 members. Of these, 56.6% were workmen, 16.3% peasants, 21% intellectual workers and 6.5%—other categories. From then until 1921, the proportion of workmen gradually decreased. In 1921 they constituted 29.7%, the peasants 41%, intellectual workers 22.2% and other categories 6.1% of the membership. In the years of Militant Communism, the Party was therefore less "proletarian" than before.

Lenin wrote in 1922¹: "There is no doubt that our Party is, in the major portion of its composition, insufficiently proletarian. . . . It is also clearly the case that our Party is now worse educated politically than is indispensable for truly proletarian leadership at such a difficult moment, particularly in view of the enormous preponderance of the peasant element, which is rapidly awakening to an *independent class policy*. Further, we must consider the temptation of joining the Party; it is enormous at this moment. . . . Without shutting one's eyes to actual facts, it must be confessed that, at the present time, the proletarian policy of the Party is carried on, not by its integral composition but by the exclusive authority exercised by that very thin stratum which may be called the Old Party Guard."

It is particularly interesting to notice that, during the period of Militant Communism, the percentage of Communists in the most important industrial establishments was negligible. Thus in undertakings with from 1 to 50 workers it was 24.6%; of these with 50 to 500 workers, it was 5.7%; and in those exceeding 500 it was 2.6%. Soviet literature has expressed this in the following formula: "*the proportion of Communists decreases in the inverse ratio of the importance of the undertaking.*"

The advent of the NEP did not increase the number of workers in the composition of the Party; on the contrary, it occasioned some hostility between the Party circles and the working masses. The recovery of industry during the NEP attracted to the factories increased numbers of workmen, whose dissatisfaction with the Soviet regime led to a series of strikes. This may be accepted as a proof that the class-interests of the Soviet proletariat were by no means always in harmony with the interests of the Government or the Communist Party. Desertions from the Party and a decrease in the number of new members, characterized the

¹ "Results of Party Work for the year 1922-23." Moscow, 1923.

first three years of the NEP. In 1922 the Party numbered 401,000 members, a decrease of about 100,000 since 1921. In 1924, there were only 323,520 members. Of these, workers "from the factory" numbered no more than 50,000. Immediately after Lenin's death this state of affairs was declared to be catastrophic, and the so-called "Lenin campaign of recruitment" to the Party, intended to increase the number of workers "from the factory" and to expel, as much as possible, the non-proletarian element was opened. In the first half of 1924, 208,000 new members joined the Party, the greater number being workmen. They were "pressed" into the Party ranks partly by administrative coercion, partly by promises of appointment to posts in the administration. As a result of these measures, the composition of the Party became somewhat more proletarian. The number of workers "from the factory" reached 40%.

The next great increase in the number of workmen in the Party coincides with the epoch of the Five Years Plan. Industrialization and collectivization entailed an enormous increase in the demand for labour and, consequently, an increase in the number of industrial and agricultural workers. In this way the difference between the number of workers in the Party and the actual mass of the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. became still more pronounced and impressive. Alarmed at this state of affairs, the Central Executive Committee of the Party decided to bring the number of workmen "from the factory" up to not less than one half of the total membership by the end of 1930; and to insist on the acceleration of the process of attracting the agricultural labourers, as well as the poorest peasants from the Kolkhoz, to the Party ranks.

As a result of this, in the period from January 1928 to April 1, 1930, the Party membership grew by 42.2%. In figures, the membership increased to from 1,302,854 in 1928 to 2,969,000 in 1930 and to about 3,500,000 in 1932¹. The proportion of workmen is now about 70%. This includes a large number of poor peasants, members of the Kolkhoz, the newly created and not very "reliable" agricultural proletariat of the U.S.S.R. The proportion of workers "from the factory" remains approximately at the previous level—45% of the total membership.

Party Discipline

Par. 51 of the Statutes says: "The most strict observance of Party discipline is the first duty of all members of the Party and of all the Party organs. The orders of the central authorities of the Party must be carried out promptly and implicitly. The discussion of all conflicting problems within the Party is permitted only until a decision has been adopted, when all discussion must stop."

Failure to execute the orders of the Party authorities entails various penalties, beginning with censure and ending with exclusion from the Party. For the purpose of enforcing discipline, the Party has special bodies, the Control Committees, established to strengthen its unity and authority. These Committees consist of from three to five members, with

¹ About 2.2% of the population.

a Party stage dating from before March 1917. The Party Statutes explain the importance of these Committees in the following way: "The prestige of the Party among the masses depends, not only upon its achievements, but also on the behaviour of each separate member. The Communists, as the vanguard of the labouring masses, must display exemplary conduct not only in public matters, but also in their private lives. If a member of the Party indulges in drunkenness or abuses the privileges of his position to live in luxury, he dishonours not only his own prestige, but also the prestige of the Party. If a member of the Party goes to church he undermines the entire work of the Party, which endeavours to disclose the fundamental unsoundness of religion. If a member of the Party infringes discipline, he disrupts the Party itself."

From the day of its accession to power, the Party has kept close watch on the discipline of its members, combatting not only external infringements of this discipline but also departures from the principles of policy periodically laid down. The so-called "cleanings" occur frequently. Thus between January, 1928 and June 1929 the Party excluded—for various offences, including "political heresy"—34,000 members. From June 1929 to February 1930, 7,300 members were called to account by the Control Committees for various disciplinary offences; of these 3,500 were rehabilitated and reinstated.

Party Cleavages

In spite of its strict discipline, the Communist Party has not succeeded in escaping a whole series of internal cleavages of a serious character. The general scheme of the internecine struggle can be divided into three main sections; 1. the so-called "general line," personified in Stalin and now in control of the Party; 2. the Left Opposition, led by Trotsky, and 3. the Right Opposition, under the leadership of Rykov, Bukharin and others.

The struggle between Stalin and the Left Opposition covers the period of 1928–29. The XV Party Congress saw the culmination of this struggle, and the "general line" routed its opponents. Trotsky himself was first exiled to Turkestan and then expelled from the U.S.S.R. The more important of his colleagues also suffered various penalties. Stalin characterized the nature of Trotskyism at the XVI Party Congress (1930) in the following terms: "Trotskyism denies the possibility of establishing Socialism in the U.S.S.R. by the efforts of the working-class and the peasants, without the assistance of the World Revolution. Trotskyism means that if in the near future the World Revolution is not victorious we shall have to capitulate before the bourgeoisie. . . . This is nothing less than a bourgeois contention. . . . In the second place, Trotskyism denies the possibility of interesting the masses of the peasantry in Socialist construction. That means, that the working class (the proletariat) cannot ally itself with the peasantry, and if, in the near future, the World Revolution does not happen, the peasantry will restore the old bourgeois order. . . . Finally, Trotskyism denies the necessity for

iron discipline in the Party and demands liberty for fractional grouping in the Party, *i. e.* freedom to form the Trotskyist Party."

At the same Congress, Stalin characterized the Right Opposition as follows: "It cannot be said of the Right Opposition that they do not recognize the possibility of independent Socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. No, they recognize it, and that is the difference between them and the Trotskyists. But the misfortune of this Opposition is that, while formally recognizing the possibility of Socialist construction 'in one country,' they refuse to recognize the only ways and means by which this can be accomplished. They refuse to acknowledge that the intensive development of industry *at any cost* is the key to the transformation of our national economy on the basis of Socialism. They do not wish to recognize the necessity of an implacable class-struggle against Capitalist elements. . . . Neither can one say of the backsliders of the Right heresy that they deny the community of interests of the workers and peasants in the establishment of Socialism in the villages. But they do not wish to recognize that the collective and State farms are the fundamental means, the high road to this end. They refuse to acknowledge that, unless the abolition of the kulaks as a class, is achieved, it will be impossible to proceed with collectivization. . . ."

The agitation of the Right Opposition had a serious effect on the internal discipline of the Party. In 1930, as the shorthand reports of the XVI Party Congress show, a conspiracy, which might have led to open rebellion, had matured in the Party ranks.

From the speech of Com. Yaroslavsky, made during the debate on the report of the Central Control Committee to the Congress, it appeared that the Right Opposition expected that they would have a majority in the Central Executive Committee. Yaroslavsky said: "They counted on this particularly, when we met with great difficulties in the grain deliveries . . . they thought that these difficulties would compel the Party to turn to the Right opportunist path." He also stated that several members of the Party debated, more than once, the possibility of effecting by force a change in the composition of the Central Executive Committee. "In what manner? By removing some persons if they turned out to be in the majority, possibly by arrest or by other means. The fact is, that these members of the Party met and discussed such plans among themselves, although sworn to Party discipline."

The leaders of the Right Opposition were defeated and forced to recant; but it is difficult to judge how far the recantation was actually sincere; and it is doubtful whether the Right Opposition can be regarded as finally suppressed.

The Party and the State

The relations of the Communist Party to the Soviet State are particularly complicated. The Soviet Constitution does not mention the Party at all. The Party on the other hand regards itself as an "administrative

organ of the State" (Kamenev),¹ or "the core, the backbone of the Soviet System"—(Gurvitch, a well-known Soviet jurist). For example, the Union Constitution was first debated by a special Committee of the Party TZIK, under the chairmanship of Lenin: and only then was the text of the Constitution submitted to the Congress of Soviets. The Congress did not find it necessary to modify the proposed draft in any respect, and assented to it without debate.

Another example: In March, 1919, the VIII Party Congress passed the following resolution: "The functions of the Praesidium of the Central Executive Committee of the R.S.F.S.R. are not detailed in the Soviet Constitution. The next Congress of Soviets will have the duty of formulating its powers and duties." The VI Congress of Soviets carried out these instructions implicitly.

Again, the NEP was introduced in 1921 in consequence of an ordinance of the X Party Conference announcing that free interchange of commodities was to be the new principle of national economy to be established for a period of years. Other sundry ordinances and resolutions of the Communist Party on questions of national policy formed the foundation of Soviet Federalism. More particularly, the formation of the Union Soviet and the Soviet of Nationalities was established by an order of the XII Party Congress (1923). Countless similar examples could be cited. The procedure obtains to this day. The Five Years Plan is the result of Party deliberations, followed by enactments obediently passed by the Congresses of Soviets.

What has been said of the relations between the supreme State and the Party organs applies also to all the subordinate organs of both. At the bottom, it is the Communist cell which dictates the policy of the Soviets and the various organs derived from them. In this work, the cells sometimes encounter more opposition than do the higher organs, since the lower contain a smaller percentage of Communists.

In the course of time, the role played by the Party in the U.S.S.R. has steadily increased and its tendency to camouflage its activities behind the screen of the State has correspondingly diminished.

How can this be reconciled with the general principle of democracy or even with those of "Soviet democracy"?

First of all, it must be remembered that public opinion—an indispensable element in all modern democracies—has a totally different meaning in the U.S.S.R. Public opinion, in the Soviet sense of the word, is *Communist opinion*: and the Communists themselves make no bones about it; every other shade of opinion is either "counter-revolutionary" or "ignorant." The Dictatorship simply excludes any and every opinion dissenting from Communism; the ignorant must be enlightened, the class enemies destroyed. The latter category, which embraces both the remnants of the privileged classes of the Empire and the bourgeois elements which have arisen in the Soviet State (kulaks, Nepmen, etc.) are incontinently debarred from full Soviet citizenship. Strictly speaking,

¹ Important Communist leader, some time assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

only the "non-partisans"—i. e. all who neither by social origin, nor political opinion are *a priori* hostile to the Communist Party—are entitled, so long as they fulfil this condition, to a limited freedom of opinion. These comprise, first of all, large numbers of the poorest and the middle peasants, who have remained outside the ranks of the Party on account of their "inferior political sense"; also some of the workers and some non-partisan specialists. The public opinion of these categories still counts for something in the U.S.S.R. and the Communist Party spares no effort to attract them to its side.

This is effected by various agencies: the principal being as follows: 1) the Union of Communist Youth (Comsomol), 2), the Trade Unions, and 3) the cooperatives.

The Comsomol is of principal importance, and the Party pays particular attention to enlisting the children of workers and peasants in its ranks. They recommend that a Comsomol cell should be created in every school. Though the Comsomol is an organization semi-independent of the Party, yet the local Communist cells are instructed to supervise and instruct them. In their turn the Comsomols are associated, through their representatives, with the local Communist cells, and take an active part in the latter's work. The Union of Communist Youth is organized on similar lines to the Party, (Congresses, Central Committees, cells, etc.): and, in this manner the Party is educating the human material destined to become its successor. The Comsomol numbers at present some 5,000,000 members, and plays no small part in the life of the Soviet State.

With regard to professional associations, the Trade Unions are State-governed, and also closely connected with the Party organs. Membership in the professional organizations, although not obligatory, is of very great advantage; and non-participation deprives an individual of fundamental economic and political advantages (e. g., the right to ration-cards, to a share of commodities, to employment, etc.). The highly developed and complicated system of professional organizations has its own hierarchy; Union Congresses of Professional organizations, Central Executive Committees, Regional and Territory Congresses, their Executives, etc.

The cooperatives are organized in a similar manner. The Communist Party permeates, through the Party cells, all these organizations. The higher the organ of any of these associations, the greater the percentage of Communists. At the summit, Communists are in complete control. In brief, Soviet public opinion is organized by the State for special purposes, and the ruling Party can always influence it in any direction required.

These may be called constructive measures designed to organize public opinion. There are others, of a coercive nature, always at the disposal of the State and, hence, of the Party. Such are the police suppression of all shades of opinion not in conformity with orthodox Marxism; the monopoly of the Press, of printing in general and of political, economic

and cultural propaganda; the monopoly of trade and industry; a legislative procedure that is merely a tool in the hands of the ruling Party, which can transform—in a legal sense—an individual or a whole class of citizens into “class-enemies” at a stroke of the pen; and courts that can be ordered to “pass more death sentences” or to see that “all persons resisting . . .” some mass measure of the Government should be “. . . sentenced to maximum penalties.”¹ Finally, there is the OGPU. . . .

X

SOVIET ELECTIONS

THE most important political measure designed to organize public opinion is the Soviet franchise law. Regulations with regard to the franchise were first enacted in the Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R. (1918), and afterwards repeated in the Constitutions of the Federal and Autonomous Republics of the Union. In respect to the franchise, the law has not undergone any modification in principle since 1918. According to it, the possession of the right of “active” and “passive” franchise is independent of sex, religion, race or nationality, and is exercised by the following categories of citizens: 1) all persons living by productive labour and labour of public utility, as also persons employed in housekeeping; 2) soldiers of the Red Army and sailors of the Red Fleet; 3) persons belonging to the two categories already named who have passed the “working age” limit; 4) foreigners resident on the territory of the Republic, if they belong to the classes of workers or peasants. (Such are very few in number.) Persons deprived of the franchise are: all those employing hired labour, or receiving unearned income; merchants and financiers, monks, ministers of all religions and sects, officers of the old Imperial police, members of the former Dynasty, lunatics and mentally defective persons, and all convicted of “economically or generally dishonest actions.”

The astounding feature of these ordinances is, that they are far from definite and may be variously interpreted. The franchise policy of the Communist Party amounts to this: instructions are issued before every election which define the categories of the disfranchised, and vary in accordance with the policy of the moment.

The village electors are particularly subject to these operations. Following its political aims the Party, in one electional campaign, considered it possible to admit to the franchise all the wealthy peasants, even those employing hired labour, and those receiving interest from the debentures of State, Communal and other loans (Instructions, 1925). In another electoral campaign, however, the Party absolutely disfranchised all kulak elements.² (Instructions, 1930.)

¹ These expressions were actually used by the Commissariat of Justice to law officers during the campaign against the kulaks in 1930.

² The interpretation of the word *kulak* was left to the local authorities.

In order to explain various manœuvres by the aid of which the ruling Party exerts influence on the elections, it is necessary to take into account some other peculiarities of the Soviet electoral system. Direct elections take place only in the case of the primary Soviets—Village and Urban. The dates of these elections, according to habitual practice, are announced to the electorate only a few days previous to the ballot. No preliminary meetings are held—the Party is strenuously opposed to these. All the electors are summoned to an official electoral meeting on the day of the ballot. The power to convene this meeting is vested in the local Electoral Committee, which consists of representatives of the local administration. The Communist cells play a leading part at the meeting. The chairman of the Electoral Committee, supported by the Communist cell, reads out reports on the political situation, the problems of the electoral campaign, etc. The Chairman finally announces the list of candidates. One is always prepared by the Communist cell; other lists are presented by groups of citizens belonging to some of the non-political associations—Trade Unions, cooperatives, etc. Independent lists are unheard of. The voting takes place by open ballot. In these circumstances, it may seem surprising that, at the elections to the Village Soviets, about 90% of non-Communists could be returned. This is not due to the Party being unable to enforce its will on the villages but to the fact that it has not enough members to fill the Village Soviets. For this reason, the lists prepared by the Communist cells perforce include a large number of non-partisans—selected, naturally, from among those who appear the most “reliable” in so far as their attitude to the Party goes.

Approximately the same picture is presented by the elections for the Urban Soviets; with the difference, that in the towns there is a much larger contingent of Communists, while a still more important part is played by the state-controlled professional associations.

The aspect of the electoral process is definitely altered when the upper stages of Soviet elections are examined. The population itself takes no direct part in these; it is represented by delegates of the primary Soviets. The non-partisans among the delegates appear, at these elections, surrounded by a solid ring of Communists. The Party prepares, beforehand, the figures according to which a predetermined number of non-partisan candidates is admitted for election. This was done, for instance, at the elections to the Central Executive Committee of the Union in 1925. The Party decided to supplement this Committee by a large number of non-partisan elements; their proportion was accordingly increased from 11% to 22%.

Lists are drawn up to conform with the instructions of the central organs of the Party, and elections invariably proceed without a hitch.

Like the State hierarchy, organized public opinion, as expressed in the only Soviet form that even outwardly resembles Western institutions—the elections to the Soviets—is nothing but a smoke-screen behind which the Communist Party relentlessly pursues its policy.

It would, in a way, be a mistake to accept the word “smoke-screen”

in a derogatory sense only. In a bourgeois or Capitalist State any un-constitutional power acting behind the scenes and camouflaging its activities behind a constitutional screen, is conscious of a breach with established traditions and political ethics. This is not so with the Communist Party. In theory it reserves itself a definite task—the transformation of human society from its present state to one of which the prophets of Communism speaks as the “earthly paradise.” This task can only be accomplished through a dictatorship, and such a regime thus temporarily becomes, in Communist theory and practice, the only legal, ethical, moral and justifiable form of government. How long this will last, the Communists do not know; and much difference of opinion exists among their leaders on the subject. Some believe in “Socialism in our time”; others maintain that such will not come about until the World Revolution takes place; others, again, believe that “Socialism in one State” (Stalin) can be achieved. Some speak of a single generation, and others of generations. But no orthodox Communist has ever assumed that the dictatorship will last permanently.

It is in the principle of dictatorship that an explanation must be sought for the relations of the Party to the State, to the classes, to problems of law, legislation, etc. Bearing the ultimate, though vague, ends of Communism in view, there is only one thing that Communists demand from the present regime—that it should act as a stop-gap. And they have certainly built up a system that allows them to exploit to the full the opportunities which their seizure of power over an enormous, populous, and potentially rich continent has given them.

By destroying all who stood openly in their way, by indulging in a sufficient amount of camouflage, and by a clever handling of the diverse—and often antagonistic—forces which constitute human society, the Communists have been able to proceed with their self-imposed task outwardly, at least, unimpeded by any considerations of an abstract nature or by any covert opposition.

The Dictatorship of the Proletariat—better termed the Dictatorship of the Communist Party for the Proletariat—is a regime based on force; a fact which the Communists do not seriously trouble to conceal.

JUSTICE

I

HISTORICAL SURVEY

BEFORE the era of the reforms of Tzar Alexander II, the administration of justice in Russia was far from satisfactory. In the first place, the courts bore a class character. The laws of Catherine the Great provided the nobility, the townspeople, and the peasants with separate courts of justice. Later—in the reign of Alexander I—the separate peasant courts were abolished and peasant cases tried in the courts of the nobility. This, however, not only did not diminish the class character of justice but actually increased it by adding to the privileges of the upper classes which, incidentally, were not merely the superiors of the peasants, in the social sense, but actually *owned* a great proportion of them.

Secondly the Russian pre-reform courts were not entirely independent of the administration. The police was entitled, in some of the less important cases, to deputize for the lower courts. The police was also in charge of all court preliminaries, and of the legal examination of cases. The lower courts were under the control of the Provincial Governors, whose duty it was to supervise their activities without actually interfering with court proceedings.

Finally, Russian pre-reform court proceedings were not public. A lawsuit bore the character of a formal examination, rather than of a litigation. Formalities had a far greater importance than the circumstances of the case, as presented by the contending parties. The prevailing red-tape and dishonesty resulted in extreme slowness and frequent miscarriages of justice; trials lasted so long that the accused sometimes spent several years in preliminary confinement. The institution of professional legal defence was unknown. Towards the middle of the nineteenth century, Russian justice was entirely in the hands of officials who were either incapable or mercenary.

The Judicial Reforms of 1864

The reform of the law courts in 1864 entirely abolished the old system and established a new one—the standards of which would be considered liberal even at the present day. It can safely be said that the new Law Statutes were the last word in jurisprudence. “Our Law Statutes”—said one of the foremost Russian Ministers of Justice, N. V. Muraviev—

"gave Russia the results of many centuries of humanity's tireless quest for better justice."

Throughout Russian political history, very few Government measures have escaped bitter public criticism; in the case, however, of the new Statutes this criticism was reduced to a minimum. It is true that some representatives of the extreme conservative camp maintained that the new Statutes were too abstractly liberal—too "Western" in spirit—and that they disregarded Russia's national peculiarities and traditions. Such views, however, were the exception. On the whole, the law reform was acclaimed by all shades of opinion.

The new system of justice was organized as follows.

Justice of the Peace. Following the example of some of the European countries (France and Great Britain), the institution of Justices of the Peace was adopted. These took cognizance of minor criminal and civil cases, and replaced the former lower courts. The Justices of the Peace were individually elected from the ranks of the local self-government bodies—the Zemstvos. In the Uyezds they were elected by the Zemstvos, and in towns by the Municipalities. Candidates for this office had to comply with certain conditions; thus only persons with secondary school certificates were eligible; and they had also to possess real estate to the value of Rbles 15,000 in rural districts, or town property to the value of Rbles 6,000 in the capitals and Rbles 3,000, in other towns. The Zemstvos could, in certain cases, elect Justices of the Peace irrespective of this property qualification: but in such cases the election had to be unanimous. Justices of the Peace were elected for a period of three years, and were confirmed in office by the Senate. They could not be dismissed during their term of office, except by indictment under process of law.

Periodically, the Justices of the Peace of each Law Circuit assembled under the presidency of a member elected from their midst. These assemblies were known as Peace Congresses, and constituted courts of appeal against the judgments of individual Justices.

The main defect of the system was, that it did not extend over the whole of the Empire. Special Volost courts were instituted for the peasants, to deal with minor criminal and civil cases. Only as an exception, and with the explicit consent of both sides, could these cases be tried by Justices of the Peace. In this way, the most numerous class of the population was placed outside the jurisdiction of the Justices of the Peace.

Courts of Assizes. For the hearing of more important criminal and civil cases, Courts of Assizes were instituted. They consisted of a president and two deputies, one in charge of criminal and the other of civil cases. Trials without jury dealt with all civil cases, and such criminal cases as did not entail forfeiture of all civil rights.¹ Cases entailing such forfeiture were tried by jury.

There was one Court of Assizes for every Province of the Empire. Juries were chosen from a special register arranged by *curia*; separate

¹ Murder, grand larceny, etc.

lists were compiled for landowners, townspeople, peasants, etc. The bodies compiling these registers were of a purely bureaucratic character and were chosen from among the members of the Uyezds administration. The contending parties had each the right to challenge three members of the jury.

Courts of Appeal. In every Law Circuit¹ a Court of Appeal was created. Appeals against sentences passed by the Courts of Assizes, as well as some of the more important offences committed by state-officials, constituted the field of their jurisdiction. The Courts of Appeal were subdivided into Criminal and Civil Chambers. Each Chamber consisted of a president and several members. The senior president took the chair at general sittings of the Court. He was also in charge of the court proceedings in the Circuit and responsible for their conformity to the law.

The Senate. The supreme court of the Empire was still the Senate—which constituted a court of cassation for the Assizes and a court of appeal against the sentences of the Courts of Appeal. Apart from this, the Senate heard cases of high treason and the more important cases of criminal abuse of office.

The law reform of 1864 emancipated the Russian law courts from the administration and introduced the principle of judicial independence. According to par. 243 of the new Statutes, presidents, assistant presidents and members of all tribunals could not be dismissed from the service without having sent in their resignation. Furthermore, they could not be transferred from one place to another against their wish. Temporary suspension was permitted if they were committed for trial; but final dismissal was only possible after the verdict of a court.

The Statutes also freed court investigation from any connection with the police, leaving to the latter only executive functions (arrests at the order of the Courts, reports on crimes, etc.). Examining magistrates (coroners) were instituted to deal with the preliminary examination of criminals. They were members of the Courts of Assizes and assigned by the latter to the districts of the respective Law Circuits. Coroners were granted equal privileges with other law officers. In conducting investigations, they were empowered to make use of the police for collecting the necessary information. In this way the Russian system approached the French model more closely than the English, where the courts do not collect any evidence against the accused but maintain an entirely neutral position between the two parties.

The Russian system of committing individuals for trial was also nearer to the French model than to the English. Trials were not ordered by special courts elected from the people—the grand juries—but by the Courts of Appeal. In this sphere of activity, the Courts had a wider field than the Grand Jury. They conducted the preliminary examination of the cases through the Procurature; and the courts, acting on its reports, ordered a trial. It goes without saying that a special act of commitment for trial was only passed in important cases; in unimportant cases this

¹ There were 12 Law Circuits in the Empire.

was automatically done by the procurators of the courts (public prosecutors).

Public prosecution was in the hands of a separate judicial body—the Procurature—attached to the various courts and also designed on the French model. According to the Statutes, the prosecuting magistrates were also charged with the duty of watching over the strict legality of all court proceedings. In 1872 this prerogative of the Procurature was extended to all Government institutions.

Legal Defence

The Statutes introduced an institution hitherto unknown to Russian jurisprudence—Legal Defence. The Corporation of Defending Counsels was a liberal profession, entirely independent of the State. Defending counsels were registered with the Courts of Appeal and were obliged to have a permanent residence within the jurisdiction of the registering Court. Each Law Circuit thus had its own corporation of defending counsels with an elected board at its head. The board had very wide organizing and disciplinary powers, and was the guardian of the corporation's traditions and honour.

The enactment of the Law Statutes was the most striking reform of Tzar Alexander II—one of which Russia could justly be proud. The resulting speed and integrity of justice exhibited by the Russian courts may well be styled the greatest achievement of the Monarchy during the nineteenth century. The reform had, however, its darker sides.

The changes introduced were so radical that they entailed not merely the adoption of new principles by existing institutions but also a lengthy process of reconstruction. By the time this had been begun throughout the Empire, the original intentions of the authors of the Statutes had undergone considerable alterations. These were chiefly the result of Alexander III's policy. For example, when the reforms were extended to Siberia (1892) Justices of the Peace were already non-existent in Russia proper; after 1889, with the exception of the capitals and some of the larger towns, their functions in the rural districts had been handed over to the "Land Captains," and in the towns (with the above exceptions) to town magistrates, appointed by the Crown. The Land Captains combined judicial and administrative functions, being responsible for law and order in the villages, peasant welfare, etc. Their judicial functions were limited to peasant affairs. The Land Captains were appointed by the Minister of the Interior—a fact which rendered them practically independent of the general system of judicial administration.

The law of 1889 created two more judicial offices—Town and Uyezd Magistrates. Town Magistrates replaced the Justices of the Peace in the majority of towns. They were appointed by the Minister of Justice, and were excluded from the jurisdiction of the Courts of Assizes. The Uyezd Magistrates were supplementary to the Land Captains, and dealt with all cases arising between the non-peasant elements of the Uyezd. Uyezd Congresses replaced Peace Congresses. These consisted of the Uyezd

Marshal of the Nobility (chairman) and of the Town and Uyezdz Magistrates, the Land Captains and some members of the local administration; the Congresses functioned as courts of appeal against judgments passed both by the Land Captains and by Town and Uyezdz Magistrates.

The trials by jury were also considerably restricted. Quite a number of important cases were withdrawn from the Courts of Assizes and handed over to the Courts of Appeal—to be tried, not by jury, but by special class delegates. All this shows that the class principle, which had entirely lost its social significance and was retained solely as a political measure—was gradually beginning to eat its way into the reforms of the 'sixties. Certain limitations of the principle of publicity were also introduced, and the powers of the Procurature considerably increased. It is generally admitted that the law reforms of Alexander II were much emasculated by all these alterations; but, nevertheless, the reputation of the reformed Russian law-courts was very high. It was the only institution of the Empire which retained its moral authority unimpaired until the Revolution of 1917.

After the Revolution of 1917, the Provisional Government made no material alterations in the existing Russian judicial system. The Bolshevik Revolution, on the other hand, so completely altered the whole structure that it is difficult to find any trace of affinity between Soviet justice and that of the Empire.

II

SOVIET JUSTICE

Conception of Law

INSUFFICIENT attention is paid to the fact that the principles on which Soviet justice is based are derived from legal theories entirely different from the "bourgeois" conception of law. In particular, the following basic ideas which differentiate the Soviet conception must be borne in mind.

1. Soviet jurisprudence, in the first place, denies the necessity of formal legal guarantees in law-proceedings. "We Marxists understand very well the meaning of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat and we shall not tolerate any form of legal fetishism," remarks one of the best known Soviet jurists, Krylenko, now Procurator General of the Union,—"We always maintain that in the struggle against social evils the interests of the community shall be placed above those of the individuals; and when facts show that a certain individual—an habitual offender, for example—is a social nuisance, should we tolerate him in our midst until he commits another crime, or rather put him away and thus protect society? We decidedly reject liberal theories in connection with such a problem. Certain 'learned' people maintain that cases of preventive justice should be the province of the OGPU and not of the law-courts. But

why? And what exactly is a law-court? In what way is it different from the OGPU? Must we agree with those who maintain that the law-courts are instruments of constitutional struggle against our class enemies, and that the OGPU is not? The only difference between the law-courts and the OGPU is that the former are less liable to commit mistakes; on the other hand, the OGPU solves the question far more expeditiously. The courts of law provide no other legal guarantees (than the OGPU) and therefore there is no fundamental difference between a trial in the law-courts or in courts of the OGPU.”¹

2. Soviet jurists not only follow entirely different principles of law to those of their bourgeois colleagues but are inclined to deny the necessity for law *per se*. In the opinion of Hoichberg, one of the foremost Soviet jurists and a “specialist” in the drafting of Soviet laws, it is entirely unnecessary to substitute a Socialist system of law for the old Capitalist system, abolished by the Revolution. “Every workman,” he states, “knows that Religion is opium for the people, but I think that very few people realize that the idea of ‘right’ is a much stronger poison. In the Communist society of the future there will be no such thing as ‘right.’ During the transitional period of the proletarian dictatorship, however, the promulgation of laws will be necessary; but these laws, strictly speaking, are not laws at all, but technical regulations for the organization of the State.”

Stuchka, the former People’s Commissar of Justice and President of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R., defines Soviet laws as “technical instructions,” with no binding power over those who issue them.

3. The peculiarities of Soviet jurisprudence are particularly prominent in the criminal law. The Soviet judges are not bound in any way by the written law when passing judgment. They may when considering a case not foreseen by the Criminal Code, use their discretion in the widest sense. For them, the principle of “*nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege*” does not exist. The law-courts are primarily political organs of the State; meant to enforce not law but the political directions of the Government.

4. Finally, Soviet law and Soviet courts are based entirely on the class principle. Their purpose is to defend the interests of one particular class; and, therefore, the ideals of equality which govern the bourgeois conception of law are not applicable to them. Par. 28 of the Criminal Code establishes mitigated penalties for persons who have rendered some service to the Revolution and for “individuals of proletarian origin.” The benefit of this particular law seems, even to some Soviet jurists, rather doubtful: Soltz, one of the best known, wrote in 1926: “A fortnight ago my attention was directed to a number of verdicts published in the daily papers. In many cases the accused, who had appropriated public funds for their own use, had been pardoned; proletarian justice said—‘you are a proletarian—you may go a free man.’ While complaining, about the abuse of par. 28, Soltz does not find anything

¹ There is, however, one very marked difference—the proceedings of OGPU tribunals are secret, which allows them far greater freedom of action.

anomalous in the mere class principle of justice. With the rest of the Soviet jurists, he maintains that "bourgeois" origin is always an element aggravating a charge.

In any case, too much significance attached to the outward forms of Soviet justice would be misplaced; they contain so much that is radically different from, and alien to, the conceptions of bourgeois jurisprudence that direct comparison is practically impossible.

Organization of Justice

The lowest courts in this system of Soviet justice are the *People's Courts*, subdivided into Regional and Town Courts. They consist either of a single People's Judge, or of a People's Judge and two People's Assessors. The People's Judges are elected by the Territorial Executive Committees, from lists drawn up either by the Territorial courts or the People's Commissar of Justice; in other words, the Soviet system combines the principles of election and nomination. The election, however, is not made by the population but by the Territorial Executive Committees. Confirmation rests with the respective Commissar of Justice.

The post of People's Judge can be filled by any citizen (of either sex) bearing a good reputation and in possession of an active vote, who has served a two-year stage of social or political work in a Party or State institution. All citizens (of both sexes) possessing either the active or the passive vote are eligible to the office of People's Assessors. Lists of eligible candidates are prepared by special administrative bodies; 50% must be workmen, 35% peasants and 15% drawn from the Red Army. The elections of Assessors are carried out by Factory Committees, Regional Executive Committees and Regimental Committees respectively. The law instructs that the lists for this office must be drawn with special attention to the "political advancement" of each candidate. Any person on trial has the right to challenge the Assessors sitting on his case. The final decision lies, however, with the Territorial Executive Committees.

Territorial Courts. Next in the system are the Territorial Courts. They consist of a President and two assistants—one in charge of criminal cases and the other of civil—12 permanent members, and a number of elected Assessors who in Soviet Courts take the place of the Jury. The President, his assistants, and the permanent members are elected by the Territorial Executive Committee for one year, and are confirmed in their offices by the People's Commissar of Justice—who has the right of proposing his own candidates. The People's Assessors are elected, according to special lists, prepared on principles similar to those governing the election of assessors to the People's Courts.

High Courts of the Federal and Autonomous Republics. Above the Territorial Courts are the High Courts of the Federal and Autonomous Republics of the Union. They are the courts of cassation for sentences passed by the lower courts, and special courts for particularly important

criminal and civil cases. In addition, they keep watch over the legality of all court proceedings under their jurisdiction and are the guardians of the law in the respective Republics. They consist of a President, his assistant, chairmen of the Criminal and Civil Departments, and members of these Departments. All are directly appointed by the Praesidium of the Central Executive Committees of the respective Republics; members of the Departments from lists prepared by the People's Commissar of Justice.

The Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. The Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R., a full description of which was given in the section on Political Structure, constitutes the highest court in the system of Soviet justice.

Powers of the Courts

The powers of a People's Judge, unassisted by People's Assessors, are very limited. In criminal cases, he hears those which relate to crimes against public health, or minor disturbances of public law and order. He examines cases which may lead to the committal of individuals for trial, or to preventive measures. In the civil field, he hears cases of a "private" order, such as private claims, injunctions, etc.

Graver cases of civil litigation are heard by a tribunal—consisting either of a People's Judge or a member of a Territorial Court, assisted, in either case, by two People's Assessors.

The Territorial Courts hear all cases of crime against the State, of abuse of office and of contravention of the economic laws; they also deal with the more serious crimes against the life, health and dignity of individual citizens. All civil actions involving over Rbles 100,000, or any against Executive Committees and Urban Soviets as well as actions brought by State administrative or industrial institutions, cooperatives of general importance and State-controlled companies, come under the jurisdiction of the Territorial Courts. All other civil cases are subject to the jurisdiction of the People's Courts.

The High Courts of the Federal and Autonomous Republics try criminal cases of the gravest nature, and of civic cases where the defendants are the People's Commissariats or other institutions of a similar status. It is also the court of cassation for the Territorial Courts, and the chief organ of legal control over the legal proceedings of the separate Republics.

In the absence of a Union Commissariat of Justice, the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. controls the system of justice throughout the Soviet Union; it supervises, advises and coordinates the activity of the High Courts of the Federal and Autonomous Republics. As a Court of first instance it hears: 1. civil cases affecting two or more Republics of the Union; 2. civil and criminal cases where the defendants are members of the Central Executive Committee or the Soviet of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. or other high officials; 3. the more important military cases (espionage, armed resistance to superiors, etc.) and any offences committed by the higher military authorities; 4. the more im-

portant cases relating to any offences of the higher transport officials.

There are some exceptions to the unity of the Soviet judicial system; these are: a) Military Tribunals for the trial of offences against the regulations and safety of the Red Army and Fleet; b) Special Labour Sessions of the People's Courts for cases of contravention of the labour laws; c) Land Commissions for the settlement of land disputes; d) Central and local Arbitration Committees for settling disputes concerning the property of various Government institutions; and lastly e) the tribunals of the OGPU which compete with the law-courts in the detection, punishment and stamping out of political crimes.

Peculiarities of Soviet Legal Procedure

Soviet jurists proclaim that court procedure in the U.S.S.R. is more consistently democratic than any Western system. It will, however, be seen that many of its democratic principles are purely theoretical and have no effect in practice. For example, it is claimed that the social principle is more thoroughly applied in Soviet courts than in any bourgeois. A. S. Vishinsky, the author of "Principles of Soviet Law" says: "Only the proletarian State applies the principle of public interest in court procedure, because it is established in the interests of the majority—the proletariat—and carries out its will; whereas the interests of the bourgeois classes control the system of justice in Capitalist States. These interests are radically opposed to the interests of society—if by this term be meant the majority of the population. This is why we say that the social principle is unknown and foreign to the bourgeois courts."

Such arguments would be correct if public interest were synonymous with the interests of the proletariat. Should, however, one interpret social principle as the sum total of the interests of all classes in their complicated relationship, then the Soviet procedure is the last to which the term democratic could apply. Its real nature is *class spirited*. This is particularly demonstrated by the absence of trial by Jury.

Soviet legal procedure has retained the principle of publicity; par. 14 of the Statutes says: "Law procedure shall be public, except in special cases expressly indicated in the Code of Laws of the U.S.S.R., or its component Republics." These special cases are limited to crimes against morals and against the safety of the State in a military, political or economic sense.

It must be noted that a great number of trials are conducted in secret, *i. e.* all those before Military Tribunals, the Arbitration Committees, and (particularly) the Tribunals of the OGPU. In the latter case, only the highest state officials can ever inspect the records of the cases tried, and no spectator has ever penetrated into the OGPU court rooms.

On the other hand, in the so-called "demonstration trials," the principle of publicity was made to serve Communist propaganda; the floor of the court became a political arena.

Trials in Soviet courts are conducted orally and retain the character

of litigations. Soviet procedure has, however, abolished the principle of appeal in the form of retrial. All appeals are addressed to the administrative authority (Executive Committees) and are, in essence, appeals for clemency.

As to the principle of litigation, it is easy to see that this must be greatly affected by the class character of Soviet legislation. Theoretically, the equality of the contending parties is maintained: *i. e.* they have equal rights to challenge the People's Assessors (par. 278, Law Statutes of the R.S.F.S.R.): equal rights in cross-examination, in producing witnesses and experts (pars. 283, 286, 287). But, in practice, an individual of non-proletarian origin has to contend with many disadvantages: in particular, in challenging the composition of the courts, where the final decision belongs to an administrative body—the Executive Committee—always antagonistic to his interests.

Contrary to bourgeois procedure, Soviet jurisprudence does not distinguish between the various organs of preliminary examination, legal investigation and police proceedings against criminals or persons suspected of offences against the law. Police investigation predominates: the Procurature's functions are limited to prosecution in the courts, to supervision over the legality of their procedure and to legal control of the activities of the State organs. The Public Prosecutors of the separate Republics are assistants of the Commissars of Justice, and are directly responsible to the supreme organs of the republican administration. They are appointed by the Central Executive Committees of the Federal and Autonomous Republics from lists prepared by the Commissars of Justice of the respective Republics.

The Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. has the Procurator General of the U.S.S.R., his deputy and two assistants attached to it; one of the assistants is in charge of the proceedings of the OGPU and the other of the Military Tribunals, which have their special organization of Military Prosecutors and their assistants, attached to each Tribunal and appointed by the supreme military authority of the U.S.S.R.—the Revolutionary Military Council.

Legal Defence

The old system of legal defence—the Corporation of Defending Counsels—has been entirely abolished. By a decree issued in 1918, a new institution—that of legal advisers—was introduced. The main difference between the old defending counsels and the legal advisers resides in the fact that it is no longer necessary to have any special legal training. Every citizen belonging to the labouring classes and possessing the active or passive vote, is entitled to represent a party in the court (par. 81 of the Statutes of the R.S.F.S.R.).¹

The legal advisers are formed into special bodies (*collegia*), which are, however, not in possession of corporate rights; it is not necessary

¹ The Statutes of the R.S.F.S.R. are quoted here as they have served as a model for the Statutes of the other Republics of the Union.

to belong to the organization in order to act in the capacity of a legal adviser; any person possessing the confidence of the court is empowered to do so (par. 53 Statutes of the R.S.F.S.R.). In addition, the collegia of legal advisers are not autonomous. The final decision, both as to the admission and dismissal of candidates, belongs to the Territorial Executive Committees. The collegia are subordinate to the Territorial Public Prosecutors and the Presidents of Territorial Courts. The functions of the legal advisers are defined as conducting defence in courts, and in giving legal advice (in a general sense) to the population.

In conclusion, it must be mentioned that the Soviet system of justice could not be extended to those parts of the U.S.S.R. where the population leads a nomadic existence. By an order of the Central Executive Committee and the Soviet of People's Commissars of the R.S.F.S.R. (October 14, 1927), all judicial functions concerning nomadic natives were handed over to the local administrative organs.

SOCIAL RELATIONS

I

SOCIAL RELATIONS PRIOR TO THE REVOLUTION

THE social relations of the Russian Empire at the beginning of this century were still based on patriarchal traditions, sanctified by religion. The laws regulating these relations were based on the canons of the Christian faith, those of the Orthodox Church in particular. Prior to the Revolution of 1917, the Civil Code recognized only religious marriages whatever the faith of the parties. The dissolution of marriages was left entirely to ecclesiastical courts. The registration of births and deaths was left to the ecclesiastical authorities and only among the non-Christian population was it given over to the police.

Family relations too were based on religious traditions; all persons were supposed, by law, to obtain parental consent to their marriages.¹ A breach of this regulation did not invalidate the marriage but on complaint of the parents might involve a penalty of four to eight months' imprisonment. The law established that a wife had to obey her husband, love him, honour him and care for him. The husband, similarly, "must love his wife as his own body," live with her in peace, honour her, defend her, forgive her all her deficiencies, alleviate her sorrows and sustain her as well as possible.

On the other hand, the law maintained the independent right of married women to hold property. Women in this respect were much better off than in some European countries. Russian law recognized the complete dissociation of property as between husband and wife. A married woman could manage and dispose of her property as she wished. As between parents and children, property was treated in the same manner. Parental authority was very great; and children of all ages had to submit to it; parents were empowered to adopt certain domestic correctional measures, and in some cases they could even demand the assistance of the State. But the extent of parental rights was tempered by the independence of the children in relation to property.

The property relations of the citizens of the Empire were embodied in Vol. X of the Code of Laws, largely compiled under the influence of European civil law—particularly the Code Napoleon. It was based on the inviolability of private property and the freedom of contracts. It

¹ Independent of age.

must be remarked, however, that side by side with the written law defining property relations there existed an unwritten "custom-law" for the Russian peasantry and for many of the non-Russian races inhabiting the Empire. The social relations of the peasantry were regulated chiefly by this custom-law which varied very considerably in different localities and created a great deal of controversy in the courts.

By the time of the 1905 Revolution, a marked discrepancy existed between the written law and the actual state of social relations. The law had long ceased to reflect the latter. The patriarchal traditions had lost their significance; and the upper classes were the first to emancipate themselves. By all who are familiar with Russian life in the beginning of this century, it will be admitted that the day of a husband's unchallenged authority over a wife, or of parents over their children, had long gone by and been forgotten. The Russian family became one of the freest in the world. Lay education shook religion's hold on Russian life. The Church lost her influence, especially over the upper classes, and many sections of the Code became obsolete; although they were not abrogated.

II

THE REVOLUTION

THE Revolution of 1917 paved the way for fresh legislation. The Provisional Government intended to reform the Civil Code extensively but it fell before it had accomplished much, an enactment for the introduction for the civil registration of births, marriages and deaths being the sum total of its measures. The validity of ecclesiastical registration was, however, maintained.

The Communist Revolution brought about a complete change in the Civil laws regulating the social relations of the population, and introduced reforms of a sweeping character. These reforms were effected side by side with profound changes in the economic structure of the country—changes amounting to the introduction of complete Socialism. Civil law, accordingly, had to assume a purely Socialist character. The combination of Western radicalism and Russian revolutionary psychology resulted in a complete and thorough rupture with tradition. The social order of the U.S.S.R., as reflected in its civil laws, bears absolutely no resemblance to the old order.

One of the first moves of the Soviet Government was to secularize the civil law. Paragraph 13 of the Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R., promulgated by the Council of People's Commissars on January 23rd, 1918, separated Church and State. Article 8 declared that all civil acts were to be registered exclusively by civil institutions.

Marriage

The new Code relating to civil acts (Collection of Laws, 1918 No.

76-77) enacted that only marriages registered by civil authority were legal. A Church marriage, from the State's point of view, was no marriage. This step, of course, was partly influenced by the Soviet Government's hostility to religion in general. On the other hand, the marriage-law of 1918 did not establish any special form of marriage. The new laws were designed to accord to the physical relations between men and women a status equivalent to that of civil marriage. The difference between legal marriage and concubinage,—recognized by Roman law,—was foreign to the Soviet Code, which considered that the basis of the family was "physical origin": concluding that therefore, "there is no difference between natural and legitimate parentage." (Par. 133.) The children of unmarried parents have, in the eyes of the law, the same rights as children born in civil wedlock. The persons registered in the *birth* certificates are considered to be the father and mother of the child. (Par. 134.) A woman may, though married to one man, ask the courts to recognize that her legal husband was not her child's father. The father is bound by law to pay the expenses of childbirth, and, even though the mother be married to another man, to maintain the child. According to Paragraph 144 of the Marriage Code, the courts may impose the duties of parenthood on several men, if it cannot be determined which of them is the child's father, and bind each of them to share in the expenses. This naturally renders the registration of marriages almost a nullity. The idea of a family as a unit loses its meaning; the law protects individual interests exclusively.

This shows a specific "individualism," in the Soviet marriage and family laws, which is in clear contradiction to the principles of a political and social regime that professedly attaches no value to personal, as against collective, rights. The paragraphs relating to divorce are especially characteristic of this individualism. They defend the rights of separate persons—man or woman—but not those of the family as a unit. The simple desire of husband or wife for a divorce is sufficient ground to obtain this. Applications for a divorce are presented to the local registry office without any formalities. The proceedings are quite simple, unless questions of alimony complicate them; they may even be verbal.

Soviet law equalizes the position of husband and wife. The idea of a "head of the family" does not exist. Property is never common. Either husband or wife, if in need, can demand support from the other. Parental rights are only recognized in so far as they promote the interests of the children; if the courts consider that these rights have been misapplied, the parents may be deprived of their children. Parents have no rights to the property of their children, nor the children to that of their parents.

The Soviet marriage and family laws of 1918 led to a great degradation of the family. This was especially noticeable in the villages, where patriarchal customs had hitherto existed. These customs were in opposition to the new individualistic, and very loose, ideas concerning

the family and marriage; the resulting chaos was in accordance with the views of the legislators who hoped to destroy the family at one blow. The number of divorces was appallingly great. The courts were snowed under by applications for the establishment of parenthood and for decisions as to who should maintain the children, or relating to the property relations between consorts.

In 1925 the Commissariat of Justice of the R.S.F.S.R. prepared a still more radical marriage-code. This was much discussed throughout the Union for two years and met with acute opposition from the peasants. This opposition found expression at the XII Congress of the Soviets of the R.S.F.S.R. (October, 1925.) Peasant deputies, as well as many Communists, were of the opinion that the family must be preserved as a social institution—public interests demanding this. The promoters of the project made certain concessions, which found expression in Paragraph I of the new Marriage and Family Code (promulgated in 1926). This paragraph states that the registration of marriage has two aims; namely, "to serve the public and social interest," and to ensure the personal rights of husband, wife and children. The principle of "social interest"—which, of course, demanded recognition of the family by the State—did not find complete expression in the new Code; which had, like its predecessor, an individualistic basis. In addition, a new institution was introduced—the "de facto marriage"—in every respect identical, in the eyes of the law, with the registered marriage. The "de facto" marriage differs from concubinage by the permanence of cohabitation, joint domicile, open admission of sexual relations, joint upbringing of children, etc. Such "de facto" married persons have the right to register their marriage at any time; it is only necessary to state at what date cohabitation began. This special form of marriage (not unlike the common-law marriage in the United States, and the custom of Scotland), may be dissolved by a simple cessation of cohabitation, and without any formality.

These individualistic tendencies of the Soviet marriage and family laws are the direct outcome of the principles governing the relations between the Soviet State and its citizens. In the "bourgeois" social order the family is an independent and autonomous unit, claiming an allegiance over which the State has no control. It is because of this that Communist legislation has freed individuals—husband, wives and children—from the family bond.

Family authority was particularly upheld in Roman law, where "patria potestas" was as great as that of the State. Being under the authority of a "pater familias," the family was an entity which the State could not penetrate, just as it could not interfere with the individual's right to dispose of his property at will. Such autonomy has no place in the Communist system, which endeavours to subordinate all individuals to a centralized authority. Communist legislation, therefore, quite logically abolished all forms of autonomy, the family among them, and placed the individual under the complete control of the State.

The position of children in the Communist State is a case in point. Karl Radek, one of the Communist leaders, states that in the "old society the parents ordered, and the children were forced to obey. A child was reared in the conviction that he was nothing, while the adults were everything. The future of the child,—his private interests—was the basis of education. The position is otherwise in the Soviet State. The first thing to be understood is that the authority of the parents has collapsed. The family has ceased to be a stepping-stone to the future. The smallest children are aware that the Communist Party is the highest authority in the land."

The Soviet State endeavours to replace the family by collective bodies, such as the Children of Lenin (for children under 8 years of age), the *Union of Pioneers*, (for children under 14 years of age), and the Union of Communist Youth. In these unions the children are taught "to submit to the collective will and to work in common discipline and common effort; a child is trained to understand that he is not an individual—not a free person who can do what he likes, even to entering into conflict with society—but that he is a member of a society to which he is bound to submit."¹

III

THE NEP

THE Socialist tendencies of Soviet legislation are especially visible in the property and contract laws. In regard to property, the Communists endeavour to replace the idea of private property—not only of the means of production but of the means of consumption—by the idea of collective property. By this radical, methodical and general abolition of private property, Communism differs from other Socialist systems and theories.

In so far as contract-law is concerned, Socialist and Communist theories are rather contradictory and confusing. On one hand various "free," "federalistic" and "anarchistic" Socialist theories not only affirm the legality of a contract but hold that the contract is the best basis for the future Socialist society. The ideal of such Socialist theories is a free association of workers based upon a general agreement or contract and necessitating no compulsion in any form.

On the other hand the Socialists condemn the Capitalist regime as using the so-called "freedom of contract" for the better exploitation of the weak by the strong. In Socialist opinion, the "bourgeois" contract is not a free agreement between equals, but a dictation of conditions by the rich to the poor. State Socialism and Communism are therefore inclined to reject the principle of contracts, in general, because it is incompatible with equality. When production is centralized and man-

¹ ("Izvestia." No. 149. June 1st, 1931.)

aged by a central authority, there should be no place for contracts between the individual and this centre (the State), or between this centre and one of its component parts (such as trades unions, political parties, etc.).

Contractual relations must be replaced by a system of compulsory labour-discipline, for all members of society. The same may be said of the relations between individuals and the State when private trade is replaced by a system of State distribution. In this case private relations are replaced by public relations between society, as a whole, and its members. Society undertakes an obligation towards its members to supply them with everything they formerly obtained, by private contract, when exchanging their labour for goods.

During the period of "Militant Communism" the Soviet State accordingly set itself to eradicate every vestige of the institute of private property, and to abolish the existing principles of contract law. A grandiose attempt at the "collectivization of wealth" and the "destruction of the free market" followed. All citizens were divided into categories, which received rations from the State. All goods and commodities were registered, and rationed on a card system. The State decreed that all rations would be provided gratis: also such facilities as the use of the railways, the telegraph and other public services, (Decrees of December 4th and 7th, 1920). On the other hand, the State decreed that it could, in return, requisition the services of every citizen under a system of general and compulsory labour.

As a result of this policy, illegal "private markets" sprang up everywhere. Secret exchanges of commodities and services, and even secret contracts of all kinds—including the sale and purchase of real estate—flourished at this period. The NEP was introduced in 1921, as a result of the total collapse of this Communist Utopia; it recognized, to some extent, both private property and the freedom of contract. Soviet contract law found its first expression during the NEP in the Civil Code of the R.S.F.S.R. (1922): which, with many amendments, is still the chief instrument of civil law in the U.S.S.R. This Code was accepted by the Federal Republics (the Ukraine, White Russia, etc.) in 1923.

During the NEP period, in addition to the Civil Code, many other laws were also modified, *e. g.* Land laws, the Labour Code, Court Procedure laws, etc. (The Land and Labour codes were enacted in 1922.) The NEP legislation primarily enlarged the sphere of private independence in the economic field. For example the Land Code of 1922, without repealing the nationalization of land, established the peasants' inalienable right to its use (Par. 11). This applied equally to individual landholders and to communal holdings. It is especially important to notice that the new Code recognized the renting of land from those temporarily unable to work it (Par. 28). It is true that these leases were to be of a short and limited character; the decision lay, as to their terms, with the local authority—the Volost Executive Committees). The new Code also permitted the employment, to a limited extent, of

hired labour (Par. 39-41). With regard to the nationalized industries, the Trust Statute of 1925 created a special type of large industrial undertakings; although they belonged to the State, yet they enjoyed a certain degree of "decontrolled" autonomy.

Small private industrial and trading enterprises were also permitted, subject to special permits in every individual case. Thus during the NEP Soviet legislation tolerated the institute of private property and freedom of contracts conditionally on State approval. This principle is characteristically expressed in Par. I. of the Civil Code of the R.S.F.S.R. (1922), which declares:—"All civil rights are protected by the law, with the exception of those cases when their exercise stands in contradiction to their social and economic functions." In other words, service to a definite social principle is the only ground on which the rights of the individual are recognized and defended by the State. When the rights of an individual cease to coincide with the social aims of the State, they are neither recognized nor defended. Civil rights are, therefore, not granted to the citizens by the Soviet State in absolute form, but only "in order to develop the productive forces of the country" (Par. 4).

With this limitation, the State gave all citizens the right to free movement, free settlement, free choice of professions not prohibited by the law, the right to purchase property within the limits of the law, and the right to conclude contracts and to inaugurate industrial and trading concerns in accordance with the rules concerning such activities, (Par. 5).

The Civil Code of 1922 recognized the right of private property as an independent right co-existing with other forms of property-rights, such as State (nationalized, municipal) and cooperative property (Par. 52). The law acknowledged that private property might consist of non-municipalized enterprises with a limited number of workers, means of production, money, securities and other valuables, gold and silver coins, foreign currency, personal and household effects, and goods the sale of which was not prohibited by law. The Code defined property as the right to "possess, to use and to dispose of effects," but only within "the limits established by the law." The rights of private property were, at the same time, defended from "encroachment by a third party" (Par. 58-60). The requisition of property was only permitted in accordance with a special Decree concerning the requisition or confiscation of private property, the owner of which had to be compensated at market rates (Par. 69).

This Code created a special social regime which differed in two respects from the Capitalist:—

1. It excluded a great number of objects from classification as private property—*e. g.* all property that had been nationalized or assigned to municipalities, land, minerals, forests, factories (with the exception of small concerns), town buildings, etc.

2. The extensive prerogatives of the State to interfere in private social relations. This interference was especially evident so far as contracts

were concerned. Par. 30 of the Civil Code declared void all contracts concluded against or in contravention of the law, or seeking to circumvent it, as well as any contract detrimental to the State. Contracts concluded under extreme necessity or which were obviously unprofitable to one of the contracting parties, were also declared void. The public authorities must see that such contracts be annulled (Par. 33). Persons who make unduly large profits may be compelled to surrender them (Par. 399). All this provided the State with ample powers to interfere when and how it liked; for it alone could decide what were unduly large profits or contracts entered into under duress.

The relations between workers, employees and the State during the NEP were also based on contracts. Compulsory labour was permitted in exceptional cases only, as when coping with natural disasters, or with an insufficiency of labour in important State works, (Par. 2 of the Labour Code). In ordinary circumstances, labour was hired by contract. The Soviet law defined labour-contracts as agreements between one or more persons, in virtue of which one side gave its labour in return for remuneration provided by the other. The conditions were dependent on the consent of both contracting parties. Groups of persons, as well as individuals, could conclude contracts. A *collective contract* was an agreement between a trade union and employers which established conditions of work and remuneration, and to which private contracts were bound to conform.

Those sections of Soviet legislation much resemble similar clauses in European codes. The great difference lies in the fact that, in the majority of cases, the employer was the State—not a private individual. The State had power to regulate the conditions of labour and the standard of pay in all enterprises, State, public and private. Such regulations were enacted by the Commissariat of Labour, and there was no appeal against them. The State thus lost the character of arbiter which it preserves in Capitalist countries.

The legislation of the NEP period created conditions which are more reminiscent of an undeveloped Capitalist society than of a Communist State. Its land laws for example, stimulated the formation of a class of well-to-do peasants—the so-called “kulaks”—who, availing themselves of the new facilities (particularly in respect of hired labour), enriched themselves considerably.

IV

SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

THE steady growth in importance of the kulaks, Nep-men, and specialists was recognized in 1928, as a menace to the regime; and the Communist Party began a systematic campaign against the NEP. A new policy of “Socialist construction” was proclaimed—which, by 1931,

brought the U.S.S.R. back to the conditions existing in the period of Militant Communism. But this turn of policy did not lead to the repeal of NEP legislation. The Civil Code and other laws continue to have force in the U.S.S.R. Without actually repealing NEP laws, many new decrees were issued with a view to amending or nullifying such of their sections as did not conform to the new orientation.

As regards social relations in the U.S.S.R., the stages of the new policy of Social construction were as follows:—


1. The new bourgeoisie was completely ruined and partly destroyed.
2. By taxation and other administrative measures, those provisions of the Code which granted a certain degree of freedom to the “private economic sector” were rendered practically abortive.
3. The autonomy of the trusts was abolished by administrative measures.
4. A merciless war upon the kulaks exterminated them as a class.
5. The collectivization of individual peasant farms introduced an entirely novel type of agricultural concern—in which the individual is entirely submerged by the collective. The peasant is being transformed into a labourer, forcibly restricted to his present manner and place of employment.

6. The principle of compulsory labour was gradually introduced; this replacing the contract methods, between workers and the State.


It is very difficult to say what form the new social relations will finally take. They are still undergoing change. But, from the point of view of jurisprudence, a jurist can only arrive at one definite conclusion:—

Soviet law does not really recognize the rights of the individual *per se*. Such rights as are embodied in the Civil Code reflect merely the attitude of the State to the individual. The State very definitely claims the right to modify—or even annul—the rights of the individual at its own will, and with none of the constitutional guarantees customary in all other social systems. *De facto*, the relation of State and individual depends entirely on the policy of the Communist Party.

MILITARY MAP I



1. ☒ **ARMY** **CORPS**
 2. ☐ **1. DIVISION (REGULAR)**
 3. ☐ **1. DIVISION (TERRITORIAL)**
 4. ☐ **8 CAV. DIVISION (TERRITORIAL)**
 5. ☐ **1. BRIGADE (TERRITORIAL)**
 6. ☐ **7 CAV. BRIGADE (REGULAR)**
 7. **FRONTIER OF U.S.S.R.**
 8. **FRONTIER OF MILITARY DISTRICT**



ARMED FORCES

I

HISTORICAL SURVEY

The Nineteenth Century Army

RUSSIA'S great area, extended frontiers and poor communications obliged her to maintain a very numerous standing army—numbering, prior to the Japanese war, over 1,000,000 men. Proportionately, this corresponded to the German army's standard—1% of the population. In actual figures, however, it meant the maintenance of an army almost twice the size of the latter.

Military service was the compulsory and personal duty of every Russian male citizen who reached the age of 21. General conscription was introduced by the statute of 1874. It exempted from services some of the border populations (the nomads), all only sons, sole workers in a family and the physically unfit. These exemptions amounted to about 15% of the total.

The term of military service was much longer than in most European countries. Active service lasted five years in the Army and ten in the Navy. In practice only 270,000 men were conscripted yearly; and as the yearly quota of young men reaching the military age was about 1,000,000 a very considerable proportion was conditionally exempt from service; but they were liable to be called to the colours in case of war.

The Russian army was subdivided into field, reserve and fortress troops. The reserve troops were a standing nucleus of war-time formations, while the fortress troops constituted the regular garrisons of various fortified places. Owing to this division, the army was not homogeneous. The field troops—the elite of the army—constituted approximately 75% of the total, the fortress and reserve troops about 25%.

The greater proportion of the army (90%) was concentrated along the western and Turkish frontiers, the remaining 10% being distributed in Siberia and Turkestan.

The organization was very complicated. The field forces were formed into divisions (4 regiments, 16 battalions) and into separate rifle-brigades—(4 battalions). The reserve infantry was formed into brigades of reserve regiments or of special reserve battalions. The infantry stationed in Siberia and Turkestan was organized into rifle-brigades. The cavalry was organized into divisions—(one Cossack and 3 regular regi-

ments); or into Cossack divisions (4 regiments) and brigades (2 regiments).

The artillery did not form part of the divisions, but was merely attached to them in time of war. The technical troops were entirely autonomous.

The army corps were of most varied composition; and, unlike foreign armies—of which the army corps was, in time of peace, the highest unit—the whole of Russia was divided into Military Districts, in each of which several army corps were stationed.

The necessity of keeping the bulk of the army on the western frontiers made it impossible to adopt the territorial principle for recruiting, as practiced in other European armies.

Technically, the Russian army was inferior, towards the end of the nineteenth century, to its Western rivals. The infantry was armed with the excellent 1891 (7.6 mm.) magazine rifle but the technical equipment and organization of the artillery (unwieldy 8-gun batteries, with slow-firing guns of two different calibres) left much to be desired.

The slowness of Russian mobilization was much more important; this was occasioned by the greater part of the army being stationed on the western frontiers; to bring it up to war strength it was necessary to transport the drafts from the interior. Owing to the poor development of Russian transport, a general concentration of Russian forces was a matter not of days, but weeks.

Finally, one of the most serious defects of the Russian army was its weakness in officers and N.C.O.'s, and the lack of uniformity in their training.

The most marked shortage was that of long-term (re-engaged) N. C.O.'s. There was only 13,000 of these in the entire army, and only half this number were in the ranks, the remainder occupying clerical positions. The German army had six times as many.

Although in time of peace the staff of officers might seem adequate, it could not stand the test of war. The reason for this was, that until the end of the nineteenth century the reserve consisted exclusively of officers who had retired from active service. The source, naturally, was insufficient to complete the cadres on mobilization. It was only at the very end of the nineteenth century that measures were taken to train young reserve officers (ensigns), for war time service; but neither their number nor their qualifications were adequate.

The category of reserve officers was drawn from the so-called "volunteers"¹—persons, with an education of not less than four forms of the Secondary Schools to whom the Statute of 1874 had granted certain privileges (reduction in the time of service from two to three years, the right to choose their units etc.). The law did not compel them to undergo an examination for a reserve commission but granted them this right, as a premium for their education. As the number of these persons was

¹ A term which had survived from the old system, where it was given to those who joined the ranks of their own free will.

limited and their qualification insufficient, the measure did not give very successful results.

The lack of uniformity in the officers' corps was due to the fact that only half of the officers were educated in fully qualified Military Schools, the other half receiving their training at schools—the so-called "Cadet Schools,"¹ whose standard of military education was comparatively low. On account of this, only part of the officers could be considered fully-qualified as regards either their general education or their military instruction. In addition to this a large proportion of these fully-qualified officers served in the Guards, in the artillery and in the technical services. Comparatively few, therefore, were available for the bulk of the army—the infantry of the line and the cavalry.

The Navy

Russia's geographical position necessitated the division of her naval forces between four seas: the Baltic, Black and White Sea, and the Pacific Ocean. Of all these, only the Black Sea does not freeze in winter; and as Turkey possessed the Straits closing it, the Black Sea Fleet represented an independent naval force of purely local character. It was merely designed to be superior to any other fleet in the Black Sea.

After the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, Russia's attention was drawn towards the non-freezing ports of the Pacific; and, with this motive she leased Port Arthur (in the Yellow Sea) from China. From that time onwards, the bulk of the Russian naval force was gradually transferred from the Baltic to the Far East.

At the time of the Japanese War, the units of the Russian Navy were distributed as follows:

	<i>Pacific Ocean</i>	<i>Baltic Sea</i>	<i>Black Sea</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>A. New Ships</i> (less than 10 years old)				
Battleships	7	1(5)	2	10(5)
Battle Cruisers	4	4
Light Cruisers	8	6	2	16
<i>B. Old Ships</i>				
Battleships	4	7	11
Second Line Battleships	4	4
Battle Cruisers	1	1
Light Cruisers	7	7

Note. Figures in parentheses refer to ships under construction.

It will be seen that practically all the new units of the navy were grouped in the Pacific, while the Baltic Fleet served as a reserve. This scheme was not, however, completely carried out; some of the new

¹ Not to be confounded with Cadet Corps—preparatory military schools, of which there was a certain number.

ships remained in the Baltic—thereby weakening the Pacific Fleet. At the same time, no fighting force of any real value was available in the Baltic. The marked defects of this policy were exposed by the events of the Japanese War.

The Russian Fleet was gravely handicapped by the inadequate equipment of its shipbuilding yards. Only a certain number of warships could be built in Russia; the others being ordered from Great Britain, U. S. A., France and Germany. Her fleet comprised, therefore, ships of many different types; and Russian shipbuilding had not, by the beginning of the twentieth century, evolved a definite type of ship designed to meet Russian requirements.

The Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905)

The Japanese War found the Russian army completely unprepared. The small traffic capacity of the only railway connecting the Far East with the interior—the recently completed Siberian trunk line—and the absence from the Far East of more than nine-tenths of her total military forces, placed Russia, from the start, in an extremely difficult military position. In spite of the fact that the Russian army was eventually (July 1905) brought to the strength of the Japanese, the event of the war was already decided.

The War also exposed the backward technical condition of the army; in particular, the ineffectiveness of its methods of mobilization, its defective reserve of officers, the weakness of its equipment and, still more important, the absence of any experience in operating against a well-organized enemy.

The plan of mobilization had not graded the reservists according to age; in consequence, all reserve units were completed by men of the senior reserve classes, which greatly reduced their fighting value. The available reserve of officers proved not only too small but insufficiently trained. A new type of 3" quick-firing field gun, hurriedly introduced, had not been provided with any heavier type of projectile than shrapnel. The value of a number of modern technical appliances—such as machine-guns, telephones and heavy artillery—was not sufficiently appreciated; and the lack of these was considerably felt by the army during the War. The most important drawback, however, was that the old tactics proved incompatible with modern firearms. Despite the courage shown by the rank-and-file and the junior officers, the Russian forces were invariably beaten by the Japanese.

II

ARMY REFORMS AFTER 1905

ALL the faults of organization which came to light during the War were quickly noted by the War Office; and the subsequent ten years of peace were devoted to their eradication, as outlined below.

A year after the termination of the Japanese War the reserves were subdivided into two categories; the first (the seven junior classes) were

intended to complete the regular field-units, and the second (the senior seven classes, *i. e.* men over 31 years of age)—were intended to complete the reserve units, and to form various organizations in the rear of the fighting line.

To increase the available number of trained reservists, the period of service was lowered to 3 years.

A new law (1912 Statute) considerably improved the system of recruiting. Many of the exemptions were abrogated, a move which permitted a raising of the physical standards. Furthermore, it introduced for the "volunteers" the principle of compulsory training for reserve commissions.

The 1912 Statute reduced the number of persons entitled to family privileges: the sole bread winner of a family was alone exempt from military service, providing that, after a year's interval, he still remained the only support of his family.

The new law was far more drastic, also, in its attitude towards educational privileges. Hitherto, the whole medical and tutorial personnel of the Empire had been completely exempt from military service. A shortened, but compulsory term of military service was now enforced upon these. As regards those suitable for completing the staff of officers in time of war, the educational standard was raised—they now had to pass through six forms of a Secondary School, and their term of service on the active list was lengthened to two years. This term, however, was reduced to 18 months for all who passed the reserve officers' examinations. Those who succeeded in passing this during their first year, served the remaining 6 months as officers.

Finally, the curricula of all military schools were brought to the level of the former specifically-named "Military Schools."

The High Command was also reorganized. A General Staff Office was formed, whose chief was directly subordinated to the Emperor. Inspector-Generals for various branches of the army (infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineers) were introduced. Thus all purely strategical and tactical matters were excluded from the purview of the War Office; the duties of which now became chiefly administrative. Finally, an Imperial Defence Council was created to ensure the joint action of all Russia's forces, both on land and sea.

New army regulations, based on the experience gained in the Japanese War were promulgated; and the problem of increasing the army's fighting efficiency was strenuously attacked. A number of generals who had distinguished themselves in the Japanese War played leading parts in this work.

The centre of military learning—the *Staff Academy*—was working on a complete revision of the Russian principles of tactics and strategy, based on the lessons of the Japanese War. Field courses, like those of European Staff Colleges, were introduced in every branch of the service. A society for the propagation of military knowledge was formed to spread the latest military ideas throughout the army.

Soon after 1910, the system of mobilization was radically reorganized. The object of this reorganization was considerably to increase the strength of the army in the field, chiefly at the expense of the reserve and garrison forces; it also diminished the strength of the army on the western frontiers, transferring some of the corps to the interior. The process of mobilization was certainly accelerated by this but somewhat at the cost of lengthening the time required for concentration in the west in case of war.

The advantage gained by increasing the field army at the expense of the reserve garrison forces was problematical. What actually happened was, that instead of maintaining regular reserve forces in time of peace—in the form of reserve-brigades, each battalion of which could be in a short time enlarged to twice or four times its original size—skeleton reserve formations were incorporated in each regiment of the line, these formations becoming on mobilization, new regiments. While this method of increasing the field army at the cost of the already-existing reserves connoted a saving of expenses, its introduction was chiefly influenced by the somewhat unsuccessful operations of the reserve divisions during the Japanese War, and by a blind imitation of the German organization. But while perfectly workable under the territorial system in force in Germany, it proved to be quite unsuited to Russian conditions. The experience acquired in the Great War showed that the new reserve troops were not much better, as a general rule, than those who fought in the Japanese War.

The garrison troops were dealt with in a similar manner. Here, however, the policy was undoubtedly sound; the maintenance of 33 regiments of infantry as garrison troops was certainly unjustifiable; from the point of view of training it was absurd to immobilize large contingents in the routine of garrison duty. A considerable defect in this part of the reform, however, was the fact that the plan of mobilization still provided for manning the fortresses, at the outbreak of war, by field troops unfamiliar with garrison duty; in this way the reform, while abolishing permanent garrison troops, still weakened the field army, at the declaration of war, by several divisions.

The reform, however, increased the number of field divisions from 63 (1904) to 79 (1914). It did not affect the cavalry: in place of 26½ divisions in 1904, there were 27 in 1914.

The increase in the number of the divisions, however, did not go hand in hand with an improvement in technical equipment. Although each infantry regiment and each cavalry division received a machine gun section (8 machine guns) while the artillery was re-equipped with 3" quick-firing guns (supplied both with shrapnel and shell), Russia's heavy artillery still lagged considerably behind that of her probable enemies.

It is true that, besides the divisional artillery of 3" guns, army corps batteries of 4.8" field-howitzers were being gradually formed; their number, however, was only brought up to 2 batteries per corps—a figure greatly inferior to that of, for instance, the German army.

Apart from this, for economy's sake Russia still maintained 8-gun batteries—while the Germans had adopted 6-gun and the French even 4-gun batteries; so that even with an equal number of guns, the actual number of Russian fighting units (batteries) was lower. Further, in spite of the fact that, coincidentally with the increase in the number of divisions, the total of guns had also been increased (from 3,800 to 4,300), the artillery units attached to each division remained the same (six batteries—forty-eight 3" guns—per division). Considerable improvement was effected by including the divisional artillery with their infantry divisions. The artillery brigades (of six 3" batteries each) were now directly subordinated to the division commanders.

A principal defect in the Russian army's organization was its underestimation of the value of supply in modern warfare. The estimates for ammunition in general, and for artillery in particular, were based on experience gained in the Japanese War. In this, the average number of shots fired per gun had been only 720; therefore a stock of 1000 shells per gun was deemed sufficient. This figure was adopted by the General Ordnance Department in 1908, the latter considering the General Staff's estimate of 2000 exorbitant. A compromise was eventually arrived at in 1912, and the figure raised to 1500. By the beginning of the Great War, however, it had not been found possible to bring the stocks up to the required amount; even the original figure (1000) was not actually reached. These miscalculations were common to all European armies in pre-War years; but whereas highly industrialized countries could, in case of war, turn to intensive shell production, Russia depended entirely upon the output of a very limited number of State factories the capacity of which was unequal to supplying even the requirements calculated on the experience of the Japanese War.

The latter pre-War years were unfortunately marked by great fluctuations in the organization of the High Command. The Council of Imperial Defence was abolished, after two years' existence in 1907; thus putting an end to coordination between the Army and the Navy. The reform of the War Office was abandoned; the General Staff Office was placed, three years after its creation, under the control of the War Minister. In addition, during the 10 years preceding the Great War the heads of the General Staff were changed six times over; some of the officers selected being utterly unqualified for so responsible a post. These continual changes naturally affected strategical preparation unfavourably.

The Great Army Programme

In 1913, through the efforts of the General Staff a "Great Army" programme was budgeted with an extraordinary expenditure of Rbles. 433,000,000—spread over four years—in addition to the normal budget of Rbles. 475,000,000 a year.¹

¹ The Army budget constituted about 25% of the total budget.

It aimed at a 30% increase in the number of officers, and 40% in that of all ranks.¹ The largest share of the increase was allotted to the infantry (57%) and artillery (27%). The scheme provided both for increasing the strength of the existing units and for the formation of new ones. It also contemplated a radical reorganization of the artillery on German lines; i. e. the transformation of 8-gun batteries into 6-gun batteries, the inclusion of light howitzers in the divisional artillery and the attachment to each army corps of a section (3 batt.) of 6" heavy howitzers and 4.2" long-range guns. This would have brought the number of batteries in an army corps to 25 instead of 14 (Germany at the time had 28). The reorganization, while only increasing the actual number of guns by 20%, increased the number of batteries four-fold.

The programme also allowed for the formation of 26 new cavalry regiments, each of which was especially designed for inclusion in the army corps as "special cavalry." The rest of the cavalry was to be concentrated near the frontier, so that on the declaration of war it could be quickly brought into action against the enemy. Finally, Cossack reserve formations were to be instituted.

The infantry was to be reinforced by 5½ new divisions; and garrison brigades were to be reinstated in the fortresses of Kovno, Grodno, Brest-Litovsk, Novo-Georgievsk, Ossovetz and Nikolaevsk-on-the-Amur.

Aviation was to be developed sufficiently to provide a squadron for each army corps, cavalry corps and fortress; and the technical troops were to be provided with wireless and searchlight sections.

The increase in the strength of the army units was governed by the necessity for speeding up mobilization. For this purpose, in place of the original 96 men (of all ranks) per company in time of peace, the number was increased to 120 in 60% of the regiments, to 168 in 30%, and to 200 in regiments on the western border (10%).

To increase the corps of officers, six new Military Schools were to be established.

Finally, measures were projected for developing ammunition works and arsenals, and for the building of a State gun-factory.

This programme, however, was only beginning to come into operation when the World War broke out.

The Navy After Tsushima

Owing to the destruction of practically the whole Baltic and Pacific Fleets during the Japanese War, the navy was confronted with a set of entirely new problems.

The Black Sea Fleet continued its isolated and independent existence. As before, the aim of Russian naval policy in the Black Sea was chiefly to maintain a supremacy over Turkey. This problem seemed at first, owing to the very marked superiority of the Russian fleet, to present no great difficulties: it was only in the second decade of the twentieth

¹ 52,000 officers instead of 42,000 and 1,670,000 of all other ranks instead of 1,200,000.

century, when Turkey commenced buying modern ships from abroad, that a new shipbuilding programme for the Black Sea was put in hand.

The restoration of the main fleet was quite a different matter. After the Japanese War, the focus of Russia's naval activities shifted back from the Far East to the Baltic.

The Baltic Fleet's new task was to defend the Baltic Sea from the Germans. This task, however, owing to the rapid development of the German navy in the twentieth century, was itself by no means an easy one; and demanded entirely new principles of organization. At first, attention was directed to the creation of a mine-laying and a submarine fleet. It was only just before the Great War (1913) that a scheme for building a large battle-fleet was prepared, and a new shipbuilding programme put into operation. The yearly budget of the navy increased from Rbles 90,000,000 (in 1905) to Rbles 245,000,000 (in 1914); of which Rbles 96,000,000 were allotted to shipbuilding.

The Ministry of the Navy was completely reorganized. The Minister became, under the Tzar, the supreme authority; replacing the Admiral-General who, until then, had nominally united the command of the naval forces and the office of Minister. A Naval General Staff was created, and a Naval Staff College established to train the higher personnel of the fleet.

STATE OF THE RUSSIAN FLEET IN AUGUST, 1914

	<i>Baltic Fleet</i>	<i>Black Sea Fleet</i>	<i>Pacific Ocean</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>A. New Ships</i>				
Battleships	(4)	(4)	(8)
Battle Cruisers	(4)	(4)
Light Cruisers	(6) ¹	(4)	(10)
Destroyers	50 (9)	13 (13)	63 (22)
Submarines	12 (23)	4 (12)	16 (35)
<i>B. Old Ships</i>				
Battleships	4	8	12
Battle Cruisers	6	6
Light Cruisers	4	3	1	8
Destroyers	10	4	18	32

(Figures in parentheses refer to ships under construction.)

From this table it will be seen that, at the beginning of the Great War, the only modern ships which Russia possessed in the Baltic were destroyers and submarines; the same was the case in the Black Sea. In the Baltic, such a state of affairs almost precluded the possibility of any efficient defence of the littoral against the overwhelming force of the German fleet. The position in the Black Sea gave much less cause for anxiety as the Turkish fleet (even if Rumania and Bulgaria should join Turkey) was not a match for the Russian.

¹ Two of them in Germany.

III

THE GREAT WAR

THE Russian War-plan was based on the Franco-Russian military agreement providing for common action, on the assumption of an attack on France by the greater part of the German forces, the most formidable force in a possible Austro-German combination. The agreement provided for a simultaneous offensive by France (on the 10th day of mobilization) and Russia (immediately after the 15th day) against Germany. France was to place an army of a million and a half men in the field for this purpose, and Russia one of 800,000.

The obligation undertaken by Russia under this agreement was certainly beyond her capacity, as she had to meet the Germans and Austro-Hungarians simultaneously; and because owing to her transport difficulties, the troops from the interior would not possibly reach the theatre of war before the second month and those from Siberia and Turkestan still later.

In other words, Russia at the beginning of the War could only put two-thirds of her available forces into the field. It resulted in a division of the Russian army into two separate groups, neither of them strong enough to accomplish decisively the tasks allotted to them—to defeat Austria-Hungary, and to pin down such German forces as might appear on her western frontiers.

On mobilization, the Russian army increased to 115 infantry and 38 cavalry divisions with 7,900 guns (7,100 field guns, 540 field howitzers and 257 heavy guns); 32 infantry and 10½ cavalry divisions were designed to operate against Germany, and 46 infantry and 18½ cavalry divisions against Austria-Hungary; 19½ infantry and 5½ cavalry divisions were maintained for the defence of the Baltic and Black Sea littorals and 17 infantry and 3½ cavalry divisions were moving from Siberia and Turkestan.

Russia Takes the Offensive

Notwithstanding all the difficulties of mobilization and concentration, Russia succeeded in fulfilling her obligations to France, and took the offensive against Germany and Austria-Hungary simultaneously—her armies crossing the German frontier on the eighteenth day of the mobilization and the Austrian on the nineteenth.¹ This was recklessly premature; for only 27 infantry and 20 cavalry divisions of the forces designed to operate against Germany and Austria had by that time completed their concentration. Only on the 23rd day of mobilization was it possible for three-quarters of the assigned forces to take the field; the full complement (still short of a few reserve divisions) could not be ready before the 30th day. In other words, the Russian army took the field a fortnight before it was ready to strike. But the repeated and persistent

¹ August 17 and 18, 1914.

appeals of the French for a speedy offensive left the Russian armies no choice, in view of the fact that seven-eighths of the German forces had invaded France and were marching on Paris.

The invasion of the Russian armies into Germany at the end of August ended with their defeat in East Prussia; neither their number nor equipment could have warranted any other expectation. Their sacrifice, however, was not in vain. At the very height of their advance on Paris, the Germans were forced to detach two army corps from the encircling wing, and transfer them hurriedly to meet the Russians in East Prussia.

The offensive against Austria-Hungary was successful; and on September 11th, the Austro-Hungarian armies, having evacuated the whole of East Galicia, were forced to beat a general and disorderly retreat towards Cracow. The victory, however, was not decisive. Owing to the smallness of the forces directed against Austria it was only possible to defeat but not annihilate them; the Russian forces were not strong enough to follow up their victory by a still deeper advance into enemy country. After a month the Austrians, supported by the German army, were able to take the field again.

The position, however, could be considered favourable. Russia had still large reserves to draw upon; these consisted of 36½ infantry and 10 cavalry divisions which had taken no part in the first operations. At this moment, it was manifest that the defence of the Baltic coast did not warrant the retention of the forces originally intended for it. The Siberian and Turkestan troops began to arrive on the Front at the beginning of the second month. But the attitude of Turkey, after the German cruisers "Goeben" and "Breslau" had entered the Bosphorous, became openly hostile. Having come to an agreement with Germany on August 2 (*i. e.* the day after the commencement of hostilities), Turkey came out on the side of the Central Powers on October 30, when her fleet bombarded the Crimean ports. On November 2, Russia was compelled to declare war on Turkey.

Leaving only 7 infantry and 5 cavalry divisions on the Caucasian front against Turkey, and 2 infantry divisions as a garrison for Vladivostok, Russia during 1914 reenforced the armies originally employed against Germany and Austria-Hungary by 22½ infantry and 6 cavalry divisions.

The operations, conducted with fluctuating success in Poland and in Galicia during the autumn of 1914, led, eventually to a stabilization of the Front; along the line of the Mazurian lakes and the southern frontiers of East Prussia, through Western Poland and Galicia and thence along the Carpathians to the Rumanian frontier. The total length of the front was about 1200 kilometres.¹

There were 101 Russian divisions on this front against 88½ Austro-German. But the Russian superiority of some 10% in men was more than counterbalanced by the enemy's superiority in guns (72 field guns

¹ The French Front, at that time, was only about 500 klm.

as against 48, per division). Only in one branch—the cavalry—was the Russian Army undoubtedly superior to its enemies. Russia had 36 cavalry divisions against 16 Austro-German. The character of the warfare, however, prevented the cavalry from being a decisive factor in the general scheme of operations.

The 1915 Retreat and Its Cause

The subsequent course of the War, especially in 1915, was extremely unfavourable to Russia. In the summer of 1915 the enemy succeeded in driving the Russians out of Poland, Lithuania, the Baltic Provinces, Galicia and Western Volhynia, and in capturing all the permanent Russian fortifications. Their advance was only stopped on the line Riga-Dvinsk-Pinsk-Tarnopol-Chernovtzy. The extent of the Russian retreat from the positions occupied at the end of 1914 amounted, in places, to 350 kilometres.

The cause of the reverses suffered by the Russian army was not so much errors in the tactical sphere as the deficiency in technical equipment—particularly in artillery and ammunition. In 1915 the shortage of guns, rifles and ammunition reached a critical stage. The infantry, not always completely armed, had to use the bayonet to an extent incompatible with modern warfare. Industry was being mobilized but it could not meet the army's demands without a long delay.

A special Council of Defense, under the chairmanship of the Minister of War, was created in the middle of 1915, to control and speed-up the production of war material. It included representatives of industry, of the great public bodies, and of military, naval and other departments, and was invested with almost unlimited powers. Apart from this, special committees were soon formed to deal with transport, fuel and supplies.

The mobilization of industry, towards the end of 1916, increased supplies very considerably. The table below shows clearly what great results were obtained in this sphere, as compared with the conditions at the beginning of the War.

<i>Material</i>	<i>In hand on declara- tion of the War</i>	<i>Average monthly output of Russian factories in the first half of 1915</i>	<i>Average monthly production of Russian factories in 1916</i>	<i>Total delivered during the War</i>
Field Guns (3").....	7,112	73	600	13,000
Howitzers	791	26	100	2,540
Heavy guns (8") and over.....	20½	43
Trench mortars	900	16,700
Rifles	4,620,000	43,000	110,000	3,100,000
Machine guns	4,157	247	920	25,000
Hand grenades	92,000	740,000	15,000,000
3" shells	6,430,000	547,000	1,600,000	41,300,000
Heavy shells (8").....	870	25,000
4" and 6" shells	571,000	83,000	320,000	8,300,000
Small arms ammunition.....	4,135,000	66,000,000	123,000,000	3,923,000,000

Munitions from Abroad

Home industry being unable to adequately satisfy many of the needs of the army, the assistance of other countries had to be sought. Imports from abroad provided during the War 85% of the motor cars, 80% of shells for heavy guns (over 8") 75% of the aeroplanes, 72% of the heavy guns (over 6") 63% of the machine guns, 62% of explosives, 56% of hand-grenades, 48% of rifles, 38% of small arms ammunition, 30% of boots, 30% of the cloth and 25% of chemicals for the manufacture of gas.

In addition to manufactured goods, the Russian military industry required also large quantities of iron and steel; by the end of the War the quantity imported had reached about 100,000 tons per month—an amount indicating a shortage of 1,200,000 tons a year.

The position as regards other light metals was even less satisfactory; even before the War, two-thirds of the quantity required by Russia was imported from abroad. Out of 151,000 tons annually consumed, only 47,000 tons were obtained at home. In particular, tin, nickel and aluminium were not mined in Russia at all, and practically the entire quantity of lead required was imported (only 2% being produced at home). It was only in copper and zinc that Russia could roughly balance her requirements—to 85% and 75% respectively; 60% of Russian zinc however, was obtained from Western Poland, which was occupied by the Austro-German armies in the winter of 1914. With the War, Russia's consumption of non-ferrous metals was almost doubled (263,000 tons), and imports were required to meet the entire consumption of aluminium and tin, 98% of that of lead, over 70% of that of copper and 50% of that of zinc.

Russia also imported *all* the nitric acid required for the manufacture of explosives. It was found necessary during the War to organize the artificial production of this commodity by the electrical oxidation of ammonia. The quantity thus produced, however, did not cover the entire demand for nitric acid; and the process, moreover, was extremely expensive. Attempts were made to establish production from the nitrogen of the atmosphere—oxidizing this by means of cheap electric power, derived from waterfalls. The erection of such works was begun near a waterfall in the Province of Olonetz; but it demanded an extensive hydraulic plant, which was not then available. Thus the works were not ready to start production until the very end of the War.

The facilities for foreign import were limited. The only ports through which communication with the outer world could always be maintained were Arkhangelsk (on the White Sea, 1,900 klm. by rail from the Front) and Vladivostok (on the Pacific, about 10,000 klm. away). The other ports could not be used owing to the German blockade of the Baltic Sea and the Turkish hold upon the Bosphorous and Dardanelles. A third exit to the sea became available—but only in 1916—through the building of the Murmansk railway; which connected the ice-free port of Murmansk, on the Arctic Ocean, with the capital of the Empire.

The 1916 Offensive

By the spring of 1916 the Russian army, nevertheless, recovered from the reverses suffered in 1915. The number of Russian divisions on the Western front increased by almost $1\frac{1}{2}$ times in the 18 months following January 1st, 1915. By June 1916 there were 140 Russian infantry divisions (in addition to $12\frac{1}{2}$ infantry divisions on the Turkish front in Asia Minor) operating against 105 Austro-German infantry divisions—Russia's original superiority in cavalry divisions—which, it is true, played only a secondary part throughout the War—became even greater. There were 40 Russian cavalry divisions (in addition to 8 cavalry divisions on the Turkish front) operating against 22 Austro-German.

The mobilization of industry, and the persistent (though slow) increase of imports enabled the Russian army, in June 1916, to resume the offensive against the Austrians in Volhynia and Galicia.

The Russian army, in the summer of 1916, succeeded in advancing on a front of 40 klm. to a depth of 50–70 klm. capturing several hundred thousand prisoners and several hundred guns. But the arrival of important enemy reinforcements from the West, the defeat of the Rumanians, and the failure of Russia's Western allies to shake the German defences, brought the Russian advance to an end in September.

In particular, Rumania's untimely entry into the War—never encouraged by Russia—served only to complicate the position. The Rumanian defeat in Transylvania necessitated the transfer of some 30 Russian divisions to Moldavia, thereby extending the Russian front by over 200 klm. and rendering the question of supply still more complicated.

Supplies and equipment were the chief deficiencies of the Russian army throughout the War. In spite of mobilizing a total of 15,000,000 men Russia was unable to maintain an army proportionate to the number of her population. If one compares Germany's population of 70 millions with Russia's 180 millions, it would appear that the latter could have raised an army at least twice the size of Germany's. Yet Russia was never able to put *into the field* more than 155 infantry divisions; while Germany by the end of the War had 236. Beginning the War opposed to 60 Austro-German infantry divisions by 1917 the Russian army, together with the remains of the Rumanian, was operating against 120 Austro-German divisions to which some 35 Turkish and Bulgarian divisions must be added.

The Navy in the Great War

Notwithstanding the great superiority of the German navy (which, admittedly, was chiefly occupied in opposing the British) the Baltic Fleet fulfilled its duty of protecting the Baltic coast and the capital; and after 1915, when the right flank of the armies reached the coast in Riga Bay, it successfully protected this flank from attacks.

The Black Sea Fleet was placed in a very difficult position at the

very beginning of the War; two modern German ships (the battle cruiser "Goeben" and the light cruiser "Breslau") having reached Constantinople and joined the Turkish navy. These ships were much superior in speed and armaments to the middle-aged Russian vessels; and during the first two years of the War they were a source of considerable anxiety. It was only after the completion of two new battleships that the Russians were able to secure freedom of action in the Black Sea; an event of special significance, as it severed Turkey's oversea communications with her army in Asia Minor and threatened the latter's very existence—its system of overland communications being in a very bad state.

A considerable part of the 1913 shipbuilding programme was eventually accomplished during the War, and both the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets considerably strengthened.

STATE OF THE RUSSIAN FLEET DURING THE WORLD WAR

	<i>Baltic Fleet</i>		<i>Black Sea Fleet</i>		<i>Total at beginning of War (Aug. 1914)</i>	<i>Total at end of War (end of 1917)</i>
	<i>At beginning of War (Aug. 1914)</i>	<i>At end of War (end of 1917)</i>	<i>At beginning of War (Aug. 1914)</i>	<i>At end of War (end of 1917)</i>		
<i>A. New Ships</i>						
Battleships	(4)	4	(4)	2(1)	(8)	6(1)
Battle Cruisers	(4)	(4)	(4)	(4)
Light Cruisers	(6)	(4)	(4)	(4)	(10)	(8)
Destroyers	50(9)	67(9)	13(13)	23(10)	63(22)	90(25)
Submarines ¹	12(23)	38(12)	4(12)	15(5)	16(35)	53(17)
<i>B. Old Ships</i>						
Battleships.....	4	3	8	8	12	11
Battle Cruisers	6	5	6	5
Light Cruisers	4	4	3	3	7	7
Destroyers	10	10

(Figures in parentheses—ships under construction.)

Note. Some of the obsolete ships in the Pacific, and several old ships bought from Japan during the War, are not included.

The losses sustained by the Russian fleet, during the War were comparatively speaking negligible,² and its total effective strength became greatly increased.

The 1917 Revolution

The Revolution broke out in March 1917; and the course of the War

¹ Ten of the submarines were British (six forced their way through the *Danish Straits* in 1914, and four were delivered in a dismantled condition, via Arkhangelsk, in 1915).

² In the whole period of the War (1914–17) the Russian fleet's losses were as follows: in the Baltic—1 old battleship, 1 armoured cruiser, 9 destroyers, 7 submarines; in the Black Sea—1 battleship, 3 destroyers, 1 submarine. Besides this, one old light cruiser was lost in the Straits of Malacca.

in 1917 has no interest whatever from a military point of view. Under the influence of revolutionary propaganda, the army and navy (especially the latter), were rapidly demoralized; and in the course of a year Russia's fighting power was reduced to zero. The Bolshevik Revolution of October, 1917, and the subsequent peace concluded at Brest-Litovsk with Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria ended the World War for Russia—and with it the old Russian army.

IV

THE 1917 REVOLUTION

The Red Army

THE chaotic demobilization of the Russian armies after the Bolshevik Revolution temporarily suspended the very existence of any kind of armed force. The Civil War which broke out in 1918 saw the formation, on one side, of several White armies; and, on the other of the first *Red Guards* and subsequently (February 1918) the *Red Army*—officially named by decree of the Council of People's Commissars—the “Workers and Peasants Red Army” (abbreviated to “RKKA”). Originally, the Red Army was recruited only by volunteers, for whom a six months' term of service was established. On June 9, 1918 a decree of the Central Executive Committee introduced conscription of all able-bodied citizens for military service.

For the first year of its existence the Red Army, strictly speaking, had no definite organization: the first step towards this was taken on September 2, 1918, when the Revolutionary War Council was formed, with the People's Commissar of the Army and Navy (Trotzky) at its head. Later in the year (September 30) a special organ—the Council of Labour and Defence (STO)—was created with a view to cooperation between the fighting forces and the bodies providing them with supplies and munitions. Simultaneously the office of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic was also created; the Commander-in-Chief being, however, subordinate to the Revolutionary Council.

The abundance of the trained human material left over from the World War made the task of manning the army comparatively easy. The demobilized men were, however, very loath to rejoin the colours. The question of providing it with officers was much more complicated. Most officers of the old army were now in the White armies; while those unable to join them, with very few exceptions, used every means to avoid joining the Red. Thus, from the very beginning the Soviet Government had to adopt ruthless measures of compulsion. In spite of these, mobilization was only successful among the workers in those thickly populated industrial districts which, on the whole, sided with the new regime. Neither the peasants nor the former officers (particu-

larly the latter) joined up in satisfactory numbers. But gradually the measures of repression took effect, and enabled the Government to increase the Red Army considerably, from 800,000 in January, 1919, to 5,500,000 in October, 1920 at the end of the Civil War.

The number of commissioned and non-commissioned officers (of the old Russian Army) grew correspondingly. The total mobilized during the Civil War was 72,000 and 240,700 respectively. In addition some 40,000 Red officers were trained in the military schools.

Mass desertion characterized the Red army during the Civil War; it attained figures unprecedented in military history.

The number of registered desertions was 4,300,000; at the end of the Civil War, out of its total of 5½ millions there were only 581,000 men in the field.

When hostilities terminated, nobody could dignify this motley array with the title of a regular army. Moreover, its maintenance had become a tremendous burden on the country; and the situation demanded radical alteration.

Demobilization was carried out in 1921, the strength of the army being reduced to 1,500,000 and further to 562,000 in 1924.

The Navy After the Revolution

The navy was almost entirely destroyed in the course of the Civil War. The Bolshevik Revolution had been effected, in great part, by the sailors of the Baltic Fleet. The ratings deserted their ships at will, and generally neglected their duties: in consequence, the fighting power of the Fleet was reduced almost to zero. The officers were dispersed, and most of the sailors left the ships. In the summer of 1919, when General Yudenitch's army was advancing on St. Petersburg, two cruisers and several destroyers were sunk by the British destroyers, while several other ships were damaged. Others, too, suffered considerable injury by gunfire from the forts in 1921 (when rebellion broke out in Kronstadt). Owing to the stoppage of work in the shipyards, the ships that had not yet been completed were rapidly becoming scrap iron. The greater part of the ships was therefore sold by the Government to Germany for breaking-up; and there remained in the Baltic only three much-neglected battleships, 2 cruisers, some ten destroyers and a few submarines. The Baltic Fleet, after its great expansion during the World War, had again lost all military significance.

The Black Sea Fleet fared no better than the Baltic. The Bolshevik Revolution entirely decomposed its personnel; the ships were allowed to rot and go to ruin. Owing to mass murders of the officers, the personnel was reduced to helpless insignificance. At the end of April, 1918, the German troops penetrated into the Crimea and quickly started to advance towards Sebastopol, the naval base of the Black Sea Fleet. All of the more or less effective ships were then moved from Sebastopol to Novorossisk; where after an ultimatum from Germany, one battleship and 10 destroyers were sunk.

On April 1, 1919, when the Bolsheviks captured the Crimea, the British squadron which had operated in the Black Sea since 1918 was forced to withdraw. Before leaving, it damaged all the remaining battle-ships and sank 13 new submarines.

Owing to these events, the White Army which captured the Crimea from the Bolsheviks in 1919, rescued and reconditioned but a few units; at the end of the Civil War (1920) there remained, in French care, 1 battleship, 10 destroyers and a few submarines. These remnants of the Black Sea Fleet are now at Bizerta.

V

GENERAL ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE U.S.S.R.

DURING the period 1924-1929 the organization of the Red Army was subjected to a series of radical reforms, affecting its recruiting, organization, administration and equipment.

At the present time the armed forces of the U.S.S.R. are organized as follows:

The Revolutionary War Council is at the head of all armed forces in the U.S.S.R. Its chairman, the People's Commissar for the Army and Navy (Voroshilov), is also Commander-in-Chief.

Directly subordinated to this Council are:

1. The General Staff of the Land Forces.
2. The General Administration of Army Personnel and Military Schools.
3. The General Naval Department.
4. The General Department of Air Forces.
5. The General Department of Supply.
6. The General Sanitary and Veterinary Department.
7. The Political Administration of the Armed Forces (PURKKA).

Standing and Territorial Armies

The strength of the Red Army was fixed at 562,000 in 1924. This number does not represent the total available force and represents only the army's *standing effectives*. The number of men yearly attaining service age is about 1,200,000; allowing for some 300,000 physically unfit, there remain 900,000. Of these about 270,000 are drafted into the standing army, which leaves a reserve of over half a million men. In order to utilize this reserve, in addition to the standing army, a territorial army was established, training some 1,000,000 men yearly. Every able-bodied citizen, before joining the colours, goes through a special course of pre-service training (two months, distributed over two years); on finishing his active service every Red soldier is listed with the reserve.

The whole term of military service lasts 21 years, from 19 to 40. The

first two years are spent in pre-service training, the following five in active service, and the last 14 in the reserve.

The following table shows the order of service in the Red Army.

	<i>Pre-service training</i>	<i>Active Service</i>		<i>Reserve</i>	<i>Reserve</i>
		<i>Service with the colours</i>	<i>Long leave</i>	<i>1 class (ages 26-33)</i>	<i>2 class (ages 34-40)</i>
1. <i>Standing Army</i>					
a) Army	2 months	2 years	3 years	8 years	6 years
b) Navy	2 months	3-4 years	2-1 years	8 years	6 years
2. <i>Territorial Army</i>					
a) Infantry and artillery	2 months	8 months	4½ years	8 years	6 years
b) Aviation and special troops	2 months	9 months	4¾ years	8 years	6 years
c) Cavalry	2 months	11 months	4 1/12 years	8 years	6 years
	2 months	6 months	4½ years	8 years	6 years

Special training has been instituted for those who are not enlisted in either the standing or territorial armies. It consists of two months of pre-service training and of six months of service in special training camps, distributed over 5 years.

The 1925 Conscription Law

Conscription for the Red Army is regulated by the Statute of 1925, further supplemented by the law of 1928 and is not unlike the pre-Revolution laws governing this subject.

The main difference between the old and the new principles is their attitude to family exemptions. In the new, the interests of the army predominate over those of the population. The family exemptions, instead of conferring exemption from military service, merely substitute a term in the territorial army for one in the standing. Furthermore, exemptions do not depend only on the position the prospective recruit occupies in his family but also on the number of dependents supported by his labour. The law entirely abolished exemption for the only sons. Further, the age limit and earning capacity of persons whose sons could claim exemptions has been defined more stringently than under the old law.

The 1925 law also entirely abolishes the privileges, formerly accorded as a premium on education. Educated recruits are drafted into the army with a view to increase the staff, and particularly the reserve of officers. Accordingly, all persons with a secondary-school or university degree pass their military service in the ranks of the standing army, and are obliged to pass an examination for a reserve commission. The pre-service training for these persons is called the "high pre-service" training, and consists of theoretical instruction (not less than 180 hours), and of two months' field training. Their term of active service in the ranks lasts 9 months (one year, in the Air Force) after which they take their examinations. Those who are successful are appointed to territorial units for a period of 4 years—or, alternatively, to pre-service training centres for the same period.

With regard to physical fitness, the Red Army divides all recruits into five categories: 1. the absolutely fit, 2. those fit for wartime service only, 3. the conditionally fit for service in the rear, 4. the temporarily unfit (persons on the sick list or under-developed at the time of enlistment), and 5. the unfit. Only the first category is drafted into the ranks of the standing army. The first (surplus), second and third categories are drafted into the ranks of the territorial army.

The law does not recognize any exemption on the basis of nationality, but exempts all persons of bourgeois origins from service in the ranks; they must pay a special military tax and can be drafted for service in the rear in time of war.

Division of the Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R.

The territory of the U.S.S.R. is divided into eight Military Districts, and into two Separate Armies:

Moscow District, headquarters at Moscow.

Leningrad District, headquarters at Leningrad.

White Russian District, headquarters at Smolensk.

Ukrainian District, headquarters at Kharkov.

North Caucasian District, headquarters at Rostov-on-Don.

Volga District, headquarters at Samara.

Siberian District, headquarters at Novosibirsk.

Central Asian District, headquarters at Tashkent.

The Caucasian Army, headquarters at Tiflis.

The Far Eastern Army, headquarters at Khabarovsk.

The Red Army consists of 71 infantry (rifle) and 16½ cavalry divisions. Of these 29 infantry and 12½ cavalry divisions belong to the standing army, and 42 infantry and 4 cavalry divisions to the territorial. The infantry divisions are formed into 21 Rifle Corps and the cavalry into four Cavalry Corps. A few infantry divisions and nine of the cavalry brigades, do not enter into corps formation.

THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE RED ARMY IN MILITARY DISTRICTS

	<i>Regular Infant.</i>	<i>Divis. Caval.</i>	<i>Territ. Infant.</i>	<i>Divis. Caval.</i>	<i>—Total—</i> <i>Infant. Caval.</i>	
<i>1. Frontier Districts</i>						
Leningrad	2	1½	4	6	1½
White Russian	5	2	5	10	2
Ukrainian	5	4	12	17	4
Central Asian	3	2	3	2
Caucasian Army	6	½	1	7	½
Far Eastern Army	7	1	7	1
Total	28	11	22	50	11
<i>2. Interior Districts</i>						
Moscow	½	10	1	10	1½
North Caucasian	2	1	3	2	5	3
Volga	5	1	5	1
Siberian	2	2
Total	2	1½	20	4	22	5½
Grand Total	30	12½	42	4	72	16½

It will be seen from this table that two-thirds of the total infantry and cavalry divisions are concentrated near the frontiers and only one-third in the interior of the country; also, that almost the whole of the standing army (90%) is concentrated near the frontiers.

National Units

A special feature of the Red Army is its national formations: 10 Ukrainian, 3 White Russian and 4 Transcaucasian (2 Georgian, 1 Armenian and 1 Azerbaijan) infantry divisions. Apart from these, there are some other national troops in the Volga, North Caucasian and Central Asian Military Districts, and in the Far Eastern Army.

Whereas no great difficulty is experienced in forming White Russian and Ukrainian divisions (their languages being very similar to the Russian), the national formations of the Volga, Caucasian and Central Asian Military Districts present considerable difficulties. Here, all army regulations have to be translated into some times exceedingly limited languages, which necessitates the creation of separate staffs. Difficulties will undoubtedly arise, too, in mobilizing these national units in time of war. It is apparent, therefore, that nationalization for purely political reasons weakens the Red Army. It is only the fact that the majority of the national units belong to the Ukrainian and White Russian branches of the Russian race that makes the Red Army more or less homogeneous.

TACTICAL ORGANIZATION OF THE RED ARMY

Infantry

The organization of the Red infantry follows the old German model.¹ Platoons consist of 2 light MG and 3 rifle sections. There are 3 platoons in a company. A battalion consists of 3 rifle and 1 heavy MG company; a regiment, of three battalions. In the number of attached machine-guns, a regiment of the Red Army is on a par with a German regiment and inferior to a French, the figures being 90, 90 and 192 respectively.

The infantry is armed with the pre-war light rifle of 1891 (7.64 mm.), previously used in the cavalry only. The heavy machine-gun is of the old Maxim type. The light machine-guns are of different makes, but are being gradually replaced by a new type, of Soviet manufacture (the Degterev), very similar to the British Lewis gun.

Every infantry regiment possesses a troop of mounted scouts, light artillery of two 76.2 mm. gun batteries (regimental artillery) and three sections (one per battalion) of 37 mm. guns or bombers (battalion artillery).

¹ Previous to its reorganization in 1932.

Artillery

A characteristic peculiarity in the organization of the Red artillery is the introduction of three-gun batteries (instead of the usual 4-gun batteries of modern armies). The artillery is divided into divisional 76.2 mm. field guns and 122 mm. light howitzers) and corps artillery (152 mm. heavy howitzers, 107 mm. long-range guns and anti-aircraft guns).

The divisional artillery (10 batteries) is organized in regiments, each divided into 3 sections: the first two consist of one light-howitzer and two field gun batteries, and the third of two light-howitzer and two field gun batteries. The corps artillery is likewise organized into regiments of 3 sections each; the first consists of three batteries of heavy howitzers, the second of three batteries of long-range guns, the third of three anti-aircraft batteries. In addition to the divisional and corps artillery, there exists an Artillery Reserve; comprising, in time of peace, three divisions of four artillery regiments each, the first and second corresponding to the divisional and corps artillery regiments, while the third is composed of 12 two-gun batteries of the heaviest calibres (9"-14") and the fourth of 12 anti-aircraft batteries. All the batteries of the Artillery Reserve, with the exception of the field-gun batteries, are motor-driven.

Cavalry

The cavalry is organized into five squadron¹ regiments (four sword and one MG). A squadron consists of four troops, having two sword sections and one light MG section. MG squadrons are provided with 16 heavy machine-guns, mounted on light wheeled platforms from which they can be fired. In volume of fire the Red Cavalry is inferior to that of other armies, owing to their being supplied with fewer light machine-guns (only 16 per regiment). A peculiarity of the Soviet Cavalry is the armament of the first file with lances. The cavalry are of one type, the former subdivision into Cossack and regular units having been abolished.

Technical Troops

The Engineer corps is composed of independent Sapper battalions and special Sapper companies and Mounted Sapper squadrons, attached to the infantry and cavalry divisions; Pontoon battalions (each capable of erecting a bridge of 3.3 tons carrying-capacity, 205 metres long and 3 metres wide), Railway regiments (each having 2 construction and 2 exploitation battalions), Electrotechnical (Searchlight) battalions, and Camouflage and Hydro-technical companies. Finally, there are Automobile regiments and Special Automobile sections. Every Automobile

¹ Equivalent to a troop in the American cavalry.

regiment consists of 480 motor-lorries and 160 motor-cycles. An Automobile section has 20 motor-lorries.

Signal (Liaison) Troops are formed into regiments (consisting of 2-3 battalions); they are distributed to serve army corps, infantry and cavalry divisions. In addition, there are Radio regiments and battalions.

The Armoured Corps consists of: Armoured Trains and Armoured Car sections (each having 9 armoured cars and 12 motor-cycles), and Tank regiments. An Armoured Train section consists of light (76.2 mm. guns and machine-guns) and heavy (105 mm. guns and machine-guns) armoured trains. The Armoured Car sections consist of light armoured-cars (two machine-guns) and heavy (one 76.2 mm. gun and three machine-guns). The tanks are mostly of the old British ("Mark V," Whippet 1918) and French ("Renault") model.

The total strength of the Red Army is: 216 infantry regiments, 89 cavalry regiments, and 104 artillery regiments and 24 horse artillery sections (about 4500 guns¹), 21 Sapper battalions, 71 Sapper companies and 76 Sapper squadrons, 9 Pontoon battalions, 7 Railway regiments, 4 Automobile regiments, 12 Automobile sections, 2 Electrotechnical battalions, 9 Camouflage companies, 21 Hydro-technical companies and Chemical battalions, 12 Armoured Train sections (40 armoured trains), 15 Armoured Car sections (about 150 cars), 3 Tank regiments (about 250 tanks), 12 Signal regiments, 21 Signal battalions, 70 Signal companies and 20 Signal squadrons, 9 Radio regiments, and 10 Radio battalions.

Each rifle division consists of three rifle regiments (9 battalions), a ten-battery regiment of divisional artillery, a squadron of divisional cavalry, a Sapper company and a Signal company. It has 108 heavy and 162 light machine-guns. The guns total 48 (30 divisional and 18 regimental).

A cavalry division consists of six cavalry regiments (some of the divisions are gradually being transformed into four-regiment divisions) a section of horse artillery (2-4 batteries, a Sapper squadron and a Signal squadron). Some of the cavalry divisions have Armoured Car sections attached to them.

A rifle corps consists of either 2 or 3 rifle divisions, a regiment of corps artillery, a Sapper battalion and a Signal battalion.

A cavalry corps consists of 2 cavalry divisions, a horse-howitzer section, and a Signal squadron.

As regards trained reserves of man-power the Red Army surpasses all its contemporaries. The endeavour constantly to increase the trained reserves is typical of Soviet military ideas and is clearly expressed in all the Soviet decrees referring to the military preparations of the U.S.S.R. This is being energetically fostered, outside the armed forces, by an organization called the *Osoviakhim*² which, officially, had some 12,000,-

¹ About one-third are heavy batteries.

² Abbreviated from: Society for Promoting Defence, Aviation and Chemical Defence.

ooo members in 1932; it is scheduled to reach 22 millions *i. e.* to embrace, practically all the population that can usefully be enlisted with the colours. The task of the Osoviakhim is to notify the population of the latest military developments; to train the young in sport and rifle practice; and to give the whole population a general knowledge of military matters.

The state of the Red Army's technical equipment is, however, far from adequate to its numerical strength. Although the small-arms of the Red infantry are more or less equal to those of foreign armies, its artillery equipment lags most decidedly behind. The number of guns per division is only about half (in some cases not even this) of that adopted in the greater modern armies.

Technical deficiency is still more apparent in the rudimentary equipment of the Armoured Corps and especially in motor-transport.

The Air Force

Before the War, with the exception of a few squadrons, there was practically no Air Force in Russia. The urgent need of this during the War was satisfied (in part only) by foreign orders. Having no aeroplane or motor-works, Russia was entirely dependent on foreign production. When the Revolution and the Civil War cut off foreign supply, the meagre aviation bases left from the War were rapidly reduced to nothing.

In building up an Air Force, the Red Army had at first to depend entirely on foreign purchases (chiefly in Great Britain and Italy.) This method, however, did not give satisfactory results; it was costly, and it did not provide for any permanent supply in case of war. The Soviet Government, accordingly, gradually began the home production of aeroplanes and motors.

This was not an easy task, chiefly because there existed no skilled Russian labour at all in this branch of industry of the U.S.S.R. Nevertheless by 1930 the aeroplane industry of the U.S.S.R. could more or less provide for the requirements of the Red Air Force. Motor building, on the other hand, has progressed very slowly, and with numerous setbacks; the Air Force is still greatly dependent on imported (foreign) motors. It is therefore premature to say that it is an independent war weapon—this in spite of the fact that, in numbers, the Red Air Force occupies one of the first places among those of Europe.

The Force possesses at present some 2200 aeroplanes; organized into 20 Air brigades. In this way each army corps, and even some of the divisions, is provided with an Air squadron. Each squadron of 8 to 12 machines is divided into four flights. Three squadrons form an Air division, 6-7 divisions an Air brigade.

The strength of the Air Force, however, does not solely depend on the number of machines but also on the corresponding development of the bases in which respect the U.S.S.R. is still dependent on foreign supply. Therefore, in appraising the Red Air Force one should direct

one's attention less to its numerical strength than to the development of its aviation parks; and in this respect the progress effected in civil aviation plays an important part (See Transport).

The Naval Forces of the U.S.S.R.

After its disintegration during the Revolution the navy has fared badly. As far as gross tonnage goes, it occupies the sixth place among the navies of the world; but its fighting powers are negligible. Apart from ships which have no value except as scrap-iron, the Red navy consists at present of the following units: in the Baltic 2 battleships, 2 light cruisers, 10 destroyers, and 15-20 submarines; in the Black Sea 1 battleship (brought from the Baltic in 1929) 2 light cruisers (one brought from the Baltic in 1929) 1 old cruiser, 5 destroyers, 3 old destroyers and 7 submarines; in the Caspian Sea and the Pacific—several old destroyers.

VI

THE COMMAND AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF THE RED ARMY

UNLIKE all other armies, the Red Army has a very definite political organization; it is not a national army, in the strict sense of the word, but a "party army"—serving the interests of the ruling Communist Party.

From its head—the Chairman of the Revolutionary War Council and People's Commissar for the Army and Navy, who is always a member of the leading organs of the Communist Party—down to the smallest units, the Red Army is enveloped by a net of Communist Party organs. Furthermore, it is a "class-army," whose hierarchy is based solely and exclusively on the class principle. Although the majority of the population of the U.S.S.R. (about 80%) are peasants, the units of the standing army and the permanent personnel of the territorial divisions are recruited from the workers in a larger proportion than their numbers would warrant.

Army Regulations of 1925 (and 1928) lay down that the percentage of workmen in the various branches of the army shall be strictly regulated according to their political importance. Allowing in the infantry, artillery and cavalry only 10% of workmen, the Regulation establishes 15% for the permanent personnel in the territorial troops, 30% in the Signal troops, 40% in the Air Force and 50% in the Armoured and Railway troops; the general percentage of workmen in the Red Army has

been brought from 14% in 1925 to 38.7% in 1932. This principle is still more effectively carried out in so far as the commanding staff is concerned.

All this, however, holds good only in time of peace. After mobilization the proportion of peasants must naturally increase. It is therefore not strictly accurate to say that the Red Army is being proletarianized. But proletarianization is being carried out in its permanent cadres (commanders of all ranks, instructors, etc.).

Communists in the Standing Army

In addition to the continual increase in the number of workmen in the standing army, the number of communists has steadily grown—from 52,000 in 1924 to 310,000 in 1932 (9% and 55% respectively of the standing effectives). The last figure includes about 120,000 members of the Union of Communist Youth (Comsomol). The tendency towards Communization of the standing army is still more clearly expressed in the percentage of Communists among the commanding staff—which in 1932 reached 60% (for the middle and lower commanding staff) and 70% (for the higher commanding staff).

Of the students promoted from the Military Schools in April 1931, 68% were Communists.

The Commanding Staff

Political security thus achieved has a very serious drawback. The cultural standard of the commissioned ranks, and even of those Red commanders who correspond to the former non-commissioned officers, is extremely low—vastly inferior to that of the old Russian army.

The officers of the old army impressed into the Red Army were fully utilized by the Soviet Government during the Civil and Polish Wars; but that Government was not inclined to rely on their loyalty to the new regime after these Wars had ended.

Directly after the end of the Civil War the Government ordered a gradual demobilization of the officers of the old army and their replacement by tried Red commanders; a certain number of these were former N.C.O.'s of the old army, others—Communists who had made their mark during the Civil War, and others again graduates from the Soviet Military Schools.

During the transition period, when an important proportion of old officers still remained in the ranks of the Red troops, the Soviet Government instituted Military Commissars whose duty it was to control these officers in their executive functions—particularly from the political point of view.

There was no clear line of demarcation between the duties and rights of the commanders and commissars. The result was natural—and lamentable. The absurdity of this system from the military point of view was evident. The Communists were obliged, however, to maintain it so

long as the old officers remained in the ranks. It was only after the gradual replacement of these by pro-Party elements that a normal organization was introduced (1925). It was decided gradually to abolish the institution of Military Commissars, and to reestablish the commanders in the fullness of their former authority. The reform was carried out with every precaution against possible "counter-revolutionary" events. At first, the commanders received full power in military and administrative affairs only; the commissars retaining their political functions. Furthermore, the commanders who belonged to the Communist Party were given political functions as well.

With the gradual "proletarianization" of the commanding staff (at present, with a very few exceptions, there are no "non-proletarian" commanders) the institution of Military Commissars disappeared, and the system of dual authority was brought to an end.

The establishment of a normal order was, however, only attained at the expense of the standard of education obtaining in the ranks of the commanding staff. Out of the present 46,000 commanders of the Red Army, only 10% (4500) are trained former officers. Of the remaining only 25,000 have graduated from Soviet Military Schools, while 16,000 (more than one-third) have received no military education whatsoever. Owing to the class principle, the general educational level of the Red Army commanders is such that out of the promotions from the Military Schools (April 1931) only 5% had previously received a secondary education, and 40% were almost illiterate when entering the Schools. Of those who entered the Military Academy in 1929, 75% had received only elementary education; but 90% were Communists and 60% of "labour origin"!

The high standard of professional knowledge expected from a modern officer can only be acquired on the basis of a sound general education. The class policy of the Communists forces them to sacrifice education to origin. While, after three years' training, graduates from the Soviet Military Schools may perhaps be considered possible candidates for junior posts in the army, their general educational level makes it impossible for them to become really good commanders of higher grade.

The fundamental discrepancies between the army's interests and those of the ruling party in the U.S.S.R. are so great that these can never be reconciled. The Communists have striven to devise measures for improving the situation. These, however, do not strike at the root of the evil, and bear a character of compromise. First, a radical reform of all Military Schools in the Union was carried out in 1929. The Red Army has a large number of such schools from which about 4,000 young men graduate yearly. Until 1929 the course of these schools lasted 3 years for infantry and cavalry schools, and 4 years for all others. The course of training has now been lengthened by 6 months, and the hours devoted to general education have been doubled. 9½ months of the period of training are spent by all students in the ranks for practical training. On the whole, the programmes of the Military Schools are not inadequate,

and correspond to those of similar institutions in other armies. But the Communists still persist in selecting the future commanders according to their class origin—with the result that about 80% enter the Military Schools with only an elementary-school education.

Secondly, the Government has introduced compulsory one-year training courses for promotion from field to staff rank (commanders of battalions, artillery sections, etc.); and also, as qualifying for promotion to regiment commander, one-year courses for commanders holding staff rank. Similar staff-courses are available in other armies; but whereas these are usually designed to impart fresh knowledge, those of the Red Army are chiefly intended to supplement deficiencies in previous training.

Finally, the greatest encouragement is given to commanders who have graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff.¹ For those, a shorter period is necessary to qualify for promotion. Moreover, they are relieved from taking training courses necessary for other commanders. The intrinsic value of these new “academicians” (as they are called in the U.S.S.R.) is, however, doubtful; for the arbitrary plan of selecting the “reliable elements” is adhered to just as it is in the Military Schools.

Great difficulty is experienced by the Academy in providing the staff of instructors. Originally the Academy was staffed by officers from the general staff of the old army. Attempts to replace these by new lecturers have ended in complete failure; owing to the general low level of education no Red commander is really fit for the task. Their experience at the best goes no further than the Civil War, and their theoretical training is very poor.

Categories of Service

All titles of rank and even the words “officer,” “lieutenant,” “captain,” etc., have been abolished in the Red Army. They have been replaced by 13 “categories of service.” The first two correspond to non-commissioned ranks, the next four to the lowest commissioned ranks (platoon commander, assistant company commander, and company commander); then follow three categories corresponding to staff commissioned rank (battalion commander, second-in-command of a regiment and regiment commander) and the last four to general commissioned rank (brigade commander, division commander, corps commander and commander of Military District). The “category” is not attached to an actual command, and is retained by its holder even when not in command of a unit.

A characteristic peculiarity of the Red Army is the low retiring-age established for the higher personnel. It is fixed at 40 years for the

¹ Besides the Military Academy of the General Staff, there are five other Military Academies in the U.S.S.R.: Naval, Technical (Engineering, Artillery and Chemical), Aviation, Political and Medical. There are also special military departments at some of the higher civil schools: The Institute of Railway Engineers, Electrotechnical Institute, and the Institute of Technology and Survey.

junior categories, at 45 for staff rank and at 50 for general rank. The commanding staff of the Red Army, owing to its very heterogeneous composition, necessarily employs the system of promotion "by selection." The principle of promotion by seniority, existing in all other armies, is not recognized at all; and the only factor modifying promotion "by selection" is the establishment of a minimum term of service in each category. This, on the average, is from two to three years.

The Political Organization of the Red Army

As previously mentioned, there exists in the Red Army, side by side with the military hierarchy, a purely political one. Its chief organ is the so-called PURKKA¹). This, although subordinate to the People's Commissar for the Army and Navy, operates under the direct supervision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party—constituting, as it were, its military department. The chief of the PURKKA is always a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. A special department of the OGPU enters into the composition of the PURKKA; it operates independently, however, under direct supervision of the OGPU.

The PURKKA is responsible for the organization, control and direction of the political mechanism of the army and navy. It is also responsible for the political training of the population for war and the political morale of the armed forces; it controls all military publications, and takes a prominent part in all legislation pertaining to general policy in military matters.

Every Military District has a District Political Department (PUOKR); lower organs of the PURKKA are established in every army corps and division. All these have special sections of the OGPU attached to them.

Finally, besides this political hierarchy there exists what is called the *Party Organization in the Army*; consisting of Party cells in every company, squadron and battery, and Party collectives in every regiment. Members of these institutions are elected, and not appointed—as is the case with the PURKKA, which is in direct control of the system of Party cells. Election to membership of the cells, like other elections in U.S.S.R., is largely nominal. This is well illustrated by official Soviet data, according to which 56% of the members of the *regimental collectives*, and 57% of those of the *company-cells*, belong to the commanding staff.

¹ Abbreviated from: Political Department of the Workers and Peasants Red Army.

VII

SUPPLY

THE experience of the World War showed the insufficient development of Russian industry, which proved quite unable to satisfy the army's requirements. The Revolution disorganized the whole economic life of the country, and introduction of Communist methods complicated the question still further. For instance the question of further development of field aviation and motor-transport has become of vital importance. The fact that industry is unable to cope with these peace-time problems makes it extremely doubtful whether it would be able to bear the brunt of war conditions. Since the War, many new requirements have arisen brought about by the further development of military technique. Taking this into consideration it is perfectly warrantable to question the fighting powers of the Red Army, and even its ability to conduct a serious campaign.

These technical defects have not escaped the attention of the Communist Party; the army's needs permeate every section of the Five Years Plan, and have especially determined the later additions to its programme.

From a purely military point of view the organization of supplies, and the geographical positions of the industrial bases, are of special importance.

Of the total sum of Rbles 86,000,000,000, estimated as required for the completion of the first Five Years Plan, about 50% are allotted to the establishment of the industrial base, and the reorganization of production. It is in this sum that the expenditure directly connected with armaments is concealed. For it must be remembered that while, prior to the last War, only purely military budgets and programmes were taken in account in assessing the armed strength of nations, the events of that War proved that military power must depend as much upon the reserves in man-power as upon the proper organization of a military industrial base. This view is openly shared by the Communists.

Voroshilov, the People's Commissar for the Army and Navy, made the following frank statement at the XV (1929) Congress of the Communist Party: "... the most rapid tempos of development should be adopted in connection with those branches of basic industry which can increase the economic power and the defence of the U.S.S.R. in the shortest time possible, in view of a possible blockade." At the XVI (1930) Congress, Voroshilov re-stated the same view still more emphatically: "... the maximum of attention should be paid, in the Five Years Plan, to those branches of national economy and industry which will ensure the defence and economic stability of this country *in time*

of war." These two quotations from official Soviet data clearly stress the military significance of the Five Years Plan; the problem resolving itself into the rapid organization of the military industrial bases—which would assure supplies in case of war, even if this were accompanied by a blockade. In this the Soviet Government is merely following modern principles. No longer are the war departments anxious to secure greater budgets, or to hoard equipment; they turn to industry for their needs, and they insist on making it capable, on mobilization, of turning all its activity to supplying the needs of the armed forces.

The Five Years Plan provides for the establishment of the complete independence of Soviet industry from foreign supplies in ferrous and non-ferrous metals¹, so essential for the armed forces. The failure to live up to estimates in this respect is particularly referred to by the military authorities of the U.S.S.R. as a real danger to the defence of the country.

Every effort is made to keep pace with modern developments in military technique, and equipment is being continually improved. In spite of financial difficulties money has been lavishly spent on organizing industry for military purposes. Civil industrialization has been, from the very beginning, subordinated to the idea of immediate transformation of production for military purposes.

No less interesting, from the point of view of military preparedness, is the location of the new industrial centres. The last war gave some indication of the danger of attack from the air to which industrial centres, working for the army, were exposed. But it is only since aviation became a weapon of destruction and one of ever-increasing powers, that great attention has begun to be paid to the geographical position of the industrial base. The distance to which aircraft can penetrate behind the lines is continually growing. At a conservative estimate, based on the average of records made in peace-time, this depth of penetration is certainly not less than 500 klm. Any region within that distance from the front is at present in danger of air attack, while there is every likelihood that the width of this danger-zone will be doubled within the next ten years.

It is the European frontier (from the Baltic to the Black Sea) which would, in case of war, become that of greatest importance to the U.S.S.R. Here the "vulnerable zone" (500 klm.) is bounded, in the east, by an imaginary line drawn through Vologda, Tver, Poltava, Ekaterinoslav and Berdiansk (on the Azov Sea). Next comes the "conditionally safe" zone; an imaginary line drawn through Nizhni-Novgorod, Tambov and Stalingrad marks its eastern limit. The Volga, the Caucasus, the Urals, Central Asia and Siberia can, at present, be regarded as completely outside the reach of enemy aircraft.

The industrial district of Moscow, Kharkov, and the Don basin are all located in the conditionally safe zone; but such industrial districts as Leningrad, Kiev, Odessa and Krivoy Rog in the vulnerable zone.

¹ See Industry.

During the World War, 28.9% of the workers employed in military industries were located in the vulnerable zone, 48.3% in the conditionally safe and 22.8% in the safe.

The Five Years Plan has not overlooked this factor and has diverted the new industrial centres (basic industry) to the absolutely safe zone. Of the seven combines projected for the production of iron and steel, four are situated in this zone—in the Urals—Magnitogorsk, Nizhni Tagilsk and Bakal works; Kuznetzk in West Siberia). On completion, these four works should produce over 6 million tons of pig-iron, or one-and-a-half times the whole pre-War production of Russia.

The Don basin, located at 650 klm. from the nearest frontier (in the conditionally safe zone) and producing three-quarters of the total coal output of the U.S.S.R. is being supplemented by an intensive development of the coal-mining district of Kuznetzk, in Western Siberia and Karaganda, in Central Asia (Kazakstan). The main base of the production of non-ferrous metals is being transferred to Kazakstan. Thus the whole metallurgical base is being definitely transferred beyond the Volga into the absolutely safe zone.

The geographical distribution of various branches of military industry proper is also characteristic. Here the Five Years Plan definitely follows the dictates of military requirements.

A chemical industry able, on mobilization, to turn exclusively to production suitable for military needs, is being created in the absolutely and conditionally safe zones: chemical combines for the production of nitrates are being built at Berezniki¹ (Urals) in Central Russia (Bobriki) and the Don basin; a great combine for aniline, coke and benzol manufactures is being established in the Urals and Kuznetzk regions.

The creation of a chemical base (nitrate base) is a great advance on pre-War conditions. It will make the U.S.S.R. absolutely independent of foreign manufacturers of explosives; the absence of such a base during the World War was one of the reasons of the Russian reverses.

Motor construction, which formerly did not exist in Russia, is being established in the absolutely safe zone: motor-cars in Nizhni-Novgorod (Fords), Moscow ("AMO") and Jaroslavl; tractors in the Urals, at Stalingrad and one factory in Kharkov. This latter seems to be a concession to the Ukraine, which has been somewhat frustrated of its expectations in the general scheme of industrialization. Kharkov, however, situated at 600 klm. from the nearest frontier, is in the conditionally safe zone.

Lastly, the Rubber Combine (Jaroslavl) including a newly opened factory for the production of synthetic rubber and Motor Plug Works at Penza will assure the provision of motor transport with home made tyres and plugs.

The cooperation and participation of German specialists in the de-

¹ Sulphuric and Nitric Acids.

velopment of military industry in the U.S.S.R. has permitted the Soviet Government to make steady progress in this sphere. On the completion of the first Five Years Plan, the Red Army will be in a far better position, from the point of view of supply, than the Russian army of any preceding epoch.

FOREIGN POLICY

I

POLITICAL FACTORS OF FOREIGN POLICY ON THE EVE OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

WHEN studying the foreign relations of the Russian State throughout the centuries one cannot but help noticing that there was no definite policy pursued and that continuity was not one of its main features. This was particularly noticeable in the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth, and was due partly to the personal inclinations of the reigning monarch, a factor which cannot be excluded from consideration in an absolute monarchy. Thus, to take only a few examples, Nicholas I was a legitimist and pro-German, Alexander II pursued a liberal and a Slavophil policy, Alexander III, being pro-German and anything but liberal yet initiated the Franco-Russian alliance and Nicholas II, continuing in the main, his father's policy, sought to find a basis for European peace in a general agreement for peaceful arbitration of international conflicts. The temperament of the rulers of Russia was an important factor too; thus Alexander III was "his own Foreign Minister" and his policy was consistent and determined; whereas Nicholas II was much easier influenced by his advisers and foreign policy during his reign pursued a somewhat varied course.

It would be absurd to regard the Tzars of modern times as pure despots; yet the element of "His Majesty's pleasure" can not be discounted, and must be borne in mind when surveying Russia's international career.

In addition to this personal element there existed certain traditions which affected Russia's international relations. These traditions, which may be looked upon as a substitute for a formal doctrine (such as Pan-Germanism or the doctrine of Monroe), can be summed up briefly as follows: The *status quo* in the Balkans, supported by a strong Western Alliance; Slavophilism and Orthodoxy; a free hand in Central Asia; the tradition of Yermak and Muraviev-Amursky in the Far East; and the maintenance of European peace through a policy of "balance of power" and international cooperation.

The Balkans

Russia's attitude towards the Balkans and the Near Eastern problem in general was determined by her age-long struggle with Turkey

for the littoral of the Black Sea. Final success was not attained until the reign of Catherine the Great, and Russia's access to the Black Sea then imposed on her the necessity of protecting her seaboard and securing the passage through the Straits.

The question of the Straits, as well as those of Russo-Slav and Russo-Greek relations, and, much later (mainly from the second half of the nineteenth century) the fate of the Armenians, were the chief factors influencing Russian policy with regard to Turkey. These three problems were so closely interwoven that it would be impossible to separate them. The question of the Straits was the more important. When Great Britain's, Germany's and Austria's intervention, at the close of the Russo-Turkish War, thwarted Russia's truly liberal plans for the pacification of the Balkans and Asia Minor (Armenia) the Russian Government became particularly insistent on the clauses of the Berlin Treaty of 1878 which closed the Black Sea to foreign navies, the littoral States excepted. Most of Russia's subsequent agreements were made with this in view, and in consequence she regarded intervention into Turkish internal affairs with a great deal of apprehension. The *status quo* could be best maintained by a direct understanding with Turkey and Austria, the other Power most interested in Balkanic affairs.

An understanding with Turkey, however, was not an easy matter. Sultan Abdul Hamid astutely played the international jealousies, one against another, thus maintaining the "balance of power" as far as he was concerned. In the nineties he could with impunity organize Armenian massacres, knowing that the Powers would not see eye to eye on the question of intervention. Russia, while strongly protesting at Constantinople, would not tolerate British direct action. Great Britain, in turn, would not permit Russia to act on her own; Germany secretly supported both against each other, and forwarded the interests of her ally Austria-Hungary. Meanwhile the Armenians were, once more, left to their fate.

It may be noted here that the Greco-Turkish war, which broke out in 1896, owing to a massacre of Christians in Crete, ended in the defeat of Greece. Her complete annihilation by Turkey was only prevented by the intervention of Emperor Nicholas II (May 17, 1897). Russia took an active part in the organization of the new regime in Crete; yet in pursuance of her Balkanic policy she supported the principle that the suzerainty of the Sultan over the island should be maintained.

Russia's agreements with Austria between 1878 and 1902 had the maintenance of the *status quo* as their chief aim. These agreements were, however, deemed insufficient, and Russia endeavoured to consolidate her stand in the Balkanic question by an alliance with some "disinterested" Western Power. This, traditionally, had been Germany. The Russian-German alliance, a remnant of the Holy Alliance of 1815, subsisted till 1890, when a change in German policy determined its

termination. At that time Germany was definitely adopting a course of Pan-Germanism and her stand by Austria excluded a thorough understanding with Russia. The latter saw herself forced to look for support elsewhere, and, after the refusal of the German Chancellor Caprivi to renew the Treaty of Alliance in 1890, she turned to France.

The Franco-Russian Alliance

The Franco-Russian Alliance may be considered as a symbol of the European system of the "balance of power." From a purely Russian standpoint, it was merely an alternative to an alliance with Germany, and was a natural consequence of the community of interests shared by France and Russia, both isolated in Europe by the Triple Alliance, supported at the time by Great Britain. In 1890 Giers, then Russian Foreign Minister, suggested taking steps towards a rapprochement; in reply to this Ribot, the French Premier, while welcoming an understanding, considered it premature to formulate a treaty dealing with definite problems, and suggested bringing the question down to its "simplest expression." This was effected by an exchange of notes on August 27th, 1891. These notes embodied two points only: 1) that mutual efforts should be made for the preservation of European peace, by reaching an agreement on all questions which might menace it; 2) that in the event of a threatened breach of the general peace and of an attack being made or contemplated upon either country, they would come to an agreement "on the measures which must be taken promptly and simultaneously as dictated by the case."

The next step was the signing (August 17, 1892) of a draft agreement between the Military Commands of the two countries. According to this, military cooperation would ensue in the event of an attack on Russia by Germany, or by Austria supported by Germany; or in the event of an attack on France by Germany, or by Italy supported by Germany. This agreement was ratified at the end of 1893. As regards the correlation of the notes of 1891 and the Military Agreement, it may be noted that only in 1899, when Delcassé visited St. Petersburg, was it settled that the Military Agreement should remain in force so long as the diplomatic agreement held good.

Slavophilism

The origins of Slavophilism were determined by the historical, cultural and religious connections between Russia and the Balkan peoples.

From the emotional point of view, Russia's Slavophilism was in essence a feeling of fraternal sympathy towards the Southern Slavs, who were of the same religion and race, but under foreign rule. This definition of Slavophilism does not mean that attention should be excluded from that side of it which strives for unification, *i. e.* for the extension of Russian domination over other Slav nations.

A considerable part of public opinion, particularly in the seventies and eighties, took this line. Many prominent writers of the Slavophil

camp urged a Slav federation under Russian official jurisdiction. They urged the occupation of Constantinople, the cradle of the Orthodox faith; and they were bitterly disappointed at Russia's failure, during the Congress of Berlin (1878), to secure greater authority over the Balkan Slavs. But this body of opinion, although admittedly eloquent, never commanded enough public confidence to enable it to dominate the Government of the day.

Slavophilism became a very definite principle of Russian foreign policy in the nineteenth century, particularly its latter half. It never acquired a Pan Slav character, Russia's commitments towards Germany and Austria excluded such a policy from the practical field. It translated itself into a sustained Russian effort to liberate the Southern Slavs from the Turkish yoke, and to establish their independence under Russian guidance and moral protection. Thus it may be said that the Russian Slav policy persistently avoided the pitfalls of "Imperialism."

The Middle East

The conquest of the Russian Middle East was State-directed from the very beginning. Starting from a fortified defense line in the Bashkir lands (S. W. Ural) in the seventeenth century, Russian military advance (followed by colonization) in the Central Asiatic steppes reached, towards the close of the nineteenth century, the Pamirs and the Hindu Kush. This conquest was chiefly determined by the continual raids of its nomadic tribes into Russian territory, and the absence of any authority there which could put a stop to these depredations.

In the direction of Chinese Turkestan, Russia acting as the champion of local interests and a mediator in the conflicts between the aboriginal Mussulman population and Chinese officialdom, annexed some nominally Chinese territories. Among these the valley of the Ili river and the town of Kuldja were occupied in 1867, but restored to China in 1881 by the Treaty of St. Petersburg. This event marks the cessation of the Russian progress eastward in this region.

In the south "the Russian advance *towards* India" gave rise to grave anxiety in Great Britain. The Kushka incident (1885—an Afghan raid into Russian territory followed by a Russian punitive expedition into Afghanistan) almost brought about an Anglo-Russian war: but, at the last moment, both governments adopted a conciliatory attitude, and agreed to a peaceful delimitation of the frontiers between Russia, Afghanistan and Persia (1887). Again in the nineties the advance of the Russian frontier posts to the Pamirs, consequent upon renewed Afghan raids, gave cause for anxiety on the part of Great Britain; but serious complications were successfully avoided (agreement of April 15, 1895).

Persia

The Anglo-Russian diplomatic clashes on the Afghan border considerably widened the "friction zone" between the two countries. It

may be noted that ever since the close of the eighteenth century the British Government had regarded with anxiety the Russian advance towards the Persian frontier.

This advance was slow, but steady. Its course in the direction of Central Asia has already been noted. Its method of progress through the Caucasus was similar. Georgia having sought Russian suzerainty (1805), Russia came into contact, in Transcaucasia, with numerous small Mussulman States, nominally dependent on Persia. Step by step, in consequence of the internal discords in Persia and the difficulty of maintaining normal relations with unruly neighbours perpetually engaged in war, Russia, wishing to stabilize her frontiers, occupied Derbent, the lower reaches of the Kura, Talym and the Khanates of Karabakh, Chanzhim, Isekin, Shirvan, Erivan and Nakhichevan.

After Russia's absorption of Bokhara and Khiva, the Russo-Persian frontier extended over 2,000 kilometres. Relations between the two countries were facilitated by the Transcaspiian Railway running from Krasnovodsk to Samarkand, and the Caucasian railway system. On the Caspian the age-long piracy of the Turkomans, as well as their land raids on Persia were held in check by Russia. All these circumstances much facilitated the spread of Russian influence, especially in North Persia, where Russia acquired a number of concessions:—the construction of high roads from Enzeli to Teheran with branches through Kasvin to Hamadan; transport and banking contracts, etc. The only regular Persian troops, the so-called Persian Cossack Brigade, were commanded by Russian officers and N. C. O.'s.

The British Government, on the other hand, was also granted a number of concessions, amongst which that to Reuter in 1891, was the most important; it included not only a commercial bank, but also a quasi-monopoly of the exploitation of the mineral wealth of the country. Like Russia on the Caspian Sea, Great Britain kept order in the Persian Gulf and her influence was paramount in southern Persia; where, at the beginning of this century, its Anglo-Persian Oil Company was founded. Enough has been said to indicate the struggle between the two Governments for preponderance in Persia.

The Tradition of Yermak and Muraviev in the Far East

The diplomatic relations of Russia with China date from the beginning of the conquest of Siberia by Yermak in 1582. The first official embassy to China under the auspices of the Mongolian Prince Altan was despatched in 1618.

Towards the end of the seventeenth century, Russia made an attempt to penetrate beyond the natural boundary, formed by the Yablonov Ridge and the Stanovoi mountains, into the Amur Basin. To this move, however, China opposed a successful armed resistance (Treaty of Nerchinsk 1689). A century and a half later Count Muraviev-Amursky, as a result of his expedition in 1854 along the Amur, from Sretinsk to the estuary, succeeded in establishing a foothold in this region. His

annexation of the left bank of the Amur and the Ussuri Province was confirmed by the treaties of Aigun and Tientsin (1858) and of Peking (1860).

The Great Siberian Railway

Russian colonization of Siberia progressed rapidly, and an improvement of the communications in this immense region became one of the main requisites for its development. Muraviev-Amursky was the first to insist on the necessity of a railway—or, at least, a good high road from the Urals to the Amur—in order to consolidate Russian authority. The plan of connecting Russia with the Far East by a railway was ultimately put into execution by Alexander III, who found in S. Witte¹ an enthusiastic supporter of the scheme which promised great advantages to Russia. The great Siberian line, however, was not merely a matter of domestic interest, but of world-wide significance. Its completion brought about a complete revolution in communications. The mails from Europe to the Far East, instead of spending four or five weeks on a roundabout sea-route, now arrived in a fortnight. Not only were trading relations facilitated but also the quicker interchange of ideas between West and East. Although the building of the railway may have led, indirectly, to the disastrous war with Japan, this untoward event should not be allowed to obscure its positive and ever-increasing influence in promoting a better understanding and amity between the Far East, Russia and the West. Its construction forged the first real link between them and undoubtedly played a great part in the development and awakening of Asia, called upon of recent years to advance again into the limelight of history. In this fact resides its real historical significance.

The Eastern Chinese Railway

As already mentioned, a by-product of the building of the Siberian railway was the war between Russia and Japan; a war caused by the penetration of both States into China in furtherance of their political and economic interests.

Although at the outset, the plans of the Siberian Railway did not contemplate its running through Chinese territory, its promoters soon realized the expediency of altering its direction to pass through Manchuria, thus shortening the distance to Vladivostok. This move brought Russia into contact with Japan.

After the Revolution of 1868, Japan, which had entered on the path of reform, adopted an aggressive policy in Korea which led her (1894) into war with China. The principal condition of peace (which was signed through American mediation in April, 1895) was that China should recognize the independence of Korea and make several other territorial concessions. Russia, supported by France and Germany, entered a strong protest against the territorial acquisition effected by

¹ Minister of Finance, and later (1905) Prime Minister.

Japan at the expense of China. Japan had to submit; and on May 5, 1895, having accepted the "good advice" given her, she announced her surrender of the Liaotung Peninsula, Port Arthur and South Manchuria to China, retaining only Formosa in her possession.

The diplomatic termination of the Sino-Japanese War did not arrest the march of events in the Far East, where international relations were constantly tending to become more critical. As early as 1896, Wilhelm II, when visiting Russia, had warned the Tzar that he intended to send a squadron to occupy Kiao-Chau and establish a coaling station there. He advised him, at the same time, to occupy Port Arthur. In November, 1897, two German missionaries were murdered in Shantung, which gave Germany the opportunity to carry out her intentions.

Much against Witte's advice it was decided to demand of China the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula with Port Arthur; accordingly, in March, 1898, a treaty, defining the terms of the lease, was signed in Peking. This treaty caused widespread resentment among the Chinese, who considered it a breach of former agreements and a menace to China's sovereignty. Japan—who, under Russian pressure, had been compelled in 1895 to renounce her conquests in order to maintain the unity of China—considered the treaty a breach of the *status quo*.

The subsequent policy pursued by the Powers in China helped to bring about the Boxer Rebellion—directed impartially against all foreigners. Relations between Russia and Japan grew steadily worse, the Russian foothold in Manchuria—which also met with opposition from the other Powers, especially the United States—providing a source of chronic irritation. The stage for an armed conflict was thus set.

The Hague Conference

In order to fully illustrate the traditions of Russian foreign policy in the pre-Revolutionary period, it is necessary also to mention that the first Peace Conference at The Hague was convened on the initiative of Russia, as a proof of the interest shown by Russian official and legal opinion in the development of international cooperation.

It is evident that the value of this step, which will be connected by posterity with the name of Emperor Nicholas II, lies not only in its positive results but even more in its abstract significance.

Russia in 1898 was enjoying the blessings of peace within all her frontiers and was working energetically to improve her national economy. It was then that, on the Tzar's initiative, an international conference was summoned on August 24th, 1898, to examine "the most efficacious means of guaranteeing to all nations the blessings of actual and permanent peace, and primarily to put an end to the development of modern armaments."

The attitude adopted by Germany, who declared definitely against any limitation of armaments (in spite of the fact that the question was put to the Conference as relating not to the present situation, but

to future reductions) nullified Russia's efforts. It was only possible, therefore, to extend the Geneva regulations to casualties in naval warfare, to draw up military legislation on the lines of the Brussels conference of 1874, and to evolve a convention providing for the peaceful solution of international conflicts by arbitration. The Powers, were invited to have recourse to arbitration "in questions which did not effect either their vital interests or their national honour." It was agreed that such resorts should be made to a "Tribunal of Arbitration" sitting at The Hague.

The defeat of the Russian plans in their main features by Germany's opposition, reduced the significance of the Conference; but there is no doubt that an important step was taken towards establishing *the rights of peace*.

General Political Situation in Europe

On the Threshold of the Twentieth Century

A few general remarks, with regard to foreign policy (as a whole) and the political atmosphere of Europe at the time, may be added to this survey of the conditions prevailing in Russian policy at the beginning of the twentieth century.

The principal feature of this epoch was, of course, the system of the "balance of power" which replaced the "concert of Europe," established by the Holy Alliance.

After the Franco-Prussian war this concert *de facto* terminated; it only survived in relation to extra-European matters, *e. g.* the delimitation of spheres of influence in Africa and China, in the Far-Eastern question, in that of Morocco, etc. The first Peace Conference, like the second (1906), did little to help Europe. Instead of concerted action and general harmony in European matters, an attempt was made to maintain the "balance of power" by means of separate groupings of the Great Powers; a method which led, on the eve of the War, to the formation of two principal combinations—the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance.

This general picture of the diplomatic structure of Europe must be completed by an analysis of the character of the treaties then subsisting and their relation to the life of the various nations. It will then be seen that the European balance of power was by no means stable, and that, in fact, the elements of eventual disruption were interwoven into its fabric. Such were the various national movements and such burning questions as those of Alsace and Lorraine, Italian Irredentism and Slav nationalism in Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, and Poland.

There were other inherent contradictions in the system. While established to preserve peace, it had no other method of accomplishing this than the piling-up of armaments—a sort of "*Schrecklichkeit*." Mistrust and fear were the decisive factors in a problem which obviously called for conciliation, mutual trust, and goodwill. It allowed one group to dictate a certain policy to all others (*e. g.* Germany at the first Peace

Conference): and, in effect, substituted a state of armed neutrality for one of genuine peace.

In such circumstances it is not unnatural that the whole political atmosphere of Europe was continually in a state of ferment. International jealousies, mutual distrust and a general spirit of restlessness were its chief characteristics—boding little good in the future. The World War—foreseen by all those who did not deliberately shut their eyes—was its natural outcome.

II

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY FROM 1900 TO 1914

THE main events between 1900 and 1914 were the Russo-Japanese War, the agreement with Great Britain on Central Asiatic affairs, and the Balkan Wars, which may be looked upon as a prelude to the great War of 1914-1918.

The Russian-Japanese War

The Russo-Japanese War was never popular in Russia. Being now in possession of all the documents, one can only wonder at the light-hearted manner in which momentous decisions were taken and at the influence exercised by secret intrigues and selfish interests in a matter upon which hinged the fate of Russian prestige in the Far East. The situation that led to the War is the only instance in Russian history, when private interests were allowed to dictate national policy, and when the greedy instincts of a few concessionaires in Manchuria and Korea were able to sway the Government, and thus lead Russia into disaster.

In accordance with the treaty of 1902 with China, Russia undertook to evacuate Southern Manchuria. Everything was ready for the recall of the Russian troops, when, in the beginning of 1903, the evacuation was cancelled. The Russian troops were moved to the Yalu river for the protection of the Bezobrazov Company's forest concessions. This breach of faith aroused international indignation; and finally Japan, after a year's fruitless negotiations, opened hostilities without the formality of declaring war.

The disasters of the Russian armed forces and the outbreak of the first Revolution, forced the Russian Government to accept American mediation, and to agree to suspend hostilities.

Witte, appointed chief Russian delegate to the Peace Conference (assembled at Portsmouth),¹ achieved the impossible; the treaty of Portsmouth was an undisguised victory for Russian diplomacy. The main stumbling blocks, most of which Witte successfully set aside, were: the Japanese demands for a contribution of \$750,000,000; the

¹ New Hampshire, U. S. A.

cession of Sakhalin; the limitation of Russia's naval armaments in the Far East.

Witte, at the conclusion of peace (September 5th, 1905) was justified in telegraphing to the Emperor, that "Russia remains as she has been, is now and ever will be, a Great Power in the Far East."

According to the statement of one of the Japanese delegates, it may be inferred that Japan was also satisfied with the treaty. "For us, honour means more than money. The fact that, through the war with Russia, my country has taken her place among the great nations of the world is of more importance than any financial gain could be."

The Consequences of the Russo-Japanese War

The outcome of the Russian-Japanese war made it imperative for Russia to walk warily until she was able to restore her military strength. It was only about 1910 that Russia could again enjoy entire liberty of action, conscious of her restored power. Her weakening in the interim was, of course, only relative. In the Moroccan question, for instance, Russian support at the Algeiras Conference proved of the utmost value to France. But between 1906 and 1910 Russia's foreign policy was necessarily less energetic, a fact which allowed the Triple Alliance to pursue their plans of Balkan penetration. Russia's attitude at the time of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is only comprehensible in the light of the above considerations. Moreover, Germany took advantage of Russia's difficulties by declining to renew the Russo-German trade treaty of 1894, except on conditions which were extremely disadvantageous to Russia.

From the point of view of Russo-Japanese relations, the peace of Portsmouth must be looked upon as inaugurating new methods in the Far East. Setting aside any idea of revenge, Russia, in her subsequent policy with regard to Japan, turned to the practical solution of her Far Eastern problems. With this aim in view a series of pacts were concluded which defined Russo-Japanese relations:—the twelve-year Fisheries Convention of June 27th, 1907; the Concordat of July 30th, 1907 on Chinese affairs (the independence and inviolability of Chinese territory; the economic equality of rights; the maintenance of the *status quo*), the Agreement of June 4th, 1910, on Manchurian affairs (following a plan proposed by Knox, the American Secretary of State, for the internationalization of the railways in Manchuria, a matter which affected the interests of both Russia and Japan): and, finally, the agreement of July 8th, 1912, supplementary to the agreements of 1907 and 1910, which established the respective spheres of Russian and Japanese influence in Manchuria and Mongolia. Russia and Japan finally, on June 3rd, 1916, signed an agreement of alliance in the true sense of the word.

In concluding this outline of Russian pre-War policy in the Far East, mention must be made of the agreement made on October 21st, 1912, with Mongolia, which recognized Mongolian independence.

Entente with Great Britain (1907)

The alliance with France and the latter's entente with Great Britain produced a decided turn in Russia's attitude towards the British Government. Soon after the conclusion of peace with Japan an important section of official opinion demanded that an understanding should be arrived with London on the outstanding problems in the Middle East—Persia in particular. This culminated with the entente with Great Britain in 1907. The result of the entente was more favourable to Great Britain than to Russia. The Memoirs of Lord Grey are illuminating on this subject.

In a letter of November 6th, 1906, to Sir Arthur Nicholson, then British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, Lord Grey frankly states that the projected treaty regarding Persia gives Great Britain all she wants, but gives nothing to Russia. The establishment of spheres of influence in Persia and the neutral zone safeguards Great Britain from the Russian menace to the Indian frontier; while, if only for strategical reasons, there could not possibly be a British menace through Persia. Grey expects that Izvolsky¹ will raise the question of compensation, *i. e.* about an exit to "the warm sea"; perhaps, on the Persian Gulf, but more probably via the Dardanelles. "It is of course," Grey emphasizes, "for Izvolsky to say what he wants."

The prospect of raising the Near Eastern question in general did not appeal to Grey, but he evidently considered it necessary to give the most serious consideration to this natural suggestion on the part of Russia. An agreement such as this would have for its object not only the question of free passage through the Straits but a general obligation of diplomatic cooperation in Near Eastern questions. Had such an agreement existed, Great Britain could not, in 1914, have taken up a position of "disinterestedness" with regard to the Austro-Serbian War. It is quite probable, in fact, that in such circumstances war might never have been declared.

Russian diplomacy, later, attempted to extend the 1907 agreement with Great Britain into a more general treaty—but without success.

In any event, however, the 1907 agreement was the germ of the Triple Entente. It was so regarded in the Wilhelmstrasse: and, although in itself an incomplete scheme, it nevertheless evoked reprisals on the part of German diplomacy. An examination of the correspondence between Wilhelm II and Nicholas II convincingly proves that while, until then, the German Emperor hoped to render the Franco-Russian alliance ineffective, and to hinder Russian rapprochement with Great Britain, after the event the tone of his letters to the Tzar changed; they lost their "frankness and friendliness."

The 1907 agreement was, therefore, not only a turning-point in the diplomatic history of Russia, but also in the whole international diplomacy of Europe.

¹ Russian Foreign Minister.

In addition to dealing with Persia, the 1907 agreement confirmed the paramount interests of Great Britain in Afghanistan and Tibet. It is impossible here to give the full history of this treaty; although it is of the utmost importance for the just appreciation of the development of events in the Middle East prior to the War. It may, however, be pointed out that the 1907 agreement not only withheld from Russia the general diplomatic guarantees which she required but very materially prejudiced her position in Persia by fostering Persian anti-Russian tendencies; these found expression in the North Persian rising of December, 1911, which called for the dispatch of Russian troops with all the inconveniences consequent on such a step.

The Potsdam Agreement

The second noteworthy incident of this period was the agreement concluded with Germany at Potsdam, (June, 1911), by which Russia undertook certain obligations in linking up the German Baghdad Railway with the lines she proposed to build in Persia. While carefully narrating the circumstances leading to the final agreement (which he described as "a great diplomatic victory for Germany") Sir George Buchanan¹ omits the fact that Russia desired to obtain from Germany the recognition of the predominance of Russian interests in North Persia—where, as already mentioned, anti-Russian disturbances had just occurred. It was a case of having to pay, perhaps, too high a price for an inadequate agreement with Great Britain.

It may also be noted that at the time, the official leaning towards Great Britain was not by any means shared by all sections of opinion in Russia. Sir George Buchanan calls attention to the fact that in March, 1914, a series of articles appeared in the *Novoye Vremia*,² inspired by Witte, which suggested that the Anglo-Russian agreement was a mistake, because it did not give Russia actual guarantees in case of war, whereas the understanding with Germany would furnish more substantial advantages. The Emperor, at an audience—while giving every assurance to the British Ambassador, who was alarmed at this campaign—mentioned, not for the first time, how desirable it would be to supplement the Treaty of 1907, by a military agreement such as that between Great Britain and France.

The main defect of the situation was thus very clearly apparent; and it cannot be denied that the reluctance of Great Britain to commit herself further did little to improve relations.

The Balkans

As has been pointed out, the cornerstone of Russian diplomacy, ever since her defeat at the Berlin Congress (1878) has been the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Balkans; the more so, because at the beginning of the twentieth century, Russia was actively involved in

¹ British Ambassador to St. Petersburg.

² One of the most important daily papers in St. Petersburg.

Far Eastern affairs. Thus, on the increase in 1902 of the nationalist movement in Macedonia, directed in favour of either independence or union with Bulgaria, Count Lamsdorf, the Russian Foreign Minister, paid a visit to Sofia, where he plainly informed the Bulgarian Government that Russia had no intention of permitting the armed activities of the Macedonian patriots to force her to intervene in Balkan affairs. On his way homewards, Count Lamsdorf had a conference in Vienna with Count Goluchovski, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, at which a plan of reforms in Macedonia was worked out. This so-called "Murzsteg agreement" came into force in February, 1903, and was a political consequence of the cooperation of both Powers on the lines laid down in the 1897 treaty.

The reforms, advocated by Russia and Austria, however, were not at all to the liking of the Sublime Porte and only served to delay events, which partook more and more of a revolutionary character—as was shown by the revolt at Salonika in 1903. Bulgarian public opinion claimed that the reforms should be extended to the Vilayet of Adrianople; and Stambulov, Bulgaria's Prime Minister, attempted to come directly to terms with the Turks; by which plan he obtained certain concessions in April, 1904. In the same year King Peter of Serbia and Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria met at Nish—an event which roused the suspicions of Vienna; where, from that moment, the decision was taken to adopt a more energetic anti-Slav policy in the Balkans. The Russian-Japanese War for a time diverted Russian attention from the Balkans and served to strengthen the position of Austria and Germany. When Russia "returned" to Europe the situation, almost immediately, demanded a revision of the policy of the *status quo*. The German Alliance was a thing of the past, and the agreement with Austria could not satisfy Russia for the future. In 1906 there occurred almost simultaneously Lamsdorf's resignation in St. Petersburg and Count Goluchovski's in Vienna. The new era had begun. Count Lamsdorf's policy of restraining Bulgaria and maintaining the agreement with Austria had been of a purely negative character; its only advantage, and a dubious one at that, was that it put off the evil day.

In the autumn of 1908, at Buchlau, Izvolsky, Lamsdorf's successor, endeavoured to come to terms with Count Aehrenthal, the new Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, on Balkan questions; but subsequent events proved that this possibility no longer existed. At the meeting at Reval between Edward VII and Nicholas II (June 10, 1908), where the subject of Macedonia was discussed, a new orientation based on an Anglo-Russian rapprochement had already been contemplated and agreed upon. The Turkish revolution (June, 1908), gave, for the time, no reason for intervention by the Powers, although it provoked the proclamation of Bulgarian independence (October 5, 1908) and the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria.

Russia's impotence in face of the latter action, explained by her

military unpreparedness, served to encourage Balkan statesmen to take the handling of Balkan affairs into their own hands. The Geshov-Milovanovitch treaty between Bulgaria and Serbia was signed on October 11th, 1911. Somewhat later Greece and Montenegro joined the alliance. But this meant more than simply regarding the new political situation in the Balkans sympathetically: One of the provisions of the Treaty of 1911 established the personal arbitration of the Tzar in matters arising out of the delimitation of frontiers in Macedonia. Russia had now no choice but to accept a *fait accompli*. The policy of the *status quo* was buried.

Russia's endeavours *in extremis* to delay the march of events were doomed to failure. A joint Austro-Russian note, of September 26th, 1912, to the Balkan Governments, strongly adverse to the declaration of war, failed to produce the desired effect. The allies declared war on Turkey forthwith.

The Triple Entente and the General Diplomatic Situation

While examining the reaction of the international position on Russian foreign policy, mention must be made of the Franco-Russian alliance, which had become its determining factor—as the only diplomatic combination possible for Russia. It is interesting to note that in the first years of its existence the French were most anxious to avoid the danger of arousing suspicion in Great Britain, whereas Russia, on the contrary, endeavoured through it, to secure a guarantee against Great Britain, but did not wish to give the treaty a too-clearly anti-German turn.

This inherent defect in Franco-Russian cooperation was, in time, obviated in favour of the French view; although leaving untouched the differences of opinion as regards Austria. Not only was France successful in coming to terms with Great Britain on colonial policy but Russia also, under French influence, agreed to a rapprochement with Great Britain.

While on the subject of the Triple Entente, it will be as well to note Wilhelm II's reaction to these events. It is well known that, from 1894 to 1903, he persevered in endeavouring to placate France—a fact noticeable in the tone of all relevant German diplomatic communications, especially during the Fashoda incident of 1898–1899 and the Boer War of 1899–1902. Wilhelm did not lose the hope of forming, by hook or crook, a triple alliance with France and Russia against Great Britain. The moment seemed opportune during the Russo-Japanese War, when diplomatic enmity between St. Petersburg and London was fairly acute. It was, however, necessary first to induce France to break her agreement (April 8, 1904) with Great Britain. Events, however, developed otherwise, and resulted in a secret German treaty with Russia, (Biorke). All the particulars of this episode are now known; they were clearly and frankly described by the Kaiser in a letter (June 25, 1905) to Von Bülow. It is there apparent that Wilhelm endeavoured

to reap as much advantage as possible from the personal feeling of ill will which the Emperor Nicholas at the time entertained against King Edward and Great Britain. All Wilhelm's wiles, however, were futile; and the treaty obtained by him from Nicholas II, remained a dead letter—it was never officially ratified.

Whatever the relations between the heads of the States or the sympathies and antipathies of leading circles in Russia the international position tended towards strengthening the Franco-Russian alliance, a process facilitated by the agreements concluded by Great Britain with Russia and France.

At one time, it is true, during the Russo-Japanese War mutual disappointment was felt; not only by France, which began to look for support from other quarters, but also by Russia. The behaviour of France during the Japanese War was openly criticized in Russia regardless of the fact that the Treaty of Alliance made no provision for joint action in the East.

III

THE WAR AND THE REVOLUTION

The Causes of the War

THERE is already an extensive literature on the subject of the causes of the War and of the responsibility for it, but a review of this would, naturally, be beyond the scope of this chapter. An emphatic protest must, however, be made against the tendency, at present widely in evidence, to lay all the blame on Russia, who has but very few champions. It is not to the interest of the Bolshevik Government to clear up the truth: it tries, on the contrary, to blacken the former regime in every way and to exhibit it in the most unfavourable light.

One incontrovertible fact, nevertheless, emerges from any impartial study—Russia did not want the War, and did not seek occasion for it. To her, the War was essentially a collision with Austria-Hungary, caused by the latter's desire to crush Serbia and to dominate the Balkans. It is now known that the Austrian decision to humiliate Serbia and hence put an end to her propaganda for a Greater Serbia had been taken long before the War, and that the Sarajevo tragedy merely afforded a convenient pretext. Russia had no warlike intentions against Germany. The question thus resolves itself into the support of Serbia by Russia and of Austria by Germany. Russia, however, had no intention of supporting Serbia unconditionally and during the dark days of July 1914, Sazonov, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, acceded to all suggestions likely to settle the matter peacefully (*e. g.* a conference of the great Powers; the mediation of Great Britain and Italy; direct negotiations between Russia and Austria), whereas Germany's

conduct was bluntly *non possumus*, her Government taking no steps to ease the crisis which terminated so catastrophically.

Such is the rough outline. It is necessary, however, to give some indications which will explain the diplomatic side of the position in which Russia found herself in June 1914. The opinion is generally held that at the beginning of the War the diplomatic situation was advantageous to Russia. She was guaranteed by her alliance with France, her agreement with Great Britain, and the very likely neutrality of Italy and Rumania. Without commenting on the nature of such a view it must, nevertheless, be noted that it has more to do with the conflict *in esse* than the conflict *in posse*. This brings into prominence the enormous significance of the attitude adopted by the British Government. It is well known how earnestly Sazonov strove to convert the simple entente with Great Britain into a more definite military and political arrangement—a Triple Alliance of Great Britain, Russia and France. The form which Russia's relations with Great Britain assumed is shown by a series of references to them in the memoirs of Sir George Buchanan.¹ It was also the subject of conversations between the Emperor and the British Ambassador. Although Buchanan refers to this subject very guardedly, he nevertheless allows it to be understood that the Russian view of the beneficial influence of the Anglo-Russian entente in maintaining European peace was not without foundation. He also mentions the constant friction caused by Persian affairs; and particularly adverts to the fact that public opinion in Great Britain was not, on the whole, favourably inclined towards an alliance with Russia.

It must be emphasized that had Great Britain categorically declared at the opportune moment that she would not hesitate to play an active part in a general European war, Germany would have had to compel Austria to accept the conference proposed by the British Government. In the circumstances, it only remained for Russia to defend herself and for France to fulfill her engagements. As a result Great Britain, having hesitated in her diplomatic support to Russia, was compelled—by her treaty of alliance—to render military support to France.

This state of affairs ultimately became clear to Sir Edward Grey² himself, *but only in July*. He honestly confessed that personally he had no doubt as to the necessity for Great Britain to engage in the War, as a complete victory on the part of Germany would have placed his country in a critical position. Here again the interactions of internal and foreign policy made themselves felt as Sir Edward had to take into account the composition of the British Cabinet, which included several pacifists. During the very last days of peace Sir Edward Grey induced Sazonov to accept a modified formula agreeing to the temporary occupation of Serbia and accepting the arbitration of the Great Powers on the controversial points of the Austrian ultimatum.

¹ "My Mission to Russia."

² Viscount Grey of Fallodon. "Twenty-five Years."

Sazonov's whole policy during the development of the conflict was, of course, conciliatory; but there were, on the other hand, irresponsible and purely national influences which complicated the situation. Be that as it may, after "a friendly warning" given by Pourtales¹ on the 29th of July to Sazonov, as the latter relates, "it became known that war was inevitable." He then sent telegrams to Ambassador Izvolsky in Paris, and to the other Russian representatives abroad, announcing that "it only remains for us to accelerate our armaments and to reckon with the inevitability of war."

The hopelessness of the position lay in the fact that the organized elements of war which German determination set in motion, could not be stopped, and because the *elements of peace*—in spite of the endeavours of the best people such as Grey, Sazonov and Viviani, proved disjointed and impotent.

Diplomacy During the War

It is important to note that there was no organic issue between Russia and Germany; and it was the War that caused both sides to seek for objectives. Thus the question of the Straits, historically vital for Russia, was only brought up seven months after the commencement of the War. As regards Poland, Sazonov's secret note advocating Polish restoration is dated April 17th, 1916.² The previous declaration of the Russian Commander-in-Chief, the Grand Duke Nicholas (Aug. 1914) had merely spoken of Polish regeneration.

The development of the Straits question may be shortly recounted as follows. On August 3rd, 1908, a special conference was called at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to discuss the dangerous complications which might be expected in Turkey, then in the throes of a revolutionary movement. The Foreign Minister, Izvolsky, described the situation in Turkey, pointing out that events there might develop as they had in China and, under these conditions, it was necessary to examine the possibility of combined action by the Powers. It was decided that it was necessary to work out a detailed plan of action "for a peaceful occupation of the Bosphorus without declaring war on Turkey" and the conference agreed with Izvolsky's opinion that while no risks were to be run, it was necessary to be "ready for any emergency." In the autumn of the same year, at an interview with Aehrenthal in Buchlau, Izvolsky understood his Austrian colleague to be in agreement with Russia's views on the Balkan question in general, and that of the Straits in particular. In London however, which he then visited, he was given to understand that public opinion in Great Britain would not accept a one-sided decision of the question of the Straits in favour of Russia. Nothing less than the complete opening of the Straits to all the Powers would be acceptable,—this was the forerunner of Lord Curzon's formula at Lausanne in 1924.

¹ German Ambassador to Russia.

² The union of Russian, German and Austrian Poland under the suzerainty of the Tzar.

The Italo-Turkish War of 1911 again drew the attention of the Government to the Straits. Italy proposed to blockade them which would most seriously have diminished Russia's exports of grain. Official protests and remonstrances to the States which had signed the Straits Convention brought about a decision favourable to Russia on the question of the blockade. The next stage was marked by the strained relations which arose between Russia and Turkey owing to the appointment (1913) of the German General Liman von Sanders as Commander of an Army Corps in Constantinople.

In October, 1914, Paleologue¹ informed Sazonov of his conversation with Krivoshein (Minister of Agriculture) and the latter's opinion that the Turkish State should be restricted to Asia, and Constantinople turned into a free city. Sazonov replied to the French Ambassador that, in his opinion, Constantinople ought to remain Turkish but that Russia should secure once and for all a definitely-guaranteed channel from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean.

Such were the preliminaries. Officially the first steps taken by Sazonov expressing a wish to annex the Straits were his telegrams to the Allies on February 26th and March 2nd, 1915, the official reason for these being the commencement of the British operations in the Dardanelles.

The official decision of the question was contained in the communications from the Ambassadors of Great Britain (March 12th, 1915) and France (March 24th, 1915) intimating the consent of their Governments to a settlement of the question of the Straits and Constantinople in accordance with Russia's demand.

Sazonov himself was ready to limit the question to the internationalization of Constantinople, but he had to consider the opinion of his country, as expressed in the Duma. His memoirs show that in his negotiations with the Allies he felt the influence of a rooted prejudice, both in Great Britain and in France, against any improvement of Russia's position in regard to the Straits. Nevertheless, he pays a just tribute to the support given him by Sir Edward Grey and M. Delcassé.

It has been considered advisable to trace the history of the Straits question in some detail, not only because of its general interest in explaining Russian foreign policy before the Revolution but also for comparison with that pursued later by the Soviet Government at Lausanne. With regard to the diplomatic outlook elsewhere it will be sufficient to state that it was not found possible to induce Bulgaria (although technically bound by her 1902 military agreement with Russia—a counter-agreement to the Austro-Rumanian convention of 1900), to enter the War on Russia's side, owing to the difficulty of reconciling her claims with the position taken up by Serbia.

Bulgaria considered herself deeply insulted by the Bucharest treaty ("My revenge," said Ferdinand, "will be terrible!"), while Serbia was still brooding over the fratricidal attack made on her in 1913. Bulgaria

¹ French Ambassador in St. Petersburg.

furthermore claimed as the price of her participation, the southern part of the Dobruja ceded to Rumania by the treaty of Bucharest, and the Greek territories at Kavalla, Seres and Drana.

As regards Turkey, that country was completely under German influence and had become a blind tool of the Wilhelmstrasse. All the Allies' efforts to counteract this state of matters failed and on October 11th, 1914, an official agreement which made Turkey an ally of the Central Powers was signed at the German Embassy in Constantinople. A fortnight later the cruisers "Goeben" and "Breslau" interned in Turkish waters, opened hostilities against Russia in the Black Sea. As a sequence of this, by the London agreement of March 16, 1915, Russia was given the right to occupy the Straits—"when the Turks have been driven out"—and also Armenia. France was to be granted Cilicia, Syria, Kurdistan with Diarbekir and Mosul, and Great Britain the territories lying between the frontiers of Egypt, the Persian Gulf, and the French zone. The boundaries of the Franco-British zones were settled in 1915 by the Sykes-Picot agreement. At the entry of Italy into the War, this agreement created some difficulties. It was only after considerable friction that success was at last attained in¹ satisfying the Italian claims, which had been found difficult to reconcile with Slav interests in the Balkans. "Fortunately," Sir George Buchanan said, "Sazonov is not an obstinate man." To be more correct, the matter was arranged in such a way that responsibility for the success of the negotiations with Italy was entirely laid on Russia. Rumania only entered the war as a result of the Russian military successes on the Austro-Hungarian Front in 1916. The views of Russia and France, as regards the part to be taken by Rumania, were seriously at variance. Russia considered that her direct participation would only be an additional burden; and by weakening Russia both materially and technically an event of negative military value. It was not entirely a surprise to the Russian generals to find that their Rumanian *confrères* had no knowledge whatever of modern warfare; however, in spite of Russian opposition, Rumania entered the lists under French pressure, the French G. H. Q. hoping to see large German contingents drawn to this new front.

Revolution and Diplomacy

An investigation of the causes which brought Russia first to the March, and then to the October, Revolutions of 1917 will be made in another part of this publication.

Here only the development of events during the War in relation to their effect on Russia's policy need be dealt with, and to what has already been said it is only necessary to add a few words on the diplomacy of the Provisional Government. Of its two essential points, the first was the question of the Straits which caused lively discussion between the Minister for Foreign Affairs, P. N. Miliukov, and the

¹ In London, April 26th, 1915.

President of the Council of Ministers, A. F. Kerensky. In this the former advocated annexing the Straits, a view which led to his resignation from the Cabinet.

Miliukov explained his views to the correspondent of the "*Temps*" on the 9th of April, 1915, and they may be summarized as follows: the only means of settling the question is to give the Straits to Russia. Their neutralization would be a menace to peace; by giving all navies the right of entry to a Russian sea, it would compel Russia to maintain a powerful fleet in the vicinity. Germany desires the Straits in order to complete the plan of her hegemony and to guarantee her Berlin-Baghdad scheme. Russia requires the Straits in order to assure her untrammelled and unmenaced export and import trade. It is, therefore, obvious to which of these Powers, Germany or Russia, the Straits should belong.

The second point, very characteristic of the time, is that of the so-called Stockholm conference, with its program of "no annexations or indemnities."

In spite of the assertions of a certain part of the London Press, that Russia "eagerly desired the Stockholm conference," Nabokov, the chargé d'affaires of the Provisional Government, informed Balfour of the official point of view as drawn up by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Tereschenko:—"The Russian Government, while considering it inopportune to forbid the participation of Russian delegates (in the Stockholm conference) nevertheless regards this as a purely *party conference*." During the preliminaries of the Conference and on the strength of a telegram from Albert Thomas to Lloyd George "*Kerensky ne veut pas de conference*," a difference of opinion arose between Lloyd George and A. Henderson (L. G.'s letter to H. of August 11, 1917) who resigned from the Cabinet. Reference to the Stockholm conference is also to be found in the work of Sir George Buchanan, to whom Tereschenko declared that it was a party conference—although with a reservation that Nabokov's note to Balfour about it "was not written at his instruction." This reservation, and other *faux pas* indicate that under the Provisional Government, the decline of the diplomatic methods had already begun.

With regard to the relations between the Allies and the Provisional Government, the United States excepted, they may be summed up in Nabokov's criticism, which originally referred to Great Britain alone, but which is equally applicable in a wider sense: "Russia will have their sympathy as long as the Provisional Government is able to carry on the War."

IV

THE COMMUNISTS IN POWER

IT WOULD be futile to surmise as to what would have taken place, had not the Russian Revolution occurred. Yet it is legitimate to say that had it not happened events would have certainly been shaped very differently. Apart from the question of Russia's participation in the organization of European peace, she would not have been debarred from international councils as a member-nation enjoying equal rights with the other Powers. In her absence from these councils the problem of organizing the post-War world is confronted with many unknown factors. For Russia, no matter what her regime, must continue to have an important influence on many international questions.

The Soviet or Communist regime and its aims do not facilitate the solution of many international complications. It is inimical to the social order of the rest of the world. Yet this world has to seek continually for Soviet participation.

It follows from this that no matter what attitude may be adopted towards Communism *per se* the weight of Russia or the U.S.S.R. in international matters remains an important factor; in appreciating Soviet foreign policy it will be therefore necessary to distinguish the Communist or temporary elements and those which find their roots in Russian political tradition.

Brest-Litovsk

In April 1917 Lenin, with the permission of the German authorities and furnished by them with means for propaganda, travelled through Germany to Russia, where he immediately took charge of the activities of the Bolshevik section of the Social Democrats.

In the first of his articles to appear in "Pravda,"¹ he stigmatized Capitalism as the primary cause of the War; he demanded peace at any price. As a means to this he handed to the Provisional Government, October 20th, 1917, a note intended for the Allies. In this, deliberately adopting many of President Wilson's ideas, he insisted on the evacuation by the opposing armies of all occupied territories; he denounced all annexations or contributions, and advocated the self-determination of oppressed nationalities, the neutrality of the Straits and international waterways in general, and the rejection of secret diplomacy.

Immediately after the October Revolution, and the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks, Trotzky informed the Bureau of the Socialist International at Amsterdam—"Peace is our first word"; and in a note (November 23, 1917) he invited the Entente Powers to conclude a general armistice for the preparation of a democratic peace. Although

¹ A revolutionary paper started in March 1917.

this proposal was supported by the extreme left wing of the Socialist parties in London, Paris and Rome, it was refused by the various Allied Governments; who contented themselves with reminding the Russian Government of the Inter-Allied agreement of September 5, 1914 which bound the individual Powers not to conclude a separate peace.

Subsequently Trotzky, on November 28, ignoring the Allied Governments, appealed to "all, all, all," *i. e.*, to all the "victims of Capitalism," among the nations in arms, the workers, peasants, etc., calling them to action. "Peace among the nations can only be concluded by means of a direct and energetic struggle of the revolutionary masses against the plans of the Imperialists" was the slogan.

On the Russian front Krylenko—the Bolshevik Commander-in-Chief—had already, on November 20, ordered General Dukhonin—the Chief of Staff at G. H. Q. to conclude an armistice; and, on his refusal to do so, gave the order to fraternize with the enemy. The Army headquarters were occupied by the Bolsheviks on December 1st, and General Dukhonin murdered. On December 3rd, Commissar Joffe left for Brest-Litovsk to make terms with the German Command, and negotiations began on December 22, 1917.

In the presence of a council of diplomats and high military authorities assembled at Brest-Litovsk, Joffe announced the Bolshevik peace terms, as outlined in Lenin's note. Count Czernin, the Austrian delegate, replied on behalf of the Central Powers, agreeing in principle with Joffe's declaration but depriving this agreement of all practical significance by adding that in the absence of all the adversaries no decision could be taken. Czernin also made reservations about the fate of the German colonies as well as of the various nationalities under Austrian rule. As to Germany, she definitely announced her decision to maintain her rights of conquest. Negotiations were broken off and Joffe left on December 28th, remarking as he left—"Nevertheless, a great step forward has been taken."

President Wilson was not deceived as to the real intentions of the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk. He proceeded, however, in a message to Congress to congratulate the representatives of Russia "on their exact presentation of the principles, according to which they had expressed their readiness to conclude peace in agreement with the spirit of contemporary democracy, with all doors open" (January 8, 1918). He also spoke of the "loyalty, breadth of view and feeling of general solidarity, evinced by the Russian people." How mistaken he was, is now a matter of common knowledge; but it is useful to recall the circumstances which accompanied the Brest-Litovsk negotiations—even if only to include such a curious document as this message to Congress; the more so, as it contains the first formula of the famous fourteen points, finally published in October, 1918, when the Central Powers applied to Wilson for mediation.

The Bolsheviks, under the pressure of a new German advance, were

compelled to abandon their plans with regard to the termination of the War through a general rising of the proletariat and to sign, at the dictation of General Hofmann, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (March 3rd, 1918); this was later annulled by the Treaty of Versailles. In the history of Soviet diplomacy this was the first, but by no means the last, miscalculation: one which counted on the power of a revolutionary phrase to begin a world-wide conflagration, in whose flames the old Capitalist organization was to disappear, leaving the ground free for Socialist reconstruction.

In order to hasten this event, one of the first important steps in Bolshevik foreign politics was the organization of the Third International in March, 1919, not long after the signature of the Brest-Litovsk treaty.

The Third International is discussed elsewhere in this book; however it may here be stated, as emphatically as possible, that there is no truth whatever in Moscow's assertion that the Comintern (III International) has no connection at all with the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs; it is quite impossible to determine where one's work begins and the other's ends. Soviet assurances to the contrary must be regarded as mere subterfuges. Both institutions are subordinate to the Political Bureau of the Communist Party.

V

THE CIVIL WAR

Intervention

THE first years after the advent of the Bolsheviks to power present a somewhat chaotic picture, in which internal and foreign events are closely interwoven and can only be disentangled with difficulty. Thus, the Civil War was primarily a matter of internal politics, in so far as a certain portion of the population refused to acknowledge or obey the new authorities; but on the other hand it was also a factor in foreign politics, since the leaders of the anti-Bolshevik movement were in league with the Allies; while the Bolsheviks had concluded peace with the enemy in contravention of Russia's solemn obligations.

The association of the Allies with the White Movement may thus be regarded both as a continuation of the normal relations obtaining before the Revolution and as an intervention in Russia's Civil War in support of one of the combatants.

While foreign intervention in the Civil War was originally prompted by the necessity of cutting off Russian supplies from the Central Powers, after the defeat of the Austro-Germans it took a very different character. The Great Powers adopted a policy which can hardly be described as tending, after the defeat of the Bolsheviks, to the restoration of a united national Russian State. A statement made in Parlia-

ment by one of the Allied leaders,—to the effect that it was not in the interests of his country to aid the rebirth of a strong Russia—may well serve as indicating the trend of official opinion among the Allies in general. Plans for Russia's partition circulated among European Chancelleries, and, if not always officially encouraged, received a great deal of attention from Allied statesmen. Separatist national aspirations often received official international recognition (as in the case of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Ukraine etc.). All this served to make the Bolsheviks, in a way, the champions of Russian unity, and correspondingly to damp the ardour of the anti-Bolshevik White Armies, the official protagonists of that cause.

It must be added that, after the defeat of the Germans at the end of 1918, some parts of Russia's former western territory had already dissociated themselves from her (Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania). Up to a certain point—that of effective separation—the struggle of the Bolsheviks against this "separatist" tendency and its consequent reduction of Russian territory, may be regarded as a matter of internal politics, but subsequent relations with the newly-formed Border States became transferred to the sphere of foreign politics.

The Revolution and the ensuing Civil War resulted in the cutting off of Russia from the West and the gradual return of all her territory in the east and southeast. This "swing of the pendulum" towards Asia appears, however, to be more than an instinctive reproduction of a traditional movement. In view of the obvious awakening of modern Asia, the interest shown by the Soviet Union in the problems of the East is of enormous importance, for the teeming masses of Asia regard, to a degree, the Soviet Union as the champion of their national liberties.

The inclusion into the Soviet Union of Mongolia, Tannu-Tuva,¹ and of the former vassal-States of Bokhara and Khiva acquires in this light a new significance.

The Baltic States and Poland

The question of the Baltic States and Poland, then occupied by the German armies, was naturally brought forward during the Brest-Litovsk negotiations.

On December 22, 1917, Trotzky in the name of the Soviet Government, expressed a wish that those national units which had not been independent before the War should determine their future by a plebiscite. In reply to this the Germans, on December 27, requested the Bolsheviks to accept the declarations of the autonomous institutions existing in Poland, Lithuania, Courland, etc., as an expression of national will, and a confirmation of their desire to be completely independent of Russia. On January 11, 1918, Trotzky enquired why the autonomous institutions existing in Poland, Lithuania and Latvia were debarred from taking part in the negotiations, and next day Commissar

¹ These two States are actually entirely under Soviet influence, though theoretically independent.

Kamenev declared that during German military occupation, no democratic franchise could be exercised either in Poland, Lithuania or Courland, which could express the actual will of the majority of the people. This was a covert and abortive request for German evacuation.

Further details of this interchange of opinions, as the result of which Poland was not represented at Brest-Litovsk, need not be given here. More important was the final decision—to accept Germany's terms. "The interests of Socialism stand higher than the right of self-determination," said Trotsky on January 8, 1918, among his friends; and, in consequence, "Poland and the Baltic States had to be sacrificed to the existence of Soviet power."

Such was actually the case. The Germans, tired of Bolshevik procrastination, terminated the armistice, on February 19, and on the same day the Soviet Government sent a wireless message to Berlin suing for peace. In their reply of February 22, couched in the terms of an ultimatum, the Germans demanded that the Soviet Government should resign all sovereign rights, not only in Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland—which were in actual German occupation—but also in the Ukraine, which had concluded a separate peace with Austria and Germany on February 9. All these conditions were accepted.

A document of paramount influence (until the Riga Treaty), upon the trend of Russo-Polish relations, was the Soviet Government's decree of August 29, 1918, article 3 of which runs:—"All treaties and conventions concluded between the Government of the Russian Empire and the Governments of the Prussian Kingdom and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, relative to the partition of Poland, are irrevocably abrogated, as they are contradictory to the right of nations to self-determination and of the revolutionary sentiments of the Russian people, which has acknowledged the incontrovertible right of the Polish people to independence and unity." The Polish writer from whom these details have been taken¹ remarks, not without reason that, prior to the end of the War and the victory of the Allies, three Russian regimes—the Tzarist, the Provisional Government, and the Soviet Government, all "manifested a certain consistency in their Polish policy."

In 1920 the Soviet Government recognized *de jure* the Baltic Republics. Treaties were concluded with Estonia (on February 2), Latvia (on May 11), Lithuania (on June 12), and Finland (October 14). It may be noted that Lithuania, Latvia and part of Estonia were occupied by the Germans till the beginning of 1919, when the Bolsheviks replaced them. These former Russian Provinces obtained their independence in different ways. Estonian independence, proclaimed on February 24, 1918, was ended in November by German occupation. After Germany's withdrawal early in 1919, Estonia fought the Bolsheviks twice, and was the first Baltic State to conclude peace with

¹ Casimir Smogorzewski, "Russia and Poland." Monthly journal "Poland," published in Paris, November and December, 1930, and January, 1931.

the Soviet Government at Yuriev (Tartu) in 1920. The Soviet attitude towards the matter is well illustrated by the following quotation from "Izvestia" of December 20, 1919: "Many are inclined to suppose that the Baltic Sea has lost much of its importance for Soviet Russia, but this is an erroneous opinion. Soviet Russia must extend to the Baltic seaboard and raise there the red flag of revolution. The Baltic Sea must become the Sea of World Revolution." It will be seen, later, that this revolutionary sentiment cloaks a not unnatural desire of the Soviet State to obtain an outlet to the sea for more prosaic and practical purposes than World Revolution.

Peace was concluded with the new Latvian Republic in May 1920. Since August 1917 the greater part of the country had been under German occupation. After Germany evacuated it, an anti-Bolshevik and pro-German faction took possession, only to be expelled by Red troops in 1919. Here again, Bolshevik expectations were deceived. The Latvian Nationalists fought them (with British assistance in arms and money) and drove the Reds out of the country.

As regards Lithuania, the situation was complicated not only by the German occupation, but also by the active policy of Berlin, which supported the Lithuanian national movement and counted on the eventual union of Lithuania with Germany. The Lithuanian National Centre—the Tariba—hastened to elect the German Prince Urach under the name of Mindovg II, thinking in this way to acquire unmitigated German support in complete independence. When the Germans were forced to retire, the Bolsheviks occupied Vilna, but the Tariba (sitting at Kovno), now converted to republican views, directed a bitter guerilla warfare against them; and, in the summer of 1919, effected their expulsion. A year later, peace was concluded.

The strategic position of Vilna, whose subsequent occupation by the Poles cut Lithuania off from the U.S.S.R. and the latter from Germany, explains the diplomatic significance of the so-called "Vilna question" in present Polish-Lithuanian relations, and also the part played in these, as will later be shown, by the Soviet Government.

The last of the Baltic States to establish its independence was Finland. Even before the Revolution, Finland had enjoyed political autonomy; and she proclaimed her independence on December 4, 1917. Compelled by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to withdraw their troops from Finland, the Soviet Government resorted to the simple expedient of enrolling the Russian Red troops into the Finnish Red Army. At the end of January 1918, the Bolsheviks were actually in power in Finland, the Seym being compelled to cease its activities, and the Senate replaced by the Finnish Soviet of People's Commissars. The authority of the Reds spread over the southern portion of Finland but the north remained in the hands of the Whites; the Government retired to Vasa. Thanks to the initiative of General Baron Mannerheim who organized the Finnish White Army, the Government in Vasa maintained itself; but obviously it could not last long unassisted. The

Finnish Government therefore, sought German support. In the beginning of April 1918, General Count von der Goltz landed his troops in Hango and on April 12 occupied Helsingfors.

On the German evacuation of Finland which followed later in the year, civil war broke out once more in Finland; but this time the Soviet Government could not intervene. Baron Mannerheim succeeded in dominating the country and peace was finally concluded on October 14, 1920.

Summing up all that has been said about the Baltic States, it may be noted that the Soviet Government's apparent reluctance to use strong measures to occupy the Baltic seaboard was not, of course, due to any respect for the "principle of national self-determination," but to its comparative vulnerability from the sea in that region. The establishment of a "screen" formed by independent states, was, therefore, of very definite military importance.

The want of clear ideas as to Soviet federation probably also played its part. The Bolsheviks may have supposed that their political friends would control the situation on the Baltic littoral and rejoin the Union later.

It must be also remembered that, in the opinion of the Communist leaders, the main danger to the existence of the Bolshevik State did not lie in the west or the Baltic but in the south and Siberia, where the Russian White Armies during 1918 and 1919 were threatening the very existence of the Soviet Government by their converging movement on Moscow.

The Polish War (1920)

During the Civil War (1918-1920) events in the south of Russia developed, under the influence of various national and social factors, along tortuous and complicated lines. Authority in the Ukraine changed hands at least twenty times. During the German occupation (1918) the Government, in the hands of Hetman Skoropadsky, was unpopular, not only because of the foreign support it enjoyed but mainly because of its reactionary character. This produced favourable conditions for the inauguration of a radical Ukrainian Government under Petlura and Vinnichenko; and this, after the retreat of the Germans, had no difficulty in seizing power. The social and economic programme of this Government somewhat resembled that of the Bolsheviks; a fact which made for the spread of Soviet influence among the masses, and, later, greatly facilitated the occupation of the Ukraine by the Reds.

From the point of view of foreign policy alone, it is possible, without going into details with regard to the successive regimes in the Ukraine, to proceed to the moment when, threatened by war with the Soviet Government, Petlura's Government turned for support to the Poles. Polish troops occupied Kiev on May 6, 1920. This Polish action cannot be explained by any altruistic interest in Ukrainian independence, which had been denounced as a fallacy by the Versailles Conference,

to which Poland was indebted for her own existence as a State. Her real aim was a "Greater Poland."

Thus began the war between Soviet Russia and Poland.

The exorbitant demands of Polish chauvinists, and their expressed ideal of a Poland stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea, occasioned alarm in the West, the more so as the fortunes of war were at first on the side of the Red forces. On June 11, the Polish troops were obliged to evacuate Kiev and beat a hasty retreat. Counting on following up this success, the Soviet Government pursued a double-faced policy and delayed their answer to representations made by Great Britain with regard to a proposed Russo-Polish peace conference in London. These were anxious days for Europe. On August 9, the Soviet Government intimated to London that the Poles were ready to enter into direct negotiations with them; but on August 19, the military situation changed, and the Red Army retreated from Warsaw as quickly as the Poles had retreated from Kiev. Soon after, preliminary peace negotiations were begun at Minsk, which ended in the provisional agreement of October 12, and peace was finally signed at Riga on March 18, 1921.

Regarding Soviet foreign policy from the point of view of national Russian interests and not from those of World Revolution, one is forced to the conclusion that the Treaty of Riga was a very severe blow. Three and a half million Russians and a vast territory forming an integral portion of the country, were ceded to a foreign power. During the negotiations at Riga the Polish Delegation took a standpoint unacceptable to national opinion and rejected by the world at large; it maintained that Poland nowhere borders on Russia proper; that the Ukraine and White Russia are alone contiguous with her; and that it was to promote the independence of these two countries that Poland had renounced rights on which she could have insisted—as these districts had formerly belonged to her. In the face of universal opposition, the Poles could not insist on embodying the recognition of Ukrainian and White Russian independence in the Treaty of Riga. Still, this Treaty implied the possibility of such independence; and, as it still regulates Soviet-Polish relations, the question has not been absolutely shelved.

Transcaucasia

Turning to the east, a passing glance may be taken at the political development of Transcaucasia after the Revolution.

After the Bolshevik Revolution, authority over the three Transcaucasian provinces—Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan—was assumed by a Provisional Government formed by Gegechkori. A Seym (Parliament) was called, to meet on February 23rd, 1918.

Meanwhile, following the demoralization of the Russian army, the Turks passed to the offensive and soon reached the line of their 1914 frontier. The Russian troops withdrew, the Armenians alone remaining. The Turks threatened to invade Armenia and thence Georgia, while Germany prepared to occupy the Poti-Baku railway in order to

gain access to the oil-fields. On January 1st, 1918, Turkey made proposals of peace to Transcaucasia, but was informed in reply that the Federation as a part of the Russian Republic was not entitled to carry on negotiations without the consent of the Russian Constituent Assembly.

Negotiations were progressing very slowly, when Transcaucasia was suddenly electrified by the news that a peace had been signed at Brest-Litovsk, according to which the Soviet Government undertook to restore Ardagan, Kars and Batum to Turkey (article 4 of the Treaty). The Turkish command, referring to the statement that Transcaucasia formed part of Russia, demanded the evacuation of the territories ceded to Turkey at Brest-Litovsk. The Sejm adopted a defiant attitude; but, as soon as it became evident that the majority of that body were adverse to the Turkish claims, the Mussulman party left the Government. At the session of March 31st the Mussulmans announced that religious convictions prevented their taking an active part in measures against Turkey, but that they would give all possible support to Transcaucasia in securing a peaceful termination of the war.

In the meantime, the Transcaucasian army retreated in disorder, and the Turkish troops advanced without difficulty. The hopelessness of further resistance became self-evident.

Receiving no satisfaction from the Soviet Government, the Sejm on April 22 proclaimed Transcaucasia an independent Democratic Federal Republic; a fact of which the Great Powers were informed by note (April 23). The Government's next act was an offer to Turkey to renew negotiations on the basis of the Brest-Litovsk terms.

However, a month later, under the pressure of internal dissensions and the ominous military situation, the Transcaucasian Federation broke up: on May 26th Georgia proclaimed her independence, followed by Azerbaijan (May 27) and Armenia (May 28).

After many vicissitudes, hostilities were brought to an end, Turkey concluding a separate peace with each of the three Republics at Batum on June 4, 1918.

Georgia

After signing this Treaty, Georgia appealed to Germany for protection. By the Treaty of Berlin (August 27, 1918), a supplement to that of Brest-Litovsk, the Soviet Government agreed to the recognition of Georgia by Germany. The latter undertook not to support Turkey outside the districts ceded to her and not to overstep the line of demarcation around Baku. In return, the Soviet Government undertook to promote the production of oil, and to supply a quarter of the total output to Germany. Actually this agreement, through stress of circumstances, did not come into effect. As early as September 24, Talaat Pasha warned the Georgians that the assent of the Soviet Government to the Treaty of Berlin was not the equivalent of Russian recognition.

The history of German-Turkish-Georgian relations goes further

back than the events just described. Messrs. Tseretelli and G. Machabelli, representatives of a Georgian revolutionary and separatist association, resided in Berlin throughout the War and, acting as German secret agents, were the authors of an agreement with Turkey; in addition to seditious activities in the Russian rear, a Georgian legion, formed through their efforts, was enrolled on the Turkish side early in the War.

It would be useless to linger over the characteristic and rapid changes in the orientation of Georgian diplomacy after the defeat of Germany. Attempts were made to introduce a third foreign element—Italy—into Georgian politics; Orlando, being then in disagreement with the other Allies, was ready to look for compensation almost anywhere and proposed to send the XII Italian Army Corps to the Caucasus; but Nitti, who succeeded him very soon afterwards, countermanded this measure.

Georgia's attitude in 1920 as regards Batum is also interesting. The Allies looked upon this port as if it were a "prize of war," which they could dispose of at will. They inclined to make it a sort of second Danzig, a "free town" with a mixed Allied garrison, and, together with the Transcaucasian "hinterland," open to foreign traffic. In a memorandum of March 16, 1920, Georgia agreed to these plans. The Allies, however, could not agree. After the defeat of Lord Curzon's Caucasian policy (which regarded the Caucasus range as a continuation of the Himalayas!), the British announced on June 11 that they were leaving Batum, which was being handed over to Georgia.

Though Georgia had been recognized *de facto* by the Supreme Council of the Allies on January 20, 1920 (together with Azerbaijan and Armenia), she was not admitted to the League of Nations. The representatives of France and Great Britain settled the question of her admission in the negative, doubting the possibility of "rendering aid on the confines of Europe." By the irony of fate when Georgia was given *de jure* recognition by France and on the day when her first envoy, Chkhenkeli, entered the Elysée with an escort of cavalry, Soviet troops entered Tiflis headed by a Soviet Commissar on a white horse and carrying a red flag.

Aralov, a prominent Caucasian political writer, draws the conclusive inference that, without the support of some power or group of powers, the independent existence of Georgia can not be assured. Another author very pertinently remarks:—"Both the Western Powers and the League of Nations evaded the responsibilities, with which the Georgians wished to saddle them. There remained—the old possibility which had arisen in 1805—Russia."

Armenia

Less time need be devoted to Armenia than to Georgia, not because she is of less importance, but because the Armenian question is widely known, whereas the position in Georgia is not so familiar. The Armenian question, from the nineties of the last century onwards, entered the arena of international relations. Its development during and after

the War is only a phase in the fate of this long-suffering country which has, in its time, played so great a part in the cultural development of Asia Minor.

Georgia, as has been mentioned, finally came to the conclusion that there was no hope of support for her either from the Great Powers or the League of Nations; this applies also to Armenia—with the difference that, as regards the latter, the diplomats of the Great Powers had given more extensive pledges. Witness, for example, the signing, on August 10, 1920, of the Sèvres Treaty on which the signature of an independent Armenia appeared, alongside those of the other Powers, who took part in the War. The boundaries of her new territory were left to the arbitration of the President of the United States.

As regards Armenia, other acts of international significance, apart from the Sèvres Treaty, were:—the proclamation on May 28, 1918, of an independent Armenian Republic, a notification of which was made to the Powers by Bogos Nubar Pasha, the Prime Minister, in a letter dated November 30, 1918; and the proclamation on May 28, 1919, of a united Armenia (*i. e.* with the addition of the territory of the so-called Turkish Armenia).

It is well known, however, that Turkey managed to avoid being disarmed after the armistice at Mudros, and decided at the Pan-Turkish Congress of Erzerum (June 10, 1919) to continue to fight for her national existence.

Whereas Turkey in her resistance to the Allies—more especially to Great Britain—found a valuable friend in the Soviet Government, Armenia was left, at the decisive moment, to her own fate. In September, 1920, the Turkish army of Kiazim Kara Bekir Pasha invaded Armenia which was being threatened on the other side by the Bolshevik XI army. On December 2, 1920, Armenia was compelled to sign the treaty of Alexandropol with Turkey. By this, she denounced her part in the Sèvres Treaty and surrendered the Surmalin district, besides Kars and Ardagan which, by the Soviet-Turkish Treaty of Batum, had been assigned to Turkey. On December 6, a Soviet Armenian Republic was proclaimed at Erivan.

The Sèvres Treaty thus turned out to be a “scrap of paper.” The international position of Transcaucasia was actually determined by the Moscow Treaty of March 16, 1921, between the Soviet Government and Turkey. On October 21, 1921, this, under the name of the Kars Treaty, was also signed by the three Transcaucasian republics, which could see no other alternative.

These treaties acknowledged the existing boundaries of Turkey and abrogated the “capitulations” as well as all former treaties and financial obligations. Finally the Treaty of Moscow between Soviet Russia and Turkey established, in principle, the freedom of the Straits. It was proposed to determine their international status at a conference of the littoral States, but with the proviso that Turkey should remain independent and Constantinople be freed from danger of foreign seizure.

Azerbaijan

A few words must be said about the last Transcaucasian Republic, Azerbaijan. The position adopted, with regard to Turkey, by her representatives at the Transcaucasian Seym, has already been mentioned. In spite of the attempts of the British under General Dunsterville¹ to hold Baku, the insignificance of his forces and the pro-Moslem feeling of the population led to the occupation of this important point by the army of Nuri Pasha, brother of Enver, at the beginning of September 1918.

Soon after this, events took another course, for on November 17, the British General Thomson issued a proclamation to the people of Baku, (re-occupied after the defeat of the Turks), in which he declared that the occupation had taken place in accordance with the conditions of the armistice with Turkey but that the Allies had no intention of retaining a single foot of Russian territory. His second proclamation (on November 24) was unfortunately less satisfactory from the Russian point of view. The territory between the Caspian and Black Seas was acknowledged, as before, to be Russian, but its final disposition was postponed until the Peace Conference.

Azerbaijan, like Georgia and Armenia, had hopes of foreign support. On December 28, 1918, the Azerbaijan Government was acknowledged by General Thomson to be the only legal authority. Everything that recalled Russian rule was done away with more or less tactfully. On June 16, 1919, Azerbaijan and Georgia concluded a treaty of alliance against General Denikin,² but all this had only a passing significance. The situation in Transcaucasia was too involved for the Great Powers to agree on a common policy and Azerbaijan's efforts to obtain support in the West met with as little success as those of Georgia and Armenia. The sympathy between the Soviet Government and Turkey must also have produced a strong impression on the inhabitants of Azerbaijan. In April, 1920, the Red Army occupied Baku with the consent of the Azerbaijan Government and it was only later that a rebellion broke out in the Republic. It was crushed with the utmost ruthlessness after only a brief resistance.

In January, 1922, a Bolshevik Transcaucasian Federation was established; on December 30 of the same year it was incorporated in the U.S.S.R.

Central Asia

Following the Bolshevik Revolution anarchy broke out in Russian Central Asia. This took the form of the widespread activity on the part of rebel bands called *Bashmach*. This was a part in recrudescence of the native unrest which had not been completely quelled during the Russian regime (*e. g.* the Andizhan rebellion of 1898, and the Dzhizhak rebellion of 1916); but it was more especially due to the economic dif-

¹ Vide "The Adventures of Dunsterforce," Edward Arnold, London, 1920.

² Commander of the Russian White Army.

facilities of Turkestan, owing to its dependence on Russia for its supplies of grain. The political formations which hastened to the aid of the Bashmach were the local "White" organizations (formed of Russian elements) and various native autonomous bodies such as the Provisional Government of Kokand and Turkestan. To these factors must be added the part played by Bokhara in its resistance to Bolshevism; and finally, the intervention on the part of the British military expedition under General Malleson, who, on August 19, 1918, signed the Treaty of Meshkhed with the representatives of the "White" Askhabad Government, the centre of resistance to the Bolsheviks.

The Pan-Turanian epic of Enver Pasha constitutes a very curious episode in the history of Central Asia at that time. Having been sent from Moscow to Bokhara for the purpose of settling the Bashmach question satisfactorily, he arrived there on November 8, 1921, and a few days later went over to the side of the rebels with the intention of making himself their Sultan. He was killed in August 1922, and since then although Bashmach activities still persist, the authority of Moscow is firmly established in Central Asia.

The Soviet Government is mainly preoccupied with the economic development of the region, where the cultivation of cotton has a great future, especially since the building of the Turksib.¹

The Far East

In order to complete this survey of the reconstruction under the new regime of the territory of the former Empire a brief study of Siberian and Far Eastern conditions is essential. As regards this region, an absence of "separatist" tendencies must first of all be noted. Siberian patriots never gave a thought to an independent Siberia.

A few words are necessary to explain the intervention of the Allies. Japan, as a power most interested in the position in the Far East, had already at the end of January 1918 made tentative inquiries of the British, French and American Governments as to the expediency of taking concerted measures against the Bolshevik menace. The opinion expressed in Paris was that Japan was not only entitled but bound to intervene; London was also, but not so strongly, in favour of this measure; but Washington (in a note of March, 1918), expressed disapproval.

By June 1918, however, President Wilson had inclined towards intervention. The declaration emphasized, at the same time, that the U. S. Government had no intention whatever of prejudicing the sovereignty of Russia, or of interfering in her internal affairs. A similar declaration was also made by Japan. On August 10, 1918, the first Allied detachments landed at Vladivostok. It was soon noticeable, however, that there was a distinct difference between the Japanese and the American attitudes, which occasioned a great deal of friction. Japan considered that her intervention was, in effect, a fight against Bolshevism. With this end in view the number of her troops was greater than at first in-

¹ Turkestan-Siberian railway.

tended (in September, 1919, the Allied forces consisted of 60,000 Japanese, 8,477 Americans, 1,429 British, 1,400 Italians and 1,076 French—distributed from Vladivostok to Chita). The position of neutrality taken up by America, exactly conforming with her declaration of non-interference, was a source of perplexity to Admiral Kolchak's Government and of strong indignation expressed in the Vladivostok Press. In March, 1920, America evacuated her troops (without first informing Japan of the fact); while the latter, in June, also withdrew her troops to Vladivostok. Japanese public opinion was by no means unanimous on the question of the advantage to be gained by occupation; and, had it not been the massacre (March 13, 1920) of the peaceful Japanese inhabitants of Nickolaevsk, the evacuation would probably have taken place much sooner.

After the death of Admiral Kolchak and the evacuation of Transbaikalia in 1920 by foreign troops, a Far Eastern Republic was formed at Chita with definite leanings towards Moscow, but officially independent. The Far Eastern Republic acted as a buffer between Moscow and Japan and proved useful in this respect. Japanese intentions became clear during the negotiations with the Far Eastern Republic at Dairen (from August 20, 1921, to April 16, 1922), and at Chaichun (September 4-26, 1922), both of which were unsuccessful. Japan not only attempted to secure wide access to the natural resources of Siberia with special shipping rights on the Sungari and Amur but also demanded the demolition of the fortifications of Vladivostok. The Japanese point of view is explained with sufficient frankness by K. K. Kawakami. The great mistake made by Japan, says this author, is that she delayed too long her dip into the international bran-pie of new territories.

Japan occupied Vladivostok and the adjoining territory till 1922, having set up a puppet Russian Government. The Washington Conference, however, indicated clearly that a continued Japanese occupation of that part of Russian territory would jeopardize her relations with Great Britain and America. In October 1922 the Japanese forces left Vladivostok, which was immediately occupied by Red troops.

VI

RECOGNITION DE JURE

As a problem of international law alone, the question as to when and in what form, the Soviet Government may be recognized, can, of course, be discussed at enormous length; it is a Government which has definitely broken all accepted legal and ethic rules and expressed its uncompromising hostility towards the Capitalist world. But this question must be also approached from a practical point of view.

From the purely practical angle, it would appear, that whatever their legal and moral motives, the "Capitalist" Governments were primarily

guided in recognizing the Soviet Government by the blunt fact that their armed intervention in U.S.S.R. affairs was a complete failure. It was made abundantly clear that that country, unsettled and weakened by war and Revolution, had not only found within itself the strength to avoid ruin but was also showing signs of exerting its influence abroad—a step against which defensive measures must be taken. The system of the “Sanitary Cordon”—the Commercial isolation of the Soviet Union—also proved unavailing. It appeared to be necessary, as an alternative, to resume relations, and to discover the actual position of affairs within the “contaminated” zone.

Hence it has come about that, at present, the United States remains the only Great Power to withhold its recognition of the U.S.S.R. Government. The position adopted by the Washington Government is, of course, mainly rendered possible by the fact that it is less *directly* interested than European Governments in Russian affairs. Moreover, America’s prestige has been greatly enhanced by the noble efforts which she has made to promote the interests of the Russian people. The generous American help afforded during the great famine in Russia, and the uncompromising attitude adopted by the U. S. Government on the moral and legal issues involved are very gratifying to Russian national feelings. But it must, at the same time, be remembered that America is the most important of Soviet financial backers; and that at the present time unofficial financial support (in the form of credit for industrial equipment) may be of far greater value than barren official recognition.

The Trade Agreement with Great Britain (1921)

It is difficult to decide whether the Italian or the British Government was the first to recognize the Soviet Government *de facto*. Nitti records that as early as 1919 he hoped to conclude an economic treaty with Moscow and in 1920 at San Remo, having come to an agreement with Lloyd George, he started negotiations with the Soviet Government; but his resignation prevented their conclusion. As regards Lloyd George, it was on May 31, 1920, that negotiations were begun with a delegation from the Centrosouz (Central Cooperative Union), *i. e.*, with Krassin. These were interrupted owing to the position of affairs in Poland but were renewed in November of that year; and they led to the signing (March 16, 1921) of the *first* treaty between the Soviet and a “Capitalist” Government. The London Treaty was undoubtedly of great significance as a breach in the “Sanitary Cordon.” The “moral” justification of Lloyd George’s policy was that: “. . . to trade, even with cannibals, is permissible.” The British law-courts, accordingly, in a test case declared that the sale of goods “confiscated” from private individuals by the Soviet Government was legal.

Besides the agreement with Great Britain, commercial treaties were signed with Germany, May 6, 1921; with Norway, September 2, 1921;

and with Italy early in 1922. All granted the Soviet Government recognition *de facto*.

This change in the tactics of Europe with regard to Moscow is mainly explained by the fact that in 1921 there was a general economic crisis.

Cannes, Genoa, Rapallo

At Genoa in April, 1922, international negotiations with the Bolsheviks assumed a fresh aspect.

Officially, the terms drawn up on January 6, 1922, at Cannes made the *de jure* recognition of the Soviet Government conditional on their acceptance of the obligation to acknowledge private property and debts, to introduce a regime of law and order whereby the fulfilment of treaties would be guaranteed, to stabilize their currency, to put an end to pernicious propaganda.

It was not clear, however, how far these conditions were to be applied solely to foreign enterprises and nationals in the R.S.F.S.R. or to the whole population. The former supposition appears to be the more probable. It was thus proposed to set up a regime of *capitulations*.

Unofficially, at Genoa, Allied solidarity definitely showed a cleavage; for while France and Belgium claimed positive guarantees—the acknowledgment of debts and the return of property—Great Britain and Italy counted more upon the possibility of establishing spheres of influence in the Ukraine and the Caucasus and obtaining concessions there. For this reason they insisted on the necessity for the formula regarding non-interference in internal matters and, equally, on the impossibility of demanding the actual restitution of property. It also became known that, behind the scenes of the official negotiations, Krassin very nearly succeeded in coming to terms with the Royal Dutch Oil Company. This combination of oil interests, however, did not take place, owing to American protests.

The point of view of the Soviet Government was set forth in their Memorandum of April 20. In exchange for *de jure* recognition, and for credits they expressed their willingness to discuss the question of State debts and the compensation for confiscated property. The reply of the Powers (May 2: not signed by France or Belgium) omitted any reference to the question of credits or of recognition and reiterated their views regarding debts and the expropriation of foreign property.

The futility of continuing the negotiations was apparent. This result was not so much occasioned by differences of principle between the representatives of Capitalism and the Bolsheviks, as by the fact that there was no longer any solidarity among the Capitalists. This became still more apparent in June and July 1922 at The Hague where the experts on economic questions were called upon to attempt to find a way out of the blind alley—an attempt which naturally was unsuccessful. At The Hague, also, the hunt for separate concessions continued; while the irreconcilable element (in the person of Litvinov, as opposed to the opportunist Krassin) took the upper hand in leading Soviet circles.

The unconditional *de jure* recognition of the Soviet Government by the German Government (under the Treaty of Rapallo January 1923) was another and still more important breach in the anti-Red front.

In the light of all that has been mentioned above—the signing of the trade agreement between Great Britain and Moscow, the differences of opinion between the Allies, and the fact that the position taken up by Great Britain and Italy was noticeably less irreconcilable, it is evident that Rapallo, as manifesting a change of attitude with regard to Bolshevism forms a landmark in the history of the U.S.S.R.

After Rapallo

De jure recognition of the U.S.S.R. by Great Britain was somewhat delayed, partly owing to friction with the British Government, due to the arrest (May, 1923) of various British trawlers off the Soviet coast and partly owing to Soviet propaganda in the Far East. As soon, however, as MacDonald's Labour Government came into power in Great Britain, and the Radicals (under Herriot) in France, the Soviet Government was recognized *de jure*—on February 1, 1924, by the British Government, and on October 28, 1924, by the French. Italy, also, recognized the Soviet Government *de jure* on February 7, 1924.

America, alone among the Great Powers, refused to reconsider the position maintained by consecutive Administrations. President Coolidge in a message to the Congress of December 9, 1923, emphasized that, while not objecting to trade relations with the U.S.S.R., he did not intend to enter into official relations with a regime which did not acknowledge the sanctity of international obligations. In spite of Chicherin's readiness, expressed in a note of December 16, 1923, "to discuss all questions referred to in your message," the Secretary of State Hughes, on December 18, 1923, informed the Soviet Government that at present the United States saw no reason for entering into negotiations. Should the Soviet Government wish to give proof of its sincerity, a matter for which no preliminary negotiations were necessary, it must rescind its Decree respecting the nationalization of property and cancellation of debts. He added that the question of Communist seditious propaganda in the U.S.A. would have to be settled satisfactorily to the U.S. Government.

This view is in direct opposition to the policy pursued by European States—*e. g.* France and Great Britain—in dealing with the Soviet Government. The Anglo-Soviet Treaty was signed on August 8, 1924. This provided, that the question of debts should be decided by the appointment of a special commission which was to come to an agreement as to a sum to be paid by the Soviet to the British Government for distribution among the creditors. With regard to the former owners of property, their claims were to be satisfied by direct negotiations with the Soviet Government; or, if agreement were not reached, by the decision of a special committee. These financial provisions were combined with the furnishing of a guarantee to the Soviet Government for the re-

establishment of credit. In a word, this was "a treaty about a future treaty." As is well known, the "Zinoviev letter incident" brought about the fall of MacDonald's cabinet soon afterwards. The subsequent General Election returned a Conservative Government to power in Great Britain; and, in consequence, the Treaty was not ratified.

The Franco-Soviet Treaty, dealing with the subject of recognition and the reestablishment of normal relations between the two countries, was drawn on the same principles as the Anglo-Soviet, although following a more cautious course. The grant of *de jure* recognition was made conditional upon a future agreement being reached between the respective Governments. It recognized the Soviet Government as the legal successor of previous Russian Governments. It thus maintained the principle of continuity in the responsibility for former obligations. The Treaty recognized the readiness of both parties to renew diplomatic relations by interchanging Ambassadors. It made the reservation that recognition should not have any effect on the obligations and treaties which had been entered into by the French Government with Rumania (Bessarabia) and Georgia. Finally, as regards financial questions, the act confirmed the rights of the French State and its citizens in anticipation of a general treaty, to which the act of recognition would be a preliminary. Mention was also made of mutual non-interference in internal matters.

The European point of view, therefore, unlike the American, seemed to postulate that *de jure* recognition must precede any negotiations for the adjustment of outstanding questions. This was not merely a theoretical conclusion; Europe had tried other means—intervention and blockade—and had lamentably failed.

It was not merely the failure of an aggressive policy towards the Soviet regime which brought about a change in the international status of the U.S.S.R.: circumstances were working in favour of the Soviet Government. The Allied front, which owing to stern necessity had somehow remained intact during the War, very soon fell to pieces under the influence of conflicting post-War interests. Two camps, those of the victors and vanquished, were formed; but in the first camp France, unable to secure guarantees either from Great Britain or the United States, herself arranged a system of treaties for defence, and for maintaining the "balance of power." As regards Great Britain she was traditionally opposed to allowing the predominance of any one country on the Continent. In addition she was mainly concerned with her trading interests, and with the restoration of European markets. The United States which did not join the League of Nations, emphasized their unwillingness to enter the labyrinth of European relations. In Germany, extremist tendencies showed themselves, and an economic crisis took place—a deadlock, centering around the question of reparation, which led to the occupation of the Ruhr. In brief, the after effects of the War made themselves extensively felt in economic and social upheavals. Europe was suffering "from a crisis of democracy," precipi-

tated by the so-called "Balkanization" of Europe—the formation of several new States with a stimulated national consciousness. The application of the principle of self-determination caused a series of complications, many of which still make themselves felt.

If in addition to this the revolutionary agitation in Asia, where millions of people are unable to devote themselves to peaceful constructive work, be taken into account, it will be quite clear that Communism could continue to gain strength—not because of its inherent qualities but mainly owing to the difficulties confronting the world; its chief difficulties lay not abroad, but at home.

VII

THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE U.S.S.R. SINCE 1929

THE problem of giving a review of the events characterizing the present period of Soviet foreign politics is very complicated, because events and relations must be studied while incomplete and changing. Simultaneously, one must deal with the Government; which concludes treaties, receives and appoints Ambassadors and carries on diplomatic correspondence, and also with the Communist Party organization, whose activity—with the help of the Third International—has developed in ways and methods, which bear no resemblance whatever to those of traditional diplomacy. Finally, there is also the foreign activity of the OGPU, which has its own organization, independent of the Narcomindel.¹ The problem is somewhat simplified by the fact that all these institutions have to implicitly obey the supreme governing body of the U.S.S.R.—the Politbureau, in other words—Stalin.

It is interesting to note the resemblance between the foreign policy of Imperial Russia and that of the U.S.S.R.; which after encountering defeat in the West, seeks compensation in the East. Similarly, also, the present intimacy and collaboration between the U.S.S.R. and Germany is not due merely to geographical and political considerations; it is equally characteristic of Russian autocracy and the no less absolute Soviet regime. Italy in this novel and informal (but essentially significant and active) "triple alliance," has taken the place of Austria, which incidentally she doubtlessly expects to supplant in the Balkans and Trans-Danubian Europe.

With regard to Asiatic countries, the Soviet cancellation of all debts and concessions granted under the old regime, coupled with a steady flow of revolutionary propaganda, gives Soviet diplomacy all the best trumps in the game, although it was in too great a hurry when announcing a "grand slam."

These general indications may render the foreign politics of the

¹ The Commissariat of Foreign Affairs.

Soviet Government easier to understand, and pave the way for a statement of the present situation.

The Great Powers

By collocating the facts it is possible to note a kind of "curve," an imaginary graph of the Soviet Government's foreign policy from the moment when, at the end of 1923, it had to abandon its plans for an "immediate" World Revolution and established more normal relations by obtaining *de jure* recognition from several States. Until 1927 this curve went gradually up, though not without fluctuations, explained by the special nature of Communist diplomacy. For example, the growth of revolutionary and anti-foreign sentiment in China (1925) stimulated Red diplomacy to renew its purely revolutionary activities through the Comintern; whereas, Locarno, synchronizing with this, was looked upon, on the other hand, as a Red defeat, and a series of measures of "defence" were taken (*e. g.* "the Eastern Locarno"; pacts of mutual non-aggression with Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan; and new treaties with Germany and with Lithuania). At the same time, the Communist organizations throughout the world began clamouring that the Capitalist world was preparing to attack the Soviet Union.

In 1927, after the break with Great Britain and rebuffs in China,—incidentally, the reason was the same in both countries: official evidence of subversive Red propaganda—the curve begins to fall. The Kellogg-Briand pact of 1928 marks its lowest point. The Moscow Protocol, a counter-attack by Soviet diplomacy, discloses a state of intense Soviet nervousness as to the outcome of such international agreements.

The Five Years Plan for Industrialization must be regarded as the decisive factor in Soviet policy since 1929. It is not a mere question of domestic politics; the "building of Socialism in one country" and the intensive efforts towards military preparedness are stages in a process which must eventually have extensive international repercussions. The need of capital and peace to carry out the programme explains the less aggressive tone of present-day Soviet diplomacy. It is a repetition on an international scale of Lenin's NEP—a temporary halt of the Communist offensive.

For home consumption the Soviet Press and the so-called "Soviet public opinion" still showers abuse on the British Labour Party ("the lackeys of the bourgeoisie"); but this does not seem to affect "official" opinion in the U.S.S.R. On Labour's return to power, successful efforts were made to resume diplomatic relations with Great Britain; there was no need to neglect the advantages to the equipment of Soviet industry, accruing from the Trade Facilities Act. A Trade Treaty with Great Britain was accordingly signed on April 6th, 1930.

It is characteristic of Soviet diplomacy since 1929, to spare no effort to convince the World of Moscow's peaceable intentions. More than this, in their disarmament proposals the Communists strive for the title of "champions of peace" in the full sense of the word. The renewal

of treaties, dating from 1925 and 1926, coincides with the period known as the "Eastern Locarno"; its fruits were a new agreement, with Germany providing State guarantees for Soviet orders; a Trade Agreement with Italy which also gave, although not as generously as Germany, similar State guarantees; and a proposal by Litvinov at Geneva to "refrain from economic aggression." In a word, Soviet diplomacy since 1929—and particularly in 1931—is trying hard to be on its "best behaviour": to make the world forget past delinquencies.

It is a matter of particular interest to notice the intense consternation occasioned both in Berlin and Warsaw by the renewal in 1931 of Franco-Soviet negotiations. A mere hint at the possibility of an economic and, still worse, a political agreement between Moscow and Paris set both German and Polish opinion on edge. The former feared the U.S.S.R.'s adhesion to the guaranteeing of the Polish frontiers in the West (the Corridor); the latter feared that Polish interests might be sacrificed by France in favour of Soviet advantages.

The Polish Government in consequence renewed their efforts in Moscow and the recent pact of non-aggression signed between the two countries cleared the atmosphere considerably (July 25th, 1932).

Border States

Since 1920 one of the chief aims of Polish foreign policy was the creation of a Baltic Entente—Conferences in Helsingfors (1920, 1921), Riga (in 1920), and Warsaw (1922); this policy failed mainly owing to relations between Lithuania and Poland becoming more and more strained; moreover Finland, an important link in the chain, showed no desire to commit herself. In 1922 a political agreement recognizing the Baltic *status quo* was actually drawn up at Warsaw, but it was never ratified by the respective Governments. Lithuania, which had not been represented at Warsaw, concluded in 1923, a defensive Treaty with Latvia. A Customs' Union between these two countries was also projected, but, despite the signing of a Treaty (Riga, February 5th, 1927), it has not yet come into operation.

Soviet diplomacy has always tried to counteract Polish activities. In 1926 the Soviet Government offered to conclude a pact of non-aggression with all the Baltic States, but Lithuania was the only one to accept. The U.S.S.R., however, concluded on June 2nd, 1927, Trade Treaties with Latvia and Estonia (May 17th, 1929), which gave Soviet trade considerable economic advantages. It may be said, however, that neither in Latvia nor Estonia were these treaties regarded as advantageous. In Estonia, particularly, the (Socialist) Government was only able to ratify the treaty by a small majority of votes.

The Pact with Lithuania caused, *inter alia*, an exchange of notes between Warsaw and Moscow, relating exclusively to the question of Vilna. During the Civil War period, when not only towns, but whole districts, were considered disputed territory, Vilna was occupied (October 1920), by the Polish General Zeligowski, at the head of a

band of volunteers. This *fait accompli* was given legal sanction (March 1923) by a decision of the Conference of Ambassadors. Lithuania did not ratify this decision, and protested—with little effect—to the League of Nations.

The Soviet-Lithuanian Treaty of September 1926, attracted the attention of the Polish Government by that part of it which speaks "of some territories which separate Lithuania from the U.S.S.R." (the Vilna district), which in Polish opinion is incontestably an integral part of the territory of the Polish Republic. According to the Riga Treaty the Soviet Government waived any pretensions to this territory, and agreed that the question of its ownership concerned only Poland and Lithuania. The Poles protested against this infringement of the treaty in a note (October 23, 1926). The Soviet Ambassador in Warsaw (November 19, 1926) confirmed the correctness of the interpretation of the Riga Treaty set out in the Polish Note; but did not accept as binding the decision of the Conference of Ambassadors—which had been repudiated by Lithuania.

The Polish-Lithuanian relations have a parallel in those between the U.S.S.R. and Rumania on the question of Bessarabia. This former Russian province was occupied by the Rumanians during the Russian Civil War. The Soviet Government never recognized the legality of this act—nor has it ever received full recognition from the Great Powers—a matter which considerably complicates the situation in Eastern Europe.

On February 9th, 1929, the so-called "Litvinov Pact" or "Moscow Protocol" providing for non-aggression between the U.S.S.R., Poland, Latvia, Estonia, and Rumania was signed in Moscow. The fact of its being signed by Rumania seems to point to the possibility of a U.S.S.R. understanding with this country in spite of Bessarabia, (although Litvinov made a reservation that the signing of the Protocol did not affect this dispute about Bessarabia in any way); while the absence of Lithuania's signature confirms the abnormal relations between Poland and Lithuania.

On July 25, 1932 a new pact of non-aggression was signed between the U.S.S.R. and Poland. Again the Bessarabian question was left open. This new pact opens the way to negotiations of a treaty between France and the U.S.S.R., the preliminaries of which were discussed in 1931.

Asia

Turning to Asia it may be well, first of all, to discuss a legend which has found widespread credence. Many believe that in Asia there is, essentially, no difference between Soviet policy and the diplomacy of the old regime. Such an idea is far too superficial, and begs the very complicated question of Russian Asiatic relations in general.

For Soviet diplomacy Asia was the arena most obviously suited for manœuvres chiefly directed, in point of fact, against Great Britain, but,

in principle, against the whole Capitalist system. Having failed in its efforts to promote a World Revolution by direct action in Europe, it turned to the East—a manœuvre calculated to produce a strong effect on Europe. The calculation proved to be correct, for in London negotiations were begun with the Soviet Government in 1921.

This brings forward the one permanent principle of Soviet diplomacy—World Revolution. The Communists make use of every favourable opportunity, anywhere, to forward it. And Asia is merely one of the chess-boards on which the complicated game can be played.

Since 1925 “the policy of disinterestedness” of the first years, dictated by shrewd political calculation, has begun to show cracks. For instance, it may be recalled that in 1925 the Afghan island of Urtatugai on the Syr Daria was seized; in 1928 an armed intervention in the internal affairs of Afghanistan ended by the Red Army seizing Mazar-i-Sherif; there was serious friction with Persia in 1927 about the final handing over to her of the port of Pechlevi (formerly Enzeli). The most glaring example of Soviet-Asiatic “friendship,” however, is the armed conflict in 1929 with China about the Eastern Chinese railway. These cases will suffice to illustrate the pressure of “Imperialism” in Soviet practice as distinguished from its theory.

The most important point to be emphasized here is the fact that the greatly exaggerated influence of the Soviet Government in Asia is not a special merit or success of Soviet policy but the logical consequence of Russian political importance in Asia, established through the ages and inherited by the Soviet Government. Consequently, the weight of the U.S.S.R. in Asia must, first of all, be attributed to inherent Russian influence there. The Soviet Government, pursuing its aim of World Revolution, merely made use of the existing anti-foreign feeling, which had been steadily on the increase since the Boxer Rebellion, and which was allied to that loss of respect for the white man caused by the Russian-Japanese War and the British difficulties in China and India.

Therein lies the gulf between the policy of the Old Regime and the New. The policy of World Revolution does not allow the U.S.S.R. to regard herself as at one with the rest of the World. This must be borne in mind when dealing with the Soviet policy in Asia, where the words “Capitalist” and “European” (or “American”) are synonymous. By inciting the Asiatics to greater hatred of the West, and by playing on their national, economic and cultural inclinations, the Soviet Government still hopes to make Asia its ally in the coming struggle with the Capitalist world. By showing-up and exaggerating the abuses of foreign power in the East they have, to some extent, succeeded in doing so.

There is no revolutionary event in Asia during the last ten years in which the Soviet Government has not had a hand—the Chinese Civil War, disturbances in India, in the French Colonies of Indo-China, in the Dutch East Indies, etc. However, these efforts of the Soviet Government have not resulted in complete success. The movement

towards independence in Asia is slowly assuming a national character—incompatible with the fundamental principles of Communism.

Turkey

In regard to Turkey, the essential question for Russia has always been the Straits. Under the Soviet regime, this question was touched upon in the Moscow Treaty (1921), which proposed to bring it up for decision at a conference of the littoral States of the Black Sea. This new diplomatic formula was not devoid of interest; but it was never discussed.

Questions concerning Turkey were decided at the Conference of Lausanne, mainly in the sense desired by Great Britain. Lord Curzon's plan much resembled the one proclaimed after the Crimean war. Chicherin opposed to the British formula the traditional Russian plan of closing the entrance to the Straits to all warships. He tried to obtain support for this plan from the Turkish delegate, İzmet Pasha; but the latter took the initiative in guaranteeing Turkey's interests at the price of concessions to Lord Curzon. On June 27, 1923, the Soviet Government agreed to sign the convention regarding the Straits. The reaction to the Lausanne Treaty in Moscow is illustrated by the following article of "Pravda" of July 21, 1923: ". . . This Convention violated our rights and those of Turkey; but we reserve the right, sooner or later, to insist on its revision. The future does not belong neither to the Curzons nor to the Poincarés . . ." and further ". . . the superiority of the naval armaments of the Entente Powers . . . signifies the transformation of the Black Sea into an Anglo-French lake. The weakness of our fleet leaves our seaboard open to the guns of British cruisers . . . Compelled to sign . . . we call attention to the forced nature of our signature."

Without going into details, it may be stated that the relations between Moscow and Ankara are developing without complications and are characterized by an amicable spirit. The pact of non-aggression signed on December 17, 1925 in Paris by Chicherin and Tewfik Rushdi Bey (the first step in the "Eastern Locarno"), was renewed on December 17, 1929, by the so-called Ankara Protocol, signed by Karakhan, who went to Turkey for that purpose. On July 28, 1930, ratifications of this Protocol were exchanged in Moscow.

The trade policy of the Soviet Government with regard to Turkey has not always been free from criticism in interested Turkish circles; especially, owing to Soviet dumping in recent times. It is regulated by the Trade Treaty of March 11th, 1927, which was renewed on March 16th, 1931.

Finally, special mention must be made of the signing by the Soviet Government and Turkey of a protocol dealing with their naval forces in the Black Sea. This took place on March 7th, 1931, *i. e.* soon after the signing by İzmet Pasha and Venizelos of the agreement concerning the limitation of both countries' naval armaments in the Aegean. The

most important point of the Soviet-Turkish Protocol is the mutual obligation of the parties to give six months' notice of an intention to increase their fleets.

Persia

The character of Soviet-Persian relations up to 1921 was somewhat platonic in the sense that Persia was separated from the Soviet Government by a strip of territory occupied by British and White troops. In a proclamation of November 22, 1917, "to all working Moslems of Russia and the East" the Soviet Government announced that "the Treaty dealing with the partition of Persia is torn up and destroyed. As soon as military operations cease, the Red troops will be withdrawn from Persia and she will be guaranteed the right of freely determining her fate." Later in accordance with Article 12 of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, Russia and Turkey agreed to evacuate their troops from Persia.

On February 26, 1921, a Russo-Persian Treaty was signed in Moscow and on April 25, the first Soviet Ambassador, Rotstein, arrived in Teheran. In accordance with the Treaty, the Soviet Government handed over to Persia, without any compensation, all the concessions obtained by the Old Regime, renounced the *capitulations*, and foreshadowed the conclusion of consular and postal conventions. Persia bound herself (Art. 13) not to hand over the restored concessions and property to any foreign State or citizens and to conclude an agreement with the appropriate Soviet Commissariat regarding the exploitation of the fish industries on the Southern shore of the Caspian (formerly a Russian private concession).

A Trade Treaty was concluded on July 3, 1924, without, however, exhausting all the questions which awaited decision. It was only on October 1, 1927, simultaneously with the Eastern Locarno that a final Trade Treaty was signed in Moscow. This established the principle of a conventional tariff on the exchange of goods; it allowed transit through Soviet territory to certain categories of Persian goods, and included an agreement with regard to the port of Enzeli and the fisheries.

Soviet-Persian relations based on these treaties and on a long intimacy as neighbours, continue to be friendly; although, it must be noted that Persia, like Turkey, is much perturbed by the trade oppression of the Soviet trade monopoly whereby the individual merchant—who has less individual influence in the East than in the West—is brought face to face with a powerful State organization. A special cause of complaint in Persia was the arbitrariness of the Soviet authorities in the matters of exchange—their calculations being made to the manifest disadvantage of the Persian merchants. It may be surmised that the renewal of the Trade Treaty, which was concluded for five years, will be less favourably received in Persia than in Turkey.

Afghanistan

Soviet relations with Afghanistan took definite form in the Treaty of September 1, 1920, which was signed at Kabul and which provided, *inter alia*, for the payment to the Amir of an annual subsidy of one million gold rubles and for the building of a telegraph line—Kushka-Herat-Kandahar-Kabul. There are indications that, in 1919, Amanullah corresponded with Lenin, who promised him support in his fight for independence. The Soviet-Afghan amity was next consolidated (during the Locarno period) in August, 1926, by a pact of non-aggression, which was renewed on June 24, 1931. This circumstance points to the fact that Nadir Shah (who succeeded Amanullah) has not changed the orientation of Kabul's diplomacy.

Trade relations with Afghanistan are not important. They are based on free trade principles (Art. 6 of the Treaty of 1920 ratified in 1921). It must be noted, that Soviet aviation maintains a regular connection between Tashkent and Kabul via Stalinabad; and that in 1926 it assisted the Amir to repress the rebellion in Host, ten Soviet aeroplanes being despatched for this purpose.

China

When mention is made of Soviet policy in the Far East, its principal features are usually supposed to reside in the fact of making Canton the base of civil disturbance in China and in the vicissitudes of the conflict over the Eastern Chinese railway in Manchuria.

Mongolia is mentioned much less often, although the Soviet Government's policy in this country really deserves far more attention. Officially as the result of certain events which took place during the Russian Civil War in the territory of Mongolia and its near vicinity, a Treaty was signed with Mongolia by the Soviet Government, on November 2, 1921. It was supplemented later by other agreements which gradually led, especially after the death (1924) of the Dalai Lama, to the Sovietization of Mongolia.

The significance of Mongolia in the Far Eastern policy of the Soviet Government is not confined to the transformation of this country *de facto*, if not *de jure*, into a portion of the Soviet Union but resides also in the fact that the Urga-Kalgan line of *communications* forms the artery along which for many years the Chinese revolutionaries have been fed with armaments and munitions.

Furthermore, Mongolia is at the same time an object lesson of the manner in which the Soviet Government follows the path of pre-Revolution Russian diplomacy, at the same time distorting the objective in view; while the Empire which concluded a Treaty with Mongolia, (November 3, 1912), guaranteeing certain Russian political and trade privileges, endeavoured to keep the peace in this part of Asia and confirmed the sovereign rights of China, by the Triple Russo-Mongol-Chinese Treaty of Kiakhta (May 25, 1915). Soviet diplomacy, on the

contrary, makes use of Mongolia not in the interests of peace but as a means of inciting Civil War in China.

The Chinese Eastern Railway is the second most important factor in Chinese-Soviet relations. Whatever difficulties Russian diplomacy may have encountered in the past in connection with the Chinese Eastern Railway, the methods employed were confirmed by international acts and belong to a category well known in international law (*e. g.* Panama Canal Zone; the post-war "corridors," etc.).

The period of transition in the history of this railway—between the fall of the old regime and the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet and Chinese Governments—was marked by a temporary agreement (October 2, 1920) between the Chinese Government and a Committee of the Russo-Asiatic Bank, sitting in Paris. The Soviet Government, in a Note of December 8, 1921 (addressed to France, Great Britain, the United States, Italy and Belgium, a copy being also communicated to the Chinese Government), re-affirmed all Russia's rights over this railway and declared any agreements reached on this question without Soviet participation and explicit approval to be *ipso facto* invalid.

This temporary arrangement lasted till the conclusion on May 31, 1924, of a Sino-Soviet Treaty, reestablishing diplomatic relations on the principle of equal rights, and supplemented (September 29, 1924) by a special agreement with the autonomous Mukden Government concerning the railway, which returned, in October, 1924, to the old method of a mixed Chinese-Russian management. The agreement thus reached, however, proved to be incapable of securing peaceful Chinese-Soviet cooperation. It would be unfair always to blame the Soviet Government for the conflicts that followed. All those knowing something of the position of affairs in China, especially as regards railway communication, well know the arbitrary methods employed by the Chinese military authorities. To this cause may be attributed two conflicts which took place in January and August 1926. In the former, the Mukden authorities demanded the free transport of troops and arrested the director of the railway on his refusal to grant this; in the latter, they seized the river flotilla on the Sungari, which belonged to the Railway Company. These disputes, however, were settled by negotiation. Far more lasting and serious was the conflict which broke out in 1929.

The strip of territory ceded to the Chinese Eastern Railway, was made use of by the Communists as a base for their propaganda; a fact which, naturally, did not escape the notice of the Chinese authorities, the more so as in 1926-1927 proofs of similar malicious activity on the part of Soviet diplomacy had been discovered in three different centres—Canton, Shanghai, and Peking. On May 27, 1929, the Chinese police raided the Soviet Consulate at Harbin, arrested all the persons present at a meeting of a section of the Third International and seized the documents.

The point of view held by the Kuomintang¹ (the present ruling party in Nanking) resolves itself into the question: (1) whether the Chinese Government had the right to arrest and deport foreigners who were apprehended on Chinese territory, at a time when they were hatching a plot with intent to depose this Government by force; (2) whether the arrest of agitators constitutes "a confiscation of the railway" if they are railway employees? The Soviet Government was accused of violating that part of the Mukden Agreement of 1924, which alludes to refraining from propaganda, and which forbids activity to any organization which intends to use force against the Government of either of the parties to the treaty.

The Soviet Government's attitude, on the other hand, was most unconvincing; it demanded the release of those arrested, and the re-establishment of the *status quo*; and threatened, in the event of a refusal, to deprive the Chinese representatives in the U.S.S.R. of extra-territorial rights. On July 13, the Soviet Government presented a three days' ultimatum. A rupture of diplomatic relations took place and the defence of Soviet interests in China was entrusted to Germany. On August 19, through the German Government, a note was handed to Nanking and Mukden respecting the invasion of bands of White guards and Chinese irregulars into Soviet territory; this, it stated, constituted provocation and justified military measures as a reply to the invasion. At the same time the Soviet Government tried to sow discord between Mukden and Nanking. The latter was accused of trying to incite the former to a struggle with the Soviets, to further and to use the conflict plans for the internationalization of the Chinese Eastern Railway; which would only strengthen the United States to the detriment of Japan. Japan, in her turn, was accused of complicating the conflict, and of looking upon Nanking as a tool of the United States. The Nanking Government was accused of playing a dangerous and inexplicable game. Unable to make up its mind to break with the "Imperialistic" treaties, it had at the same time violated the only treaty which was based on equal rights.

Such are, in general terms, the views maintained on the Soviet side. The initiative of the United States with regard to the maintenance of the Kellogg Pact in Manchuria was the cause of "a storm of indignation" and a bitter anti-Imperialist and anti-American campaign in Moscow.

It is characteristic of the real policy of the Soviet Government in Asia, that it did not hesitate to use force in this emergency. The conflict ended in favour of the Red Army, reinforced by Mongolian detachments and Korean Irregulars, while in the rear of the Chinese army, agents (following the rules of Soviet tactics) were organizing collisions, explosions of powder magazines, etc. On December 22, 1929, a Protocol was signed at Khabarovsk, which established a temporary

¹ "The Sino-Russian Crisis," published by the International Relations Committee, Nanking, China.

modus vivendi in anticipation of the conclusion of a treaty, to be negotiated in Moscow. Although these negotiations were begun (1930) they were broken off after several meetings had been held, as the Chinese representative did not find it possible to discuss various general questions (*e. g.* the Trade Treaty, the rights of trade representatives, etc.) raised from the Soviet side. After a long interval the negotiations were renewed in May 1931, but events in Manchuria and the Sino-Japanese conflicts of 1931–1932 relegated these to the background.

Japan

Soviet-Japanese relations constitute one of the most important elements of the Far Eastern situation. The reestablishment of normal relations took place on January 20, 1925, when the Soviet-Japanese Treaty was signed containing the usual clauses respecting non-intervention. Japan received oil concessions in Soviet Sakhalin, and also a lease of the Amur fisheries. If, however, the reestablishment of normal relations was dictated by the normal motives, which may be assumed to influence two Powers whose interests are closely connected, any hopes of special advantages developing in the course of time have hardly been realized. At the end of March, 1928, it is true, rumours were circulated that Viscount Goto had concluded a secret political agreement in Moscow, involving the recognition by Japan of the *status quo* of the U.S.S.R. in North Manchuria; a Japanese guarantee of its present frontiers in the Far East; a mutual pact of non-aggression; and a promise of Japanese credits. In return for these advantages the Soviet Government is supposed to have granted Japan concessions not only in the Amur district but also in Trans-Baikal, and to have recognized Japanese supremacy in South Manchuria as well as granting to Japan trade privileges in Mongolia and fishing rights in Soviet waters.

The trend of events from 1928 onwards makes it doubtful whether such an agreement was actually concluded. It is not without interest, however, to enumerate its rumoured contents, because they appear to give a sufficiently true picture of Soviet-Japanese mutual interests and follow mainly the lines of traditional Russian policy, since the Russo-Japanese War.

The Sino-Japanese conflict late in 1931 upset all possible calculations as to the development of the U.S.S.R.'s relations with the Empire of the Rising Sun. The forcible ejection of Chinese power from Manchuria and the proclamation of the latter's independence under the name of Manchukuo—all effected through Japanese connivance—is a drastic departure from the policy pursued by the two powers in this part of the world since the Russo-Japanese War. There is no doubt that responsibility for this departure lies with Japan and not with the U.S.S.R.

It is as yet premature to analyze the events; but there is no doubt that the situation in the Far East has taken a very serious turn. One of its first effects was a sort of unofficial rapprochement between the

U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., both these countries finding themselves defending the sovereign rights of China and the Briand-Kellogg Pact.

Japan's encroachments in Manchuria are decidedly of a nature to arouse legitimate apprehensions in the U.S.S.R., to say nothing of the heavy losses of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

The Manchurian problem seems very far from a solution and is fraught with incendiary possibilities which it would be unwise to disregard.

The League of Nations

From the very beginning the slogan of Soviet diplomacy has been "Lenin's front against Wilson's front"; the Third International, it claims, is the only true League of Nations; and it unites in an irreconcilable alliance against the Capitalist world not only the proletarian class and the Communist Party but also all oppressed and backward nations. A definite statement of the hostility of Communism to the League of Nations was made in the programme of the Comintern. *Class versus nation* is its chief thesis.

The Soviet Government, however, apart from its revolutionary partisanship, is a State authority; and, as such, its *de facto* relations with the League of Nations must be studied. Until 1926 this matter was only of abstract and theoretical interest. When, for some reason or other, the Soviet leaders thought it necessary to express their opinion on the League of Nations, they merely maintained that it is "a shop where nations are bought and sold": that to join it would be treachery to the oppressed peoples and to the proletarians of the world—who are lulled to sleep by the Second International with the help of plans of disarmament; it is a "bourgeois consortium" of the victorious Powers, the chief aim of which is the maintenance of the *status quo*, advantageous for the exploitation by Capitalism of the proletariat and the oppressed peoples. All sections of the Third International are categorically forbidden to enter into relations with the International Labour Bureau—an "abominable masquerade, calculated to trick the proletariat into accepting the Capitalist shop." The Dawes Plan similarly is nothing but "a noose cast by the stock exchanges of New York, Paris and London round the neck of the German workman." Locarno was only meant "to pull the noose more tightly."¹

All the efforts of Soviet diplomacy have always been directed towards drawing Germany into the ranks of the "oppressed" nations. Every "oppressed" State, *i. e.* one which is in a condition of revolt against the established order, whether social, economic or political, is, or must become, an ally of the Communists who work to that end in Berlin, Ankara, Nanking, and everywhere where the situation appears suitable.

If in the first years the Soviet Government defined its attitude to the League of Nations so irreconcilably, then since it has been compelled (after 1926) to alter its decision to take part, for instance, in

¹ Quotations from diverse Soviet publications.

the work of this very League of Nations on disarmament, on political economy and on the question of European unity, can it be said that Communism has changed its attitude?

The answer to this question is, it would seem, in the negative. If indeed, the tone and contents of the speeches made by Soviet delegates to the League have become more moderate it would nevertheless appear that, so long as Communism remains true to itself, no real significance should be attached to such changes. They are merely excellent examples of the chameleon-like tactics used by Soviet diplomacy. The Communists consider, as already stated, that the principle of *nationality* must disappear altogether and give way to the principle of *class*. This illustrates their attitude to the existing political frontiers between States. These frontiers, mere partitions artificially separating the proletarians of the world, must be abolished. The only barriers that can exist are the horizontal boundaries between the classes, until such time as the proletariat, guided by Communism, shall have abolished all other classes. Briefly, such words as "territory," "frontiers," "nationality," which are so essential in international relations, mean nothing in the Communist vocabulary. If they ever use them it is for tactical reasons. This applies, in particular to the word "nationality" and is well illustrated by the creation of "national" republics in the Soviet Union. The purpose *inter alia* is to create trouble on the other side of the frontier. Such is the function of the Soviet Republics: of Moldavia on the frontier of Bessarabia; of Tadzhikistan and Turkmenistan, on the frontiers of Persia and Afghanistan; of Karelia on the Finnish border; and of White Russia on the Polish.

This, then, is the basic difference between Soviet foreign policy and the principles guiding the League of Nations: unless the Communist point of view, that the League of Nations is nothing but a class institution, set up by the bourgeoisie, be accepted.

This, too, distinguishes it in no less degree from Russian foreign policy before the Revolution. If certain resemblances persist, and if continuity between the two can be established, such is entirely a consequence of the country's geographical position and of its intrinsic importance in international affairs—not in the least an outcome of Communist theory and practice.

CONCLUSIONS

The status of the U.S.S.R. in the international community—of which she constitutes one of the largest units—under the present regime, can be epitomized as follows:—

1) as regards the *territory* of the Soviet Union, a certain stability has been achieved, to disturb which would not be in the interests of international peace. Any territorial question still subsisting between the Soviet Union and her neighbours can be solved by negotiation.

2) any disputes that may arise should consequently not be of a

territorial nature. The existence of a troubled atmosphere depends on the peculiar nature of Soviet authority, the aims it pursues and the methods it employs.

The Soviet leaders reverse the argument, and maintain that the atmosphere of nervousness and suspicion surrounding the U.S.S.R. is fomented by Imperialist plots, bourgeois class-hatred and Capitalist machinations. Whatever point of view one adopts, the conclusion must be much the same: the two systems—Capitalism and Communism—have very little common ground. There may be periods of toleration, dictated by circumstances—but there will never be peace, in the true sense of the word, between them.

The spirit in which the rising U.S.S.R. generation is being educated must also be taken into account. In a country which for fifteen years has been deliberately isolated and rendered unconditionally antagonistic to all the rest of the world, feelings of international solidarity and collaboration cannot possibly develop; on the other hand, bigotry and chauvinism must flourish—especially in the young, who have grown up without the possibility of forming any critical estimate either of the Soviet regime, of past conditions in Russia or of present conditions in foreign countries.

Soviet authority has no natural checks, either within the country or outside. To secret diplomacy must, therefore, be added an entire lack of public control over policy or expenditure of the national resources.

The Communists are straining every nerve, every atom of strength to make the U.S.S.R. an impregnable fortress of Socialism in its extreme form. This is the first and preparatory stage; the next, if and when it comes, must in their minds be the conversion of the whole world to Communism.

THE COMMUNIST OR THIRD INTERNATIONAL

I

HISTORICAL SURVEY

THE *Communist or Third International*¹ was founded by Lenin, also the founder of the Russian Communist Party (R.C.P.).²

It has been stated that the Comintern may be styled the Soviet Government's "Ministry of World Revolution." This definition, although not absolutely correct—as in many respects the Comintern determines the activities of the Soviet Government, and not *vice versa*—illustrates the position fairly well. The Comintern foundations certainly antedate the Soviet Government, as the bases of its organization were laid down in 1915 when at Lenin's initiative, there was held at Zimmerwald (Switzerland) a conference of Socialist "defeatists" from the Allied nations, the Central Empires and the neutral countries (representing eleven Socialist parties). At the end of this conference a resolution was passed recommending sabotage, general strikes and armed risings, in the hope of provoking a universal social revolution. This resolution was confirmed and developed by later conferences at Kienthal (1916) and Stockholm (August, 1917).

Thus was born the international Communist movement. Its technical organization was formed in 1919, after the accession to power of the Communists in Russia.

II

THE ESSENTIAL LINES OF THE PROGRAMME OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL³

THE Communist International claims to supply the long-felt need of an international organization of the world's revolutionary proletariat; and it aims at establishing a dictatorship of the proletariat, with the object of introducing Communism all over the world.

¹ There is a Second International (Amsterdam) which is sometimes called the "Yellow International" by the Communists.

² Now called the Pan-Union Communist Party. (V.C.P.)

³ From the programme adopted by the VI World Congress of the Communist International on Sept. 1, 1928, in Moscow. As far as possible the actual language of the programme has been preserved in this chapter.

Aims of the International

"The proletarian revolution signifies a violent intervention of the proletariat into the property institutions of bourgeois society. The conquest of power by the proletariat is not a peaceful evolution of the existing machinery of the bourgeois State through a parliamentary majority. The conquest of power by the proletariat is a violent abolition of the power of the bourgeoisie, the destruction of the apparatus of the Capitalist State (the bourgeois army, the bureaucratic hierarchy, tribunals, parliaments, etc.) and their replacement by new organs of proletarian power, which are primarily an instrument for the repression of exploiters. The Communist State presupposes a complete disarmament of the bourgeoisie, and the concentration of arms in the hands of the proletariat; the triumphant proletariat will employ the power it has obtained, as a lever for an economic revolution, *i. e.* for changing the regime of Capitalist property into a regime of Socialist production. The starting point of this great economic revolution is the expropriation of the great landowners and capitalists, *i. e.* the transfer of the individual property of the bourgeoisie to common ownership, for the benefit of the masses."

The Communist International sets the following fundamental tasks before the proletariat:—

1. a) Confiscation and nationalization of all private enterprises (factories, workshops, mines, electric power stations, etc.) and the handing over of these to the State; b) confiscation and nationalization of all privately-owned means of communication (railways, shipping, telegraphs, telephones, etc.), and their transfer to the State.

2. a) Confiscation and nationalization of all landed estates; b) confiscation of all means of production situated upon landed property, such as buildings, tools and implements, cattle, agricultural and dairy plants, flour mills, cheese farms, dairies, malt-houses, etc.; c) distribution of part of the land, particularly land under cultivation, to the poorer peasants; the proportion of land transferred to the peasantry must be determined by economic exigencies, by the necessity for neutralizing the peasantry and gaining them over to the side of the proletariat; this proportion must, consequently, vary according to circumstances.

3. a) The nationalization of private banks, and the transfer to the State of all gold reserves, valuables, securities, deposits, etc.; b) the centralization of all banking operations and the subordination of all the nationalized banks to a Central State Bank; c) the nationalization and transfer to the State of warehouses, grain elevators, stores, stocks of goods, etc.; d) the monopoly of foreign trade; e) the cancellation of State debts owed to Capitalists both at home and abroad.

4. a) The nationalization of printing establishments; b) the monopoly of newspapers and periodicals; c) the nationalization of film production, cinemas and theatres.

5. a) The confiscation of large buildings in private ownership; b) the transfer of the confiscated houses to the local Soviets; c) the accommodation of workmen's organizations in important private and public buildings.

Methods

The diversity of the conditions and means of realizing the Dictatorship of the Proletariat in different countries can be reduced to three principal types:—

1. *In highly developed Capitalist countries* (U.S.A., Germany, Great Britain, etc.), possessing great powers of production and a long established "bourgeois-democratic" regime, the principal political feature of the programme is Communist organization of the workers and a direct transition to the Dictatorship of the Proletariat.

2. *In less highly developed Capitalist countries* (Italy, Spain, Poland, etc.), the possibilities of a rapid change from the "bourgeois-democratic" order to Socialism, through revolution, are not so great; it will take some time before the revolutionary movement in these countries will acquire the character of a class struggle; here the agrarian revolution plays a more important part.

3. *In the colonial and semi-colonial countries* (China, India, etc.) where certain embryonic (and sometimes more developed) industries exist but where class-consciousness among the workers is not developed; where "mediaeval feudalism" predominates as much in the economic life of the country as in its political superstructure and where, finally, the principal industrial commercial and banking enterprises and the chief means of transport, etc. are concentrated in the hands of foreign "Imperialist" groups, the struggle of the peasantry against feudalism, Imperialism and oppression must be organized. The transition to the Dictatorship of the Proletariat in these countries is only possible after a long period of political and social changes; the success of Socialism is here dependent on the help of countries already under the Dictatorship of the Proletariat.

"The U.S.S.R. is the home of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat and of Socialist construction, the hope of the working classes, the union of the workers and peasants, the country of a new civilization, marching under the standard of Marxism; it must, therefore, inevitably become the pivot of the world movement of the oppressed classes, the centre of World Revolution and the most powerful factor of the world's new history."

The Strategy and Tactics of the Communist International

The accomplishment of the Comintern's "historic" task depends on the carrying out of a strategic plan in which every unit has its allotted part. The preparatory work must be done by the Communist Parties. It is essential that they strive relentlessly to extend their influence over the majority of the proletariat proper, as well as over the poorer

urban and rural population, the lower strata of the intelligentsia, small tradespeople, and the lower middle class.

Particular importance must be attached to the day-by-day work for the victory of the proletariat. The work performed even inside the "reactionary workers' syndicates,"¹ their penetration and the supersession of "reformist" boards, are among the most important tasks of the preparatory period. Special attention must be paid to organize the revolutionary elements among the peasantry.


This work must be conducted in secret until such time as direct action may become possible. But once direct action is decided, "it is the duty of every Communist Party to lead the masses in an open attack on the bourgeois State. This must be done by ever-increasing and open propaganda of Communist slogans, by the organization of mass demonstrations, industrial strikes, riots and armed insurrections against the power of the State and the bourgeoisie. Direct action must be subject to military rules, and presupposes a military plan. The preliminary and indispensable conditions for such action are the organization of large masses into fighting units, the formation of which draws together and sets in motion the majority of the workers, and presupposes an intensive revolutionary propaganda in the armed forces." In "Imperialist" countries, systematic aid must be given to revolutionary movements for the independence of the colonies: "In colonial and semi-colonial countries the Communist Parties are to carry on the most inveterate and widespread struggle against foreign Imperialism. At the same time they must promote the idea of a rapprochement and alliance with the proletariat of Imperialist countries, and openly launch, spread and bring into being the agrarian revolution by inciting the great masses of the peasantry to rise and throw off the yoke of the landowners, and by conducting a struggle against the reactionary and the mediaeval influence of the clergy, religious missions and similar elements."

The Communist International pays special attention to systematic preparation for combatting the aims of Imperialistic militarism: "The activities of the Communist Parties must unmask the Chauvinism and pacifist hypocrisy which conceal the Imperialist plans of the bourgeoisie, must proclaim the basic slogans of the Communist International through open and secret propaganda. The basic principles of the Communist International in this direction are to turn Imperialist war into civil war, to defend the U.S.S.R. and the colonies by every possible means, against all who make war on them. The sacred duty of all the sections and of all the members of the Communist International is to proclaim these principles, to unmask the sophistries of the social traitors² (Socialists), to tear off the mask of Socialism from the League of Nations and constantly to recall the experiences of the War of 1914."

¹ Reference to the Second International.

² Reference to the Second International.

In order to coordinate revolutionary aims and activities and to be able to direct them in the most efficient way the international proletariat has need of an international class discipline; which must, above all, be observed in the ranks of the Communist Parties. Communist international discipline expresses itself by the subordination of all special and local interests of the movement to its general and perma-



¹ I.e. German C.P., French C.P., English C.P., etc.

ment interests, and by the implicit carrying out of all the decisions taken by the organs at the head of the Communist International.

General Structure of the Communist International

The appended diagram gives a clear idea of the structure of the Comintern. It is based upon data given in the "International Correspondence Annual" published by the Comintern in Moscow in 1924. No changes in the structure of the Comintern have occurred since.

The addresses of the respective offices are:

The Executive Committee of the Comintern: Moscow, Sapozhkovskaya Place 1.

Its department: Organization (Directorate), Secretariat, Agitation and Propaganda, Information, Liaison, Moscow, Sapozhkovskaya Place 1.

The Executive Committee of the International for the Young, Moscow, Sapozhkovskaya Place 1.

Women's International, Moscow, Sapozhkovskaya Place 1.

Red Syndicalist International, Moscow, Solianka, 12.

Cooperative International, Moscow, Sapozhkovskaya Place 1.

Peasant International, Moscow, Staraya Place 5-8.

International Red Aid, Moscow, Ogarev Street, 4.

Sports International, Moscow, Varvarka, II.

Society for Cultural Relations between the U.S.S.R. and Abroad, (V.O.K.S.), Moscow, Malaya Nikitskaya 6.

International of Education Workers; Paris, Rue de la Grange-aux-Belles, 33.

Anti-Imperialist League: Berlin, Monbijou Platz 10.

International of the Proletarian Freethinkers (International of the Godless): Berlin.

Intertourist sections exist in all countries where there are Soviet diplomatic or trade delegations.

The Statutes of the Communist International

Several characteristic extracts from the official text of the Statutes of the Communist International are herewith given verbatim:

Par. 1. The Communist International, the international association of the workers, is the organization which unites all the Communist Parties of the world into one united Communist organization.

Par. 2. The political organizations which adhere to the Communist International bear the name of "The Communist Party of - - (name of country)". In each country there can be only one Communist Party, constituting a section of the Communist International.

Par. 3. A member of a Communist Party is a person who accepts the Programme and the Statutes of the Communist Party of the country where he is domiciled, and those of the Communist International, submits to all the decisions of the Party and International, and pays his contributions regularly.

Par. 4. The basis of the organization of the Communist Party are the Communist cells in every industrial enterprise (workshop, factory, mine, office, store, farm, etc.); the cells group together all the members of the Party, who work in the said enterprise.

Par. 5. The Communist International and its sections are organized on the principle of democratic centralization¹; subordinate organizations must implicitly obey the orders of the senior organizations; the decisions of the Communist International, as well as those of their respective directing organs must be carried out accurately and promptly . . . Once a decision has been taken by a Congress of the Communist International, their sections or the respective organs directing them, that decision must be rigidly carried out.

Par. 8. The supreme authority in the Communist International belongs to the World Congress of the representatives of all the Communist Parties and other organizations affiliated to the Communist International.

Par. 12. The executive Committee (ECCI) is the organ directing the Communist International in the interval between Congresses. It is this organ which gives directions to all the sections of the Communist International, and which controls their operations.

Par. 13. The decisions of the Executive Committee are binding upon all sections and must be applied by them without delay.

It follows, therefore, from the above extracts that every member of a Communist Party, by the very fact of his joining the Party, accepts the Statutes, and undertakes to carry out the decisions, of the organs which direct the party as well as the general programme of the Communist International. The following conclusion may be drawn from these facts: there is an absolute incompatibility between belonging to the Communist Party and accepting any official position in a "bourgeois State" (such, for instance, as that of a magistrate, a member of a legislative assembly, or a Government official), which impose special duties and responsibilities and include an expressed obligation of fidelity. The two engagements—to Party and to Country—are completely irreconcilable. There is here no mere question of opinion or politics; it is a fundamental conflict between two engagements which nullify one another—and between which, consequently, choice must be made.

III

CONGRESSES OF THE COMINTERN

THE supreme authority in the Comintern—the World Congress—was at first convened annually; it meets less frequently now.

The *First Congress of the Comintern* met in March, 1919, in

¹ All officers of the Comintern are elected, but each organ has unconditional powers over those below it.

Moscow. It consisted of 33 delegates from 19 Communist Parties and of 19 delegates from 16 other organizations in sympathy with its aims.

The *Second Congress* took place in July, 1920, in Moscow; 214 delegates were present and rules were drawn up for admission to membership of the Comintern. This Congress paid particular attention to the methods to be used to stir up revolution in the East. A little later (September 1st, 1920) at the initiative of the ECCI, the First Congress of Oriental Nations took place at Baku (1891 delegates, representing 37 nationalities).

The *Third Congress* met in July, 1921, in Moscow; 603 delegates were present, representing 98 Communist Parties, with about 2,000,000 members. The principal questions on the agenda were—the world economic crisis, the new tactics of the Comintern and the New Economic Policy of the Soviet Government (NEP).

The *Fourth Congress* took place in November, 1922, in St. Petersburg (401 delegates from 62 Parties representing about 1,965,000 members were present). The principal subjects on the agenda were: organization of a united front, the Programme of the Comintern, agrarian and syndicalist questions, the struggle against Fascism, and the organization of Communist Youth.

The *Fifth Congress* met in June, 1924, in Moscow. This Congress, in the first instance, paid a tribute to the memory of Lenin. The setbacks experienced by the Comintern in the West (Germany and Bulgaria) forced the Congress to turn its attention to the East.

From March 21st to April 6th, 1925, a session of the Executive of the Comintern (ECCI) met in Moscow under the chairmanship of Zinoviev. This assembly was extremely important because it examined with great attention various questions of technique; and laid, *inter alia*, the foundations for the secret activities of the Comintern in South America.

From February 17th to March 15th, 1926, another session of the Executive Committee took place in Moscow. On the 17th of March, 1926, the new statutes of the Communist International designed to secure greater smoothness in working were adopted. These statutes were inspired by a resolution of the XIV Congress of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R., which had recommended a larger representation of foreign Communist Parties on the board and secretariat of the ECCI.

In December, 1926, another session of the ECCI passed, among others, the following resolutions of the greatest importance for the work of the International: (1) The post of President of the Communist International was abolished (owing to the disgrace of Zinoviev). The office of President was replaced by a political secretariat, composed of 9 representatives of different Communist Parties. (2) The ECCI was hence to meet three times a year. It was to elect from among its members a Praesidium having permanent headquarters in Moscow and meeting daily. It was to consist of 18 members and 7 deputies.

The ECCI also issued to all the Communist organizations "Instructions for 1927" (vide "Pravda" of 18th December, 1926) which may thus be summarized—At present the stability of Capitalism is endangered, on the one hand, by the existence of the U.S.S.R. and, on the other, by the weakening of British Capitalism, the development of the class-struggle in Great Britain, and the Chinese National Revolution. Consequently the Communist Parties and the numerous international organizations created by the Comintern must not only consolidate the results already attained, but also exploit every pretext for incitement to revolutionary action. The masses are to be enlightened on the hidden motives of the "pseudo-pacifist" movement (Locarno and Thoiry) and on the "Imperialist" character of the League of Nations, which is to be replaced by the Soviet United States of Europe. The Comintern furthermore insists on strenuous opposition to all attempts of the bourgeoisie to improve the lot of the workers, such as profit-taking schemes or mixed syndicates of employers and workmen, etc.; and also on the duty to combat the Socialists of the Second International as well as all information directed against the Soviet Government.

Two more sessions of the ECCI in 1927 and 1928 led up to the Sixth Congress of the Comintern.

The *Sixth Congress of the Comintern* (17th July–1st September, 1928) was one of the most important meetings of the Communist International. On the 1st of September it adopted a revised form of the Programme and Statutes quoted above.

Reviewing in the Manifesto to the Proletariat of the World the international situation, it laid down a programme of activities for all the organizations affiliated to the Comintern; paying particular attention to Communist activities in the East and the Colonies.

The next session of the ECCI (Moscow, July 1929) occupied itself chiefly in issuing instructions to all Communist organizations to accelerate their preparations for World action; special attention was given to methods of provoking political and economic disturbances.

The last session of the ECCI (April 1931) of which information is available, stressed, when reviewing the world economic crisis, the possibility of armed Capitalist intervention in the U.S.S.R. It reaffirmed the need, throughout all Communist organizations, of great vigilance and readiness to act swiftly—either to oppose such intervention or, if the crisis came to a head, to take revolutionary action.

IV

THE AUXILIARY ORGANIZATIONS OF THE COMINTERN

IN ESTABLISHING auxiliary organizations, the Communist leaders started with the essentially practical idea that the work done must differ according to circumstances, and that success must depend on the penetration of every profession and every class. These organizations

do not confine their activities to Communist elements, but also penetrate into other strata of society; either to recruit new adherents, or to disintegrate them to the advantage of Communism. A brief survey of some of these organizations follows:

The International Union of Communist Youth or Comsomol has as its object to assure the recruiting and training of members for the Communist ranks, by emancipating youth from such "bourgeois" prejudices as religion, patriotism and respect for the family.

In the U.S.S.R. the Comsomol counts some 5,000,000 members; its foreign organizations spread all over the world. Affiliated to it are the *Red Pioneers* and the *Children of Lenin*. Outside the U.S.S.R. it is one of the special duties of the Comsomol to disintegrate national armies and to form the nucleus of the Red Guards.

The Comsomol publishes numerous periodicals, *e. g.* *The Red Dawn* (Great Britain) *The Young Comrade* (France) *The Young Comrade and the Proletarian Child* (Germany) *Pioneers* (Denmark), *The Young Comrade* (Holland) *The Young Worker and Communist* (Belgium) etc.

Closely connected with the International Union of Communist Youth is the *Women's Red International*.

The Congress of Communist Women held in Paris, on November 16, 1924, defined the part to be played by woman in the Communist movement in the following way: "For a successful revolution the adherence of woman is indispensable: to get hold of the woman, she must be dissociated from her home; her selfish sentiment and her instinct of maternal love must be destroyed—Woman, if she loves her children, is nothing but a bitch . . ."

Another important organization closely related to the Comsomol is the *Sport International (Sportintern)*. Generally speaking, the Comintern pays special attention to the development of sports organizations, with a view to using them as auxiliary groups of the Red Army or as secret Red Guards abroad. The Communist sports organizations (in the U.S.S.R. there are no other) also play an important part in the anti-religious training of the young.

The main auxiliary organizations of the Red Army outside the U.S.S.R. besides those of the Sportintern, are given the name of *International Groupings of the Red Combatants* consisting of such organizations as "*Proletarian Defence*," "*Combatants of the Red Front*," "*Old Red Combatants*," etc.

Their activities are defined as follows: "The various organizations for proletarian defence are armed bodies, professing the principles of proletarian class consciousness; they are established for the defence of the working masses, in order to organize and instruct them for the struggle against Imperialist wars and Fascism, as well as for the protection and defence of the Soviet Union."

The Voks, or Society for Cultural Relations with Abroad has as its definite aim to bring the intellectual circles of the West under the

influence of the Comintern by exploiting the fields of science, literature and art. The Voks is in direct relations with the Comintern's section of Agitation and Propaganda and with the OGPU; it is entrusted at the same time with the supervision of Russian scientists, as regards their international relations. The expenses of the organization are met by the Soviet Government. A news bulletin is published in four languages. It is the Voks which receives, controls, directs and registers the educated foreigners who visit the U.S.S.R., through an institution called the *Intourist* (International Tourist).

On the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution (1927) at the instance of the Voks, an International Society of the Friends of the U.S.S.R. was founded. It is an auxiliary propaganda institution of the Voks, and is meant to reach the organizations of the foreign intelligentsia. It has many branches abroad and has established a great many societies, of a subsidiary character with a non-Communist membership, which serve the purpose of "intellectual propaganda"; such for instance is the American Society for Cultural Relations with Soviet Russia, similar societies in European and Asiatic countries, etc.

The International Educational Workers is an organization uniting all Communist and pro-Communist teachers of the world; it has numerous foreign sections: French, German, Dutch, Belgian, Luxembourg, English, Italian, Spanish and Portuguese.

According to the terms of article 3, the I.E.W. "has for its aim the grouping of all the national organizations of educational workers *on a basis of class-war*." It publishes a news bulletin in three languages from its headquarters in Paris, but it is controlled by its Soviet branch—the Soviet Union of Teachers.

The Freethinkers (Godless) International the main object of which is anti-religious propaganda outside the U.S.S.R. bears to its Soviet branch, the Union of the Godless, the same relation as the I.E.W. does to the Soviet Union of Teachers. It is the Soviet branch which supports and directs the whole. I.E.W. headquarters are in Berlin.

The International Red Aid and the International Workers' Aid were created by the Comintern in order to penetrate the intelligentsia and the masses of workmen under the cover of philanthropy, and thereby to absorb large numbers of non-Communists. Their aims are defined as follows (in the shorthand transcript of the First International Congress of the I.R.A. June, 1924): "The powerful organization of the International Red Aid is distributed all over the world; its adherents number several millions. It is neither a philanthropic organization, nor an institution of public welfare, but must be looked upon as a fighting unit of the international proletarian movement. The Executive Committee of the Communist International considers the I.R.A. as one of its most important members."

The I.R.A. is associated with the activities of authors, scientists and intellectuals in many countries. Owing to its well-planned organization and its clever tactics, it constitutes one of the pillars of Communist

propaganda. Light was thrown on this subject by the Sacco-Vanzetti agitation and disturbances in the U.S.A., Paris, Geneva, etc. All the delegates of the Soviet Red Cross outside Russia are, in one way or another, affiliated to the I.R.A.

Several other less important Communist auxiliary organizations, such as *The Anti-Fascist International*, the *Esperanto Groups*, and the *International of Revolutionary Writers* specialize in propaganda for intellectual centres.

*The Red Syndicalist International, or Profintern*¹ was founded by the Comintern in 1920. It is the most important of the auxiliary organizations and is represented in the Executive Committee of the Comintern.

The constitution of the Communist Syndicates had for its object the disorganization of the "reformist" labour organizations. In France the C.G.T.² was thus split into two sections; one of which, the C.G.T.U.³ is affiliated to the Profintern. The same occurred in Czechoslovakia. The Profintern has scored important successes in Norway, Finland, U.S.A., Latin America, China, India, Africa, Australia and Mexico. In Great Britain a section of each Trade Union is affiliated to the Profintern. The struggle against the International Federation of Labour (affiliated to the Second International) is still going on.

The successful resistance put up by the "reformists" caused Moscow to change its tactics. It solemnly proclaimed the necessity of safeguarding "syndicalist unity." At the same time the Third Congress of the Profintern recommended the Communist workmen of every country to strive to disintegrate this unity from within, while continuing to belong to the "reformist" Federation of Labour either individually or as entire organizations.

The Red Peasant International (Krestintern) is designed to spread Communist propaganda among the "international agricultural proletariat." It was founded in October, 1923 for the purpose of banding together the poorer or discontented peasants and agricultural labourers in opposition to the more well-to-do peasants and landowners; it also endeavours to form a close bond between the urban Communist workers and the peasants. It is only in the course of the last few years that the activities of this special branch of the Communist International have attained noticeable development.

The Krestintern is active not only in Europe but also in China, the Dutch Indies, British India and in Africa. It issues numerous publications.

In order to assure a "scientific" basis for the revolutionary peasant movement, an "*International Agricultural Institute*" was founded (1926) in Moscow. This, however, has very little interest in agriculture as such; its activities are purely political.

¹ Professional International.

² Conseil General du Travail.

³ Conseil General du Travail Unifié.

The Cooperative Section of the Executive of the Comintern is in close touch with the Profintern and Krestintern. It does not aim at establishing new Communist organizations but at penetrating existing cooperative societies for the purpose of controlling them. Its work is defined in the following way by the Executive Committee of the Communist International, in an international appeal to Red cooperatives: "85,000 cooperative societies, with their 50 millions of members must be united in an International Cooperative Alliance, representing labour. It must proclaim its solidarity with the First Republic of Labour and demonstrate in favour of a united front of the workers against Capital. Every cooperative society should become a weapon in the hands of the working class."

It may be added that the agents of the Centrosouz (Union of Soviet Cooperative Societies) outside the U.S.S.R. play a most important part, not only as commercial agents but also as active propagandists.

The Comintern in Asia and Africa

To attain various objectives in the East, the Soviet Government and the Comintern have set on foot a vast organization. One of the most important organizations working in the East, the *Scientific Association for the Understanding of the East of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R.* was founded in 1921, to serve as a "laboratory for the Bolshevization of the East." It is in intimate relations with the Comintern. As may be seen from its title, it is a Soviet Government institution.

Another—*The League against Colonial Oppression and Imperialism* was founded, on the initiative of the Comintern, in February, 1927, at an international congress in Brussels. This congress was the starting point of great activity all over the world. Among those who took part in it were representatives of the Executive of the Third International of the Communist Party in the Reichstag, of the International Workers' Aid, of the Intourist of the Belgian Communist Party and of the International League of Women for Peace and Liberty.

In March, 1927, the Executive of the League met in Amsterdam; then in Cologne in 1928, later in Frankfurt in 1929 and finally at Berlin (1931). The last of these assemblies decided to include in the programme of the League "assistance to the revolutionary minorities in Europe."¹

V

THE BUDGET OF THE COMINTERN AND ITS AUXILIARY ORGANIZATIONS

"INTERNATIONAL CORRESPONDENCE," the official organ of the Comintern, published in its number of May 2, 1931, the following budget:

¹ Full details of Communist activities in Asia and Africa may be found in the "Yellow Book" at the International Colonial Office (at The Hague).

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CASH ACCOUNT FOR 1930

RECEIPTS

	(In American dollars)
1. Balance brought forward from 1929.....	14,733.24
2. Members' subscriptions. Payments from 49 sections containing 2,518,637 members	956,009.32
3. Subscriptions and donations.....	85,481.74
4. Receipts from publications, telegraph and Press agencies.....	60,006.80
Total	<u>\$1,096,231.10</u>

EXPENDITURES

1. Administration (staff, economic administration, etc.).....	321,469.05
2. Postal and telegraph charges.....	24,417.37
3. Missions	48,024.62
4. Subsidies to newspapers, publications and cultural and educational work.....	631,230.76
5. Balance carried forward.....	61,089.30
Total	<u>\$1,096,231.10</u>

This budget merely shows the receipts and expenditures of the ECCI; the total budget of the Comintern, with all its organizations and auxiliaries, is of course much larger. However, for obvious reasons, this budget is kept secret; just as the activities of the various agencies of the Comintern, and the subsidies occasionally paid by Moscow to foreign Communist Parties are never officially disclosed. The total figure of \$8,000,000 *per annum* has been suggested by competent authorities—but there is no way of checking this.

It is also difficult to obtain correct information as to the exact source of these sums. It is quite evident that the greater part of the funds can only come from the Soviet Government; because the subscriptions from foreign members of the Comintern are negligible. Nevertheless, it is not denied that the coffers of the Comintern are occasionally replenished from abroad; thus the Communist movement in China produced considerable sums. Collections have also been made by Communist agents among the nationalist elements in both British and Dutch Indies, and some important donations have come from pro-Communist sources in Europe and America.

VI

THE COMINTERN, THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE U.S.S.R. AND THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

THE programme of the Comintern contains a special chapter under the following heading: "Importance of the U.S.S.R. Its International revolutionary obligations." It points out that the U.S.S.R. is the home of the World Revolution, and that the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. is a section of the Comintern, which directs the Dictatorship of the Proletariat in the U.S.S.R. and controls the Soviet Government.

Stalin confirmed this direct subordination of the Soviet Government to the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. in his speech to the American workers' delegation, published in "Pravda" on September 15, 1927. At the same time the leaders of the Union Communist Party are also the leaders of the Communist International. They appoint its staff; while the ECCI is housed in a Soviet Government building in Moscow.

The respective duties of Stalin in the Soviet Government, Communist Party and the Comintern form a good illustration of the above; he is a member of the Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R., a member of the Council of Labour and Defence, the Secretary General of the Union Communist Party, and a member of the Praesidium of the ECCI. There is no possibility, with the best will in the world, of making any real distinction between the activities of these various organs. But in accordance with the statutes of the Communist International and the rules of the Communist Parties, it is every member's duty to devote himself to executing the orders of the Supreme Communist authority—the Comintern. The members of the Soviet Government, its home agents and its diplomatic and commercial representatives abroad are all members of the Communist Party. It necessarily follows that, no matter what their official position may be in the last resort the Comintern is their supreme. Practice, however, does not always follow theory. Since the inauguration of Stalin's regime, the Comintern has greatly diminished in importance, and all Communist activities have been made to serve the aims of the Five Years Plan. The requirements of industrialization have very definitely relegated the international political issue, for the time being, to a secondary role. But it must not be forgotten that the Plan itself is a stepping stone for World Revolution; Red "preparedness" in the U.S.S.R. must be followed by world-wide action, and thus the present subordination of the Comintern to the Socialist construction of the Soviet Union must be considered transitory and tactical. The principle of the Comintern leadership for World Revolution and its supreme authority have not, and will not be abandoned.

PART THREE—ECONOMIC

FIVE YEARS PLAN

THE problem of economic reconstruction takes first place in the minds of the Communist rulers of the U.S.S.R. If in 1917 Lenin could, with a certain justification, enunciate that everything "even the baking of bread, is politics," his successor Stalin, in 1928, was no less justified, from the Communist point of view, in proclaiming that "everything is economics."

The reasons for this change are simple enough. At the end of the Civil War (1920) the Communists had every hope that the Russian Revolution would speedily be followed by similar revolutions throughout all Europe. Both in the victorious and in the vanquished countries, the war-weary masses were restless; Communist propaganda was being successfully conducted among the workers of Germany, Great Britain, Italy, France, etc.: Communist Parties were springing up everywhere; riots and revolutionary outbreaks were frequent—altogether, the disorganization occasioned by the War seemed to have brought about a critical period which the bourgeois order could not possibly survive. The World Revolution—the ultimate aim of Communism—seemed imminent. But the failure of the Communist *putsch* in Germany (1923) brought the Bolsheviks back to realities.

They then turned to the East. Without discontinuing their efforts on the "Western Front," the greater part of their attention was diverted to China, India and the Near East. It was hoped to strike a decisive blow at Capitalism through "the colonial peoples"; and at certain moments it appeared that success was near. But here again the Communists were disappointed; the revolutionary movement in Asia took a definitely Nationalist turn, and divorced itself from any direct dependence on Moscow.

This forced the Soviet leaders to reconsider their policy for World-Revolution once more. It was decided that the only way to achieve this would be by making the U.S.S.R. the fortified base of a protracted struggle against Capitalism—a base which could, independently of any foreign allies, maintain the fight for World Revolution. Hence the proclamation of the motto "Socialism in one country" (Stalin), and the promulgation of the Five Years Plan as the method of accomplishing this aim.

Reduced to its simplest expression the Plan of Industrialization pur-

sues two main objectives: the complete economic independence of the U.S.S.R. from the rest of the world and as complete a control of the economic life of the country by the State.

The necessity of developing Russian industry was recognized long before the Communists came to power, and the twenty-five years preceding the Revolution saw two periods of remarkable industrial growth: 1893-1900 and 1910-1917 (see chapter on Industry). The novelty consists not in the realization of the necessity of industrialization, but in the interpretation of its aims. The Communists set themselves the task of "building Socialism in one country" as a necessary step towards World Revolution.

The Soviet economic regime has been often called State Capitalism. This term must, however, be rejected as misleading; for the Soviet State does not use its own capital in its enterprises. The greater proportion of Soviet capital investments are derived from taxation and compulsory loans imposed on the community, which at the same time is prohibited to own property and inherit or accumulate wealth beyond a very limited amount. Neither is it Communism in its pure Marxian or modified Leninist form: the Communist tenets have been abandoned one after the other: the workers do not own the factories or their tools and the peasants do not own their land; the equality of wages has been abandoned in favour of piece-work remuneration; the short working day exists only in theory, as well as the right to strike or to change employment. Stalin's Communism is a system of State Monopolies in which the State appropriates to itself everything it deems expedient.

The question now arises whether industrialization—as envisaged by the Communists—is succeeding.

The pace of the industrialization postulated by the original Five Years Plan did not appear excessive. If anything, it was not as rapid—in some branches of industry—as, for instance, in 1893-1900. But, after their first initial successes, the Communists proclaimed an "enlarged" Five Years Plan. The revision established a twofold—and sometimes threefold—increase of production in various branches of heavy industry as compared with the original programme; later, the slogan "The Five Years Plan in Four Years" was proclaimed. This increase in the planned volume of production, and general speeding-up resulted (1931) in a state of chronic failure to fulfill the estimates. Thus, instead of 83,600,000 tons of coal planned for 1931, only 57,000,000 were produced and instead of 8,000,000 tons of pig iron, only 4,900,000. The production of oil¹ and light metals was also behind the estimates for 1931.²

This proves that with respect to the pace ("Bolshevik tempos" as the

¹ "Economic Life" Feb. 3rd, 1932. No. 28/4010.

² "Economic Life" June 29th, 1932. No. 149.

(The official economic organ of the Soviet Government.)

Soviet Press calls them) of industrialization established by the Plan, signs of weariness are already apparent.

The Five Years Plan embodies another vital problem. If the process of industrialization is not new to the country and if the Communists, in their own way, and for their own purposes, are continuing an historical task, nevertheless their system of financing industrialization has certainly broken away from previous tradition.

The Capitalist order knows two ways—the attraction of domestic capital and foreign capital; *i. e.* the offer of economic advantages to private funds, seeking for good investments. But private capital, in the strict sense of the word, finds no place in the Soviet financial system. The Soviet Government, in its search for funds, has in consequence been compelled to have recourse to a system of expropriating a very large proportion of the yearly national income—by strictly regulating and rationing consumption, by direct and indirect taxation, and by regulating prices (on the home market) to the advantage of nationalized industry.

It is interesting to note that the Five Years Plan was inaugurated after the NEP had given the population, during a period of years, the chance to accumulate a certain amount of wealth (Capital). The Communists from 1928 onwards proceeded to expropriate this wealth. The Five Years Plan abolished every vestige of economic freedom and substituted for it a system of “integral Communism.”

What did the Communists extract from the population after the NEP?

The total capital investment in industry between 1921 and 1928 is estimated at roughly Rbles 3,000,000,000. A large proportion of this belonged to individual investors, private companies, and mixed (State and private) Trusts. In addition to this, private trade flourished. Its assets are difficult to estimate. The private investor and the private trader were officially suppressed; an act which enabled the Government to invest, during the first two years of the Plan, Rbles 4,605,000,000 in industry.

Next came the turn of agriculture. In 1930 an extensive campaign against the well-to-do peasants was inaugurated, as well as an extensive plan of collectivization. (See Agriculture.) The official figures published by the Soviet Government for 1931 show that 62% of all peasant farms have been collectivized. This “Socialist sector of agriculture” aggregates two-thirds of all the sown area (70% of wheat, 55.5% of flax, 64% of cotton, 56.5% of sugar beet, etc.). At the same time, the kulaks were wiped out of existence, all their property being confiscated in favour of the collective farms (Kolkhoz). According to an official Soviet publication,¹ from 25% to 40% of the total property of the Kolkhoz has been expropriated from the kulaks. Such Draconic measures enabled the Government to control the prices of food commodities on the home

¹ “The Kolkhoz at the time of the XVI Party Congress.” Moscow, 1930.

market, to export large quantities of grain and to feed the population of the towns. But all this, of course, could not suffice for the financing of the Five Years Plan.

To measures of expropriation, fiscal measures were added, with the view of extracting as much as possible from the national annual income. The progressive schedule of individual taxation reached 53% in 1930, and 60% in 1931.

The income from nationalized industry was expected to increase owing to a progressive lowering of the cost of production; while the prices for manufactured goods sold to the population were expected to remain on a very high level (a form of indirect taxation). The difference between the cost of production and the prices realized from the sale of goods constituted the most important item in the financing of the Five Years Plan—77.4% of its Budget for 1930.¹ It must be added that the Communists expected that the purchasing power of the Chervonetz would increase.

This, however, did not occur. Unrestricted emission of paper-money has been one of the outstanding features of the Five Years Plan. Since 1928 the notes in circulation have increased from Rbles 1,600,000,000 (Jan. 1, 1928) to Rbles 5,800,000,000 (Aug. 1, 1932). A sharp decline in the purchasing power of the Chervonetz was the result.

Still more serious were the deceptions with regard to the lowering of the cost of production. In the first two years the costs were reduced by 12%, instead of the projected 22%. But the third year (1931) witnessed an increase of 5%.² The same phenomenon occurred in the first six months of 1932; the costs of production in heavy industry went up 2.3% (in the coal industry—11%). The position in light industry is not better.⁴

These failures in the financial side of the Plan have forced the Soviet Government to make further, and still more drastic, demands on the population. Great increases in taxation, both direct and indirect, have been introduced in 1932—every other means of raising money seems to have been exhausted.

In addition to the domestic problem, the Soviet Government has still to face another important item—the payments due to foreign firms for purchases of machinery and of certain raw materials not produced in the U.S.S.R. In view of the fact that the Chervonetz has no international circulation, and that the Soviet Government's reserves of gold are very limited, these foreign payments can, in the regular course, only be effected through the medium of exports. Thus the Soviet Government's need for foreign currencies and bank balances abroad determines its export policy.

This policy has many peculiarities. First of all, a large proportion of

¹ "Economic Life." June 26th, 1930.

² "Economic Life" June 23, 1932, No. 144.

³ "Economic Life" June 30, 1932. No. 150.

the goods exported could find a better market at home; this refers, in particular, to grain and other food commodities of which there is a great shortage in the U.S.S.R. Secondly, these goods are sold abroad at prices far lower than those which the Government puts on them for the home market. Finally, the export of goods abroad takes the form of "dumping," *i. e.* of selling them at prices lower than those ruling on the foreign markets—prices sometimes even lower than the cost of their production in the U.S.S.R.¹ This is done, not so much with a view of creating difficulties on the foreign markets—although this occurrence is certainly kept in mind by the Soviet rulers—but for the purpose of acquiring foreign currency. Thus the normal principles of trade are being sacrificed to the aims of "Socialist construction." The Soviet Government can carry on its foreign trade at a loss; for, owing to its monopolist position, it can compensate its losses by taxation, profits on national industry, compulsory loans, etc.—all of which losses the population has to bear.

The total of Soviet foreign indebtedness, at the beginning of 1932, may be roughly estimated at Rbles. 1,750,000,000, about one-half of this sum being German credits. This, in view of what has been said about the financial situation at home, is a very heavy burden; and a great deal of speculation exists as to the Soviet Government's capacity to meet its maturities abroad.² The world-wide economic crisis of 1931 has had a severe reaction on Soviet finance. It is curious to note that the "Capitalist crisis," so joyfully acclaimed by the Communists at first, is very seriously affecting the Five Years Plan. Dumping is becoming less and less profitable—even from the Soviet point of view; Soviet foreign trade has considerably shrunk during the latter half of 1931; credits are hard to get; and the fear of the U.S.S.R. defaulting on its maturities creates an atmosphere far from favourable to the Government's financial activities.

What are the conclusions reached after studying the Five Years Plan's financial basis? They cannot be very hopeful: the depreciation of the Chervonetz, the failure of nationalized industry to lower the cost of production or to increase its volume sufficiently; the lack of foreign credits, and the shrinkage in volume and gross value in the Soviet export trade, leave at the disposal of the Government only one means for finding the necessary funds for investments—further extraction of capital from the national income. But, as already stated, the population bears a terrific financial burden. Can any additional taxation be safely imposed on it? That is a question which the near future must answer.

But the question now arises: can the Plan be accomplished in spite of these financial difficulties? Does production in any way conform to the projected figures? In a sentence, can it be expected that the Five Years Plan will be accomplished in the allotted time?

This is very doubtful. 1931 has been a crucial year for the Five Years

¹ See Trade.

² See Trade.

Plan and its results cannot be called inspiring, falling far short of the estimates, in heavy industry in particular.

In spite, or perhaps on account of this, the Government has decreed important increases in production in all branches of heavy industry for 1932. The general increase compared to the estimates of 1931 and regardless of that year's failure must be 36%. Of this the major proportion falls to heavy industry to the share of which Rbles 9,200,000,000 are appropriated out of the general expenditure of Rbles 11,790,000,000. Production of pig-iron must reach 9,000,000 tons, of steel 9,500,000 tons and of coal 86,000,000 tons. In the latter industry the increase is chiefly expected from the new coal fields—Karaganda (an increase of 896% compared with 1931), Kuznetzk (199%) Eastern Siberia (192%) etc. The production of oil must be increased to 27,400,000 tons (from 23,000,000). The production of light metals must be also considerably increased. Thus 90,000 tons of copper, 26,000 tons of aluminium, 28,500 of zinc, 38,000 tons of tin, 3,000 tons of nickel and 8 tons of cadmium must be produced in 1932, an increase in some cases of over 300% as compared to 1931.¹

The control figures for the first six months of 1932 show, however the same failing as in 1931: production falls considerably short of the estimates: thus only 32,925,000 tons of coal (73%), 11,200,000 tons of oil (92%), 3,650,000 tons of pig-iron (80%) and 2,900,000 (77%) of steel have been produced.² In the first five months of 1932 only 60% of the planned production of light metals has been accomplished. In many cases it is lower than in 1931.³

The position is no better in light industry: the cotton industry has fulfilled only about 90% of the estimates; wool—about 93%; leather—83% and flax only 80.8%.

Neither is there any marked improvement in the productivity of labour. This has always been a weak point in Soviet industry. In spite of all the efforts of the Government and enormous expenditure for new machinery in the first three years only 34% of the 110% of increase were attained, 1931 showing a marked decline as compared with 1930. The control figures for the first six months of 1932 show a small improvement in comparison with 1931; yet they are considerably behind the estimates—in heavy industry only 13.4% instead of the 31% estimated.⁴ The position is no better with regard to the cost of labour.

The position with regard to transport is catastrophic. The railways are unable to cope with the traffic—this in spite of the fact that the estimates of production for 1931 have not been realized. Thus on November 1931 only 83.6% of the loading of wagons—as estimated by the Plan—was effected (55,587 wagons a day). In December the position became steadily worse—towards the end of the month only 46,000

¹ Report of the Commissar of Heavy Industry Ordjonikidze to the XVII Party Conference. Econ. Life. Feb. 3, 1932. No. 28

² "Economic Life" July 12, 1932. No. 160.

³ "Economic Life" June 29, 1932. No. 149.

⁴ "Economic Life" June 30, 1932. No. 150.

wagons were loaded daily. The daily run of the locomotives has also decreased—from 149.7 klm. in October 1931 to 147 klm. in December. Industry, in its turn, has been unable to supply the railways with the estimated rolling-stock; in November 1931 they received only 23.2% of the locomotives, 17.2% of the oil tanks and 8.6% of the goods wagons which it had been planned that they should receive.

There is no marked improvement for the first six months of 1932. Of the 158,000,000 tons of goods planned for transportation only 138,400,000 tons (87.6%) were carried by the railways, the latter placing at the disposal of industry only 85.7% of the goods wagons necessary. The railways are not entirely to blame for this; they have received only 77% of the locomotives planned and only 61.2% of the rolling stock—a reduction of 9.4% as compared with 1931 and for goods wagons alone of 24.8%.¹

The production of motor vehicles is in a semicatastrophic state; thus the Nizhni-Novgorod Motor (Ford) Works were brought to a standstill in June 1932.² The reason for this is plain enough—the failure to produce the estimated quantity of steel in 1931 and in the first six months of 1932.

These aspects of the failure of the Five Years Plan (for 1931) drew the attention of the Communist Party. The XVII Party Conference on February 4, 1932 officially stated that the estimates for 1931 have not been carried out. The principal reasons for this were: 1) Bad transport work, in the first quarter of 1931 in particular. 2) Serious defects in the organization of industry, in labour in particular; a deficient system of wages (not enough attention paid to individual achievement); bad planning in separate works and factories and deficient technical leadership etc. 3) The absence of any coordination between the rise in wages and the productivity of labour which is chiefly responsible for the failure to lower the cost of production.³

There still remains to be considered the element of proletarian enthusiasm for the Plan, an element upon which the obedient Communist Press is so prone to expatiate.

It would be a mistake to deny the existence of this enthusiasm. But is it the result of knowledge and explicit understanding? First of all, the enthusiasm is limited to the proletariat proper—to the workmen, plus a very small proportion of peasants—and its source should rather be looked for in the blissful ignorance of the Soviet working masses than in any conscious and rational attitude towards the problem of Socialist construction. Secondly this enthusiasm is kept up by a system of propaganda which closes the worker's mind to the realities of life. The Press magnifies every success of Soviet industry into "historical" stages of progress; the worker is told that the U.S.S.R. has "England

¹ "Economic Life" July 12, 1932. No. 160.

² "Economic Life" June 22, 1932. No. 143.

³ "Economic Life" Feb. 5, 1932. No. 30.

beaten, and will have the U.S.A. beaten in 1932." How is he to judge of the true condition of affairs? The only indications of the Five Years Plan's failure appear indirectly—in reports to the Central Committee of the Communist Party, or to the TSIK of the U.S.S.R.—and they are always well camouflaged. Great stress is laid in them on the low productivity of labour, which makes the workman feel that if anything is amiss with the Plan it is himself.

But, in spite of every precaution, the impression that all is not well with the Plan is steadily gaining ground, even among the workmen. Were the other factors of industrialization to reach a still more critical stage, enthusiasm would easily change into despondency, if not despair.

The impossibility of continuing industrialization in strict conformity with the Plan has been realized by the rulers of the U.S.S.R. Accordingly, they instituted a system of differentiation in favour of certain branches of industry; a "shock sector" was created in 1931, and all the available resources and technical means of the Soviet Union are henceforth to be chiefly devoted to the fulfillment of the Plan's provisions in this sector.

This departure from the original programme constitutes, in itself, an admission of failure. "Planned economy," of which the Communists spoke with such pride, did not work according to plan. The Communists were forced to admit failure and to concentrate on that part of the Plan which is of the most vital importance in case of war.

Soviet leaders make no bones about this, and do not attempt to conceal the purely military aspects of the Plan; on the contrary, the view is broadcast, in every possible way, that the Red Army must never feel such a need for supply, in any form or shape, as the Russian army suffered during the Great War. In accordance with this, it is the metal, coal, oil, motor and chemical industries that have been declared "shock-sector industries." They must, at all costs, be brought to the Plan's estimates by 1933. Nitric and sulphuric acid production¹ has been declared one of the most important items of the "shock-sector," and a great chemical base is coming into being between Moscow and the Urals (Beresniki-Voskressensk-Bobriki). It must be remembered that the Soviet Government, with regard to chemical warfare, finds itself in a peculiarly free position—since it has practically no binding international obligations in this sphere. At a moment's notice, chemical factories can be turned to the manufacture of toxic gases.

A great development of the Soviet motor industry is contemplated. The tractor base (Stalingrad, Kharkov, Leningrad and Cheliabinsk) must produce 150,000 tractors by 1933, and also be equipped for tank construction. Automobile production (Nizhni-Novgorod, Moscow, Yaroslavl) must reach 820,000 units by 1933—420,000 lorries, 340,000 light cars, 30,000 auto-buses, and 30,000 special cars. A substantial and quite recent improvement in Soviet motor industry is the erection of a

¹ Both indispensable for the manufacture of explosives.

magneto factory in Moscow and a spark plug factory in Penza; both have been in operation since November, 1931. In addition to this, the State Ball-Bearing Works in Moscow was completed in the spring of 1932. These works will render the Soviet motor industry absolutely independent of any foreign supplies.

On February 4th 1932 the Communist Party proclaimed the inauguration of a Second Five Years Plan for 1933-1937. Yet in 1929 it had lavishly promised that by 1933 the U.S.S.R. would have everything in plenty and that its citizens would enter into the era of unprecedented prosperity. Now this is relegated to 1937 with every likelihood that the date may again be postponed. The failure of the First Plan to achieve the promises of the Communist leaders explains the mistrustful attitude of the population to the Second. The necessity of five more years to reach prosperity is generally explained by an even exaggerated popular conviction that the First was faulty and has failed more than it really has. In consequence symptoms of weariness, so easily translated into unrest, have been characteristic of the first six months of 1932. It is hard to see how, under such conditions, the population will bear another five years of ever increasing pressure, of semi-starvation and of unrelenting financial stress.

The main objectives of the Second Five Years Plan as passed by the XVII Party Conference (Febr. 4, 1932) are as follows: 1) The increase of the production of industrial machinery 3-3½ times as compared with 1932 (in the motor industry the production of tractors must reach 175,000 and of motor-cars 400,000 a year). 2) The creation of a power base producing: 100,000,000,000 k.w. of electric power (from 17,000,000,000 planned for 1932), 250,000,000 tons of coal (90,000,000 in 1932) and up to 80,000,000 tons of oil (27,000,000 in 1932). 3) The production of 22,000,000 tons of pig-iron in 1937 (9,000,000 in 1932). 4) The establishment of the complete independence of the U.S.S.R. in light metals (no figures quoted). 5) A complete reorganization of the railways, the building of some 30,000 klm. of new lines, the introduction of more powerful locomotives and goods wagons of greater carrying capacity; of automatic coupling and of automatic signalling; the electrification of some railways and the introduction of motor-drawn locomotives (Diesel).

The railways must be able to transport 750,000,000 tons of goods in 1937 (320,000,000 in 1932), and water transport—1,000,000,000 tons. 6) Special attention to be paid to the development of motor transport (roads and repair stations for automobiles). 7) The development of air transport over the whole country. 8) The trebling of the rations of individual consumption (light industry and alimentation). 9) The completion of the Socialist reconstruction of Agriculture; the Machine and Tractor Stations to control all the Kolkhoz; the increase of the sown area to some 170,000,000 hectares (from 143,000,000 hectares in 1932), with a production of no less than 130,000,000 tons of cereals.

The Second Five Years Plan, as its predecessor, will inevitably be subjected to many alterations. It is vague enough, in particular in those parts which interest the consumer mostly. It is not the first time he has been promised an increase of his meagre rations and his patience, proverbial as it is, is wearing thin. The temper of the collectivized peasants is, on the other hand, growing threatening; 1932's harvest was a time of great anxiety for the Government and the results disappointing, as climatic conditions throughout the summer, no less than the sullen and determined "sabotage" of the peasantry have greatly diminished the yield of the land.

The future of the Second Five Years Plan and of the whole Communist structure in the U.S.S.R. is therefore fraught with many misgivings. The First Plan has exhausted all the accumulated wealth of the population, and the extraction of capital from the national income has reached such a pitch that it is impossible to expect any increase from this source. Only two other ways seem to be open to the Soviet Government: foreign credits and an intensive development of foreign trade. In the present condition of the world, neither of these methods seem promising.

Whether the Communist Party will be strong enough to admit failure and adopt new methods of State economy, or whether the admission of failure *per se* will affect Communist rule in the U.S.S.R. more deeply than any of the other partial failures—these are questions that only the future can answer.

INDUSTRY

I

THE BOOM OF 1893-1900 ¹

THE development of Russian industry, inaugurated by Peter the Great, took a very definite upward turn after the discovery of oil in the Caucasus (Baku) and of iron in South Russia (Krivoy Rog) in the neighbourhood of the rich coal fields of the Don basin. The impetus given to Russian industry by these discoveries resulted in a boom between 1893 and 1900. The wise economic policy of the then Minister of Finance, S. Witte,² was chiefly instrumental in this.

Conditions were especially favourable to the iron industry, and the profits were very high. According to Professor M. I. Tugan-Baranovsky (writing in 1898), many South Russian works recovered their capital expenditure in ten years. The yearly profits of the Hughes Iron and Steel works in Krivoy Rog amounted to 20%; the Briansk Company paid a 30% dividend in 1895; the South Dnieper Company paid 20%, 30% and 40% in 1894, 1895, 1896 respectively. Such huge profits attracted both domestic and foreign capital into the industry, and the boom in the iron industry, of course, had much influence upon other branches.

Unfortunately pre-Revolution statistics fail to give the whole picture. Still, company flotations and the permits granted to foreign companies to operate in Russia, afford, as shown in the following table, some indication of how the boom developed.

<i>Year</i>	<i>Number of companies floated</i>	<i>Amount of capital in million rbles</i>	<i>Number of foreign companies authorized to operate in Russia</i>
1894	63	54.6	3
1895	94	116.6	1
1896	131	197.3	24
1897	136	192.9	25
1898	176	229.8	28
1899	325	363.3	69

¹ For reference see table No. 1, facing p. 365.

² Later Count Witte, Chief Russian delegate to the Portsmouth Conference.

It is interesting to study the distribution of this capital among the different branches of industry. Relatively, the greatest increase of total capital was in the metal industry. This rose by Rbles. 219,000,000 or 665% between 1893 and 1900. Next in order were the glass, cement and brick industries, whose capital rose by Rbles. 39,000,000 or 433%. Then followed the mining industry which increased its capital by 302% or, in figures, by Rbles. 305,000,000 and the chemical industry, where the increase was Rbles. 41,000,000 or 242%. The capital increase in the textile industry was Rbles. 119,000,000 or 54%, and in the food industry Rbles. 51,000,000 or 50%. Other branches of light industry did not advance proportionally—in general, light industry failed to keep pace with the heavy.

The intensity of industrialization in that decade was not less than that of the "Stalin era." S. Witte performed miracles which Stalin would like to emulate. The Russia of the nineties made a decided effort "to attain and surpass the production of other European countries."¹ In pig-iron for instance, by 1900 she had exceeded French production, and regained the fourth place she had held in 1850.

II

1900-1913

The Crisis of 1900

As was the case in many other countries, a severe crisis beset Russian industry at the beginning of the present century. In Russia this crisis took the form of a reduced inflow, or even a withdrawal, of capital. Russia paid large annual sums in the form of interest on loans. Such payments were possible because of favourable trade-balances but in 1899 that balance became an adverse one, which stimulated the flow of Russian gold abroad; the money market became strained in consequence and at the end of June 1899, the Bank rate began to rise. Europe could not assist Russia, because her own position was difficult. The lack of free capital threw the economic life of the country into a crisis. Companies began to sell their securities which, accentuated by the flow of gold abroad, caused numerous failures in the latter part of 1899. A panic started, and the most stable securities fell catastrophically. At the end of September 1899 the Bank rate was 6%, by December it was 7%. In the autumn, many works and factories began to reduce production. At the end of September 1901 there was an especially sharp fall of Russian securities on the foreign stock exchanges; by October 15, nearly a hundred Russian securities quoted on the Paris and Brussels exchanges had lost 59% of their value; a state of matters which rendered any influx of foreign capital into Russia, for some time to come, more than unlikely.

The State Bank greatly assisted industry at this critical period. Con-

¹ The modern Communist slogan.

trary to the practice of private banks, it increased rather than reduced its advances. The State Bank shouldered the entire losses of some private banks and took under its control those enterprises which were menaced with bankruptcy. This, however, was only a palliative, and could not radically alter the economic situation.

The following table shows the fall in company promotion:

<i>Year</i>	<i>Companies floated</i>	<i>Capital—in millions of rbles</i>	<i>Foreign companies authorized to operate in Russia</i>
1899	325	363.3	69
1900	202	250.8	40
1901	135	107.6	23
1902	78	73.2	13
1903	76	68.1	15

Almost all branches of heavy industry suffered acutely from the depression. Coal was an exception. The 1902 production was only 0.4% lower than that of the previous year. Copper showed a similarly unimportant reduction of output—this being 2.5% lower in 1902 than in the previous year. There was a decline in 1905, but thenceforth copper-smelting made giant strides in Russia, which offered a splendid market for this commodity hitherto purchased abroad. The decline in the production of iron and steel also was only temporary. The crisis in pig-iron was more acute. It developed between 1900–03, when production fell by 15%. This decline was comparable with that in oil. The crisis affected this product in 1902 and the two following years, during which production declined by 11%.

The boom of 1893–1900 had been most noticeable in heavy industry, and it was this branch which was principally affected by the crisis of 1900–03. The consumption per head of certain products of light industry indicates this clearly. Sugar consumption, for example, rose steadily. The consumption of beer fell only 6%. The fall in the consumption of spirits was also slight and transitory. The consumption of pig-iron, on the other hand, fell sharply. It was lower by 27% in 1903 than in 1899. Only in 1913 was the consumption of 1899 again equalled.

The decline of prices was especially marked in the products of heavy industry. Pig-iron, at Odessa, fell by 25% in price—from Rbles. 48 per ton at the beginning of 1900 to Rbles. 36 at the end of 1901. The fall in the price of coal was even more acute. It cost Rbles 6 per ton in 1900, and Rbles 4 in 1902. Iron rails fell 50% between 1899 and 1901. Oil fell from Rbles 6.84 per ton in January 1901 to Rbles 2.76 in January 1902. A similar fall in prices was to be noted in building materials. In Kiev, a centre of brick-making, prices decreased by 35%, and the annual production fell from 200,000,000 bricks to 80,000,000.

In the products of light industry the fall of prices was not so acute. Cotton yarn and calico, for example, declined only 10%.

There was no unemployment in Russia at the end of the nineteenth century but rather a shortage of labour; especially in the coal and oil industry. A few years later, conditions changed vastly. The following table shows the reduction in the numbers of workers in heavy industry:

<i>Mines, S. Russia</i>	<i>1900</i>	<i>1902</i>
Iron	45,416	35,710
Iron manufactures	8,736	7,502
Don coal fields	67,526	58,596

Even those branches of industry which did not reduce production considerably diminished the number of their employees. For example, the workers in the Baku oilfields were reduced from 33,000 at the beginning of 1901 to 27,500 a year later.¹

The Government repatriated the unemployed to their villages. In the summer of 1901, 10,000 men were thus "repatriated" from Krivoy Rog alone. Next year—for the first time in many decades—agrarian riots began in Russia. In many cases the "repatriated" miners were the ring-leaders. The economic situation thus had political consequences which greatly confused the issue. S. Witte considered that an economic revival would put an end to political disturbances but part of the Government was inclined to treat the situation from a political angle alone. Witte's measures, however, were able to stem the tide of the economic debacle. By 1903 the worst had been passed and a revival was in view. It was at this moment that he was forced to resign from office on account of his disagreement with the rest of the Government on the Russian Far Eastern policy.

Revolution of 1905

The Japanese War, and the Revolution of 1905 which followed upon Russia's defeat, stopped the economic revival. In July 1905, street fighting took place in Lodz and Belostok, two western industrial centres of the Empire. In August, Tartar-Armenian massacres drenched Baku with blood and very extensive damage was done to the oilfields. In October 1905 a general strike paralyzed production. This was followed in December by a workers' revolt in Moscow.

At the end of 1905 Russian industry was in a critical state. Owing to political events, the crisis had deepened. After the conclusion of the peace with Japan the position slightly improved, but the depression lasted until 1909. Seven years of prosperity had been followed by ten of depression.

The following table shows the flotation of stock companies:

¹ There were no general unemployment returns published.

<i>Years</i>	<i>Companies floated</i>	<i>Capital (millions of Rubles)</i>	<i>Foreign companies authorized to operate in Russia</i>
1904	84	85.2	11
1905	75	74.9	11
1906	85	69.4	6
1907	109	122.7	16
1908	108	12
1909	116	99.5	15

There was no general increase of the capital invested in heavy industry between 1902 and 1907. The mining industry, however, was an exception: its capital increased by 23.6%, or Rbles. 97,000,000, during this period.

The position of the more important branches of light industry—textiles and food—was comparatively favourable. The capital invested in textile companies increased by 23.6% (Rbles. 94,000,000), and in the food industry by 12.2% (Rbles. 19,000,000).

Iron

The fall in the production of pig-iron was characteristic of the period. In 1909 production was lower by 33,000 tons than in 1900. Russia again surrendered the fourth place to France. While Russian production decreased, that of the United States increased by 86.9%, that of Germany by 67.4% and that of France by 40%. In 1902 Russian furnaces utilized only 67% of their capacity and in 1909, 86%. Russia's total increase in output for the decade was 5%, while in the previous decade this had been 211%.

Oil

The position of the oil industry was terrible, and the destruction at Baku was felt generally. The destruction of the Baku oilfields terminated one period of Russian industrial history and began another. Coal assumed a preponderating importance. The Government lent Rbles. 12,000,000 to the oilfield owners free of interest; but even this did not greatly improve the situation. In 1905 the output of oil fell by 31%, and the production of kerosene by 42%.

The wounds inflicted on the industry by the 1905 Revolution healed but convalescence was very slow. Public opinion accused the oil companies of delaying the recovery; and claimed that they desired to maintain the present high prices of oil, which had risen from Rbles. 12 per ton in 1905 to Rbles. 16.8 in 1906–1909. The 1909 report of the Budget Committee of the Third Duma pointed out that it was more profitable for the oil companies in 1907 to sell 7.93 million tons at Rbles. 16.20 per ton—yielding Rbles. 128,500,000—than to sell, as they did in 1901, 11.18 million tons at Rbles. 4.86 per ton—yielding Rbles. 54,400,000. Owing to the fall of her oil output, Russia began to lose her importance

in the world-market; while coal replaced oil, to a large extent, in the home market.

At this period, Russia exported between 66,000 and 83,000 tons of oil and oil-products yearly. She lost one market after another—among them those of the East Indies, China and Egypt.

Only in 1909–10 did oil prices begin to fall. Owing to the competition of the smaller companies a figure of Rbles. 8.40 per ton was ultimately reached, and many railways and industrial enterprises at once replaced coal fuel by oil.

Coal

This return to oil seriously affected the coal industry. Prices began to fall. By the end of 1908, the price per ton had fallen from Rbles. 5.40 to Rbles. 5.10—while by October 1909 it was Rbles. 4.80.

Until 1906, the output of coal increased, on the average, by 3.33 million tons annually. Between 1906 and 1908 the average increase was only 1.16 million tons; and in 1910 production decreased by 4%. This showed that the crisis was not yet ended. Russia's total increase in coal output during 1900–1910 was 52%, as against 173% in the previous decade.

Light Industry

The position of some branches of light industry was much more prosperous. Shag production, for example, increased by 49% in 1910. Vodka increased by 28% respectively. The production of beer was increased by 76%, that of granulated sugar by 50%, and of lump sugar by 43%. Matches increased by 41%. The smallest increase was in the production of salt and tobacco, each of which rose by only 4%.

The development of the cotton industry at the beginning of this century was not so pronounced as formerly. During the nineties Russia augmented her spindles by 2,600,000, or 76.2%¹ but between 1899 and 1909 the increase was only 1,800,000, or 29.5%.

Light industry fared better than heavy for various reasons, some of them unconnected with the economic situation. For example, between 1897 and 1910 the population of the Empire increased by 25,000,000; the boom of the nineties resulted in the growth of cities and industrial centres which increased the volume of trade; regions hitherto isolated (Siberia and Turkestan) were brought into closer contact with manufacturing centres; after the 1905 Revolution the wage-level generally rose and rents went down. All these circumstances were favourable to light industry. Moreover, the uncertainty of the political situation greatly affected heavy industry. It was only after Stolypin's reforms that a new period of industrial activity began.

The Revival of 1910

In 1909 money became plentiful in the Russian market. Owing to an

¹ During the same period the increase in the U.S.A. was 25.6% and Great Britain 1.6%.

abundant harvest he was even able to lower her Bank rate in September; world prices for grain were very favourable, and gold began to flow into Russia. The Russian money-market improved still further in the following year, and capital began to seek investment in industry. After the low quotations of 1907 and 1909, industrial securities began to rise. Count Kokovtsov, the then Minister of Finance, remarked, in his memorandum preceding the 1911 Budget: "The position of the St. Petersburg exchange today resembles that prior to the boom of the nineties . . . In those years the economic revival was due to the influx of foreign capital for the use of industry. This was short term capital. On the contrary the influx of money in 1909 and 1910 was due to our success in trade, and the new capital now available may be invested more easily, because it has no time limits assigned to it. The process of investment will be calmer and more stable."

As is the case with all industrial booms, the activity of 1910 was first reflected in heavy industry and the building trade. Late in 1910 there was a sharp rise in the prices of iron. In the following January, the price of pig-iron on the Kharkov exchange was Rbles. 10.80 per ton higher than it had been twelve months earlier; while that of wrought iron was Rbles. 9 higher. The abundant harvest of 1909 led to much house-building activity, and this had its influence upon the iron industry. The output of agricultural machinery and implements also increased.

A second abundant harvest was reaped in 1910; and in consequence the position of industry improved still further.

From 1910 onwards the production of pig-iron began to progress rapidly. Within three years, it had increased by 1,600,000 tons (52%). In the autumn of 1910 the price of coal in Kharkov rose to Rbles. 5.40 per ton: this marked the beginning of a revival in the coal industry. Within the next three years, coal production rose by 11,250,000 tons (44%).

Gold and copper had begun to pick up a little earlier. Signs of recovery were already visible as early as 1906. Previously, the output of these metals had been practically stationary for several years. Thenceforth, the production of copper increased until 1913, and that of gold until 1910.

The Russian copper industry was one of the few Russian industries to be influenced by the European industrial boom of the early years of this century—which, generally speaking, made very little impression upon Russia. In 1907 copper production was 58% higher than in 1905. Many new copper plants were constructed, and old works resumed operations. The development was greatly assisted by foreign capital, and the production of 1913 was 262% greater than that of 1905. In 1913 the home industry could supply 85% of all the copper required by Russia.

The graph of oil-output shows no increase between 1910 and 1913. There was even a tendency to fall: the production of 1913 was 4%

lower than that of 1910. By that time, Russian oil-products had been beaten in the international market; and the home market was not very extensive—due, to some extent, to the high prices imposed by the oil companies (who were practically monopolists). Thus the oil industry was not much affected by the industrial revival of 1910: but the chemical and building industries, with pig-iron, coal and copper, reacted in sympathy with it. Light industry increased production during the boom period by 15% to 20%. Tobacco rose by 21%, shag by 18%, granulated sugar by 18%, alcohol by 16% and beer by 14%.

Generally, the yearly increase in these branches of industry was from 5% to 7%, while the increases in heavy industry were from 15% to 17%. This indicates that the revival of 1910, like that of the nineties, affected heavy industry mostly.

Statistical Surveys

Statistical surveys of industry were made in 1900, 1908, 1910, 1911 and 1912. The most detailed figures are those for 1908. Gross production in five industrial groups (mining, metal, textile, food and various) amounted to Rbles. 4,729,000,000. A correction must be made to these figures, because the statisticians included both raw and partly manufactured material. With this deduction, the gross total was Rbles. 3,716,000,000. The following table shows the development of production between 1908–12:

<i>Branches of industry</i>	<i>(Number of undertakings)</i>		<i>Increase</i>
	<i>1908</i>	<i>1912</i>	
Mining	390	520	33.3%
Metal	510	715	40.2%
Textile	950	1,158	21.8%
Food	1,207	1,350	11.8%
Various	659	822	24.7%
Total	3,716	4,565	22.8%

In 1908 the workers employed in large-scale Russian industry numbered 2,466,000 earning about Rbles. 600,000,000 annually in wages; the average yearly wage of a worker being Rbles. 243. The gross profit of large industrial undertakings was about Rbles. 400,000,000, of which about one-third was assigned for redemption of capital.

In 1913 the number of undertakings inspected by factory inspectors (Poland and Finland excluded) was 17,877, and the number of their workers 2,320,000.¹ All undertakings using mechanical power, or employing 15 or more workers, were inspected. There was no inspection of State factories or mining enterprises. In the whole of Russia there were 392 enterprises employing more than 1,000 workers. The total number of workers engaged in these concerns numbered 903,000. An-

¹ "The Statistical Survey" 1913–17. Central Statistical Dept. Moscow, 1921.

other 351,000 workers were employed by 502 concerns employing from 500 to 1,000 workers each. The remaining 16,983 enterprises, with less than 500 hands each, employed 1,066,000 workers.

The following table shows the distribution of workers among the different branches of industry in 1913, (the order followed is that of pre-Revolutionary official industrial statistics):

<i>In thousands</i>		<i>In thousands</i>	
1. Cotton	497	12. China	22
2. Wool	95	13. Ceramics	87
3. Silk	32	14. Animal products	45
4. Flax, hemp, jute	90	15. Flour	38
5. Mixed textiles	28	16. Sugar	155
6. Paper	33	17. Chemicals	14
7. Printing	44	18. Oil products	6
8. Timber	84	19. Powder and explosives	6
9. Steel	82	20. Oil	28
10. Machinery	187	21. Oil well sinking	9
11. Glass	55	22. Electric power stations	5

Although these figures are not complete, they indicate the prominent place occupied by the cotton, machinery and sugar industries.

The following table gives figures of workers employed in 1913 by some industries not mentioned above:

<i>In thousands</i>		<i>In thousands</i>	
Blast furnaces	300	Beer	21
Coal mining (Don)	168	Tobacco	32
Peat	31	Matches	22
Alcoholic beverages	48	Cigarette paper	4

In addition, there were some 215,000 small industrial undertakings giving employment to about 600,000 workers; their total production being between Rbles. 600,000,000 and Rbles. 700,000,000: *i. e.* about 15% of that of the big industries. The handicrafts—another type of small production carried on by the peasants during the winter months—aggregated about Rbles. 250,000,000 in value and gave part-time employment to more than 2,000,000 persons. 30% of all workmen employed in small industry were engaged in the clothing trade. Then came animal products (leather, etc.) and woodwork, each employing 16% of the workmen. Woodwork was the largest handicraft industry, employing 34% of the workmen.

The value of the sum total of manufactured goods disposed of on the Russian market amounted to Rbles. 6,750,000,000 (in 1912). Of this sum Rbles. 1,140,000,000 were realized by the sale of foreign goods. Rbles. 2,000,000,000 worth of goods was bought by the peasantry (numbering some 100,000,000), Rbles. 2,500,000,000 by the townspeople, (some 30,000,000 only), and the rest by factories, railways, etc.

*Geographical Distribution*¹

In studying the geographical distribution of Russian manufacturing industries, four separate centres stand out—namely: Moscow (Cen-

¹ Excluding Poland and Finland.

tral), St. Petersburg, Ural (chiefly Perm and Ufa Provinces) and South Russia.

The textile industry was concentrated chiefly in the Moscow and St. Petersburg centres. The silk industry was principally concentrated in Moscow; paper manufacture was spread through the northern provinces where there was an abundance of pulp. The printing industry was established in the cities of St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev, Odessa and Kharkov. Woodwork was largely confined to the forest regions, being especially prominent in the valleys and the estuaries of great rivers—at Arkhangelsk, St. Petersburg and Riga.

Metallurgic works were concentrated in St. Petersburg, Moscow, the Urals and the South. China and earthenware manufacture was chiefly concentrated in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Vladimir, Yaroslavl, Kharkov and Volhynia Provinces.

The great milling industry was situated in the black-soil belt, and along the principal waterways of northern Russia—in Yaroslavl, Tver and St. Petersburg Provinces. Sugar was produced in the southwest (from the Provinces of Podolia and Volhynia in the west to those of Voronezh and Tambov in the east). There were, in addition, great sugar refineries in Moscow, St. Petersburg and Odessa.

Large chemical factories were established in the Provinces of St. Petersburg, Moscow, Vladimir, Yaroslavl, Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, Viatka and Perm.

Outside Baku, oil was produced at Grozny, in Northern Caucasus. There were oil refineries in both these places and also along the Volga and Oka rivers and in the Provinces of Nizhni-Novgorod, Moscow, Yaroslavl and St. Petersburg.

Organization

The standard of Russian production was excellent; but industry suffered from a lack of technical organization. There were many concerns in Russia employing from 5,000 to 10,000 workers; but these were generally a simple agglomeration of separate workshops, having little or no technical connection and united only by the management. In other words, technical centralization was weak. There was also a certain weakness in the rationalization of production. The textile and food industries, generally, adopted more rational methods of production than the remainder. In the metallurgical industry a high degree of rationalization was achieved in the rolling-stock works and in the production of some types of agricultural machinery. Rubber and cement manufactures were also well equipped, while the manufacture of machinery and chemicals was conducted upon somewhat antiquated lines. The woodwork, ceramic and leather industries were conducted on a small scale and lacked modern equipment.

The cost of building was from 50 to 75% higher in Russia than in Europe, partly due to the rigorous winter, which necessitated a greater use of materials. The reequipment of industry with modern machinery

proceeded very slowly; due, partly, to the years of depression at the beginning of this century.

The handling of materials within the factories themselves was particularly lacking in efficiency. This resulted in a very large proportion of workers being employed in auxiliary labour. While in Europe the number of such workers was usually from 5% to 8% of the total, in Russia this proportion sometimes exceeded 20%. On the other hand industry was very deficient in technical staff. In Germany and the United States one mechanic was employed for every five to eight workers; in Russia the proportion was one for 10 to 15 workers. There was also a marked shortage of skilled labour (foremen) in such works as used more modern machinery.

Trusts and Syndicates

A tendency towards amalgamation first appeared at the end of the nineteenth century: one of the first instances was a kerosene trust at Baku in the late nineties. The Government, in the person of S. Witte, encouraged amalgamation as tending to improve the quality of production and keep prices on a steadier level. Between 1902 and 1910 eighteen trusts were organized in the steel and iron industry. The *Prodamet* was the most powerful, being a union of five separate syndicates, and handling about two-thirds of South Russia's iron and steel trade, and about 60% of all Russia's sheet-iron trade. The trust known as *Krovlia* was an attempt to amalgamate the Ural iron industry. The Don coal industry was united in *Produgol* (1906). There was a secret salt syndicate in existence, at the beginning of the century, among the producers in the Crimea and Don regions; it monopolized the whole of the salt trade in South, Central and Northwestern Russia. In 1908 the salt producers in the Volga region (Lake Baskunchak) organized another syndicate. As a consequence, salt prices increased three-fold—from Rbles. 2.40—Rbles. 4.20 per ton, to Rbles. 7.20—Rbles. 13.80 per ton. Such prices retarded the development of the industry (see Table No. 1).

The match industry was united, after the crisis of 1904–5, in the *Rost* syndicate. More than half the manufacturers joined this combine. There was a powerful society of Russian cloth manufacturers, as well as syndicates associated with the production of copper, glass, jute, rubber, food, etc. In fact by 1907 combines, secret or official, existed in almost every branch of industry; and they did not always keep the interests of the public in view. The number of trusts registered was 120.

In many cases an influx of foreign capital assisted amalgamation. In *Prodamet* and *Produgol*¹, French money played a leading part. The Baku oil industry was divided into two groups: British capital, however, succeeded in uniting these and in acquiring large interests in other Russian oilfields.

The amount of foreign capital invested in Russian companies before

¹ Coal.

TABLE NO. 11

1. Coal (mill. tons) ...	7.75	8.91	9.25	9.53	11.4	12.5	14.2	16.71	16.8	16.75	18.18	19.95	19.1	22	25.35	26.35	26	25.4	28.9	31.7	36.6	36.2	1916
2. Oil (mill. tons) ...	5.41	5.83	7.1	6.43	10	11.7	11	10.5	10.9	7.5	8.18	8.73	8.81	9.38	9.8	9.81	9.48	9.38	9.28	1913
3. Kerosene Oil (mill. tons) ...	1.48	2.23	2.15	2.23	2.69	2.45	1.4	1.2	1.5	1.3	1.5	1.3	1912
4. Pig Iron (mill. tons) ...	1.15	1.3	1.4	1.6	1.88	2.33	2.73	2.95	2.88	2.62	2.5	3	2.74	2.73	2.88	2.8	2.9	3.1	3.65	4.23	4.7	4.4	1911
5. Wrought Iron and Steel (mill. tons) ...	0.9	1	1.1	1.2	1.4	1.6	1.78	2.23	2.23	2	2.23	2.5	2.3	2.24	2.4	2.4	2.6	4	1910
6. Copper (lbous. tons) ...	5.56	5.54	5.97	5.9	...	7.4	7.5	8.4	8.6	9.54	9.4	10	9.4	10.6	15	17	18.6	23	26.4	32.7	34.4	32.86	1909
7. Laboratory Gold (tons)	39	39	40	39	42	44	39.8	43	44	50	57	64	59	59	61	67	1908
8. Salt (mill. tons) ...	1.3	1.3	1.5	1.3	1.5	1.5	1.7	2	1.7	1.88	1.6	1.9	1.88	1.8	1.9	1.88	2.24	2	2	1.9	2	1.9	1907
9. Matches (milliards)	183	186	209	232	234	238	236	224	245	252	275	274	295	309.8	335.8	1906
10. Cotton Manufactures (lbous. tons) ...	138.8	268.7	300	306	278	301	324.9	352.5	354.5	368.1	391.6	396.6	1905
11. Tobacco Manufactures (lbous. tons) ...	15.9	1904
12. Shag (lbous. tons) ...	42.06	1903
13. Granulated Sugar (mill. tons) ...	0.41	1902
14. Lump Sugar (mill. tons)	1901
15. Alcohol (mill. hectoliters 40) ...	9.3	1900
16. Beer (mill. hectoliters)	1899

1 Finland excluded.

2 Poland excluded.

the War was Rbles. 2,243,000,000. French capital held 32.6% (Rbles. 732,000,000), British 22.6% (Rbles. 507,000,000), German 19.7% (Rbles. 442,000,000), Belgian 14.3% (Rbles. 322,000,000), and American 5.2% (Rbles. 118,000,000). Foreign capital was also invested in banking, trading, transport and insurance concerns. The capital invested in industry proper was Rbles. 1,630,000,000. Some branches of industry were almost entirely under foreign control. Thus French capital controlled pig-iron production to the extent of 60.7%. About half of the Don coal production came from enterprises in which French capital was invested. On French capital also, depended the community of interests of the shipbuilding yards and locomotive works. More than half of Russia's copper was produced by British capital. During the latter pre-War years, British capital controlled the production of Russian silver and lead. In the textile industry the manufacture of thread and sewing-cotton was almost exclusively in British hands. The tobacco industry was under the influence of British capital. German capital was especially strong in the chemical and electrical industries.

Owing to the importance of foreign capital, the question was often raised whether Russian industry was independent, or only a branch of foreign industry. Opinion was divided, but those who maintained Russia's industrial independence were probably nearer the truth. There were many branches of industry in which Russian capital predominated; while in those cases where foreign capital dominated Russian, this had reached the industrial concerns through Russian banks which distributed it independently of foreign control, although interest was paid to foreign investors. Besides, Russian national economy, and Russian industry in particular, was such a big and complicated concern that no amount of foreign capital could have secured a decisive influence over it.

Labour

The number of industrial workers has already been dealt with. In proportion to the population of the whole Empire, (about 180,000,000 in 1913), this was quite insignificant.

The population in the vicinity of the two capitals (St. Petersburg and Moscow) and that of the Ural region was best adapted to industrial labour; in the south in spite of the over-population, it was much more difficult to find labour as the population had a definitely agrarian psychology.

The Russian people, especially those in the North, are very industrious; but, owing to the general economic conditions, the productivity of labour was (and is) below that of most European workers. In 1912 the British coal industry, with 4.5 times the number of workers, produced nine times the quantity of coal raised in the Don basin. The British cotton industry, in the same year, employed only 1.5 times more workers than the Russian but its production was 250% greater.

The following table shows the productivity of labour in the metal industries of different countries.

	<i>Annual production per worker In Rubles¹</i>
Russian metallurgic works	1796
German metallurgic works	3659
American metallurgic works	5400

This table shows that the production of a German metal worker was twice, and that of an American more than three times, that of a Russian similarly employed. It must be remarked that the Russians worked fewer days than their Western competitors. The number of working days per year was about 270, while in the United States, Great Britain and Germany it was 300. In addition, before the War textile and machinery workers worked ten hours daily in Great Britain and Germany; while in Russia, using two shifts, they worked only nine hours.

III

THE WAR ²

THE war altered the course but not the progress of Russia's industrial development. The gross production of industry (estimated, for the limits of the present U.S.S.R.) amounted to Rbles. 7,700,000,000 in 1913 and to Rbles. 7,080,000,000 in 1914, a reduction of only 8.1%. In 1915 production surpassed that of 1913, reaching Rbles. 7,860,000,000. In the following year it was still higher—Rbles. 8,400,000,000. The production of 1917 promised to be still greater, but the Revolution upset all calculations.

Unlike her German neighbour Russia had no scheme for the mobilization of industry in the eventuality of war; and in this respect industry was taken absolutely unawares. It was not till 1915 that the seriousness of the situation was fully realized, and plans for increasing production put through. The chemical industry—one of the most backward—was the first to be mobilized. In February 1915 the metallurgical industry was mobilized for the manufacture of shells, and this work was in full swing a few months later. The factories had to cope with a huge problem as quickly as possible under the most difficult conditions. In spite of the shortage of equipment and other technical obstacles, the rapidity with which the production of war material was organized and new plants erected was astounding, and reflected the utmost credit upon the Russian engineers responsible. Among the new branches of

¹ Figures compiled by B. Grinevetsky for 1912.

² For reference see Table No. 2, p. 368.

production, that of lathes (especially lathes for shell-manufacture) was the most important. Previously, these lathes had been imported from abroad but during the War Russian manufacturers attained a very high standard and turned out machines sometimes superior to Western production.

Creative energy and technique never attained greater heights than in 1916. Of course, production had taken an unusual turn: but the progressive development of industrial activity continued unabatedly until 1917.

The mobilization of industry under Government control had, however, its darker sides; many plants providing the population with their peace-time requirements stopped producing such commodities. This led to a great deal of disorganization in the national economy. For instance, production of agricultural machinery greatly decreased; as did that of artificial manure, clothing, shoes, etc. The army was absorbing all that industry could give.

The enterprises engaged in munition manufacture were rapidly enlarged, and new factories erected. All the available labour was mobilized for them, which created difficulties for other branches, depleted of labour as they already were by mobilization; and although the number of workers increased rapidly, much of the increase was due exclusively to the employment of unskilled labour. About 40% of the skilled workers were mobilized when war broke out. In 1916, the survivors were withdrawn from the trenches; but the shortage was very great and could not be made up.

1915 and 1916 were years of great financial prosperity for industry. There were no difficulties about marketing. Owing to the large issue of paper-money, the purchasing power of the population increased rapidly, while the Government was the largest consumer of all. It must be borne in mind, however, that the capital invested was reckoned in gold, and the profits in paper. By the end of 1916 the ruble had lost about 40% of its value; but, even taking this devaluation into account, the profits were large.

The financial success of industry influenced the stock exchanges. These were closed during the first thirty months of the War. The values of securities were then exceptionally low. In 1916 the position changed radically; industrial securities began to rise. Neither political conditions nor the closing of the exchanges could prevent this boom. On January 25, 1917, the St. Petersburg and provincial exchanges were reopened. Comparison of the prices quoted that day in St. Petersburg with the last official prices before the closing (July 27, 1914) showed that while the ruble had lost about 40% of its value, industrial securities had risen by 100% to 200%.

During the War invested capital greatly increased. In January 1917 the securities of 271 enterprises were quoted on the St. Petersburg exchange, their total capital being Rbles. 2,175,000,000; as against 277 enterprises, with an aggregate capital of Rbles. 1,503,600,000, on Janu-

ary 1, 1913.¹ Capital had thus increased by Rbles. 672,400,000. The increase was especially pronounced in metallurgical, mechanical, oil and steamship companies. In analysing the comparison, the fall of the ruble should not be taken at anything like 40%; part of the capital increase took place before Russia went off the gold standard (July, 1914), and the ruble did not at once reach the low level of 1917. To the quotations of the St. Petersburg exchange must also be added those of other exchanges (*i. e.* Moscow, Odessa)—which would make the general increase still greater.

TABLE NO. 2²

	1913	1914	1915	1916	1917	1918	1919	1920	1921
1. Coal (mill. tons).....	29.5	32	31	33	30	12	8.5	7.6	8.5
2. Oil (mill. tons).....	9.4	9.1	9.4	10	8.6	3.8	3.45	3.8	4.1
3. Peat (mill. tons).....	1.5	1.6	1.45	1.35	1.2	0.96	1.1	1.5	2.3
4. Iron Ore (mill. tons).....	9.1	7	5.6	0.15	0.13
5. Pig Iron (mill. tons).....	4.3	4.15	3.75	3.86	3.18	0.5	0.11	0.11	0.11
6. Steel (mill. tons).....	4.3	4.5	4.2	4.3	3.1	0.4	0.2	0.16
7. Sheet Iron (mill. tons).....	3.56	3.65	3.31	3.43	2.48	0.36	0.18	0.2
8. Ploughs (thous.).....	667	133	23	89
9. Railway Waggon (thous.).....	20,492	31,674	13,000	5,000	1,900	854
10. Locomotives (thous.).....	609	762	882	616	410	200	74	90
11. Copper (thous. tons).....	34	38	26	22
12. Laboratory Gold (thous. tons).....	61	66	48	31	31.4	21	6.6	1.8	1.2
13. Sulphuric Acid (thous. tons).....	81.6	83	88	101	81	20	23	15
14. Hydrochloric Acid (thous. tons).....	47.6	48	38	33.3	32.8	18	3	16
15. Nitric Acid (thous. tons).....	1.6	1.7	2.8	4.2	2.95	0.35	0.5	0.38
16. Caustic Soda (thous. tons).....	41.5	43.6	44.8	40.3	30.6	19	4.1	11.2
17. Salt (mill. tons).....	2.03	1.96	0.58	1
18. Matches (thous. packages).....	4,500	3,000	3,060	1,614	1,019	1,008	633
19. Cotton Manufactures (thous. tons).....	295	293	320	18	13
20. Flax and Hemp Manufactures (thous. tons).....	93	98	83	68
21. Vegetable Oil (thous. tons).....	490	425	314	345	256
22. Tobacco Manufactures (thous. tons).....	25	27	26.8	29.1
23. Shag (thous. tons).....	89.3	95.8	76	84	19
24. Granulated Sugar (mill. tons).....	1.1	1.53	1.94	1.52	0.33	0.08	0.09
25. Lump Sugar (mill. tons).....	0.66	0.62	1.64	1.51	0.85	0.25	0.05	0.02	0.18
26. Alcohol (mill. hectolitres).....	13.3	15.3	6.7	1.3	0.06	0.31
27. Beer (mill. hectolitres).....	10.1	6.3	0.13	0.03

¹ Shares of enterprises in territory occupied by the enemy are not taken into consideration.

² Figures between 1913-1916 excluding Poland and territories occupied by the enemy during the War; figures after 1917 relate to the territory of the U.S.S.R.

Table No. 2 illustrates the state of production during the War and the first years of Revolution. It shows that production rose steadily until 1917. For many branches, however, (coal, oil, cotton, yarn, flax, hemp, tobacco, sulphuric and nitric acid) the peak was reached in 1916.

Other branches showed very slight decreases (iron, pig-iron, steel, sheet iron, matches, shag, sugar, soda, etc.) while in some branches the decrease was very marked. It must not be forgotten that there were difficulties in regard to labour—owing to the mobilization of some 15,000,000 men—and other factors, such as transport, and Russia's isolation from the rest of the world which greatly hindered the supply of raw material, preference being given to industries working for the army. The decrease in production was particularly great in agricultural machinery, copper smelting, peat, gold, etc.

The prohibition of vodka, just before the War, led, of course, to an enormous reduction in alcohol production. The maximum production of vodka was reached in 1914. Two years later it had fallen 1,160%.

IV

THE REVOLUTION OF MARCH 1917

DESPITE these adverse factors 1917 opened with good prospects of a continuance of industrial prosperity. Then the catastrophe occurred. The process of industrial disintegration became very serious at the end of 1917; problems such as the supply of raw material and fuel, labour discipline, technical organization, markets and the whole financial system were already in a state of chaos on the eve of the Bolshevik Revolution (November 1917).

Increase of Wages

One factor in this disorganization was the excessive and unsystematic increase in wages. This began as early as 1914; although, despite the rise in the cost of living, some branches of industry long resisted it. Such was the case in the textile industry, where women and minors were largely employed (these numbered 70% of the total workers in 1916). The discrepancy between the wages and the cost of living was but poorly compensated by the sale (organized by the industry) of commodities to the workmen at pre-War prices. Another factor was the better pay obtainable for munition-work. For example, in machine-manufacturing plants near Moscow, in August 1915, the daily wage was Rbles. 1.50; while in the newly-built shell factories skilled workers received Rbles. 0.75 to 1.25 *per hour*. Such disparity in wages occasioned a constant migration of workers from one factory to another.

Following upon the March Revolution, the workers demanded a general increase of wages; while the eight-hour day was introduced without consulting the employers or taking War-needs into consideration. Soon after the Revolution, some private manufacturers reached

a wage-agreement with the metal workers but, as the State factories offered higher wages, the agreement was annulled. This matter was settled by arbitration in June 1917. The day wage for workers was fixed at Rbles. 5 to 12, according to qualifications.

In the textile industry the manufacturers showed themselves more obdurate and the workers less intelligent. They demanded wages equal to those of the highest categories of metal workers. These are mere examples. The increase of wages continued throughout the year; coupled with the steady fall of the ruble, it greatly affected industry.

Decline of Discipline

The position of the employers became ambiguous after the creation, in May 1917, of a coalition Government of bourgeois and Socialist parties, with the Socialist, Skobelev, as head of the newly-created Ministry of Labour. They soon lost all control over their undertakings. Discipline no longer existed in the factories. The newly-introduced eight-hour day was only nominal; work was liable to be frequently interrupted by political meetings, lightning strikes, etc. In most cases not more than four hours, on the average, were worked daily. The managers were often compelled to leave the factories and little or no care was taken of the plant.

The productivity of labour had begun to fall at the beginning of the War, owing to the employment of so many unskilled workmen, but it now became catastrophic; *e. g.* in 1913, 1916 and 1917 the yearly output of a Don miner was 153 tons, 124 tons and 90 tons respectively.

The following table¹ gives a general view of the decline of output in 1917:

<i>Years</i>	<i>War-manufactures</i>	<i>Other</i>	<i>Average</i>
1913	100 %	100 %	100 %
1914	100.1 %	97.2 %	97.2 %
1915	144.8 %	98.2 %	113.7 %
1916	145.8 %	99.4 %	114.3 %
1917	129.2 %	66.2 %	86.6 %

In consequence of the increase in wages, and the high cost of fuel and raw material, many enterprises began to lose heavily. Under the Provisional Government (March–November 1917) losses in plants working for defence were covered by State subsidies. Other industries had often no choice but to close down; between March and July 1917, 568 undertakings, employing 194,000 workers, stopped work.

*The Bolshevik Revolution*²

On seizing power (in November 1917) the Bolsheviks had at first no intention of nationalizing industry immediately.

¹ B. Gukhman. "The Productivity of Labour and Wages in the U.S.S.R." Moscow, 1921.

² For reference see Table No. 2, p. 368.

A regime of "labour control" was promulgated—involving the creation of "workmen's councils," who joined with the owners, and the administration, in running the factories. Even in ordinary circumstances, the introduction of a large number of untrained persons into the responsible administrative boards could bode no good to industry. It was infinitely worse under revolutionary conditions. To make things still more complicated, the regime of "labour control" was decreed to be the first step towards complete nationalization. Owners and workmen alike, therefore, could only regard it as a temporary stage—the latter being impatient for its termination in favour of a purely Socialist policy of national ownership.

The Supreme Council of National Economy, created by the Communists to supervise industry, did nothing to improve the relations between employers and workmen. It consisted largely of workmen, who sympathized with the rank and file of labour, and were with difficulty restrained from adopting extreme measures.

The regime of "labour control" did not last long in its original form. A decree announcing the nationalization of industry was promulgated by the Soviet Government on June 28, 1918. This decree at first affected 2,000 enterprises. The proportion of enterprises nationalized varied in different branches of industry. In the mining industry, for example, all the companies were nationalized. In some branches, companies possessing a capital of less than Rbles. 200,000 were not nationalized; in others (*e. g.* metallurgical works) those with less than Rbles. 1,000,000 were not nationalized.

The enterprises which the Government was not prepared to nationalize were left to the owners temporarily; par. 3 of the decree of June 28, 1918, declared: "Until further orders of the Supreme Council of National Economy concerning each separate enterprise, certain enterprises declared the property of the R.S.F.S.R. shall be considered as being leased free of charge to their former proprietors: the boards of directors or the former individual proprietors, shall finance them as previously, and receive profits as before"; and par. 4 stated: "From the moment of the promulgation of this decree, the members of the boards of directors and other responsible persons associated with the nationalized enterprises will be answerable to the Soviet Republic for their integrity and for their management. In the event of these persons abandoning their posts without the consent of the appropriate department of the Supreme Council of National Economy, or in case of bad management, they will be held liable not only to confiscation of their property but to severe punishment in the courts of the Republic."

The order instituted by the decree of June 28, 1918 did not last long. A further decree of the Supreme Council of National Economy (November 29, 1920) nationalized all enterprises employing more than five workers (if possessing mechanical power) and more than ten workers (if not). This was merely a *pro forma* measure, as the owners had been dispossessed long before. By December 1918, according to

A. Rykov, 1,115 enterprises were nationalized; by March 1919 this number had risen to 2,000, by January 1920 to 4,000, and by November 1920 to 4,547. From June 1918 onwards, the management of nationalized concerns was organized on a basis of centralization—associated with the merging of certain branches of industry into trusts, administered by the Government. Those of the manufacturers who, for one reason or another, still remained at their posts saw their authority completely superseded. The management of industry assumed an entirely bureaucratic form. Everything depended upon the Supreme Council and its departments.

Production for 1917 was lower than that of 1916 by Rbles. 3,000,000,000 (Rbles. 5,320,000,000, as compared with Rbles. 8,400,000,000—a drop of 41%). There was a further decline of Rbles. 3,000,000,000 next year, when the entire industrial production amounted to only Rbles. 2,340,000,000—another decline of 56%. In 1919 (Rbles. 1,850,000,000) it was again 21% down. In 1920–21 production was only 70% of that of the previous year (Rbles. 1,300,000,000).

In 1919 the oil and peat industries showed a certain increase in production. This was due to two different factors, the oilfields of Baku and Grozny were under the control of anti-Communist Governments, which explains why production was higher by 15% in 1919 than in 1918; and the increase in the production of peat (15%) is explained by the great difficulties experienced by industry in the Moscow region—cut off, at that time, from Baku oil and Don coal. Wood fuel at this time almost resumed the importance it possessed in the eighteenth century. In 1920, for example, 9,016,000 cords were cut—some 33,000,000 tons. The railways used the following proportions of wood fuel: 13.1% in 1913, 51.8% in 1918, 88.2% in 1919, and 64.2% in 1920. The forests of Central Russia saved the Communists from a complete stoppage of transport but at the cost of greatly depleting the country's reserves.

The Communists also made use of the soft brown coal deposits in the Moscow region. The following figures show the production of this between 1916 and 1921:

<i>(In thousands of tons)</i>					
1916	1917	1918	1919	1920	1921
700	710	390	400	660	735

When the Civil War ended (November 1920) the Soviet Government endeavoured to introduce pure Communism at one fell swoop. Small industry also was nationalized, money abolished, the population rationed, and general labour conscription proclaimed. Militant Communism, however, could not continue long. The country sank under this last blow at her economic resources. Political unrest, and economic duress forced Lenin to recognize the necessity of a retreat. This was

effected in the period known as the New Economic Policy (NEP), promulgated in March 1921.

V

THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY¹

THIS is no place to analyse the reasons which induced Lenin and the Communist Party to adopt the NEP. It need only be remarked that the attempt at complete abolition of the "free market," and a total subjugation of all economic activity, as well as all distribution of supplies, to the State completely upset the national economy and paralysed trade; the country was exhausted by external and civil war, and the population, ruined by Militant Communism, had in addition been starved by the awful crop-failures of 1920 and 1921.

From a social viewpoint, the Communist retreat was not very considerable. Almost all the larger industries were left under State management. Of the nationalized enterprises some small concerns were made available, by lease, for private enterprise: but these mostly called for large capital expenditure.

The introduction of the NEP was accompanied by the abolition of the bureaucratic centralization of industry. Many enterprises (about 2,000 by the end of 1921), previously under departments of the Supreme Council, were now handed over to the Provincial Councils of National Economy. In the middle of 1921, those Councils began to lease these enterprises. The majority of the best-equipped factories and works were placed under the so-called *State trusts*, which replaced the various departments in the management of industry. The trusts were allowed a relative independence, and could—in certain cases—enter into financial transactions without first applying for permission.

The new trust methods were first of all applied to the flax industry (July–August 1921) in the Kostroma and Murom districts, and to the northern timber industry (where a large trust, *Severoless*, was formed). Later, this method was also applied to other branches of industry.²

Trust organizations were sometimes generic—uniting enterprises of the same type; and sometimes territorial—uniting enterprises, of different types, situated in one region. Constant changes were made in their composition; separate industries were liable to be taken out of one trust and placed in another; but the system continued to function on the same general lines throughout the NEP period.

Conjointly with the introduction of the NEP and the State trusts, all industries were placed on a self-supporting basis. By this is meant that industries were allowed to keep the difference between the cost of production and sales, subject to strict accountancy and control. The

¹ For reference see Table No. 3, p. 379.

² On December 10, 1921, the Praesidium of the Supreme Council of National Economy ratified the formation of 20 trusts, of which 9 were Textile, 5 Chemical, 3 Timber, 2 Metallurgical and 1 Food.

word "profits" was concealed under the expression—"accumulation of material resources."¹

Profit-making soon became the one aim of the trusts, one which, in the peculiar market of the U.S.S.R. under NEP conditions, was not easily attained. In 1921-22 the cost of production in State industry was so high, and the purchasing-power of the population so low, that the State was compelled to dispose of its products at a loss: *i. e.* sugar, the price of which was exceptionally high during the greater part of 1921-22, was sold by the Sugar Trust below cost. According to its own figures, the cost of producing sugar was Rbles. 1,000,000 per pood² in November, 1921—a sum which would purchase 10 poods of rye³; while the average price obtained for the sugar sold by the Trust in January-September was equal only to seven times that of an equivalent amount of rye. Amongst other largely-consumed goods sold at a loss were matches, soda, paper, chemical products, etc.⁴ Under such conditions the change to a self-supporting basis was very difficult for many undertakings to effect.

This position changed radically when the 1922 crop proved a good one. Prices of factory goods—which hitherto, when expressed in gold, had not kept pace with those of agricultural products—began to rise quickly in relation to the latter. However, on August 1, 1922, the price-index for agricultural products was still higher than that for manufactured goods—2.11 and 1.89 respectively. A month later—September 1, 1922—these indexes became almost equal (1.56 and 1.44); while a year afterwards (September 1, 1923) the price-index for manufactured goods was three times as high as that for agricultural products—2.70 to 0.92. The gap between these prices, called the "scissors," played a very important part in Soviet economic life at that time. Leaders of State industry endeavoured to use its monopolistic position in the Russian market to retrieve all previous losses. A decrease in the demand for goods followed. Nationalized industry had not succeeded in raising its production to even half (in value) of that for 1913 when an acute selling-crisis arose in the autumn of 1923.

Owing to the chronic lack of capital, this crisis was disastrous to industry. It was, of course, natural that only a few branches should have been able to increase their production between 1920 and 1923. But, even taking this into account, the total production was abnormally low.

Between 1920 and 1923 thirty-four agricultural implement factories, working under the Supreme Council of National Economy, greatly diminished their production of ploughs—the simplest and yet the most important product of this branch of industry.

During the same period, there was a similar decrease of production

¹ "Industry in 1921." An Annual of the Supreme Council of National Economy.

² In depreciated currency.

³ One pood equals 36 lbs.

⁴ "Industry in 1922."

in the tobacco industry. Many smokers began to use shag, and many persons gave up smoking altogether.¹

A serious decline occurred in the production of rubber goods, alcohol, certain chemical products (such as superphosphates), pharmaceutical apparatus, harness, railway wagons, locomotives, and all classes of machinery. The work of the oil refineries was chiefly confined to the production of heavy oils—in other words, the more valuable products were not obtained, as there was no demand for them. It should be borne in mind that kerosene was the most popular illuminant in Russia—yet its production was less than two-fifths of the pre-War amount.

Despite these sporadic reductions, a general revival of industry was evident. In 1920–21 production only reached 16.9% of the 1913 level (calculated at pre-War prices). It rose to 25.6% in 1921–22; to 33.4% in 1922–23 and to 46.2% in 1923–24.

1922–23 was the first year to show a profit—one of Rbles. 96,000,000; in addition Rbles. 145,000,000 were placed to reserve and sinking funds. These results were obtained in the peasant market. At the end of 1923 and the beginning of 1924 the gap of the “scissors,” owing to numerous official measures, was reduced to a certain extent. By February 1, 1924 the price-index of manufactured goods exceeded that of agricultural by 150% only. On February 1, 1924, the indexes were 2.27 and 1.53 respectively. Within six months the price-index of manufactured goods was reduced by 10%, while that of agricultural produce rose concomitantly. Thus the crisis gradually passed off; owing, chiefly, to an increase in the prosperity of the peasants.

The years 1924–25 and 1925–26 showed a great development of State industry. The total production rose to 64.1% and 89.3% respectively, of the 1913 standard; valued at Rbles. 4,937,000,000 (1924–25) and Rbles. 6,876,000,000 (1925–26) in gold. Almost all branches of State industry showed increased production. In 1923–24 the combined profits and allotments to the sinking fund amounted to Rbles. 300,000,000. In the following year this figure rose to Rbles. 735,000,000 and in 1925–26 to Rbles. 970,000,000.

Despite this increase in production, there were indications in the following year of an impending crisis. At the close of 1926–27 Soviet industry saw itself unable to meet the needs of the peasants. The Government, however, found a way out. It increased the taxes and tightened its control over the “free” market. These devices, together with “extraordinary” measures adopted against the well-to-do peasantry (kulaks), marked the beginning of a “new revolutionary period” (the Five Years Plan), and brought the NEP to a close.

What, exactly, was the position of Soviet industry on the eve of the Five Years Plan?

Soviet economists assert that the value of industrial production in the U.S.S.R. for 1926–27 and 1927–28, as compared with that of pre-

¹ “Russian Industry,” 1922.

War production, was 101.6% and 115.2% respectively. It amounted to Rbles. 7,820,000,000 in 1926-27, and Rbles. 8,870,000,000 in 1927-28. Taking individual branches, the manufacture of electric lamps was the first to exceed pre-War production. This it did in 1923-24. In the following year the production of paper attained the pre-War level, and the production of electrical energy exceeded it. In 1925-26 the production of muriatic acid and caustic soda was restored to its pre-War dimensions. Leather, linen yarn and linen tissues followed suit. Among commodities of mass consumption, shag attained its pre-War level. In 1926-27 many branches of industry reached, and some exceeded, the pre-War level of output. Among the latter were: coal, oil, kerosene, calcinated soda, salt, goloshes, woollen yarn, cotton tissues, and woollen tissues. Later, in 1927-28, the production of electrical machinery, matches, cotton yarn, and soap reached the pre-War level. Many branches of industry, however, failed to attain this standard in 1927-28. These included iron ore, manganese ore, pig-iron, steel, copper, concrete, bricks, hempen yarn, silk tissues, vegetable oils, tobacco, sugar and alcohol.

It is particularly noteworthy that so many important industries should have failed to reach the pre-War standard of production, when it is recalled that the population of the U.S.S.R. in 1927 was greater by 15,000,000 than that of the same territory in 1913.

Such were the *quantitative* results of Soviet nationalized industry on the eve of the "new revolutionary period." An examination of *qualitative* results would not be so favourable to it.

VI

STATE AND PRIVATE INDUSTRIES DURING THE NEP

THE decree of the Council of People's Commissars (July 5, 1921) and the subsequent Instruction of the same body (August 9th) legalized certain forms of private industry. The principal of these was the so-called "leased" industry. Between August 1921 and September 1922, small and medium-sized enterprises numbering 7,113 were scheduled for lease to private individuals. These were enterprises which had been nationalized not long before. Such leases were soon in considerable demand. On October 1st the number of leased factories and works was 600, and within a fortnight 3,400¹ had been taken over from the State. The subsequent increase was not quite so rapid. On September 1st, 1922, there were 3,874 such enterprises, and October 1st, 1923, 6,220.² According to the calculations of the Supreme Council of National Economy, 90,000 workers were employed in these enterprises. These figures show the relative insignificance of the leased properties; only a

¹ "Russian Industry in 1921."

² To these must be added the leased mills of various kinds, which numbered 6,500 on September 1st, 1922

few employed so many as a hundred workers. In addition to leasing properties, private individuals were permitted to construct factories and works—on condition that the number of workers did not exceed twenty.

The lessees were not private individuals only, but often cooperative bodies and State institutions (about 33% of the total). The local Soviets often preferred to run enterprises themselves rather than hand them over to individuals, and were not much inclined to create rivals, leasing only those enterprises which called for considerable capital expenditure, or which could not hope to compete with the State.

In spite of all obstacles, the part played by private enterprises after the inauguration of the NEP was an important one. In 1923, they employed 16.6% of the industrial workers (179,778 out of 1,083,000) in enterprises under the control of the Supreme Council of National Economy.¹ The average production of each worker engaged in private industry was higher than in nationalized industry.

In addition to private enterprises handicraft production was revived under the NEP.

General figures relating to private industry, however, are only available for 1925-26 and 1926-27. The total production in 1925-26 was valued at Rbles. 6,375,000,000 and in 1926-27 at Rbles. 9,457,000,000, of which 30.4% and 26.2% respectively fell to the share of private industry. Private enterprise was particularly successful in light industry producing 73.3% and 73.9% of the total output for these two years respectively. This is of especial interest when one recalls the unfavourable conditions under which private business was conducted in the U.S.S.R. 1927, however, saw the end of private business.

The history of private industry during the NEP is typical of Soviet methods and of Communist dogmatism. The NEP was proclaimed as a temporary measure, based on the principle of "*reculer pour mieux sauter*." Revived in 1921, Soviet private industry blossomed rapidly—only to be once more abolished in the course of a few years; the respite in the process of Socialization having been brought to an end by Stalin's Five Years Plan. A few examples will illustrate this.

Private industry in fat products assumed some importance in 1921-22. At that time 15% of the total production of ordinary soap was manufactured in private factories, as well as 40% of the total production of toilet soap, perfumery and cosmetics. Private production continued to increase. In 1922-23 the common soap produced in private factories equalled and in 1923-24 surpassed the output of the State factories. Thus private soap factories had become dangerous rivals of the State concerns. The Government, alarmed at this, devised measures to limit private production. A severe blow was struck in 1925-26, when supplies of raw material to private concerns were stopped.

The private shag and tobacco industries underwent a similar experience. In 1921-22 many private tobacco factories came into being,

¹ Control figures of the State Plan Commission. 1927-28.

especially in the Crimea and in North Caucasus. According to Soviet economists, private tobacco factories then produced about 12% of the total output. An increase of the excise duty on private tobacco manufactures reduced this next year to only 4.4%. In 1927-28 the private tobacco industry ceased to exist.

The private shag industry was more successful. The 1922-23 private production forced the State (Shag) Ukraine Trust out of the local market, compelling it to sell its goods in the R.S.F.S.R. According to the Commissariat of Finance, 24.8% of the shag manufactured came from private factories. Production was still on an increase when the blow fell. In 1924 the Government fixed a maximum price for privately-produced shag, and increased the excise duty by 56.2%. In 1925-26 private shag factories accounted for only 17.7% of the total production. Next year came a further catastrophic fall and by 1928 private shag production was extinct.

The struggle in the tanning industry is particularly interesting. By 1922-23, tanneries to the number of 900, employing some 10,000 workers were leased to private concerns. Between this year and the end of 1928 private production of leather goods successfully competed against the State. Competition first took the form of forcing the State leather industry out of the hide-purchasing market. In 1924-25 private manufacturers were offering prices 27% higher than those the State industry could offer and still working at a profit; in 1925-26 it had secured the best raw material on the market and gravely handicapped State production. The manufactured goods of the private leather sector were cheaper and better in quality.

In 1925, measures were first taken against private trading. On September 4th of that year the Commissariat of Home Trade prohibited its agents from selling raw material to private individuals. Next year stronger measures were adopted. No more factories were leased, various contracts were annulled, and the private manufacturers were debarred from obtaining imported tanning materials. In addition, taxes were increased, and credits stopped. Private industry, however, did not perish. Beaten in the large-hides market, private industry transferred the struggle to the small-hides arena. Imported tanning materials were not necessary for the treatment of such skins. There were numerous home tanning-plants, which sufficed for this simple operation. At the beginning of 1927-28 the purchasing activity of the State's Leather Syndicate again gave unsatisfactory results. In view of a possible non-realization of its programme, urgent repressive measures were adopted against private manufacturers in January 1928, and many tanneries were closed, under various pretexts. These measures were effective; the competition of the private purchasers of raw material weakened, prices fell, and the Leather Syndicate increased its purchases. It was the end of the private tanning and leather industry; the State industry defeated its rival by direct administrative measures.

The story of other branches of private industry in the twenties is

TABLE NO. 3 (See note on page 380)

	1913	1930	% of 1913	1930-31	1931-32	1932-33	1933-34	1934-35	1935-36	1936-37	1937-38	% of 1913
1. Coal (in thous. tons).....	29,271	6,658	22.7%	7,738	10,185	11,676	15,278	16,472	25,510	31,095	19,095	123.5%
2. Crude Oil (in thous. tons) ¹	9,243	3,832	41.4%	3,813	4,585	5,271	5,042	7,060	8,319	11,634	19,095	123.5%
3. Paraffin Oil (in thous. tons)	1,511	1,510	103.4%	2,031	2,031	2,376	2,821	2,080	3,510	4,881	19,095	123.5%
4. Fat (in thous. tons)	1,400	1,400	100%	1,400	1,400	1,400	1,400	1,400	1,400	1,400	19,095	123.5%
5. Soda (in thous. tons)	1,240	1,240	100%	1,240	1,240	1,240	1,240	1,240	1,240	1,240	19,095	123.5%
6. Manganese Ore (in thous. tons)	1,240	1,240	100%	1,240	1,240	1,240	1,240	1,240	1,240	1,240	19,095	123.5%
7. Pig Iron (in thous. tons)	4,267	104	2.4%	116	167	300	661	1,270	2,203	2,061	3,460	82.5%
8. Steel (in thous. tons)	4,267	89	4.1%	173	316	500	993	1,868	2,911	3,592	4,158	97.5%
9. Ploughs (in thous. tons)	4,267	89	4.1%	173	316	500	993	1,868	2,911	3,592	4,158	97.5%
10. Railway Wagons	20,402	854	4.2%	823	585	299	173	96	186	1,016	1,169	173.5%
11. Electric Power (in thous. kilowatts)	34.3	90	262.7%	76	101	179	179	96	186	1,016	1,169	173.5%
12. Copper (in thous. tons)	34.3	90	262.7%	76	101	179	179	96	186	1,016	1,169	173.5%
13. Electrical Apparatus and Machinery (in thous. kilowatts)	732	46	6.2%	38	77	142	339	434	559	741	10,126	155.2%
14. Electric Lamps	2,564	258	10.1%	1,110	2,000	5,948	10,252	14,423	14,423	14,423	15,896	150.4%
15. Sulphuric Acid (in thous. tons)	1,264	11	0.9%	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	100%
16. Soda (in thous. tons)	47	16	26.7%	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	100%
17. Caustic Soda (in thous. tons)	47	16	26.7%	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	100%
18. Calcinated Soda (in thous. tons)	154	11	7.2%	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	100%
19. Salt (in thous. tons)	1,958	610	30.6%	723	788	1,027	1,556	1,327	1,557	2,090	2,371	118.7%
20. Cement (in thous. barrels)	12,157	363	3.0%	153	540	2,450	4,450	8,079	10,056	11,866	11,866	90.5%
21. Cricks (in mill. metres)	2,000	43	2.1%	43	43	43	43	43	43	43	43	100%
22. Matches (in thous. packages) ²	4,500	634	14.0%	489	899	1,424	1,882	3,162	3,080	4,192	5,490	122.0%
23. Paper (in thous. tons)	193	37	19.2%	203	4,179	10,120	6,178	15,731	25,303	29,631	36,985	134.5%
24. Goloshes (in thous. pairs)	27,885	232	0.8%	1,153	639	638	1,153	1,153	1,153	1,153	1,153	100%
25. Rubber Goods (in thous. pairs)	824	232	28.2%	1,153	639	638	1,153	1,153	1,153	1,153	1,153	100%
26. Leather (in thous. hides)	16,000	6,132	38.0%	7,081	4,841	8,314	9,386	12,684	17,064	20,312	20,312	110.3%
27. Shoes and Boots (in thous. pairs)	285	14	4.9%	18	51	74	102	185	241	322	46	118.0%
28. Cotton Yarn (in thous. tons)	397	19	27.5%	9	16	29	39	45	133	40	61	128.0%
29. Woollen Yarn (in thous. tons)	49	6	12.0%	9	16	29	39	45	133	40	61	128.0%
30. Flaxen Yarn (in thous. tons)	2,238	149	6.7%	149	302	581	836	1,490	2,028	2,539	2,539	113.4%
31. Cotton Fabrics (in mill. metres)	1,567	71	4.5%	15	23	22	29	49	65	84	97	136.9%
32. Woollen Fabrics (in mill. metres)	1,567	71	4.5%	15	23	22	29	49	65	84	97	136.9%
33. Hempen Fabrics (in mill. metres)	1,567	71	4.5%	15	23	22	29	49	65	84	97	136.9%
34. Flaxen Fabrics (in mill. metres)	1,567	71	4.5%	15	23	22	29	49	65	84	97	136.9%
35. Vegetable Fats (in thous. tons)	42,511	16	0.04%	66.3	2,310.4	3,147	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	100%
36. Ordinary Soap (in thous. tons)	166	16	9.6%	10	12	20	41	67	102	130	175	105.4%
37. Toilet Soap (in thous. dozens)	51,888	12	0.02%	23,092	18,141	12,555	2,935	6,495	10,333	10,495	17,112	96.7%
38. Tobacco Manufactures (in mill. cigarettes) ³	1,871	12	0.6%	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	100%
39. Shag (in thous. tons)	4,656	205	4.4%	205	205	205	205	205	205	205	205	100%
40. Alcohol (in thous. hectolitres)	1,945	205	20.8%	205	205	205	205	205	205	205	205	100%
41. Beer (in thous. hectolitres)	1,945	205	20.8%	205	205	205	205	205	205	205	205	100%
42. Electric Power (in mill. kilow. hours)	1,945	205	20.8%	205	205	205	205	205	205	205	205	100%

¹ Including small private production at Baku (some 300,000 tons in 1913; 64,000—1921—22; 84,000—1922—23; 75,000—1924—25; 73,000—1925—26; 87,000—1926—27; 90,000—1927—28).

² Not counting private production for personal use.

³ Excluding the Urals and the Ukraine.

⁴ Including the more important factories leased to private concerns.

⁵ For 1912.

⁶ For 1912.

⁷ For 1912.

⁸ For 1912.

⁹ For 1912.

¹⁰ For 1912.

¹¹ For 1912.

¹² For 1912.

¹³ For 1912.

which before the war accounted for 25% of production, and in 1924—25 rose to 57% of the total.

1 kg. of tobacco equals 4,000 cigarettes. Private sector not included in above figures.

Including the private sector.

similar, to the above examples. The "private sector" was doomed to perish; it had never been intended to be a permanent factor in Soviet economics. By the end of the decade State industry was predominant in every field.

Table No. 3

Note: Owing to the backward state of statistics in the U.S.S.R., the figures in the following table cover only about 85% of the total production, as the smaller industries, *i. e.* those employing less than 30 workmen, are not included—no reliable figures existing.

Figures for 1913—the most productive year before the War—are given for comparison.

In 1913, with very few exceptions, all industries were in private hands; since 1920 the figures, unless otherwise stated, relate to nationalized (State) industries only.

During the twenties, the financial year ran from October 1st to September 30th following; such years are accordingly designated 1920–1921, 1921–1922, etc.

VII

THE FIVE YEARS PLAN¹

It is important to note that the campaign of industrialization in the U.S.S.R. followed on the NEP, inaugurated by Lenin in 1921 at the height of an unprecedented industrial (and general) depression—due to War, Revolution, and, above all, to the policy of Militant Communism. The depression which started in 1917 lasted ten years: thus affording a remarkable example of the recurrent rhythms which have characterized Russian industry for the last half a century—a period of seven years' prosperity alternating with one of ten years' depression. Thus the depression of the eighties was followed by a seven years' boom (1893–1900), and this by ten years of depression (1900–1910); after which came another seven years of industrial prosperity. From the Revolution to the conclusion of the NEP, industry went through a period of acute depression. During the NEP the population was allowed to accumulate wealth and increase its purchasing powers, which permitted, during the following period—inaugurated in 1928—new capital investments in industry.

This rhythm, although not a law of the Medes and Persians, has hitherto been a marked characteristic of Russian industrial development, both before and after the Revolution. This has always depended, to a large extent, upon being able to avail itself of the previously-accumulated "surplus wealth" of the nation—particularly, the agricultural community.

But never has this process been pushed so far as it has since 1928.

¹ For reference see table No. 4, pp. 386, 387.

Never before has any Government used its powers to extract every ounce of "surplus wealth" out of the country, and invest this in industry; never before has the population had to experience such a lowering of its standard of living at the order of the central authority; and never has it had to contend with so powerful a machinery of compulsion as is at the disposal of the rulers of the U.S.S.R.—*e. g.* the nationalization of industry and trade, and the collectivization of agriculture. These new elements, combined with the poor foreign credit of the Soviet Government, distinguish the present period of industrial development from any previous one.

It is most essential to bear these factors in mind in order to understand the mechanism of industrial development in the U.S.S.R. today.

As is the case in all Protectionist countries, the home market plays an important part in providing capital for industry. But the U.S.S.R. does not depend solely on tariffs—which permit home industry to sell its goods at high prices—to seclude the home market. The situation is complicated by the State monopoly of foreign trade, by the nationalization of all industry, and by an unbounded State control of the agricultural market. Under such conditions a powerful State may exploit the home market as it likes—and as no private industry, however well protected, could ever do.

The U.S.S.R. is in a position to exploit, to the fullest possible extent, the gap between the cost of production and the selling price. In other words, being a monopolist it can, and it does, derive large profits from the sale of factory goods in the home market.¹ At the same time, always having in view the industrialization of the country, it artificially lowers the selling-price of agricultural produce. Fiscal pressure, too, is always at its disposal. N. E. Bogolepov—a prominent Soviet financial authority, and author of the financial portion of the Five Years Plan—states the principles of his work thus: "The financial problem for the first two years of the plan is very simple; it is to check consumption as far as possible, and to direct the national income towards production. How is this to be done? The answer is: by powerful financial levers—by fixing the prices of industrial goods, by an industrial tax, by excise and by loans."² (He means compulsory loans, chiefly in the form of compulsory deductions from salaries and wages—a measure very frequently adopted by the Government.)

The funds for promoting industrialization have thus to be obtained by an artificial decrease of national consumption. By regulating prices, and by taxation, most of the national income is attracted to nationalized industry.

The new industrial development in the U.S.S.R. has been organized by the State: such action being rendered possible by its control of the

¹ By 1927-8 "accumulated wealth" (a Soviet term meaning profit) reached Rbles. 1,231,000,000. According to the financial plans for 1931 these figures must by then have attained Rbles. 3,400,000,000.

² "The Problems of the Reconstruction of National Economy in the U.S.S.R. during Five Years." Moscow, 1929.

vast home market, and by the barrier which it has erected between this market and the outside world. But one must not lose sight of another important factor. Nationalized industry has only been able to obtain assistance from the national income because wealth *had* been accumulated during the NEP period.

Inauguration of the Five Years Plan

The Five Years Plan, as it exists today, has had various predecessors. During several preceding years the State Plan Committee had drawn up plans for future development. The Supreme Council of National Economy did the same¹; but all these plans, such as the "Control Figures of the Industry of the U.S.S.R. for the Five Years 1927-28 to 1931-32" (issued to the XV Party Congress in December, 1927), remained mere projects. At the time the financial future was far too uncertain to warrant any sweeping change of policy.

It was the favourable 1927-28 financial year which laid the economic foundations for the Five Years Plan.

In 1925-26 the production of State industry increased by 42% as compared with the previous year; but next year the increase was only 19.5%. It was estimated that for 1927-28 the increase would be only 15.8%, and it was thought that even the attainment of that figure would involve some strain. Soviet economists were astounded when production that year increased by 23%. It then became evident that the funds available for reconstruction had been considerably underestimated. The Government, hitherto deaf to the appeals of the State Plan Committee regarding the necessity for working out a "plan for the future development of national economy," decided to go into the matter. Late in 1928 the various planning departments worked out the Five Years Plan for 1928-29-1932-33; which, after being subjected to many alterations, was ratified by the V Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. (May, 1929.)

Investment of Capital

Capital investments rose steadily during the NEP, as the following table shows:

<i>(In millions of rubles)</i>					
1922-23	1923-24	1924-25	1925-26	1926-27	1927-28
120	209	385	811	1,090	1,240

Between October 1st, 1928 and October, 1930—i. e. the two first years of the Plan—Rbles. 4,605,000,000 were invested in nationalized industry. According to estimates, it was proposed to invest, during 1931, Rbles. 5,500,000,000 in industries controlled by the Supreme

¹ Before 1928 the State Plan Committee drew up three different plans; and at least as many were also drafted by the Supreme Council of National Economy.

Council of National Economy (Rbles. 5,053,000,000 in heavy industry, and Rbles. 256,000,000 in light industry), and Rbles. 420,000,000 in industry controlled by the People's Commissariat of Supply. Inclusive of expenses on electrification and cooperatives, the total investment was estimated at Rbles. 7,465,000,000. These figures cannot be compared with pre-War investments, because—in spite of Government control—prices were from two to three times higher than those of 1913; moreover, these prices fluctuated constantly, although always tending to rise. The above-quoted figures, however, show the great effort made in recent years towards the reconstruction of industry.

Pace of Development

In an early and modest draft of the Five Years Plan which was laid before the V Congress of State Plan Committees held in March, 1929, it was pointed out that the production of group "A" *i. e.* "industry manufacturing the means of production," must increase during the five years by 175%–235%; while the production of group "B" manufacturing "goods of mass consumption" must increase by only 109%–144%.

1928 must be considered the first year of the new industrial boom. The 1913 level was attained in the cement industry. Then followed copper which exceeded the production of 1913 in 1929. The 1913 level was exceeded in 1930 by the brick industry. Iron-ore production also attained the 1913 level in 1930. In 1931, production exceeded that of 1913.

Steel manufacture developed more rapidly. In 1928 production attained 4,278,000 tons, or 31,000 tons more than that of 1913. Production in 1929 and 1930 was 4,907,000 tons and 5,841,000 tons respectively. The growth in pig-iron production is most interesting. The output of 1913 (within the present limits of the U.S.S.R.) was 4,206,000 tons. In 1929 the output reached 4,322,000 tons. In 1930 it amounted to 5,330,000 tons—22.3% greater than the maximum pre-War production.

Bearing in mind the large scale of Soviet projected economic development, this increase cannot be considered very striking. During the fourth year of the previous boom—*i. e.* in 1913—pig-iron production exceeded that of the last maximum output (1900) by 60%. What is more remarkable, in 1931 the Communists failed to increase the output of pig-iron further. There was even a marked tendency for it to decrease: it was only 4,900,000 tons in 1931, whereas the Five Years Plan had envisaged a great increase. This fact is very important, as pig-iron production is the most important factor in the general economic situation; constituting, in fact, a barometer for the industrial position.

The same remarks apply to the production of motor cars, a most important item in the general scheme of the Five Years Plan—one competing, in so far as transport goes, with rolling-stock building. The automobile industry is in its infancy in the U.S.S.R. In 1928, 1929, and 1930, it produced 700, 1,400 and 8,700 cars respectively. According

to Plan, an output of 33,900 cars was to be reached in 1931.¹ Production, however, has been far behind the projected figures; but it was hoped that the new works started during the end of the year would help to catch up with the Plan. These hopes were not fulfilled, the motor industry producing only 20,000 cars. Nor has there been any improvement in the first six months of 1932, judging by the returns of the Nizhni-Novgorod Motor Works, which have produced only 1,193 cars instead of the planned 4,600.²

The position in regard to tractor production was rather better. World tractor production is far below motor-car production, but the position is reversed in the U.S.S.R. In 1928 the production of tractors was twice, and in 1929 three times, that of motor cars (1,500 in 1928, and 4,500 in 1929). This production is not in itself very remarkable, but the estimates for the two following years were higher—16,400 and 56,000 for 1930 and 1931 respectively. Soviet economists and newspapers give more attention to the tractor question than to any other. This is partly explained by the plans of the Communists for agricultural reconstruction (collectivization), and partly by the readiness with which tractor plants may be turned into tank works and used for supplying the army in time of war. Notwithstanding many failures in tractor construction, the results were rather noteworthy; especially at the Stalingrad Tractor Works and at the Red Putilov Factory, in Leningrad.³

The general production of tractors reached roughly 40,000 for 1931. In the first six months of 1932 no general figures have been published. But judging by the returns of the largest tractor factory—the Stalingrad works—the scarcity of raw material has affected the tractor industry. Only 13,500 tractors have been produced by this factory, instead of the planned 17,700. The Kharkov Works gave still less satisfactory results, producing only 7,400 tractors instead of 15,000.

Extension of Plan

The first projects for the Five Years Plan were modestly compiled. As the general economic position steadily improved, Soviet optimism expanded, and the Plan was amended. That ratified by the V Congress of Soviets (May, 1929) was much more grandiose than those previously considered. The economic position still continued to improve, and the Communists' heads became turned. Slogans appeared calling for the realization of the Five Years Plan in four, and even three, years.

The following table shows the execution of the Five Years Plan during the first years—from October 1st, 1928 to October 1st, 1930.⁴

¹ In 1930, a year of crisis, the United States produced about 4,000,000 cars; while Canada, with a population sixteen times less than that of the U.S.S.R., produced 150,000.

² See Transport.

³ On October 1st, 1931, the Kharkov Tractor Works began operation. They have the same capacity as the Stalingrad Works—50,000 tractors per annum.

⁴ "The National Economy of the U.S.S.R. on the Eve of the Third Year of the Five Years Plan, and the Control Figures for 1931." March, 1931. Moscow-Leningrad, p. 217.

	<i>Estimated</i>	<i>Executed</i>	<i>% of Plan</i>
Invested in planned industry (in millions of rubles).....	3,900	4,605	115.4
Gross prod. of planned industry, including food (in millions of rubles).....	29,337	30,456	103.8
Gross production, Group "A" "means of production" (in millions of rubles).....	12,476	13,764	110.3
Production of Group "B" "Goods of mass consumption" (in millions of rubles).....	16,861	16,692	99.0

The results of the first two years of the Five Years Plan showed the Communists that they might be more ambitious and they took them into consideration when drafting the estimates for 1931. Increases were planned for heavy industry to the detriment of the light.

In the first project for the Five Years Plan there was already a considerable gap between development in industry and agriculture, as well as between heavy and light industry. The "control figures" for 1931 increased this disproportion further. It was planned to enlarge industrial production by 44.3% and agricultural by 24.7% only. The output of Group "A" was to be increased by 58.4% and that of Group "B" by only 16.4%.

The production of coal, iron-ore, pig-iron and steel was to be increased 150%. Copper smelting was to be increased by 220% in a year, and at the same time manufactures of wool, linen and silk tissues were to be reduced by 3.1%, 14.3% and 23.1% respectively. Those acquainted with the "textile famine" in the U.S.S.R. can understand what this means.

There is an acute shortage of footwear in the U.S.S.R.; but this did not hinder the Communists from decreasing the estimated production of tanned leather in 1931 by 4.8%, and that of goloshes by 0.4%.¹

New Wage Regulations

In 1931, not only light but heavy industry was behind schedule, in particular in metallurgical and coal production. This induced the Soviet Government to adopt emergency measures. On September 20, the Supreme Council of National Economy decreed: "The system of the remuneration of the workers and technical specialists in the coal, metallurgical and other industries . . . must be revised. Equality of wages must be abolished; piece-work must be resorted to as much as possible, and the workers must be induced to improve the quality of their work." The daily wage of the highest category of workers was increased from Rbles. 6.20 to Rbles. 13, but the wage-increase of the lowest categories was not important. Bonuses, payable to the technical staff on the fulfillment of that portion of the Plan for which they were responsible, were introduced, "each per cent of increase between 70% and 80% of the fulfillment of the Plan will be rewarded by an increase

¹ In 1930 even the production of goloshes fell by 3.4%—from 44,180,000 pairs in 1929 to 42,670,000 in the following year.

TABLE NO. 4

Group "A" (means of production)	1928	1929	1930	1931 estimates	1931 production	1932 estimates	1932 production Jan.-July
I. Fuel							
1. Coal (mill. tons).....	35.7	41.3	56.7	83.6	57.6	90	33
2. Oil (mill. tons).....	12.4	14.4	18.9	25.59	23.1	27.7	11.25
3. Coke (mill. tons).....	4.2	5.0	6.3	9.4
4. Peat (mill. tons).....	5.3	5.5	6.4	12.5	9.5	17.3	4.5 (I-V 1932)
II. Mining							
5. Iron Ore (thous. tons)....	6,321	8,019	11,470	16,100
6. Manganese Ore (thous. tons)	767	1,415	1,583	960
7. Asbestos (thous. tons)....	27.5	38.7	56.6	100
III. Metallurgy							
8. Pig Iron (thous. tons)....	3,373	4,322	5,330	8,000	4,900	9	2,987
9. Steel (thous. tons).....	4,278	4,907	6,023	8,826	5,035	9.5	2,917
10. Wrought Iron (thous. tons)	3,487	3,960	4,914	6,720	4.0	6.7
11. Copper (thous. tons).....	23.2	37	46.6	150	50	90
12. Zinc (thous. tons).....	4.7	30	9.5	28.5
13. Lead (thous. tons).....	13.9	26.9	13	38
14. Locomotives (for industry)	68	163	812	1,300	452
15. Locomotives (for Commis. of Commun.).....	620	1,028			
16. Goods Waggon (thous. H.P.)	17,000	30,000	20,000	50,000
17. Diesel Motors (thous. Mtrs.)	126.6	271.4
18. Steam Boilers (thous. sq. Mtrs.)	115.2	288.6	206
19. Steam Turbines (thous. sq. Mtrs.)	272.2	874.0	753
20. Tractor Ploughs (in thous.)	41.4	138
21. Horseploughs (in thous.)	1,284	1,913.2	1,851.8	434
22. Tractor Seed Drills (in thous.)	35.5	108
23. Horse Seed Drills (in thous.)	269.1	93.7
24. Combines (thous.)	0.30	5
25. Tractors (thous.)	1.5	4.5	16.4	56	40	82
26. Motor Cars (thous.).....	0.7	1.4	8.7	33.9	20	73	9,090
27. Lathes (thous.)	7.0	16
IV. Electricity							
28. Motors (A/C) (thous. KLW)	717.3	1,720
29. Motors (D/C) (thous. KLW)	109.2	240
30. Transformers (thous. KLW)	1,605.6	3,200
31. Generators (thous. KLW)	350	990
32. Electric Bulbs (in mill.)	39.2	68
33. Electric Energy (billions KLW)	8,800	10,600	17,000
V. Building Materials							
34. Cement (in mill. of barrels)	12.5	15.3	21.7	35	33
35. Bricks (mill.)	1,180	1,700	2,907	4,824
VI. Wood							
36. Timber (mill. of cub. mtrs.)	72.3	143.2	160.2
37. Fire Wood (mill. of cub. mtrs.)	47.2	69.6	80
38. Sawn Timber (mill. of cub. mtrs.)	19.8	30.5
39. Veneer (mill. of cub. mtrs.)	394.9	541
VII. Paper							
40. Paper (thous. tons).....	287	394.7	501.8	605.5
41. Cardboard (thous. tons)	69.3	66.2

TABLE NO. 4—(Continued)

Group "A" (means of production)	1928	1929	1930	1931 estimates	1931 production	1932 estimates	1932 production Jan.-July
VIII. Chemicals (A)							
42. Sulphuric Acid 100/ (in thous. tons)	198.8	263.7	370	728.5
43. Caustic Soda (in thous. tons)	58.4	64.3	75	125
44. Calcinated Soda (in thous. tons)	216.2	235.8	270	357
45. Phosphates (in thous. tons)	40	76.1	260	1,114.4
46. Superphosphates (in thous. tons)	155.4	231.2	440	1,112	521
Group "B" (goods of mass consumption)							
I. Textiles							
47. Cotton Tissues (in mill. mtrs.)	2,454	2,885	2,320	3,061
48. Woollen Tissues (in mill. mtrs.)	129.1	125	134	270
49. Linen Tissues (in mill. mtrs.)	204.3	175
50. Silk Tissues (in mill. mtrs.)	19.5	15	18.5
II. Leather							
51. Large Hides (in mill.)	16.7	15.9
52. Small Hides (in mill.)	23.6	28
53. Footwear (in mill.)	68	84.6	76	91.5	36.6

of 1% in salary; each per cent of increase between 80% and 90% of the fulfillment of the Plan will be rewarded by a 2% increase; and each per cent of increase above 90% of Plan fulfillment will be rewarded by a 3% increase in salary." Bonuses could thus amount to 60% of salary. The Communist Government, in order to cope with the defects of production, has thus decided to rely in its wage policy and in the internal organization of its industry upon the elite among the workers.¹ By such action, it hoped to improve the position.

As a result of these measures, the fourth quarter of 1931 gave somewhat better results than would have been expected. The general production for the year was 21% higher than that of 1930 (*figured in values, not in quantity of production*). The increase in quantitative production has been evaluated at 14.8% for heavy industry and at 1.8% for light. This is considerably less than was hoped, but more than would have been expected in the middle of the year.

No detailed accounts for 1931 have as yet been published.²

As regards 1932, returns, and very incomplete at that, have been published only for the first six months. As compared to the production during the same period in 1931 it shows the following increases:

Group A (means of production)—25.3%.

Group B (goods of mass consumption)—13.2%.

¹ The decree of the Supreme Council of National Economy declares that the previous regulations were wrong because they "under-estimated the interests of the leading skilled workers."

² See table No. 4.

These figures, favourable as they are, lag considerably behind the estimates which had planned an increase of 43% for Group A and 29% for Group B.

General Results of the Five Years Plan

One of the motives of the Plan is a desire—carried to ridiculous pitch—to “catch up and exceed the production of the most advanced countries of Europe and America.” Furthermore the principles of industrial competition, which were not absent from other periods of Russian industrial expansion, are now complicated by the revolutionary aims of the Soviet Government—“Socialism in the U.S.S.R. is a step towards World-Revolution.”

This desire to beat all economic records is well illustrated even by the expressions used by all concerned in Soviet industrialization; for example: “No country has experienced such a tempestuous development of large industry.” (Stalin’s declaration at the XVI Congress of the Communist Party, July, 1930.) The new industrial plants are “unique,” “gigantic,” “the first in the world”; the motor car industry is very backward but that does not prevent the Communists from asserting: “We shall export cars in great quantities.”¹ When the production of the Stalingrad tractor works attained 100 per day, the workers wrote to their Leningrad comrades: “There are no other works in the world producing 100 tractors per day. The McCormick works produce only 70 machines per day, while Ford’s tractor factory in Ireland is at a standstill in consequence of the economic crisis.”² Before the A.M.O. (Motor) works in Moscow began operations, Soviet newspapers declared: “The largest American motor works produce 18,000 lorries annually. With one shift A.M.O. will produce 25,000 lorries, and with two shifts 50,000.”³

Every declaration that “our technique has been freed from the tutelage of Capitalist countries” arouses enthusiasm. “How fine it is to construct our own machinery,” says the Soviet Press, in spite of the fact that most industrial machinery has to be purchased abroad. This, however, does not prevent the Communists from declaring that their industry is independent.

Data, provided by statisticians obedient to orders from higher authority, show that already the industrial production of the U.S.S.R. is larger than that of Great Britain. This statement is an obvious exaggeration, intended for home consumption only. It is true, though, in relation to pig-iron, of which in the first half of 1932 the U.S.A. produced 4,600,000 tons, the U.S.S.R. 2,500,000, Great Britain and France 2,300,000 each and Germany 1,700,000.

If production in 1913 be taken at 100, the following table shows the position of the U.S.S.R. in 1930, undoubtedly the peak year of the Five Years Plan:

¹ Declaration by V. V. Osinsky at the XVI Party Congress.

² “Pravda,” October 3rd, 1931.

³ “Pravda,” September 4th, 1931.

Coal	193.7	Cement	178.4
Oil	204.5	Bricks	145.4
Peat	438.4	Matches	213.3
Iron-Ore	124.3	Paper	260.1
Manganese Ore	126.3	Goloshes	153.0
Pig-iron	122.3	Tanned Skins	251.9
Steel	137.5	Cotton Tissues	109.7
Ploughs	283.8	Linen Tissues	130.8
Railway Wagons	83.0	Woollen Tissues	156.3
Locomotives	113.0	Silk Tissues	45.8
Copper	135.9	Vegetable Oils	70.0
Electric machines and apparatus.....	112.8	Soap	130.7
Electric Bulbs	1,521.1	Tobacco	121.4
Sulphuric Acid	293.7	Shag	88.0
Caustic Soda	174.4	Sugar	93.8
Bicarbonate of Soda	175.3	Alcohol	52.7

At the XVI Party Congress, Stalin declared that the production of heavy and light industry in 1929 was 142.5%, and that of 1930—180% greater than pre-War production. In 1931 there was a further increase of about 10%; so it may be taken that present production in the U.S.S.R. is about twice that of the pre-War period.

Cost of Production and Productivity of Labour

The weakest point of the Five Years Plan relates to the cost of production and the productivity of labour. According to the first draft of the Plan, it was proposed that by 1932 the cost of production should be reduced by 32%, and that of building by 47%. The condition of Soviet money-circulation was the most serious obstacle to the realization of these wishes. The Communists have endeavoured, and are still endeavouring, to lower the cost of goods; but so far they have completely failed.

In a speech at a conference of Soviet economists (June 23rd, 1931), Stalin stated: "It is a fact that lately the costs of production have been increasing in many enterprises, despite orders to reduce them by 10%. The Krivoy Rog metallurgical works are faced with an increase of 11.6% in costs, while in the Urals these have increased by 10.6%." ("Pravda," September 8th.)

The same applies to the productivity of labour. Before the NEP, production fell to about 27% of the pre-War level. The following table shows how slowly it increased:

	1920	1921	1922	1922-23	1923-24	1924-25	1925-26	1926-27
Annual gross production per worker (in pre-War rubles)	669.2	985.3	1390.6	1637.0	1720.5	2137.0	2437	2723.0
% to 1913	27.3	40.1	56.7	66.7	70.2	87.8	99.4	111.7

The general productivity of labour in Europe and the United States had generally increased between 1913 and 1930. This placed the Soviet worker in a still less favourable position than before the War. It was stated at the V Congress of State Plan Committees, that "the output of coal per worker in the U.S.S.R. is only a sixth of that of a United States miner. National conditions, of course, play an important part—but at present we do not look for an explanation; we simply give the facts."¹

1930 showed a sharp divergence from the Plan in this particular. A projected rise of 24.4% in productivity did not eventuate. The actual rise was only 9.4%. "To a certain extent this failure is explained by the large number of unskilled labour attracted to industry as well as the incessant migration of labour. Among other causes of the inability to increase productivity are the following: non-fulfillment of measures to improve working conditions; lack of staff authority; delays in the realization of constructive measures (and in particular, delays in the starting of new plants); delays in the rationalization of production; lack of technical personnel (in many cases the workers did not know how to use the machinery); deficiencies in the supply of raw material; and the frequent cutting-off of electric current. In many cases the deficiency was due to mismanagement; inability to exploit the initiative of workers, and lack of leadership from the Party and Trade Union organizations in regard to Socialist competitive effort. The Central Committee of the Party has frequently pointed out all these defects."²

In order to increase the productivity of labour, the Communists endeavoured to arouse a spirit of competition among the workers, and to induce them to beat "world records." This, however, has not achieved serious results, although it has led to a great deal of boasting.

In spite of all the efforts of the Communists the productivity of labour continued to decrease in 1931. The output per worker per day diminished:

Coal	3.3%	Building	4.7%
Iron and Steel	5.5%	Chemicals	2.5%
Light Metals	9.6%		

Improvements were registered only in electricity—an increase of 13.2%, machine building—6.8% and in metallurgy—6.9%.

Rationalization

Between 1917 and 1926 the U.S.S.R. was very backward with regard to the rationalization of industry. This backwardness was more pronounced than during the depression of 1900–1909. The Communists only began to introduce new technical methods into industry in 1925–

¹ "Problems of Reconstruction of the National Economy of the U.S.S.R. in Five Years," p. 336.

² "The Control Figures of the Five Years Plan," 1930.

26, when large sums of money were invested to "buy" progress. For example, only after 1925 were conveyers first used—in some of the agricultural machinery works in the Ukraine. The same spirit of "beating world records" manifests itself in this process. The correspondent of "Pravda" at the Nizhni-Novgorod Motor Car Works wrote on October 1st last: "Conveyers were installed within 26 days; and, despite this, the American and Russian specialists state that the quality of the work is splendid. A three-copeck coin, put on edge on a conveyer, ran a distance of 100 metres without falling. *This exceeds American requirements.*"

Distribution of Labour

The following table shows the changes in the numbers of workers in industry:

	<i>No. of workers (thousands)</i>
1913	2,608
1917	2,596
1918	2,011
1919	1,335
1920	1,223
1921	1,186
1922	1,096
1922-23	1,302
1923-24	1,503
1924-25	1,853
1925-26	2,348
1926-27	2,469
1928	2,690
1929	2,921
1930	3,577
1931	5,447
1932	6,218 (estim.)

Their distribution, as between heavy and light industry, was as follows:

	<i>Number of workers (in thousands)</i>		
	1928	1929	1930
Heavy	1,515	1,714	2,227
Light	1,175	1,207	1,350

It is very difficult to effect a comparison of these figures with the number of workers, in separate branches, in 1913. The old and new classifications of the branches of industry do not agree. But some conclusions can still be reached. At the present time, the number of workers engaged in machinery construction and in the chemical industries has risen notably. In 1913 the number of workers making machinery (including those in State factories) hardly exceeded 200,000. In 1928 and 1930 there were 331,000 and 589,000 respectively. Before

the War the chemical industry employed about 30,000 workers—and in 1930, 143,000. This industry still fails to meet the needs of the country, but its present rapid development was undoubtedly assisted by the War. The same may be remarked of machinery construction—the 1916 mobilization is responsible for the present-day boom.

On the other hand the number of workers employed in the production of ferrous metal (pig-iron, iron, steel), did not attain in 1930 the number engaged before the War. Within the present limits of the U.S.S.R., the number of workers in this branch of industry was 300,000 in 1913, while in 1930 it was 236,000. It is not surprising that there is a shortage of ferrous metal in the U.S.S.R. The Communists have endeavoured to improve conditions in this respect but without much effect.

In the coal industry—the workers now exceed the pre-War number (300,000 as against 200,000) but the consequent development is not up to the Plan's requirements.

Artisans and Craftsmen

In addition to labour employed in the factories the following figures show the numbers of artisans and craftsmen (in thousands) in the U.S.S.R.

1913	3,706
1929	4,721
1930	4,820
1931	4,959

These figures should, however, be taken with a great deal of reservation; the men registered as artisans or craftsmen are at best only temporarily employed. A great proportion are always unemployed. This is often occasioned by the lack of raw materials, the supply of which is a State monopoly. Even the best craftsmen are not fully employed. The metal artisans of the village of Pavlovo (near Nizhni-Novgorod), for example, who were accorded a favoured position by the Communists, received only from 40% to 60% of the required raw material between October, 1930 and April, 1931. Thus they were only employed half the time ("Pravda," September 27th, 1931). In general, it is not in keeping with Communist policy to encourage small and individual concerns; and the large number of registered artisans and craftsmen does not mean that home crafts are flourishing. On the contrary, it is declining, and the Communists are only interested in it as affording a reserve labour-force.

Concentration of Industry

It has been shown that in the pre-Revolutionary period there were many large factories in Russia. At the beginning of Communist rule

there was a tendency to prefer small factories but in later days the concentration of industry has been favoured. This may be seen from the following table:

	<i>Less than 50 workers</i>	<i>Less than 500</i>	<i>Over 500</i>
1913	4.5%	33.5%	62.0%
1923	6.1%	31.6%	62.3%
1924	5.0%	28.1%	66.9%
1925	4.5%	25.7%	69.8%
1926	3.5%	22.3%	74.2%

In 1926 the concentration of industry was greater than in pre-War days, and was especially marked in the coal, metallurgical and cotton industries. The following table shows the percentage of workers in these industries, engaged in factories employing more than a thousand workers:

	<i>Cotton</i>	<i>Metallurgical</i>	<i>Coal</i>
1913	79.3	75.3	71.9
1926	90.3	85.7	92.6

This indicates a reversion to the former trend in industry, a process which has recently become more rapid. Between 1901 and 1904 the proportion of workers employed by enterprises having more than 500 workers rose 0.5% yearly, while after 1925 it rose by 4%.

This process of concentration is still going on—money is chiefly invested in large enterprises.

Technical Staff

As was the case in pre-Revolution times, industry suffers from a lack of engineers, foremen and skilled workers. In July, 1928, the Central Committee of the Communist Party seriously discussed this problem. It was discovered that there was a great deficiency in technically-educated foremen; and it was decided that the proportion of these to the engineers must be raised to 3 foremen *per* 2 engineers. At the V Congress of the State Plan Committees, G. F. Grinko said in his report: "Under the existing system of education, in the High Technical schools, we can count on 20,000 engineers in five years; not only industry but other branches of national economy, such as transport will claim them. At the same time during these five years the nationalized industry alone requires 30,000 additional engineers." It was quite natural, therefore, that the V Congress of the State Plan Committees should discuss the question of "the engagement of large numbers of foreign specialists." The lack of specialists led to another decision; at the same Congress, G. F. Grinko said: "Bearing the lack

of specialists in mind, as well as the technical training system of our Capitalist rivals—the United States, for example, turn out 20,000 engineers annually—we must improve the teaching in our schools. At present only 8% of those graduating annually are engineers. We must increase this to 12% at least.”

As a consequence of these deliberations, the Government decreed that by 1932 the number of foremen must be 300% higher than in 1928. Further measures were devised by the Communist Party. In November 1929, the Central Committee of the Party ordered to increase the number of students in the technical schools to 25% of that of all students in the higher educational institutions. In addition, it ordered that the period of practical training should be prolonged. There is another interesting passage concerning technical education to be found in the resolution of the Central Committee. It runs, “the election of the boards of all High Technical schools—such as rectors and deans—must give way to appointment by the interested State organs.” (“Pravda,” November 19th, 1920.) From that moment the High Technical schools became completely subordinate to the Supreme Council of National Economy, and were turned into “engineer factories” rather than educational institutions. Instruction suffered greatly on this account; but it must be admitted that a great deal of practical work was introduced into the schools—an improvement on earlier methods.

At the end of 1929 the State Plan Committee of the U.S.S.R. estimated that “the Five Years Plan requires 80,000 engineers and 150,000 foremen. The present number of 57,000 engineers and 55,000 foremen is inadequate to the Plan and does not provide the decreed proportion of 2 engineers to 3 foremen.”

There is also a great lack of skilled workers in the U.S.S.R. In Germany, in 1926, the number of skilled workers was 62.6% of the total in heavy industry, while in the U.S.S.R. it was only 41.3%.

During 1931, 21,000 engineers and technicians have been graduated and 51,000 workmen were passed through the factory schools. For 1932 these figures are planned to reach 38,000 and 350,000 respectively. The number of scientific workers employed in industry has grown from 6,500 to 12,500 during 1931.¹

Territorial Distribution of Industry

During its first ten years, the Communist Government was very conservative in regard to industrial geography. It could not be otherwise while all efforts were devoted to the restoration of old enterprises, and to the strengthening of some at the expense of others. In the first Communist decade the construction of new plants was insignificant. Only Rbles. 220,000,000 were expended for this purpose. After experiencing the difficulties of the Civil War special attention was given to the development of local sources of energy. The Volkhov hydro-electric

¹ *Economic Life*. Feb. 9, 1932. No. 30.

station (Volkhovstroy) was the first step in this new policy. It was constructed between 1921 and 1926 to supply electrical power to Leningrad.¹

Success was attained in fueling electrical stations with peat, and a large production of brown-coal in the Moscow region was projected. But all these ventures did not radically change the outlines of industrial geography.

There was no thought of a geographical redistribution of industry in the early drafts of the Plan. No programme existed for the creation of new industrial centres—this despite the fact that the resources of the old industrial regions did not promise much further development. Don coal and Caucasian oil continued to be the chief mineral fuel of the U.S.S.R. and the Urals and Krivoy Rog its metal base; but industry could not permanently rely on these sources alone. Far more important coalfields, comparing favourably with the best in the world, lie to the east of the Urals, in regions rich in mineral deposits: Kazakstan in non-ferrous metals, the Urals in iron-ore. In order to secure maximum production, therefore, industry had to move eastwards.

As far back as 1916 it had been decided to begin the exploitation of the Kuznetzk coal basin, in the Altai Mountains. The Revolution postponed these projects for nearly fifteen years. It was only in May, 1930, that the Central Committee of the Communist Party first approached the project. It was resolved that "the rapid industrialization of the country demands the creation in the east of a second basic coal and metal centre; through the use of the rich coalfields and metal deposits in the Urals and in Siberia." In relation to this project, the Central Committee drew up a number of Instructions, specially concerning the development of metallurgy in the Urals. The construction of metallurgical works at Magnitogorsk (South Urals) and in the Kuznetzk basin were included in the projects for the Five Years Plan. By July 1932, the construction of both works was almost accomplished. The production now anticipated is 2,630,000 tons of pig-iron at Magnitogorsk, and 1,200,000 tons in the Kuznetzk basin.² The Magnitogorsk works, according to Communist plans, are to be the second largest of their type in the world.

The later projects of the Five Years Plan anticipated a coal production of from 5,200,000 to 6,000,000 tons from the Kuznetzk basin in 1932-3. Judging by the output for 1927-8 (2,500,000 tons) and that of 1930 (3,450,000 tons) these expectations may well be realized. The later projects of the Five Years Plan raised the estimated coal output of the Kuznetzk basin in 1933 to 23,600,000 tons. Work preparatory to this huge production is already in hand, and much capital has been invested.³

The above-mentioned resolution of the Central Committee also stated

¹ The Volkhovstroy, as it is called, was projected in 1911, and surveys had been carried out before the War stopped further progress.

² V. Tiunov. "The Ural-Kuznetzk Combine," Novosibirsk, 1931.

³ In 1931 Rbles. 1,500,000,000 were to be invested in the construction of works and factories in the Ural-Kuznetzk regions, an increase of 300%, as compared with the previous year.

that "the survey of the Karaganda coal-fields must be hastened." In June 1930 the first five coal-pits were opened here. An exhaustive geological survey of the region has proved that the Karaganda field is the best in the U.S.S.R. Its coal deposits were first estimated at 4,800,000,000 tons; but this estimate was later raised to 10,000,000,000 tons. In August 1931 new and rich seams of coal were discovered south-east of Karaganda; the reserves of coal in this region are now estimated at 20,000,000,000 tons.

On September 1st, 1931, the railway reached Karaganda, connecting that locality with the Siberian Railway by way of Akmolinsk. This was an important event in the history of the national industry—one which may be compared with the inauguration of the Transcaucasian Railway (which provided an outlet for Baku oil), and with the Ekaterininsky Railway (which gave an outlet for South Russian coal).

At the beginning of 1930 there was not a house in Karaganda. On January 1932 it had a population of over 100,000.

Many similar examples of the rapid growth of towns have occurred during the last two years; *e. g.* the new, or greatly-enlarged, towns in the Urals, Magnitogorsk and Cheliabinsk with a population of over 200,000 each, Khibinogorsk (Khibiny) in the Kola Peninsula, which sprang up in two years, and which, in September 1931, had a population of 50,000. Khibinogorsk adjoins on the Murman Railway and is within the Arctic Circle. It is a centre for the phosphate product called apatite.

Prospects for the Future

The Communists during the first half of 1932 were able to achieve a certain success in two branches of heavy industry, particularly backward in 1931—coal and pig-iron. But since July 1st industry has been experiencing serious difficulties. The daily produce of pig-iron fell from 19,000 tons a day to below 13,000.¹

This would not be too unusual in ordinary circumstances; the production of pig-iron was always smaller in summer even in pre-War years. But the case today is very different, as new furnaces are being continually added to those already working; thus new furnaces have been recently started at Novo-Kuznetsk, Magnitogorsk, in the Don basin and at Dnepropetrovsk.

A very serious situation developed towards summer in the motor industry. Production ceased to bear a regular character and work was often brought to a standstill owing to the lack of some parts. Grave complaints are heard about the work in the coal mines. In January production reached some 200,000 tons a day. By April this figure was reduced to 185,000 and towards July it was only 150,000. For the Don basin Commissar Piatakov gives the following monthly averages: January—141,500; February—137,000; March—131,000; April—127,800; May—122,700; and June—121,000. In view of the sufficiency of labour

¹ End of July.

and of the great technical improvements introduced into this region during 1931 this lowering of production can only be explained as a sign of disorganization.

The reason for all this is not difficult to discover. The difference of the prices for "goods of mass consumption" supplied by the State and those governing the free market, the inaccessibility of the latter to the workmen and even the higher paid industrial staff, coupled with the continual fluctuation of the Government rationing system can but affect the spirit of the working masses adversely. This explains the recent decree of the Government giving greater facilities for the free marketing of certain raw materials in the hope that the workers will be better provisioned and the prices fall.

It must be remembered that at no time during the period of industrialization has the population been even moderately well supplied with "goods of mass consumption." Towards July 1932 an acute crisis developed in this sphere, in the food supply in particular. The Government found itself unable to provide the workers with their rations and was forced to alter its policy towards the free market. By the decree of July 23, 1932 the cooperative unions of small producers and even individual producers were granted some freedom to acquire the raw material needed for their industries. The State, however, maintained its exclusive right to distribute the following raw materials and forbade their purchase at free market prices: cotton, flax, hemp, wool, silk and leather. Nor were the producers allowed to sell their wares on the free market. With regard to the food supply free trading was permitted between the producer and the consumer.¹

At the same time a very grave situation has developed in the money market. Such is the situation, that State factories often refuse to release any goods without a corresponding exchange in raw material or other goods they may need. The Soviet Press is full of reports on such cases and the Government is anxious to put a stop to a practice which cannot but disorganize production and distribution.

In accordance with the slogan "the Five Years Plan in four years," 1932 is the final year for the execution of the Plan; and although there is no likelihood that its provisions will be fulfilled the XVII Party Conference has proclaimed the inauguration in 1933 of a second period of five years of industrialization and established some estimates of its aims (February 1932).

These estimates are characterized by two features: the promise to improve the supply of the population with "goods of mass consumption," by increasing the existing rations "at least threefold"; and a considerable development of those branches of heavy industry on which the first Five Years Plan had concentrated.

In respect to the first problem, curiously enough, no details were given or published. It is evident that the supply problem and its solution in the next five years was introduced for the purpose of calming

¹ See Agriculture.

public opinion, brought to a high pitch of excitement by the catastrophic condition of things. Whether the Party sincerely intends or will be able to carry out this promise is another matter. Judging by the fact that some details of the further development of heavy industry were discussed at the Conference and later published in the Soviet Press it seems that the Communists would wish to accomplish that part of the Plan in preference to others.

Great increases are planned in certain branches of heavy industry by 1937; production of electric energy must reach 100,000,000,000 Klw. (an increase of almost 1,000% on 1931); of pig-iron—22,000,000 tons; of coal—250,000,000 and of oil—80,000,000. Transport facilities must be increased by 250–300%.

What can the theoretical conclusions of a study of the second Five Years Plan be?

If the Soviet leaders concentrate on the development of industries producing goods of mass consumption it would mean the admission on their part that the boom period of Soviet industrialization is over. They are loath to do that and hope to be able to develop heavy and light industry simultaneously. Can this be done?

During the first Five Years Plan the industrial boom was bought at the cost of a drastic reduction in consumption. There are very few chances that the situation can be altered during the second, as nothing has happened to suspend the law governing the material resources at the disposal of the Soviet Government. They are not limitless and must in the future be greatly reduced because both foreign credits and the emission of paper money, two important factors of Soviet finance, must inevitably shrink. It is very likely that the Communists will not be able to carry out both the development of light and heavy industry, but will have to choose between them. It is easy to guess where their sympathies lie. They will certainly endeavour to proceed with their schemes for heavy industry. However, the conditions in the country and the temper of the population may force them to pass from words to deeds in the question of supply, even to the detriment of heavy industry.

It is also very doubtful whether the estimates for the second Five Years Plan can be carried out. They appear at least exaggerated, and doomed, as were the provisions of the first Plan, to lag behind actual production, and very likely to a much greater degree.

Anyhow the hopes that the first Plan would solve all the external and internal problems of the Soviet Government and the Communist regime have been considerably shaken. The necessity of spreading industrialization and reconstruction over another five years is in itself an admission of failure.

AGRICULTURE

I

HISTORICAL SURVEY

UNTIL 1861 the Russian peasant was a serf, belonging either to the Crown or to a private individual; he did not own the land he tilled, and even his person was the property of his owner. The Crown peasants fared generally better than the private; the State administered them from a central department and was primarily interested in the collection of taxes, thus indirectly in the welfare of its peasants. Still, no less than the private, the Crown peasants were practically devoid of all civic rights and were regarded as a chattel to be used at the owners' will.

Since 1800 the Government took decided steps towards the peasants' emancipation. But it was only in the reign of Tzar Alexander II in 1861 that it felt itself politically and economically strong enough to carry out this reform.

The Emancipation law of 1861 freed the peasants from dependence on the landowners and provided them with their own land. The system of land-tenure, however, that the reform introduced was, for the greater part of the country, not individual but communal landownership.

Communal landownership in Russia was distinguished by the following features: each member of a village community had his own allotment and implements; and worked for himself; but the land he tilled was only given to him by the community for his temporary use, and from time to time the total area belonging to the village was redistributed amongst its members. These periodic redistributions were necessitated by the unequal increasing of the various families, and their plan was not always uniform. The most frequently adopted was a redistribution in accordance with the number of working men in a family; another was based upon the number of "mouths." Members of a community could neither sell their land nor dispose of it by will. If a peasant left the community he lost his rights in the land which it owned.

When land was redistributed, not only the area but also the quality was taken into consideration. For this purpose each portion suitable for crop-rotation had to be divided into plots according to the quality of the soil, and each family received an area in each group. Each family thus possessed many tiny plots in different portions of the communal area. These family plots sometimes numbered dozens; the greater the population, the more numerous they were.

In the Ukraine and in White Russia, there was no communal ownership of land; each peasant in those districts had his single compact plot, but owing to the growth of the population and the fact that the land could be divided by will amongst the members of a family, these plots also became cut up.

The Emancipation Act allowed the peasants to buy land in private and individual ownership. This, however, perforce remained a dead letter, as the peasants had no funds to buy the land forthwith and no credit scheme was evolved to enable them to do so. Only very few could avail themselves of this right.

It was not to be expected that men who were serfs yesterday should at once change their methods of agriculture. Moreover, the communities did nothing to assist their weaker members. The absence of a credit scheme to assist them in improving their methods affected the communities adversely—the standard of peasant prosperity became extremely low.

The land received by the peasants under the Emancipation Act was called “granted” land and could not be sold or mortgaged. Theoretically, all the land worked by the peasants for their own use was to be handed over to them; but owing to the system of the so-called “cuts”¹ the amount of land which they actually received was somewhat reduced. Crown land, and the land expropriated from private owners, was given to the peasants at a certain fixed price, paid with the assistance of the State.²

Such privately-owned land as had not been expropriated for the use of the peasants was called “private” land. Its proprietors could do what they liked with it. Any land acquired by the peasants after the emancipation belonged to the last category. It is easy to see that the owners of “private” land had many advantages over the owners of granted land.

The agricultural census of 1905 (excluding Finland, Poland, Siberia and the Baltic Provinces) showed that there were 131,000,000 hectares of “granted land.”³ Peasant holdings numbered 11,200,000. The average holding comprised 11.7 hectares. In the North (non-black soil) holdings were larger than in the South: 13.3 hectares for the former, and 10.8 for the latter.

In addition to the “granted land” the peasants in 1905 owned 24,000,000 hectares of “private” land. There were in that year 535,000 private landowners in all, of whom 313,000 were peasants. Non-peasant landowners (222,000) possessed 74,000,000 hectares of which 38,000,000 were forests.

In the forty-seven grain growing provinces the sown areas increased

¹ A system whereby the landowners resumed exclusive possession of certain lands which they had previously used in common with the peasants.

² The peasants paid the purchase money lumped with their taxes, and the estate owners received from the State special debentures called “Redemption Certificates.”

³ A hectare is equal to 2.471 acres.

between 1887 and 1900 from 71,000,000 hectares to 74,000,000: *i. e.* by about 4.25%, whereas the peasant population had increased by 20% in the same period. Between 1887 and 1900 the average yield per hectare was about 550 Klg. on peasant holdings and about 670 Klg. on other land. The proportion of arable land to the whole was higher in Russia than in many European countries.¹

This excess of ploughing led to an agricultural crisis in the central regions, where the sown area decreased.

	(in millions of hectares)		
	1887	1900	% of decrease
Non-black soil	7.6	6.6	13
Black soil	23.7	22.6	5

The position was complicated by an international agricultural crisis. The rapid development of overseas transport enabled distant countries to send much grain to Europe at low rates. The fall in prices began. Between 1870 and 1890 rye fell 18% in price, and wheat as much as 30%. In certain years (1896, for example) the fall was still steeper.

The fall in prices and the German duty² seriously affected both private owners and peasants; particularly those well-to-do peasants who were able to sell a portion of their harvest. The last thirteen years of the nineteenth century were a period of great agricultural depression in Russia.

Rents and the price of land continued to rise despite this depression. Although the peasant poll-tax was abolished in 1886, and the redemption payments reduced, the peasants were becoming more and more impoverished; and as the population continued to increase rapidly a shortage of land became evident. As the peasants were not allowed to dispose of their "granted" land, they were confined to holdings which were insufficient for their minimum needs. Agrarian disorders began in consequence in 1902.

The first peasant movement was occasioned by nothing except the restrictions imposed on the disposal and purchase of land. In spite of many warnings, the Government was taken unawares and had to resort to punitive measures.

Revolutionary propaganda, and the disasters of the war against Japan, favoured the spread of the movement. In 1905-06 the disorders took a very serious turn and were accompanied (particularly in the Baltic Provinces) by violence, rioting and larceny.

¹ The proportion of cultivated land (excluding forests) was 46.9% in Great Britain, 74.8% in Germany, and 76.9% in France; while in Russia it was 79.9% (in the Middle Volga region, 81.5% in the Central region, and 81.9% in the Ukraine).

² Germany was Russia's chief customer.

DISTRIBUTION OF PRIVATE AND GRANTED LAND IN 1905

I. GRANTED LAND

	<i>Total area in thousands of hectares</i>	<i>Holdings up to 5 hectares</i>	<i>Holdings from 5 to 10 hectares</i>	<i>Holdings above 10 hectares</i>	<i>Total</i>
			<i>(in thousands)</i>		
Black soil	78,743.9	2,193.3	3,226.1	1,812.7	7,232.1
Non-black soil	52,644.9	476.1	1,714.2	1,778.0	3,968.3
Total	131,388.8	2,669.4 (23.8%)	4,940.3 (44.1%)	3,590.9 (32.1%)	11,200.4

II. PRIVATE LAND

	<i>Peasant owners</i>	<i>Hectares</i>	<i>Non-peasant owners</i>	<i>Hectares</i>
Black soil	264,498	13,904,900	136,340	37,195,070
Non-black soil	270,261	10,834,500	85,277	36,537,930
Total	534,759	24,739,400	221,617	73,733,000

This table does not include the Caucasus, Turkestan, Siberia, Finland, Poland and the Baltic Provinces (the present Estonia, Latvia and portions of Lithuania).

II

STOLYPIN'S REFORMS

The Land Settlement Act

THE events of the first Revolution forced the Government to modify its previous attitude towards the agrarian problem. 1906 saw the introduction of a reform—initiated by the Prime Minister, Stolypin.

An Imperial ukaze of Nov. 9, 1906 (the Land Settlement Act) was the principal factor in this reform. It abolished all legal restrictions preventing peasants from leaving the village communes. Those withdrawing had the right to claim an undivided plot. If, for some reasons, such a plot could not be accorded, the commune was obliged to pay its value in cash. A two-thirds majority was sufficient to dissolve the commune and divide the land among its members.

Prior to the promulgation of the ukaze, the Central Land Settlement Committee and Local Land Committees were formed (March 4, 1906). The chief purpose of these Committees was to increase peasants' holdings, as well as to redistribute the land so that plots more convenient for working should be made available. The Committees were instructed to collaborate with the Peasants' Bank in assisting the peasants to buy such land as came into the market on comprehensive and easy credit

terms. The peasants themselves were represented on the board of the local Land Committees. The Land Settlement Act was passed by the Legislature on May 1911, but the process of settlement had come into operation as early as 1907.

The Act offered the following plan of land settlement to the peasants: 1) A simple majority in a village commune could demand the abolishment of further redistributions of the communal land; 2) a quorum numbering one-fifth of the members of a commune could demand that their proportion of the land be partitioned into individual holdings; 3) any one member could demand his proportion of land on a freehold basis if his demand coincided with the periodical general distribution of communal land; at other times the consent of one-fifth of the commune was necessary; 4) a commune, by a two-thirds majority, could declare itself dissolved.

The local Land Committees were composed of a representative of the Zemstvo, three peasant representatives, the district judge and an official of the Ministry of Agriculture. The latter was entrusted with the preparation and execution of the agenda. The chair of a Provincial Committee was taken by the Governor, and that of a District Committee by the Marshal of the Nobility.

The accompanying table shows the results attained under the Land Settlement Act between 1907 and 1916.

Year	<i>No. of peasant (freehold) farms established</i>	
	<i>No. of farms</i>	<i>Area in hectares</i>
1907	8,315	97,193
1910	151,814	1,591,838
1914	203,915	2,178,300
1916	93,578	986,697
Total	457,622	4,854,028

Thus in the ten years preceding the Revolution over 10% of the "granted" land had been decommunized. The intensity of the process varied in different districts. It was most popular in the northwest and southeast, where about a third of the communal land was cut up into individual holdings.

There were two types of freeholdings—farms (khutors) and detached holdings (otrubs). In the first case, not only was the land divided but the village itself disappeared, each freeholder transferring his homestead to his farm. In the second the village was preserved and sometimes pastures and forests were held in common.

The Government availed itself of the Peasants' Bank to increase peasant landholding. Between 1907 and 1916 this Bank purchased some 8,000,000 hectares of private land; it was granted another 1,500,000 hectares from Crown reserves and resold it to the peasants. In addition the peasants bought about 2,000,000 hectares privately.

Colonization

Other measures in addition had to be devised to cope with the shortage of land in Central Russia and the Ukraine.

Ever since the beginning of the twentieth century the peasants had had recourse to leasing privately-owned land. As to the extent of this practice no exact figures are available; but an authority on the subject—Prof. Manuilov—estimates that 37% of the peasants leased some 25,000,000 hectares from private landowners. Leased plots were usually small, and the term of the leases seldom exceeded one year. With the introduction of the Land Settlement Act, a proportion of this leased land was bought by the peasants with the assistance of the Peasants' Bank.

However, such was the increase of the agrarian population that it soon became obvious that the problem could not be solved without using the enormous reserves of land in the East more extensively than had previously been done.

This brought about a revival of peasant emigration. An Emigration Department was formed in 1906 at the Ministry of Agriculture. It organized emigration and assisted the settlers during their first years in the new settlements. The movement developed very rapidly. From 1896 to 1910 the total emigration to Siberia and other border regions was 2,766,312, while between 1911 and 1915 the emigrants totalled 600,318. The countries most favoured by the emigrants were Siberia and Turkestan.

The settlers received on the average 16.5 hectares of land per man. The total area allocated was 21,733,800 hectares.

The emigrants left behind some 5,500,000 hectares of land which became available in Central Russia and the Ukraine; and went to increase the size of the average peasant holding (by about 1.9 hectares per head of population).

Technical Assistance to Agriculture

Conjointly with these measures the Government rapidly developed a system of technical assistance to agriculture: in 1895 there were only 25 experimental agricultural stations, while in 1912 there were 207; agricultural schools rose from 64 in 1893 to 360 in 1913; in 1895 there were only 148 qualified agronomes (experts in agriculture) in the service of the Government or the Zemstvos, in 1912 their number had grown to 3,266 in Zemstvo service and 1,365 in Government employment.

The peasant freeholders, whose number by 1917 had grown to over 8,000,000,¹ adopted more progressive methods and got far better results.

¹ If the peasants of the Ukraine and White Russia (where communal landownership was an exception) and the settlers in Siberia, Turkestan, etc. be added to those who left the communes. It must be also noted that some 2,000,000 applications for the advantages offered by the Land Settlement Act were never definitely settled, owing to the Revolution.

The old three-field rotation system of crops (winter crops, spring crops and fallow) rapidly gave way to more modern systems—such as five and eight years' rotation.

Non-Peasant Land

A survey of Russian pre-Revolution agriculture would be incomplete without a study of the status and social composition of the group of non-peasant landowners.

This group was primarily distinguished from the peasants (until 1906) because it was not restricted in the disposal of its property.

In 1905 there were in Russia proper¹ 699 estates each over 10,000 hectares in area, with an average of 32,730 hectares per owner; there were about 15,000 landowners who possessed between 1,000 and 10,000 hectares. Three-fourths of these belonged to the nobility who also owned 57% of the 37,000 estates ranging from 100 to 1,000 hectares. Estates of 10 to 100 hectares numbered 187,000—of which only 35,000 (about 18%) belonged to the nobility.

The large estates played an important role in agriculture. According to "Information on Russian Agriculture" (published by the Department of Agriculture in 1904), out of 1,570 large estates 352 had adopted improved methods of cereal and grass growing, 242 raised root crops, 207 raised sugar-beet, 131 organized experimental stations, 116 had meteorological stations, etc. Modern methods were more generally adopted after the Revolution of 1905. The production of the large estates was, on the average, 22.5% higher than that of peasants' land.

What was the role of the different social groups of landowners in agricultural production?

According to data published by the Central Statistical Committee, Russia proper produced on the average 33,350,000 tons of grain (excluding oats) yearly between 1901–1905.

This total was derived from the various types of land as follows:

	<i>Tons</i>
Peasant granted land.....	21,000,000
Peasant private land.....	2,800,000
Land leased by peasants.....	2,400,000
Private estates.....	7,150,000
	<hr/>
	33,350,000

Thus the private estates yielded 21.5% of the total production of cereals.

On the eve of the Revolution, the importance of the private estates as a factor in grain production was beginning to decrease. The decrease was partly owing to the purchase of some of the large estates by the peasants, and partly to the fact that the more important estates were beginning to grow other (non-grain) crops—sugar beet in particular.

¹ Excluding Poland, the Baltic Provinces, Finland, Siberia, Turkestan, and the Caucasus.

III

THE NATIONAL INCOME FROM AGRICULTURE

THERE was a general boom in agriculture between 1900 and 1913. During this period the revenue from agriculture in Russia proper grew from Rbles. 2,985,000,000 to Rbles. 5,630,000,000—i. e. by 88.5%. Much of this was due to a rise in the prices of agricultural produce—which increased, on the average, by 40.5%.

The increase is further explained, to a certain extent, by the growth of the population (about 19%); taking this into account, there still remains an increase of 17%, per head of population, in national revenue. This indicates that an important part of the progress of agriculture was due to the increased productivity of labour.

The development of agriculture varied in different branches. The great net advance was made in the intensive cultures (cattle breeding, dairy-farming, root crops, etc.). Animal (cattle and fowl) breeding occupied first place, followed by technical cultures.¹ Then came grain.

The marketable surplus of agricultural production rose steadily as the rail-transport figures show:

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL PRODUCTION MARKETED BY RAIL

<i>Year</i>	<i>Cereals</i>	<i>Veg. oil</i>	<i>Potatoes</i>	<i>Hemp</i>
1901-5	27.9	49.4	1.9	31.8
1911-13	37.4	63.8	2.8	37.4

Agricultural produce transported on the railways showed the following increase in turnover:

	<i>Rbles.</i>
1901-1905	2,297,000,000
1911-1913	3,220,000,000
Increase 40%	

Exports of agricultural products, and also of cattle, increased. In the period 1901-5 agricultural products to the value of Rbles. 701,000,000 were exported, while during 1911-1913 this figure rose to Rbles. 1,126,000,000.

Owing to the development of her agriculture, Russia gradually assumed a more important position in the World trade. On the whole export figures grew more rapidly than the general increase in agricultural

¹ Crops such as hemp, flax, sugar-beet, cotton, etc.

production but this was chiefly due to the export of animal products (live stock, meat, hides, etc.).

Favourable markets had a great influence on the development of Russian agriculture—especially its intensive branches. The rise in prices was due to the growth of both the Russian and the world markets; but the development of markets in its turn favoured the growth of specialization, technical improvement, etc.

A Communist writer, a member of the Academy of Science of the U.S.S.R., states: "During the decade 1907–1917 the peasants did not show any revolutionary activity and it seemed as though the Stolypin reforms had satisfied and pacified them. . . ." ¹ Coming from such a source, this opinion may be accepted as fairly summarizing the results of the policy pursued towards peasant agriculture in the years immediately preceding the War and the Revolution.

IV

THE WAR

DURING the War, fifteen million men were called to the colours. They were mostly farmers and workers between 20 and 35 years of age. The elder men, women and children were left to shift as best they could.

The following features characterized the state of agriculture during the War:

1. The external market was closed; and, owing to transport difficulties, there was a falling-off in internal trade. All the railway lines were engaged in military transport; and there was a marked shortage of labour. This led to a decrease in the sown area—amounting, for the whole country, to 7.6%.

2. Owing to the same factors, there was a change in the relative proportion of the various crops. The greatest decrease was in marketable cereals—spring wheat, barley and rye in particular. There was also a great change in technical culture. Plants (such as hemp, beet and beans) requiring much attention were replaced by grass, flax and cotton—the latter being in great demand.

3. Owing to the increased income of the villages cattle breeding developed rapidly. Yet such were the calls of the armies on the live stock of the country that the number of horses decreased by 3%, and that of cows by 5%: only the number of pigs increased.

4. The general depreciation of money, the huge rise in the prices for agricultural produce which this occasioned, the shrinkage of markets and the general disorganization of the country's normal existence had a bad effect on the agrarian population. On the eve of the Revolution they had become restless; a feeling of general discontent spread through the villages. They were not agitated by personal economic grievances; but

¹ "Peasant Movements in Russia." P. Maslov. Moscow, 1924.

the toll of the War, affecting the peasants more than any other section of the population, was annulling the work of the preceding decade.

V

THE REVOLUTION

IN ITS manifesto of March 9 the Provisional Government declared "The dream of many generations of peasants has been a radical land-reform; and this reform will be that first dealt with by the Constituent Assembly." On April 21 the Government formed Land Committees to draw up a plan of this reform. It called upon the peasants calmly to await the decision of the Constituent Assembly, and declared that it would not permit any unlawful seizure of land. Plausible as this spirit might be, it failed utterly to meet the requirements of the moment; the peasants, completely indifferent to Socialist or anti-Socialist theories of the land problem, desired for a speedy solution. Procrastination on the part of the Government merely served to arouse their suspicions, and this gave the Communists their chance.

Early in 1917 the Communist Party passed the following extreme resolution concerning the land problem: "The Proletarian Party struggles with all its might for the immediate and complete confiscation of all non-peasant lands. It demands the nationalization of all land, this to be placed under the control of local democratic bodies." The Party also decided to oppose the Provisional Government as well as the petty bourgeois psychology of the Social Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, who advised the peasants not to take over the land before the Constituent Assembly sanctioned this.

"The Proletarian Party," the resolution continues, "advises peasant proletarians and semi-proletarians to form a collective farm in each private estate, controlled by Councils of Deputies of agricultural labourers."

At the Peasants' Congress, held on May 22, 1917, the Party, represented by Lenin, insisted upon the development of this programme. Lenin said "We approve of the immediate seizure of the nobles' land by the peasants. We do not approve of the division of this land; we think that it should be taken over by the local peasants collectively. . . ."

The Provisional Government, galvanized into activity, decided to organize a land and agricultural census based upon the latest American statistical methods. It was also busily preparing the draft of a complicated agrarian reform. The project demanded a great deal of time and the expenditure of much money. Meanwhile, nothing was done.

In May, violence increased throughout the country. Owing to the inefficiency of the Government, Lenin's slogan "rob the robbers" was put into practice by peasant organizations, as well as by armed deserters from the army and criminals escaped from prisons. Between

March and November, 1917, there were 4,469 cases of unlawful seizure of private estates, and of looting and arson. Not only landowners proper but also peasant-freeholders suffered greatly. Half of the reported cases of violence occurred in Central Russia, the black-soil belt and the Middle Volga regions. The figures quoted above show, however, that the movement was of not very great importance until the Communists secured complete control.

Notwithstanding the intensive Bolshevik propaganda, advocating the seizure of the land, promoted during the existence of the Provisional Government, agriculture did not suffer very extensively; there was no considerable reduction in the sown area or the amount of live stock. According to the Central Statistical Department the area sown in 1917 was about 1% less than that of 1916.

VI

MILITANT COMMUNISM

THE Communists overthrew the Provisional Government on November 7, 1917, and at 2 A.M. on November 8, at the Second Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, they passed a decree relating to the land. The most important sections of the decree may be epitomized as follows:

The Landowners' rights to their land are forthwith abolished without compensation; estates—private, Crown, Church etc.—and all other private lands, together with their live stock and equipment, must be handed over to the Town Soviets and the Soviets of Peasants' Deputies to be held by these bodies until the Constituent Assembly definitely settles the land problem. Until then these bodies must abide by the *Special Peasant Ordinance*. Land belonging to ordinary peasants and to Cossacks, must not be confiscated.

The Peasant Ordinance on the other hand stated:

Private ownership of land must be abolished for ever . . . All land must be confiscated without compensation, and become the property of the whole people; live stock, implements and machinery must pass without compensation to the village communities; all this does not apply to small peasant farms; all citizens of the Russian State, without distinction of sex, desiring to work the land individually or in associations, have a right so to use it as long as they really work it; hired labour must not be permitted; the land must be distributed in equal portions; all land confiscated must be handed over to the People's Land Reserve; from time to time this land reserve must be distributed in a manner dependent upon the increase of the population and the productivity of the soil; if the local land reserve be insufficient to support the population the surplus population must be moved to other regions.

The Communists declared that this Ordinance expressed the wishes

of the majority of Russian peasants; and that it must, therefore, be recognized as a provisional law, until the Constituent Assembly gave its final decision.

The acts of November 8 had little in common with the Party agrarian programme which aimed at the organization of large State farms, and the reconstruction of agriculture on a Socialist and collective basis. At the Congress only the confiscation of the landowners' land was emphasized—the land of "ordinary" peasants was not to be confiscated. The expression "ordinary," however, could be variously interpreted: for example, it might be regarded as inapplicable to a well stocked peasant holding. As a result chaos reigned supreme.

A further decree "Concerning the Socialization of Land" (Feb. 19, 1918) endeavoured to solve a hopelessly complicated problem—the equal distribution of land. This decree was largely due to the influence of the left wing of the Social Revolutionary Party, with whom the Bolsheviks had at the time concluded a political pact in the hope of sharing in the government.

The decree "Concerning the Socialization of the Land" caused a vast upheaval throughout the country. All that had been accomplished during the previous ten years was undone. The land was redistributed according to well-remembered old traditions of communal land-holding.

The Constituent Assembly met on January 1918—for one day only—but it passed the "General Statute of the Fundamental Land Law" proposed by the Social Revolutionary Party. This new law merely confirmed the agrarian policy then being carried out by the Communists. The Communist Government, having permitted the Constituent Assembly to approve its agrarian policy, then disbanded it by force.

In January 1918 the Communists began to adopt an aggressive policy towards the well-to-do peasants. In a speech, Lenin said: "A struggle will arise in the solution of the land problem, between the well-to-do and the labouring peasants. We have to help the poor peasants. We did not take the land from the landowners to give it to the kulaks, but to the poor peasants. We must not permit the kulaks to use the confiscated implements and machinery. They belong to the Soviet Government, to be hired to the labouring peasants through the local Soviets. The poor peasants must not allow the kulaks to benefit by the use of this machinery. The kulaks must be kept in check."

This speech inaugurated a class-war in the villages. The systematic prosecution of Lenin's programme began on June 11, when the Executive Committee of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies promulgated a decree concerning the organization of poor peasants, and the supply to them of grain, commodities and agricultural implements.

Special Committees of poor peasants were created. They were promised the grain and the belongings of their well-to-do neighbours if they assisted in securing the kulaks' grain surplus for the Government. These Committees—which became, in some regions, more important than the Peasant Soviets—were dissolved by the All Russian Congress of Soviets

(held in November 1918), as the Government found them more harmful than useful to the Communist Party.

Apart from these political problems—the abolishment of large estates and the repression of the kulaks' economic activity—a new and more immediate problem confronted the Government—the feeding of an urban population totalling 37,000,000, of the Red Army, and of a large and increasing horde of officials.

Town and Village

By 1919 the normal trade relations between town and village had ceased. During the first three years of the Soviet Government's existence these were replaced by a system of State monopolies of grain and other foodstuffs, and the compulsory requisition of such from the peasants.¹ For very soon the reserves of grain of the private estates were exhausted or squandered. The Government was forced to adopt measures of confiscation to the peasants themselves. The visits of grain-collecting detachments and other exceptional measures became the bane of the countryside, which in addition was infested by innumerable "bagmen"—townspeople who scoured the villages in search for food. Not relying on the peasants themselves to see that the better off section of the agrarian population should surrender its surplus, the Soviet Government decided to send special workers' food-detachments "to assist the poor peasants in the struggle against their richer neighbours, the Kulaks."

The grain collectors acted upon the instructions of the Commissariat of Food issued on August 4, 1918. These instructions defined what proportion of the grain confiscated from the peasantry had to be handed over to the Food Departments and what to the raiders themselves; one of the instructions concludes thus: "The Local Food Committee must enroll the workers' detachment, supply it with money, and, if necessary, with firearms." All the units were armed, as it was impossible to secure deliveries from the peasants without using force, especially as the term "kulak" was very vague and many "ordinary" peasants suffered in the process.

The "collections" included not only grain, but also other agricultural produce—such as cattle, poultry, meat, butter, eggs, honey etc. The total quantity collected rose steadily. 580,000 tons of foodstuffs were collected in 1917-18, 1,800,000 tons in 1918-19, 4,400,000 tons in 1919-20 and 4,700,000 tons in 1920-21. The yield as compared with estimates was as follows: 1918-19—41.5%, 1919-20,—56.6%, 1921-21,—67.1%, 1921-22,—96%. On the other hand the towns afforded the peasants kerosene, sugar, and salt; but only about 3% of the country's kerosene and sugar requirements, and 10% of its salt needs were satisfied.

The peasants met confiscation with armed revolts which broke out all

¹ The grain monopoly was introduced in theory by the Provisional Government a few weeks after its formation; but it was never carried into effect.

over the country. They were most violent in the central regions, which suffered the most from grain raiders.

The Statute of Socialist Land-Settlement

In order to settle the land question, and to promote agriculture on a Socialist basis, the Government, on February 14, 1919, issued "The Statute of Socialist Land Settlement." Chief attention was given to the organization of Soviet farms (Sovkhoz), land communes and other methods of collective farming. The law declared that all types of private land-ownership were transitory; this principally concerned peasant farms which by that time comprised 96% of the sown area. This law served as a model for further Communist measures directed towards the compulsory collectivization of farming.

The following table shows the results of collectivization in 1921.

<i>Types of Kolkhoz</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>No. of members and their families</i>	<i>Area in thousands of hectares</i>
Communes	2,114	138,420	376
Artels	11,136	729,888	985
Communal Working Association.....	1,356	63,295	59

A Soviet report, estimating the results of collectivization in 1921, states: "The quantitative results were not great. The surviving collectives are improving but their agricultural quality is not high. The collectives were mostly organized on the estates of former landowners."

The total number of State farms (Sovkhoz) in 1921 was 4,300, with an area of 3,300,000 hectares. That year they yielded 250,000 tons of grain and fodder only.

What were, by this time, the results of the agrarian revolution?

There was a general redistribution of land. Peasant land-holdings were equalized within the narrow limits of the village. There were no State methods prescribed for this: the peasants themselves were left to effect the division. The villages nearest to the former estates therefore divided their land amongst themselves, leaving nothing for other villages.

The number of peasant farms with over 10 hectares of land was reduced by 400%—yet these were the very farms which formerly produced surplus corn. On the other hand the number of small farms (less than 4 hectares) had increased by 300%. This type in 1920 comprised 74% of all peasant holdings; thus the equalization of holdings brought all farms down to a very low level.

The following table shows the general effect of the events of 1918-21 upon agriculture.

<i>Years</i>	<i>Sown area in millions of hectares (exclusive of grass and technical crops)</i>	<i>% of 1913</i>
1913	95	100
1916	87	91.6
1917	86.9	91.5
1920	66.5	70.0
1921	58.5	61.6

SUGAR-BEET

<i>Years</i>	
1913	645,000 hectares
1916	674,000 "
1917	592,000 "
1920	198,000 "
1921	202,000 "

Reductions varied in different regions. In spite of the prolonged Civil War in the Ukraine, she suffered less than Great Russia. The reductions were also small in Siberia during the Civil War but in 1921, when the grain monopoly was introduced, the sown area diminished by 25% and the yield by 50%. Gross agricultural production was reduced for cereals from 76,000,000 tons in 1913, to 25,000,000 in 1921, for potatoes from 20,000,000 tons to 8,000,000 and for oil-yielding plants from 1,-700,000 tons to zero.

There was a great failure of crops during 1920 in twenty Provinces of southern and southeast Russia. The failure was repeated, in sixteen of these Provinces, in the following year. According to the Central Statistical Department, the harvest yielded only 80 kilogrammes of grain per head of the population. The peasants in these regions, periodically affected by drought, usually had a reserve of grain. In 1920 these reserves had been confiscated. Hence the famine in 1920 and 1921 was unprecedented in the annals of Russian history and was characterized by hunger riots, cannibalism, and a widespread epidemic of spotted fever. The Soviet Government did little to relieve the calamity, but the active assistance of the United States¹ and of other foreign agencies saved millions of lives. The loss of life caused by the famine in 1920-21 is variously estimated from 3.5 to 5 millions. No official data, however, are available.

The shrinkage in the sown area was accompanied by a reduction of the live stock of the country by over 25%. In 1916 there were 23,890,000 plough horses; in 1921 this figure fell to 18,276,000. Since there were about 20,000,000 peasant farms, this meant that there was less than one horse to each farm; in 1913 55% of the peasant farms had more than 2 horses and 24% had 3 or more horses. In 1921 only 1% of the farms had 2 horses.

The quality of the live stock also deteriorated. All horse-breeding stations had been destroyed, and the pedigree cattle slaughtered or

¹ A.R.A. (American Russian Assistance), headed by Mr. Herbert Hoover.

scattered. According to the Commissariat of Agriculture, out of 5,000,000 merino sheep in 1916 only 90,000 remained in 1921.

In February and March 1921 a new difficulty arose—an acute industrial crisis. Owing to the lack of fuel and raw materials, many factories and works closed down. Transport difficulties multiplied the delay in food deliveries and assisted the famine and general disorder. At the X Congress of the Communist Party, held in March 1921, Lenin had to admit that: “. . . We must endeavour to satisfy the demands of the peasants, who are dissatisfied, who are discontented—and rightly discontented. They cannot be otherwise. . . .”

VII

THE NEP

ON MARCH 21, 1921, a decree was promulgated replacing the food monopoly by a food tax in kind. This, together with other Government measures, inaugurated the New Economic Policy (NEP).

It is difficult to say what especially influenced Lenin in making his famous retreat. The most menacing events were the sailors' revolt in Kronstadt and the spread of the peasant armed risings, mostly in the central regions which supplied Moscow with food. Here the revolt—led by a certain Antonov—lasted nearly two years. By 1921—just before he was killed—Antonov had 50,000 men under his direction, divided into two armies. The revolts did not actually cease until the New Economic Policy became operative.

Article 8 of the resolution of the X Congress of the Communist Party, concerning the replacing of the food monopoly by the food tax, best expresses the change that occurred. It is as follows:

“All reserves of food, raw material and fodder that the farmers have left after paying their tax, are at their complete disposal. They may use them either for the improvement of their husbandry, for personal consumption or for barter in exchange for factory goods.”

Thus under the NEP, the peasants were permitted to dispose of a portion of their produce in the open market. This greatly stimulated production. Other measures followed.

The XI Congress of Soviets decided to alter the land laws to conform with the NEP. Accordingly, on October 30, 1922, all land laws were codified in the Land Code of the R.S.F.S.R.: “This code is issued in order to secure the more stable and just *use* of the land, which forever remains the *property* of the Workers' and Peasants' State.” Such is the beginning of the resolution of the Central Executive Committee concerning the introduction of the Land Code of 1922. Thus Communist land-legislation in the NEP period, while permitting the peasants to dispose of the produce of their labour as they wished, *did not guarantee them the permanent use of the land, nor freedom in selecting methods*

of *land-tenure*; the local Soviets were empowered to deprive the peasants of their land-holdings in specified cases. It also imposed restrictions on inheritance and redistribution of land.

After the enactment of the new Code the conditions of the peasants speedily improved; but they were still poorer than they had been under the "reactionary and Capitalist" Imperial regime.

The sown area, which had rapidly diminished since 1918, began to increase as soon as the NEP was inaugurated. Only in districts stricken by the famine of 1921 was the recovery slow. The following table shows the increase in production.

Gross cereal harvest in 1921 and 1922 (In millions of tons)			
Regions	1921	1922	% of increase
1. Unaffected by the famine.....	22	25	113
2. Partly affected	3.9	5.6	147
3. Fully affected	2.7	6.6	248

The XII Congress of the Communist Party (April 1923) decided to replace the agricultural tax (in kind) by a money tax, and this was gradually effected. The same Congress, fearing the antagonism which had been aroused between the peasants and the factory workers by the high prices charged for manufactured goods, decided upon measures equalizing the prices for agricultural and manufactured produce. In this respect no improvement was visible until a year had passed. In October 1923 the price indexes for factory goods were still three times as high as those for agricultural produce; but in February 1924 they only exceeded the latter by 150%. Although this reduction in the prices of factory goods was transitory and artificial (a result of official compulsion), it assisted the peasantry on the path of recovery.

In January 1924 the Communist Party finally decided to collect the agricultural tax in cash (the "sole agricultural tax"). At the same time it was resolved to stabilize grain prices by organizing a State grain trade.

The following table indicates the variations in gross production at pre-war prices.

Years	Millions of Rubles	Percentage of 1922-1923
1922-23	8,243	100
1923-24	8,474	102.8
1924-25	8,648	104.9
1925-26	11,046	134
1926-27	11,462	139.1
1927-28	11,926	144.7

This compared to gross production of 1913 (in %) would be:

	1925-26	1926-27	1927-28
Total sown area.....	89.3	90.5	90.5
Under cereals	83.8	87.8	87.8
Live stock	86.9	90.2	91.8

The further course of agrarian policy during the NEP was a chequered one. In 1925 the Communists put forth the slogan "Face to the Village" and in April of that year the XIV Congress of the Communist Party passed resolutions advocating the strengthening of the union between the workers and the peasants, greater freedom of economic activity, encouragement of cooperation and strict adherence to "revolutionary legality." In 1924 the harvest had been less good than that of 1923, and the Congress decided to reduce the agricultural tax. N. Bukharin, one of the leaders of the Communist Party, even went as far as to say to the peasants, "Enrich yourselves!" He very quickly recognized, however, that his advice had been erroneous; and the policy of paying court to the villages was very short-lived.

A few regulations were issued in conformity with this policy. On April 18, 1925 the *Provisional Regulations on Hired Labour in Agriculture* and on April 21 the *Regulations for Renting Land* were issued. They greatly benefited the peasants; since previously they had neither the right to hire labour, nor to rent land. Together with the reduction of the agricultural tax, these regulations had a good effect on the national economy in 1925-26.

Very soon, however, other measures were introduced. In October, 1925 the Central Committee of the Communist Party, on the report of D. Molotov (the present Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R.) outlined measures for a "united struggle" of poor and middle peasants against the kulaks. This struggle proceeded with less intensity than the one initiated in 1918. The experience of the first years, and Lenin's warning, mitigated against the desire of the extremists in the Party to do away with the richer peasants at one fell blow. The postponement of such a policy was not of long duration.

In 1926 a new industrial crisis occurred—a goods famine, accompanied by a rise in the prices both of manufactured goods and agricultural produce. This gave birth to the so-called "left opposition" within the Party, led by Trotzky, Kamenev and Zinoviev. The opposition blamed the "petty-bourgeois" psychology of the peasants and demanded an increase in the taxes imposed on them, especially those levied upon the kulaks (who, they maintained, should be destroyed), as well as a policy of increasing prices for factory goods and a drastic curb on private trade.

The XV Communist Party Conference held in October 1926, stated—under the influence of this opposition—that "the restoration period may

be considered as accomplished" and a turn to "integral Communism" must immediately follow.

The opposition found itself in a minority and was not successful in carrying its programme through. Stalin virtually became a dictator, and the victory of his group, for a time, led to a further economic emancipation of the peasantry. For some months the kulaks had a respite—Stalin and his supporters even went as far as to advocate State assistance to the richer peasants.

The leaders of the "left opposition" lost all influence in the Party and had to relinquish their high offices. Stalin, however, very soon adopted the policy recommended.

In the autumn of 1927 an election reform was carried out. Many categories of peasants were disenfranchised; all peasants hiring more than two labourers (except during the harvest) lost their vote. The hiring of a third labourer at any season led to "political and civil non-existence." Small peasant craftsmen employing hired labour were also disenfranchised. The "sole agricultural tax" was increased. In 1927 it was raised from Rbles. 252,000,000 to Rbles. 346,000,000.

As the result of this new fiscal and electoral policy, the gross production of cereals in 1927 was below that of 1926. It was (in millions of tons) 76.6 and 71.9 respectively. Moreover the Government was finding it difficult to purchase the grain necessary for the cities and for export.

A way out was found in establishing a system of quota deliveries by the peasants at prices which were fixed as much as 200% below the prices of the free market. By devious means the Government made private trade in agricultural produce difficult, and sometimes dangerous; private traders were not permitted to transport their wares by rail and were constantly under the threat of being accused of speculation. Peasants who refused to sell their grain to Soviet agents were not allowed to buy goods in village cooperatives and were placed under an official boycott. Later, when the grain campaign reached a serious crisis, "exceptional measures" were applied to those who "concealed" their grain. These measures were very simple; the owners were made to appear before the courts on charges of speculation and their grain was confiscated. Many peasants were imprisoned and deported by the OGPU courts at this time.

The results of these measures was what should have been expected. The peasantry again curtailed production which in 1928 began to fall below pre-war levels. In 1929 cereals were 40% to 45%, animal products 15% to 20% and the produce of technical cultures 10% below the 1913 figures.

VIII

THE ANTI-KULAK CAMPAIGN

IN DECEMBER 1927 the XV Congress of the Communist Party was summoned. This Congress saw Stalin and his associates completely triumphant. A new plan of economic policy was adopted; the Congress resolved that the most important problem of the Party in the villages was to unite small individual peasant farms and reconstruct them into large collectives. The Congress fixed a period "for the more radical exclusion" of the kulaks from the villages.

After this Congress, the pressure on the kulaks was increased and hastened by the threatened failure of the grain collection, the difficulty of supplying the industrial centres with food and the menace offered by any failure of the export plan to the plan of industrialization which was being inaugurated.¹ In order to avert these dangers it was decided to extract food reserves from the country with increased severity. The whole Party was mobilized for this work and the results were immediately favourable. It was also decided, coincidentally with the pressure on the kulaks, to reorganize and multiply the State farms, so as to increase the Government's hold on the grain supply.

In 1928-29 the well-to-do peasants were faced with supplementary taxes, while the kulaks (about 3% of the peasants) were to be taxed at the discretion of the tax-collector.²

The kulaks—a peasant with a yearly income of over Rbles 600 (3.31% of all the peasants)—had in 1927-28 paid Rbles. 70,000,000, or 33.7% of the agricultural tax. In 1928-29 this was raised to Rbles 14,000,000. The local tax collectors, when assessing the kulaks, were ordered to base their calculations "on the general information which the Soviets possess concerning their income." The well-to-do group—peasants with a yearly income of from Rbles 400 to Rbles 600 (8.6% of all the peasants)—paid 22.29% of the agricultural tax in 1927-28 and Rbles 20,000,000 more in 1928-29. The agricultural tax amounted to Rbles 320,000,000 and Rbles 430,000,000 in 1927-28 and 1928-29 respectively.

In addition to the law increasing the sole agricultural tax, a special law relating to "self-taxation" was promulgated. According to it, one-sixth of the village could decide upon additional taxation for local requirements in the broadest sense of these words. Although the burden of this new self-taxation chiefly fell on the well-to-do peasants and the kulaks, they were deprived of the right to attend the meetings which decided these matters. Until 1930 the amount of this self-taxation could

¹ It must be remembered that the difficulties in the supply of agricultural produce arose in consequence of (1) a grain export of 2,300,000 tons undertaken in 1927, and (2) exceptionally low compulsory prices, under which it was more profitable for the peasants to consume all their produce than to sell it to the State.

² At this time a new classification was introduced—the *well-to-do peasants* and the *kulaks*.

not exceed 30% of the agricultural tax but it was then raised to 100%. Self-taxation could be applied only to individual farms.

On June 28, 1929, the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. empowered the Village Soviets to decide what quantity of grain each peasant must sell to the State. The well-to-do peasants and kulaks were not permitted to participate in these Soviets but they were bound—under threat of fines, imprisonment and even exile—to accept their decisions. Contracts affecting future deliveries of grain were also signed without consultation with these two groups, who were, in effect, deprived of all civic rights. All previous instructions relating to the assistance given by local Soviets to private farmers were abolished. The poor peasants were authorized to demand a redistribution of the land "at any time." In these redistributions the well-to-do peasants received the worst land invariably.

Many outstanding Communists who had assisted Stalin to victory over the left opposition opposed these Draconic measures against the well-to-do peasants. At the XV Party Congress they formed the so-called "right opposition." They opposed the ruination of the better-off peasants, seeing a way out of a very difficult situation, not in the confiscation of grain to which the State collection had been reduced, but in raising the fixed prices at which it was purchased. They maintained that the pace of industrialization and collectivization had been made too fast and that this was especially harmful to agriculture, as collective-farm production could only develop gradually. Individual farms, they said, should be maintained and assisted without undue discrimination.

At the end of the year, under the pressure of the Stalin majority, the "right opposition," being threatened with expulsion from the Party, capitulated.

By 1928-29 the Communist Party definitely established state-control over the grain market. This was reflected in the amount of grain collected by the State, in grain prices and in the fate of the private traders and of the kulaks.

The following table shows the development in State grain collection, (in millions of tons).¹

1922-3	7.0	1926-7	11.3
1923-4	7.2	1927-8	11
1924-5	5.1	1928-9	10
1925-6	9.5		

IX

COLLECTIVIZATION

THE victorious Stalin majority was, at the time, facing a difficult problem. It had become obvious that the peasants were easily swung by

¹ See also Appendix A.

their better-off colleagues (kulaks) and that, in the existing conditions it was impossible to expect unanimous or even a sustained support from them for the Party's plans of industrialization. It was evident that drastic reforms were necessary to bring the peasantry into line with the Five Years Plan. Accordingly collectivization was decreed as the next step to be taken. At first it was proposed to have by 1932, 20 to 22 millions hectares of land under cultivation in collective farms (Kolkhoz) with a population of 19,000,000. These farms, given averagely good conditions, were then to yield 3,900,000 tons of cereals, contributing 23% of all the grain marketed, and together with the State farms (Sovkhoz) 39%. It was, however, recognized that individual farms will continue, for a while, to play an important part in agricultural production, and therefore assistance to poor and middle peasants must be continued.¹ This comparatively modest plan was abandoned for wholesale collectivization in the second half of 1929. By January 1930, about 4,000,000 peasant farms with an aggregate area of over 30,000,000 hectares had been merged into collectives; these figures were more than doubled in March 1930.

On December 27, 1929, at the Union Conference of Communist Agrarians, Stalin laid down the agrarian policy for the coming years. He declared: "The destruction of the kulaks in the regions where wholesale collectivization is being carried out is now not a simple administrative measure; it is a part of the scheme for development of the collective policy, and therefore, it is ridiculous to dwell at length on the inevitable—the kulaks must go. Once having cut off the head one does not weep over the hair."² The proposal that we should permit the kulaks to enter collective farms is also ridiculous. We cannot permit them to enter the collectives because they are sworn enemies of the collectives."

The position, indeed, was quite clear. The Communist Party accordingly changed its policy from fiscal pressure and confiscation of grain to confiscation of all kulak property, forced labour, exile, etc.

A decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. (February 1, 1930) ordered "the suspension of the laws and regulations concerning the renting of land and hiring of labour in the regions of collectivization."

The decree further declared: "The Provincial (and Regional) Executive Committees and the Governments of the Federal and Autonomous Republics are authorized to apply to the kulaks all the necessary measures of compulsion, up to confiscation of all their property and exile. The property of the kulaks so dealt with, with the exception of the part which must meet State obligations, must be handed over to the collective farms in the place of payments due from poor peasants who join the collectives."

¹ "The Five Years Plan" Vol. 2, Part I.

² *Russian proverb.*

This decree, like most others, did not strictly define the meaning of the word "kulak." It was again left to the discretion of the local authorities to decide who were kulaks and to what extent their belongings were to be confiscated. In consequence a multitude of middle peasants¹ were affected; all depended on the local authorities' decisions, as to what constitutes the permissible level of prosperity. According to the Commissariat of Finance of the R.S.F.S.R., 2.44% of the peasant farms were of the kulak type in 1930, while the number of farms destroyed under this policy amounted to from 10% to 15%—and in some regions even to 20%. It is of interest to note also that the decree contained no definition of the property that was to be confiscated. It was, therefore, natural that all sorts of property, even personal belongings, should be thus treated.

On January 20, 1930, *i. e.* at the beginning of the campaign for "the extermination of kulaks as a class," there were in the U.S.S.R. 59,400 collective farms, while on March 1st of that year, when the principal stages of the "extermination" had been accomplished, there were 110,200 (21.6% and 55% of the total cultivated area respectively). The following table shows other aspects of collectivization:

	1930 Jan. 20th	1930 March 1st
1. Number individual farms collectivized (thousands).....	4,393.1	14,264.3
2. Total area (in thousands of hectares).....	31,237.9	87,868.7
3. Average number of farms merged in one collective farm.....	73.9	129.2
4. Average cultivated area in one collective farm (hectares).....	525.9	797.4

A Check on Collectivization

This rapid progress very soon resulted in chaos. On March 2, 1930, in an article "Heads turned by Success," Stalin summed up the remarkable success of collectivization. "But success, however, has another side to it, especially when it is attained comparatively easily; and, as it were, unexpectedly. Success produces vanity . . . If such vanity becomes general then the collectivization will be affected, and even fail . . ."

Stalin further declared that the collectivization must be profitable to the State. "What really happened?" he asked. . . . "In many northern *consuming* regions, where collectivization is less profitable than in *producing* regions, our officials frequently endeavour to replace the preparatory work necessary for the creation of collective farms by red-tape decrees—in order to demonstrate that the number of collective farms is increasing. Take Turkestan, where conditions are even less favourable than in the north. It is known that in some Turkestan districts attempts were made to exceed the results gained in the leading collectivization regions of the U.S.S.R. The process was carried on under the menace of armed reprisals; irrigation water was withheld

¹ A new name for the "well-to-do" peasants.

from objectors and those who declined to join collectives were deprived of manufactured goods."

This meant that for a time the Party had decided to abandon the policy of wholesale collectivization in non-producing regions. What led to this? First of all these regions hardly ever produced agricultural surplus for the market and depended, especially for grain, on imports from producing regions. Thus it was not profitable to collectivize the peasants from a purely financial point of view.

Stalin was on the other hand optimistic as regards the producing regions: "The producing regions play the leading part in collectivization," he continued. "Why is this so? Because in these regions we have many well-organized State and collective farms . . . because in these regions the struggle against the kulaks was waged for two years, because the best Communist workers were sent to these regions from the industrial centres."

Writing of the best type of collective farm Stalin decidedly opposed the zeal of Government agents to create a large number of Agricultural Communes, where not only production but consumption is Socialized. He continued in the same article: "The basis of the collective movement, on which we must rely, is the Agricultural Artel, in which houses, vegetable gardens, some cattle, poultry, etc. are not Socialized. . . . This is the best form for the solution of our grain problem."

This article was the forerunner of a series of measures checking indiscriminate and unprofitable collectivization. As a consequence in March, 1930, the development of collectivization was less intensive than in the two previous months. In the black-soil regions the position remained stationary but in other parts there was a mass exodus of the peasantry from the collectives, many thousands of which were broken up. On March 1, more than half the peasant farms had been merged in collectives; by May, this number fell to 25%. The following table illustrates this process:

	<i>On March 1, 1930</i>	<i>On May 15, 1930</i>
Number of collectives.....	110,200	82,276
No. of individual peasant farms merged in collectives (thousands)	14,264.3	5,778

During January and February 1930, when the collective movement was at its height, the Party and Government organs quite forgot the individual farms. These were referred to as "farms not yet collectivized." It was not until March that the Government took once more notice of the productive possibilities of individual farms. It endeavoured to increase the sown area by all possible means. The slogan—"increase the sowing on individual farms" was proclaimed; and Soviet writers began to talk about the private sector favourably. The confiscation of

seeds from individual farmers was forbidden. They were also freed from taxes on any increase of the sown area.

This change in policy led to a weakening in the persecution of the kulaks and to a slowing-down of collectivization. The authorities had no alternative—otherwise the fields would have remained untilled.

The March scare during which the Government felt the ground shake under its feet, lasted for six months only.¹ In October, 1930, after the harvest and the winter sowing campaign the Communists again decided to intensify collectivization.² The central bodies of the Party ordered the collectivization of 80% of individual peasant farms in Ukraine, North Caucasus and the Lower and Middle Volga Territories. In other grain-producing areas, *i. e.* the Central Black-Soil Territory, Siberia, the Urals and the agricultural part of Kazakstan—50%; in consuming regions—from 20 to 25%; in cotton and sugar-beet growing districts—50%. On the average, in the whole of the U.S.S.R. not less than half of all individual farms was to be collectivized by 1931.

At the beginning of March 1931, the collectives had engulfed more than 9,000,000 farms, but this figure was still 5,000,000 lower than that of a year before. Collectivization, however, proceeded rapidly. By August 1, 1931, the number of collective farms was 224,500. In these were merged 14,264,200 individual farms, or 57.9% of all the farms of the poor and middle peasants. This figure rose to 62.3% in May 1932.³

A Party regulation relating to "the tempo of further collectivization and the strengthening of the collectives" was issued on August 3, 1931. The Central Committee of the Party explained that the full measure of accomplishment in collectivization would not be the merging of 100% of the private farms, but of 68% to 70% of the farms, and from 75% to 80% of the cultivated area. In accordance with this instruction, it was recognized that full collectivization was already completed in the Ukraine, Northern Caucasus, the Middle and Lower Volga Territories, the Crimea and the Urals.

As to the other regions of the U.S.S.R., the Central Executive Committee decided to complete the plan of collectivization in 1932-33.

The Kolkhoz

The Kolkhoz (collective farms) were divided into three types: Agricultural Communes, Artels and Communal Working Unions. These three forms of collectives differed as follows: a Commune is a unit in which not only the means of production but those of consumption are socialized; in the Artels the means of production are socialized but consumption is individual, not collective; in the Communal Working

¹ In January and February 1930 the Government attempted to attract the Red Army to the collectivization movement. As the soldiers are very closely identified with the peasants, the attempt failed. There is reason to believe that discontent in the Red Army forced the Government to effect the March retreat.

² It should be noted that measures of repression against the peasantry are always intensified after the harvest and till the spring sowing season. The peasants have a saying: "Summer to the peasants and winter to the Soviets." The reason is obvious.

³ Report to the Pan-Ukrainian Party Conference, Kharkov, June 8, 1932.

Unions neither the means of production nor consumption are socialized; their members work the land communally with their own implements.

Before passing to a description of the general scheme of the Agricultural Artel (the predominant type of the Kolkhoz) it will be interesting to survey the comparative importance of all three types of collective farms. The following table shows their proportion for 1928 and 1930 in the more important areas of wholesale collectivization.

		Kolkhoz (in %)			Sown area (in %)		
		C.W.U.	Artels	A.C.	C.W.U.	Artels	A.C.
1. Middle Volga Territory.....	1928—	32.3	64.7	3.0	31.4	56.3	12.0
	1930—	8.4	87.0	4.6	3.0	90.8	6.2
2. Central Black-Soil Territory.....	1928—	73.8	21.7	4.5	57.0	30.5	12.5
	1930—	17.5	76.9	56.6	3.0	90.8	6.2
3. Lower Volga Territory.....	1928—	58.0	38.5	3.5	43.6	47.3	9.1
	1930—	1.6	91.9	6.5	0.6	95.1	4.3
4. North Caucasian Territory.....	1928—	87.8	8.8	3.4	73.4	14.0	12.6
	1930—	6.3	82.2	11.5	1.0	93.8	5.2
5. Ukraine	1928—	73.8	23.5	2.7	42.8	44.3	12.9
	1930—	42.5	52.9	4.6	35.2	57.5	7.3

This table is based upon the last census of the Kolkhoz, taken in 1930 and published under the title "The Kolkhoz at the time of the XVI Party Congress."¹ The authors comment on the general situation as follows: "Whereas the Artels in the preceding years showed no signs of growth, for May 1, 1930 they exhibited in all areas of collectivization very striking increases—though less in the Ukraine than elsewhere. The importance of the Communal Working Unions and the Agricultural Communes has everywhere greatly diminished." No explanation is given of this phenomenon. The only clue is a statement that this all happened "in conformity with instructions from the Centre."

Another interesting comment by the authors of the above-mentioned publication states that "... Property received by the Kolkhoz as a result of confiscation of the kulak elements in the villages constitutes from 25% to 40% of the general fund of the Kolkhoz (not counting items that have not been collectivized and remain in individual possession). This illustrates not only the political but also the economic significance of the process of confiscation for the purpose of successful wholesale collectivization, which is our aim." Establishing in principle that the supreme form of Socialist collectivization is the Agricultural Commune, the authors of the publication admit that for the time being, and for some time to come, the Artel is more suitable to the psychology of the peasantry, while it gives greater advantages to the State than the Communal Working Unions.

Thus the Artel appears in the light of a compromise between the passive resistance of the peasantry to experiments and the degree of

¹ Moscow, 1931.

pressure which can usefully be brought to bear on them by the authorities. In this respect a closer study of the Artel is interesting both as the fundamental factor governing the agricultural community of the U.S.S.R.—or a large proportion of it—and as the outcome of the Communist Party's efforts radically to reform the social structure of this community.

What is the organization of the Artel which has absorbed more than half of the peasant population?

According to the Statute of Artels, a collective farm is created by the merging of a number of individual farms. The former tenants constitute the General Board which is the governing body of the Artel; it elects the Executive Board and decides the more important matters. All means of production in an Artel are socialized and the members are remunerated only for their labour and not for the portions of land or other assets they have contributed to the Artel. Each Artel must join the Kolkhozcentre; and carries on business under its immediate leadership; it concludes contracts with the Kolkhozcentre for grain and other deliveries, which bind the Artel to follow a certain plan of production and to hand over its marketable goods to the State and the cooperatives at fixed prices. An Artel can be dissolved only with the consent of the Kolkhozcentre, ratified by the highest authority. No member of an Artel, if he leaves it, is liable to any compensation for the portion he has contributed.

The Executive Board of the Artel organizes, distributes and supervises the work of the members of the Artel, collects the produce which is to be delivered to the State and cooperatives, and sees that remuneration, in cash and kind, is justly distributed among the members of the Artel.

The regime thus established has a distinctly bureaucratic character and has resulted in a great volume of red-tape; the quality of work suffers in consequence and there is much delay. The Soviet Press is full of complaints on these two points. In particular, the disappointing results of the agricultural campaign of 1932 have aroused a tempest of recriminations against the peasants and the agents in charge of the Kolkhoz. These recriminations were merely the forerunners of an admission that collectivization did not work out so well.

Further Developments

On February 4, 1932 the TZIK of the Communist Party passed the following order: "Permanent working brigades must be created and become the pivot of all the work of the Kolkhoz, in conformity with the experience of the most successful Kolkhoz which had introduced this institution in 1931. These brigades composed of a permanent staff will be given all the necessary machines, implements and livestock, for which they will be answerable." It was hoped thereby to raise the standard of work, as the brigades were organized on military lines.

"Pravda" of June 28, 1932 ascribes the "victory on the spring-

sowing-front" to the institution of these brigades. It will be seen later that the "victory" is somewhat problematic; even official Soviet publications cannot conceal this fact, and the same paper and on the same date regrets the hastiness with which the brigades were organized, the lack of detailed instruction, and the superfluity of "Party-optimism" towards the Kolkhoz-peasantry. "It is time," exclaims the paper, "to deal more seriously with the problem of creating permanent Kolkhoz brigades."

The trouble with the Kolkhoz is, of course, that they were created not with a desire to improve the lot of the peasants but to ensure to the State the grain (and other agricultural produce) needed for export and for the feeding of the non-agricultural sections of the population. The peasants driven into the Kolkhoz, chiefly by measures of coercion, but also by promises of better economic and political conditions, soon discovered the real trend of affairs. The harvest of 1931, the sowing for the next season and the harvest of 1932 showed the Communists that the peasantry was getting more and more dissatisfied both with the conditions of affairs and the treatment meted out to them. After the spring sowing of 1932—carried out under conditions of extreme duress for the peasants—the Government realized that some relaxation was imperative; accordingly it issued a decree (June 25, 1932) to all Kolkhoz authorities, imposing heavy penalties on those who exceed their legal powers when dealing with the Kolkhoz or their members; in particular as regards any interference with the economic autonomy of the Kolkhoz as a whole, and as regards the rights of members to participation in its administration. Special attention was drawn to the frequent practice of illegal "de-kulakizing" (expropriation of property); this henceforward must be in strict conformity with the law. The latter, however, leaves such a wide scope to local authority that the peasant can hope for no relaxation in this quarter. The instruction therefore should be accepted as an order to Soviet officials to go "easier" with the peasants *for the time being*.

As regards economic autonomy, the central organs of the Government were the first offenders against the decree: on July 11th, the Commissariat of Agriculture and the Kolkhozcentre of the U.S.S.R. issued intricate regulations for the harvesting of the crops and the distribution of the profits between the State, the Kolkhoz and its members. The desire to ensure the receipt of its portion by the former is the leading motive of these regulations. The interests of the peasants are relegated to the last place.

In this respect the State has a freer hand with the Kolkhoz than with the Sovkhoz (State farms). The Sovkhoz workers must be adequately paid; if their interests are neglected they simply leave and even the Soviet Government has no power to retain them at their task; the scarcity and the continual migration of labour on the Sovkhoz is one of the permanent worries of the Soviet Press. It is different in the Kolkhoz; they are amply provided with labour, consisting of the

former holders of its land, who lose everything if they leave. If not a serf by law, the Kolkhoz-peasant has become one in practice.

Machine and Tractor Stations

One of the means at the disposal of the authorities to keep the Kolkhoz under control are the Machine and Tractor Stations (M.T.S.). Agricultural machinery and implements are in most cases concentrated at these stations and only lent to the Kolkhoz. The M.T.S. are made responsible not only for the technical services rendered, but also for the correct distribution of the profits between the State, the Kolkhoz and its members. The stations are under direct Government control.

The number of machines which were at the direct disposal of the collectives decreased during 1931 three times in total h.p.—from 243,000 in 1930 to 80,000 in 1931. On the other hand the M.T.S. had 250,000 h.p. in 1930, and 980,000 h.p. in 1931, when they served 35,000 Kolkhoz with a sown area of 30,000,000 hectares. On July 1, 1932 the M.T.S. had 146,000 tractors, 10,000 trucks and 10,050 combines at their disposal.¹

The number of M.T.S. was 1,400 in 1931² and must be brought to 3,100 with an aggregate 5,000,000 h.p. in 1932.

Income

The peasants of medium means comprise the bulk of the agrarian population. In 1927 they constituted 65% of all farmers; they held 80.7% of all the horses, 75.2% of the cattle and 78.3% of the sown area. Before the War they produced 49.4% of the marketable grain. In 1926-27 this figure rose to 74%.

In June 1927 the percentage of collectivized farms was only 0.8%, but by July 1932 it reached 62.3%. An inquiry concluded in January 1931 by the Agrarian Institute of the Communist Academy and the Scientific Kolkhoz Institute showed that the number of former middle peasants in the Artels was from 48.7% to 59.4%. The remaining members of the collectives consisted chiefly of former poor peasants. The percentage of former agricultural labourers (these, as distinguished from the peasants, did not possess farms) in the collectives was rather low. It varied, in different regions, from 7.5% to 19.8%, but the average did not reach 14%. It may roughly be said that 60% of the members of the collectives were former middle peasants, about 26% poor peasants, and 14% agricultural labourers.

How are the profits of collectives divided between them and the State? The following table gives the figures of the North Caucasian collectives in respect of the Artel farms alone. This district is an im-

¹ Economic Life, July 17, 1932. No. 161.

² This was, however, far behind the requirements of the collectivized sector. The lagging behind of the M.T.S. is due to the non-fulfilment of the estimates for the building and repairing of agricultural machinery. 1931 ended with 35% of the estimates not fulfilled (Izvestia, Feb. 23, 1932).

portant grain producing district; and its condition, in so far as collectivization goes, is typical.

<i>Artels</i>	<i>Handed to the State per family (in rubles)</i>	<i>Proportion of profit handed to members of Kolkhoz</i>	
		<i>To 1 family (rubles)</i>	<i>Of this in kind (in rubles)</i>
Those served by Tractor and Machine stations....	391.5	250.5	119.2 (47.5%)
Those independent of such stations.....	336.5	292.3	149.9 (51.3%)

It is interesting to note that the earnings of a member of a collective working independently of a Tractor Station were rather higher than those gained in collectives served by Tractor Stations. A member of an independent Kolkhoz not only earned more but took less time to do it. He was engaged, on the average, 101.0 days, while in those dependent upon Tractor Stations this was 109.8 days.

In 1930, a year with a record harvest, the poorest peasants received from the collectives rather more than they once obtained from their poorly-cultivated individual plots. The middle peasants, on the contrary, were worse off in collectives. In the black-soil regions the middle peasants, now members of Artels, earned in 1930 about half of their former income as individual farmers. The former agricultural labourers, however, gained considerably by joining the collectives.

The position in the non-producing regions (those growing no surplus of grain) appears somewhat more favourable on the surface, whereas in the grain growing region the peasants were obliged to surrender 50% of their produce to the State, in other parts of the country this was established at 30%. The advantage, however, is ephemeral; in the non-producing regions the peasants never grew enough grain to last them from harvest to harvest and were obliged to buy an important proportion for their domestic needs, in exchange for vegetables, dairy and poultry produce, fruit, meat, etc. They are now obliged to sell their produce to the State at artificially low prices, whereas they pay exorbitant ones for all they are forced to buy. Thus their position is, if anything, worse than their colleagues in the grain growing regions.

The situation became considerably more serious later in 1931. That year's harvest was nothing like the preceding. The State collected its share regardless of the actual yield, and diminished the peasants' income at a very modest estimate by at least 10%. As a result the sowing campaign for 1932 was conducted under conditions of the utmost gravity, necessitating measures of coercion on the part of the authorities in very numerous cases. The difficulties experienced in the working of the Kolkhoz were ascribed to "kulak mentality" . . . the kulak himself being exterminated as an economic factor. The Communists

revived him in a psychological form to explain their difficulties on the "agrarian front."

Results of Collectivization in 1932

The "kulak-mentality" was, however, more difficult to intimidate than the real kulaks; it became very soon imperative to do a little more than the mere finding of a scapegoat. The State scheme for provisioning the towns, the industrial centres and the non-producing regions collapsed completely early in 1932 and it became apparent even to the Moscow rulers that the situation was becoming catastrophic. Hunger riots in the south, the falling off of the index of the productivity of labour, the undisguised sabotage of the peasants during the spring-sowing campaign forced them to face realities.

During May decrees of the Council of People's Commissars cancelled all the restrictions for the free marketing of agricultural surplus, flour, bread, butter, vegetable oil and sugar excepted.

This was indeed a very grave decision; for it forced the proletariat, to whom promises of plenty had been given only a year ago by no less a person than Stalin, to buy every article of food except those enumerated above on the free market; it must be added that even those products, for which the State has maintained its monopoly, are not furnished to the population regularly or in quantities specified by law. About 30% must be acquired on the free market. This makes a very acute situation. Whereas a year ago a workman bought only 25% of his requirements on the free market this proportion has gone up to 65% in 1932. The difference between the fixed prices on the socialized market and those obtaining on the free is continually growing. The following table compiled by the Leningrad authorities illustrates this.

Measure	1931		1932	
	fixed price	free price	fixed price	free price
Rye bread	0.075	0.37	0.075	0.64
Wheat bread	0.25	0.85	0.25	1.25
Buckwheat	0.20	2.34	0.20	3.08
Rice	5.13	9.20
Potatoes	0.9	0.44	0.10	0.45
Cabbage	0.9	0.80	0.10	0.92
Meat	0.90	8.00	0.90	9.00
Butter	22.50	4.00	29.50
Veg. oil	0.49	11.10	0.50	15.56
Herrings	0.45	3.25	0.45	4.50
Lump sugar	3.50	0.68	8.25
Granul. sugar	0.60	2.00	0.60	3.38
Milk	0.24	1.33	0.36	1.70
Eggs	0.70	4.92	0.90	7.00
(in rubles)				

It is easy to judge of the consequences. The situation has become particularly acute in August and September, in spite of the new harvest.

Conditions are no better in the other great cities and industrial centres of the Union; in the south they are considerably worse.

A peculiar and anomalous situation has arisen in and about Moscow; such were, indeed, the circumstances of provisioning the capital in the late spring of 1932 that the authorities have been obliged to return to "Capitalist" methods. By a decree of July 20, 1932 the Council of Labour and Defence (STO) has established a special regime for Moscow and its environs, over a radius of 50 klm.: "In order to develop the Kolkhoz trade on Moscow markets and to allow the consumer to buy direct from the Kolkhoz or individual farms it is decreed that all contracts between the farmers and State or cooperative institutions for 1932 are hereby cancelled, excluding those relating to grain."¹

This really is a "counter-revolutionary" measure, one under which it was impossible only a year ago to see the signatures of Communist leaders! . . .

X

THE SOVKHOZ

ANOTHER form of Communist agricultural enterprise is the State-farm or Sovkhoz. As mentioned above, the XV Congress of the Communist Party (1927) decided, in order to increase grain production, to organize new State farms—or as the Communists styled them "grain factories." The area of these farms grew rapidly; it amounted to 1,000,000 hectares in 1928, to 1,500,000 hectares in 1929, to 3,900,000 hectares in 1930, subdivided into about 200 Sovkhos.

A great decrease in the number of cattle, having become apparent in 1930, the Government formed a State Cattle-Breeding Trust, with 140 Sovkhos, totalling 20,000,000 hectares of land and 1,200,000 head of cattle. Later in the year the Sheep-Breeding Trust—controlling 115 Sovkhos with 13,000,000 hectares—and the Pig-Breeding, Oil-Seed, Hemp and Flax Trusts were formed, with similar important allotments of land.

Some of the cattle and grazing land was confiscated from the nomads of the Lower Volga Territory and Turkestan and some taken from the kulaks; the middle peasants were also compelled to contribute their share.

While reviewing the results of the Sovkhoz campaign of 1930, the VI Congress of Soviets (March, 1931) referred to the following defects of the State farms: "The inefficient use of machinery led to bad harvesting. There were many instances of criminally careless handling of tractors and machinery by the workers on State farms and at Ma-

¹ "Pravda," July 28, 1932. It should be noted that grain plays an entirely insignificant role in this region.

chinery and Tractor Stations. On the cattle-breeding State farms the chief deficiencies were inattention to cattle and sheep, lack of veterinary service and unscientific feeding. These contributed to the destruction of young stock and to the failure to fulfill the estimates."

The Congress further decided to increase the cultivated area of State grain farms to 10,500,000 hectares in 1931, 14,000,000 hectares in 1932 and 19,000,000 hectares in 1933. It was also decided to increase the number of cattle State farms to 2,800,000 head in 1931, 5,000,000 head in 1932 and 7,000,000 head in 1933; the number of sheep to 4,400,000 in 1931, 9,000,000 head in 1932 and 18,000,000 in 1933. Proportionately large increases were decreed for other Sovkhoz as well.

In 1930 the State farms handed over to the State 1,250,000 tons of cereals, and some 16,000 tons of meat. It is estimated that 3,160,000 tons of cereals and 100,000 tons of meat were available in 1931.¹

According to the plan for the development of the State cattle and sheep breeding the peasants were forced in 1930 and 1931 to hand over 4,400,000 head of cattle, 1,500,000 sheep, 300,000 pigs; in addition 1,683,300 tons of meat was requisitioned from them. The prices paid for this confiscated stock were much lower than those obtaining on the free market. The slaughter of cattle for private needs and the local markets was regulated by a special instruction of the Executive Committee and of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., issued on November 1, 1930, and entitled "Measures concerning the excessive slaughter of cattle." It practically prohibited the supply of the free market with meat. The penalty for infringing this regulation was a fine amounting to ten times the value of the animal slaughtered or the confiscation of a part and sometimes of all the property of the offender.

The Sovkhozcentre

All the Sovkhoz in the U.S.S.R. are placed under a special organ—the Sovkhozcentre—created in 1929. Until that year the Sovkhoz were under the management of the local administration.

In 1930 the Union Commissariat of Agriculture was created and the Sovkhozcentre was subdivided into several departments, called trusts: dairy and vegetable, poultry, grain, rice, seeds, sheep, cattle, pigs, etc. These trusts control the respective Sovkhoz throughout the Union, and are subordinate to the Union Commissariat of Agriculture. There are a few trusts of a similar character under the Supreme Council of National Economy of the U.S.S.R.

The areas of jurisdiction of the trusts do not conform to the political and administrative subdivisions of the U.S.S.R. which makes them absolutely independent of the Federal Republics, the local administration, etc. All local authority is entirely debarrèd from the control of the Sovkhoz.

¹ See also Appendix A.

Unsatisfactory Results of the Sovkhoz

It is extremely difficult to estimate the results of the work of the Sovkhoz. No official returns have been as yet published for 1931, a year in which particular efforts to develop this branch of agriculture were made.

The Soviet Press is full of complaints but affords no comprehensive figures. Yet the very fact of the continual recriminations against the work of the Sovkhoz is very significant. Still more so is the survey of the work of the various meat growing Sovkhoz issued on April 1, 1932 and signed by Stalin, Molotov (Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars) and Yakovlev (Commissar of Agriculture). Here are a few extracts: During the last two years the Commissariat of Agriculture has organized 1,480 Sovkhoz with 2,500,000 heads of cattle, 860,000 pigs and 4,700,000 sheep . . . As a general rule the management of these Sovkhoz has been "deplorable from top to bottom"; . . . the Government has had to dismiss over two hundred Sovkhoz managers, of whom about a third have been condemned to various punishments by the courts for dishonesty (a list of names follows); . . . heavy penalties are promised to all those high in command over the Sovkhoz (a list of names follows) if conditions are not speedily improved . . . the Sovkhoz have furnished only 6,500,000 tons or 69% (in 1931) of the estimates for meat, causing great distress to the population; . . . this in spite of the fact that they had received 4,405,000 heads of cattle, sheep and pigs, expropriated from the agricultural community. . . .

*General Prospects of Agriculture*¹

The Five Years Plan provided the sowing of 144,000,000 hectares for 1932, of which 105,800,000 were to be under cereals. The returns of the Commissariat of Agriculture show that these estimates have not been accomplished: the total sown area for 1932 is 143,900,000 hectares, of which 100,200,000 are under cereals. Of these about 25,000,000 have been sown much too late to give satisfactory results. Of the total about 35% belong to individual farms and 65% to Kolkhoz and Sovkhoz. The decrease in the sown area as compared to 1931 amounts to almost 2,000,000 hectares, but cereals alone have diminished by over 4,000,000. The fact that about 16% of all the sown area has been planted too late will considerably reduce the yield of the harvest. As it is, the expectations of the Government were disappointed in 1931; instead of the 7 centners of cereals planned per capita of population the harvest yielded only 4.8. It was particularly bad in the Sovkhoz sector, where instead of the 10 centners planned the harvest yielded only 3.3.²

It is difficult to estimate the actual amount of agricultural produce the Government was able to collect from the population. The harvest

¹ See also Appendix A.

² Socialist Agriculture, Moscow, 1932. No. 2.

of 1931 has been estimated at 78,400,000 tons of cereals, some 9,000,000 tons below the figures for 1930. Yet the official Press reports that the grain collection campaign exceeded 1930 by 5.3%; producing 19,500,000 or 91.2% of the estimates.

Of this an important proportion was exported abroad in order to help balance Soviet foreign trade. In spite of unfavourable results of the harvest of 1931, as compared with those of 1930 exports of cereals were augmented as the following table shows:

<i>Exports (in tons)</i>		
	<i>1930</i>	<i>1931</i>
Wheat	2,500,000	2,500,000
Barley	1,200,000	1,000,000
Rye	600,000	1,100,000
Other cereals	500,000	600,000
Total	4,800,000	5,200,000

This of course could be done at the expense of the consumers and the difficult food situation which developed late in the spring, should not have come as a surprise to the rulers of the U.S.S.R.

There can be absolutely no doubt that this situation will become steadily worse in the future. The harvest of 1932 is inferior to that of 1931. At the same time the continual rise of the number of industrial workers and the natural increase of the population (some 3,000,000 a year) must be reckoned with. All this does not promise well for the coming winter and spring, especially as the grain collection for 1932 has been decided at roughly 20,000,000 tons.

It is therefore to be wondered how Commissar Molotov, speaking of the Second Five Years Plan at the Party Conference on February 4, 1932 could proclaim the "victory" of the socialized agricultural sector. Who will believe the promise to raise individual food rations threefold in five years when production per capita in 1931 was only 4.8 centners, whereas in 1926, before collectivization, it was 5.4 and in 1913—5.9?

True, the Government has issued several decrees establishing the freedom of the "surplus market"—of that which is left to the farmers after the share of the State has been handed over. But will there be a marketable surplus? There is another serious obstacle to the marketing of the surplus: only *direct* trade between the consumer and the producer is permitted; the private trader remains under an interdict of the Government which has ordered its agents to see that "no kulak or speculating elements were allowed to profit by the new regulations."

There is no doubt that the Communists are faced by a very serious situation. Pledged to a policy of Socialization, they cannot return to the NEP, which would be a solution. This would mean the revival of the private sector, the abandonment of "integral Communism," as well as entail an enormous expense. Collectivization has cost the country

over Rbles. 10,000,000,000 (gold) already. What would de-collectivization cost?

Thus the battle between the Party and the peasantry continues. It has taken a particularly acute character during the harvest of 1932. A decree of the TZIK and the Soviet of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. (Aug. 7, 1932) established the capital punishment and confiscation of all personal property for the theft of Kolkhoz or socialized property. In special cases the courts are empowered to reduce the sentences to imprisonment for no less than 10 years. The term "kolkhoz or socialized property" is purposely left vague, and "Pravda"¹ reported death sentences passed on peasants who had concealed or stolen such quantities of grain which, under the normal Soviet law, would have been punished by imprisonment for not more than 3 months (par. 162, Criminal Code). The paper, reflecting the mood of the authorities, exalts "the defence of the sacred socialized property" and appeals to the courts to show no mercy to the delinquents.

The Communists have no choice: they must subdue the peasantry or the latter will destroy their work sooner or later.

APPENDIX A

I. GENERAL AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

	1928	1929	1930	1931 <i>estim.</i>	1931 <i>prod.</i>	1932 <i>estim.</i>	1932 <i>prod.</i>
Cultivated area (mill. hect.).....	116.7	118.0	127.8	143.6	136.6	144.0	134.9
Of this under cereals (mill. hect.)	102.7	95.4	103.4	111.0	104.5	105.8	100.2
Technical cultures (mill. hect.)....	5.4	8.7	10.1	13.5	8.5
Cereals (mill. centners).....	858	717	874	970	784
Production per capita of cereals....	6.2	4.7	5.5	7.	4.8

Note: The returns of the harvest of 1931 are taken from "Economic Life," July 14, 1932. No. 161.


APPENDIX B

EXPORT OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE



(in gold rubles)

1913	1,117,371,000
1929	293,899,000
1930	382,638,000
1931	342,200,000

¹ "Pravda," Aug. 21 and 22, 1932.



COMMUNICATIONS MAP II



TRANSPORT

PART I—THE EMPIRE

I

HIGHWAYS AND ROADS

Highways

RUSSIA has never been very rich in roads. The size of the country coupled with the sparseness of its population and the absence of good road-building material were the chief causes.

Altogether, 20,300 klm. of highways had been constructed in European Russia (excluding Finland) by 1890 (including 7,615 klm. of highways in Poland).

The corresponding figures for Europe, at this time, were as follows:

In Belgium	24,000 klm.
Germany	100,000 klm.
Great Britain	199,000 klm.
France	486,000 klm.

Another reason for the poor development of highways in Russia, after their management had been entrusted to the Zemstvos in the seventies, was that in the absence of any general law their maintenance depended on the local authorities' attitude towards road-making. It was only in 1914 that the decision was taken to create a special Government fund for financing road-making. Unfortunately, it was promulgated only three weeks before the start of the War and remained largely a dead letter.

By 1911, the total length of the Russian highways (Finland excluded) amounted to 35,940 klm. The following table gives particulars as to the distribution of these roads.

<i>Parts of Russia</i>	<i>Area in sq. klm.</i>	<i>Popul. (in thousands)</i>	<i>Length of highways in klm.</i>
Poland	111,600	12,250	8,736
Lithuania	106,000	5,800	2,367
Caucasus	411,000	13,250	4,967
Baltic Provinces	81,000	2,700	525
The rest (excl. Finland).....	21,316,500	145,700	19,345
Total	22,026,400	179,700	35,940¹

¹ Siberia and Turkestan had only 170 klm. of highways.

The backwardness of Russia with regard to highways was especially noticeable when compared with the conditions prevalent in Europe generally. The following table shows the great disparity that existed just before the War.

	<i>Area in sq. klms.</i>	<i>Population (in thous.)</i>	<i>Density popul. per sq. klm.</i>	<i>Length of highways in klms.</i>
Belgium	29,500	7,400	251	24,500
France	536,400	39,000	73	563,000
Germany	540,700	67,000	124	265,000
Great Britain	314,000	45,000	145	256,000
Italy	286,600	34,500	120	82,000
Norway	322,200	2,350	7	26,500
Spain	496,900	18,700	88	25,000
Sweden	447,900	5,500	12	58,000

Unpaved Roads

The length of the unpaved roads of general importance in 1911 was 737,275 klms. as shown below.

<i>District</i>	<i>Area in sq. klms.</i>	<i>Population (in thous.)</i>	<i>Length in klms.</i>
Baltic Provinces	81,000	2,700	34,629
Lithuania	106,000	5,800	56,531
Poland	111,600	12,250	64,565
Caucasus	411,800	13,250	19,022
The rest	21,316,500	145,700	562,528
Total (excl. Finland).....	22,026,400	179,700	737,275

In addition, there were some 3,000,000 kilom. of roads of only local importance.

One more factor must be taken into consideration when surveying Russian road-making: the climatic conditions of Russia, also, are inimical to the construction of highways on a large scale, the winter frosts damaging the surface of the roads very considerably.

Notwithstanding these difficulties, a plan was formulated in 1913 for the construction of 20,000 klm. of highways, to be completed in 10 years; of these some 5,000 klm. were built during the War, chiefly in districts immediately abutting on the Front.

II

WATERWAYS

Length of Waterways

THE numerous waterways of Russia have afforded, from the earliest times, the most ready means of communication available in that

country, prior to the introduction of railways. Their utility was not exclusively commercial; they also constituted an important factor in the political rise of Moscow. This city is situated near the Valday mountains, from which the great rivers of the Russian plain run in four directions: the Dnieper and the Don to the south, the North Dvina and Volkhov to the north, the West Dvina to the northwest and the Volga to the southeast.

The communications originally afforded by these rivers, however, were far from satisfactory owing to a lack of technical equipment. Only with the advent of Peter the Great a new epoch began. He initiated the construction of canals to connect the various rivers with the view of connecting the Baltic and the Black Sea littorals with the basin of the Volga and the Caspian Sea. He also initiated the scientific survey of the rivers and their improvement for navigation.

The work started by Peter the Great was continued throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and resulted in the creation of a well developed canal system. Among the more important were: the Vyshnevolotsk canal connecting the upper Volga with the Dnieper; the Ladoga canal connecting the Neva with the Volkhov; the Marinsky system of canals connecting the Baltic with the Volga basin; the Dnieper Bay canal connecting the basins of the Dnieper and the Visla; the Berezina canal connecting the Dnieper with the W. Dvina and the Baltic; the Lake Onega canal connecting the Baltic with the White Sea.

The total length of the canals constructed in Russia up to 1913 was 2,134 klm. The length of Russia's natural waterways was some two hundred times as great.

The following table gives details as to the use made of the waterways.

	Whole length of rivers, canals and lakes (in kilm.)	Length of waterways									
		Rafting		Navigable		Others		Passenger traffic		Towed traffic	
		Kilm.	% of whole length	Kilm.	% of whole length	Kilm.	% of whole length	Kilm.	% of whole length	Kilm.	% of whole length
Russia proper (without Finland)	247,500	142,600	58%	45,500	18%	59,300	24%	25,600	10%	7,730	3%
Siberia and Turkestan	138,700	52,000	38%	48,500	35%	38,200	27%	26,200	19%	8,270	6%
Total	386,200	194,800	51%	93,900	24%	97,500	25%	51,800	14%	16,000	4%

This table shows that half (51%) of all the water routes could be used for rafting and rather less than one quarter (24%) for navigation. Passenger traffic could be conducted upon about 14% of the total of all water routes.

The Exploitation of Waterways

Russia is more richly endowed with natural waterways than Europe; there, only the Danube, the Rhine and, in a less degree the Seine, are

comparable to the great Russian rivers. In their length and volume the Russian rivers can vie with those of America; although they are much less utilized for internal communication.

Statistics compiled by the Ministry of Communications before the War (1914), which relate to about 85% of all Russian waterways, show that:

1. Of the many great rivers of Russia proper, there is one, the Ural, which is not navigable at all; and one, the Onega, which is only navigable for a third of its length. All the other great rivers are navigable over almost their entire length, Volga (97%), West Dvina (98%), N. Dvina (100%), Petchora (86%), Dnieper (88%), Mezen (68%), and the Don (70%).

Taking the average of these percentages, the fact emerges that all the great rivers of Russia are navigable throughout three-quarters of their total length.

2. Of the large rivers of Siberia and Turkestan one, the Syr-Daria, is only navigable for 75% of its length; but all the others are either navigable over their entire length (Obi, Yenissey, Amu-Daria) or very nearly so; the Lena (97%).

Passenger traffic is conducted over 55% of the whole length of the

Name of River	—River systems (in klm.)—			—Main Rivers alone (in klm.)—		
	Total length	Navigable length	Passenger traffic	Total length	Navigable length	Passenger traffic
<i>A. Russia proper</i>						
Volga	82,450	17,670	10,330	3,700	3,570	3,275
North Dvina	28,380	5,320	3,370	750	750	750
Dnieper	24,830	5,820	4,800	2,280	2,000	2,000
Neva with lakes Ladoga, Onega and Ilmen	21,580	2,330	1,175
West Dvina	8,610	1,520	650	1,000	980	540
Petchora	7,290	1,940	930	1,810	1,560	830
Don	6,670	2,090	630	1,990	1,400	615
Narova	6,570	545	330
Mezen	6,400	890	28	915	620	28
Onega	6,250	290	270	410	140	120
Ural	3,970	16	16	2,440	16	16
Dniester	960	840	715	890	830	715
Total	203,950	39,271	23,244	16,215	11,860	8,889
<i>B. Siberia and Turkestan</i>						
Obi	43,470	16,950	10,245	3,720	3,720	3,450
Yenissey	26,200	8,340	3,880	3,150	3,150	2,750
Lena	19,600	9,100	5,190	4,600	4,480	4,080
Amur-Shilka	19,280	8,280	6,000	2,840	2,840	2,840
Amu-Daria	3,050	1,550	880	1,450	1,450	880
Syr-Daria	2,260	1,380	1,810	1,380
Total	113,860	45,600	26,195	17,570	17,020	14,000
Grand Total	317,810	84,871	49,439	33,785	28,880	22,889

greater rivers (not counting tributaries) in Russia proper. In Siberia, there is no passenger service on one river, the Syr-Daria; on the river Amu-Daria, there is a service for 60% of its length; the rest of the rivers have longer services—the Yenisey (80%), the Lena (89%), the Obi (93%), and the Amu-Daria (100%).

For the whole of Russia, the total average navigable length of the great rivers is 86% of their whole extent; passenger traffic is conducted on 67% of this—i. e. on 78% of the whole extent of the navigable portions. The severe Russian winter makes it, however, impossible to use the waterways all the year round. Of the important rivers only the Amu-Daria and the Syr-Daria do not freeze. All the rest are frozen for from four to six months a year.

The table on opposite page gives particulars about the navigation on the main Russian rivers.

The River Basins

The relative extent of waterways accessible from the various seas and oceans surrounding Russia is as follows:

<i>Outlet of waterway</i>	<i>Length of rafting water-routes, in klm.</i>	<i>Length of navigable water-routes, in klm.</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>A. In Russia proper</i>			
Caspian Sea	45,900	18,500	64,400
Arctic Ocean with the White Sea.....	43,600	8,600	52,200
The Baltic Sea	38,400	7,800	46,200
The Black Sea and Sea of Azov.....	16,700	12,500	29,200
<i>B. In Siberia</i>			
Arctic Ocean	39,300	36,300	75,600
Sea of Okhotsk, with the Tartar Straits	9,300	8,300	17,600
Sea of Aral.....	1,600	3,300	4,900
Bering Sea	600	500	1,100
Sea of Japan.....	700	80	780
Sea of Kamchatka	500	500

From the above data it can be seen that 34% of the whole length of the rafting and navigable water-routes of Russia proper terminate in the Caspian Sea, which has no significance in international trade, and 27% in the ice-bound basin of the Arctic Ocean; in Siberia 75% of the waterways likewise flow into the Arctic Ocean and the Okhotsk Sea—which is of similar character. *On the whole, 23% (in total length) of the Russian rafting and navigable waterways flow into inland seas, useless for international commerce, and 50% into the Arctic Ocean.*

The above clearly shows the natural defects of Russia's internal waterways, particularly those of Russia proper, where the main artery—the Volga—flows into the Caspian.

River Traffic

The main water-arteries of Russia proper are the Volga, the Kama, the Marinsky system, the Dnieper and the Oka. Their total transport of various goods, for 1913, is shown in the following table:

<i>River</i>	<i>Total cargo carried (in thous. tons)</i>	<i>Nature of cargo</i>		
		<i>Grain</i>	<i>Wood</i>	<i>Oil</i>
Volga	27,490	3,240	7,970	9,670
Kama	3,680	580	1,920	111.5
Oka	2,150	140	610	260.5
Vetluga	880	7.7	830	2.5
Neva	8,120	495.3	3,660	68.5
North Dvina	4,900	124	3,490	21.5
Dnieper	5,130	2,020	1,810	45.5
West Dvina	3,310	23	2,220	4.8
Don	1,240	840	160	162.2
Tributaries and other rivers.....	46,680	3,460	32,460	550
Total	102,780	10,930	77,500	10,897

These particulars show that of the whole volume of traffic, 74% was composed of Russia's three staple products: grain (about 11%), oil (about 11%) and wood (about 52%); and that the Volga had the largest volume of traffic (30%) of all the rivers.

The following table shows the goods-traffic of the principal Russian river ports.

	<i>Cargo in thous. tons</i>	<i>Principal goods</i>
<i>Volga</i>		
1. Astrakhan	6,350	Crude oil, in transit from Baku; export of fish.
2. Tzaritzyn	1,895	Oil and timber.
3. Saratov and Pokrovsk.....	1,734	Oil and timber; export of grain.
4. Samara	1,222	Export of grain; oil.
5. Kazan	1,123	Timber and oil.
6. Nizhni-Novgorod	2,742	Oil and grain.
7. Yaroslavl	1,598	Oil and grain.
8. Rybinsk	1,323	Oil and grain.
<i>Neva</i>		
9. S. Petersburg	6,417	Timber and grain, for local needs and for export.
<i>North Dvina</i>		
10. Arkhangelsk	2,829	Timber, for export.
<i>Dnieper</i>		
11. Kherson	941	Grain, for export.

The total goods-traffic on the main Russian waterways was 37,840,000,000 ton-kilom. in 1913, as against 65,770,000,000 on the railways

and the average load-mileage was 713 klm. as against 605 klm. The Volga (with its tributaries) is particularly prominent, with 20,510 million ton-kilom. (*i. e.* 55%) and an average haul of 1,016 klm.; for oil, on the Volga, this was as much as 1,705 klm.

River Shipping

As the following table shows, the shipping on the Russian rivers increased rapidly during the years preceding the War.

A. RUSSIA PROPER

	1900	1906	1912
<i>a) Steamships</i>			
Number	3,295	3,897	4,884
Horsepower	165,004	192,284	238,626
Value of vessels, in millions of rubles....	133.3	153.2	183.5
<i>b) Vessels other than steamships</i>			
Number	22,859	22,511	23,175
Value in millions of rubles.....	60.6	71.5	90.0
Total value of all ships, in millions of rubles	193.9	224.7	273.5

B. SIBERIA AND TURKESTAN

Siberian river shipping, in 1912, consisted of the following vessels:— 672 steamships, totaling 36,041 h.p. valued at Rbles. 38,000,000; and 1,640 other vessels, valued at Rbles. 12,500,000.

Shipping, by the census of 1913, was distributed as follows:

<i>Basin</i>	<i>Steamships</i>	<i>Vessels other than steamships</i>
Volga	2,625 (54 %)	8,445 (36½%)
Neva	770 (15 %)	7,069 (30½%)
Dnieper	470 (10 %)	2,218 (9½%)
North Dvina	300 (6 %)	1,507 (6½%)
Don	240 (5 %)	471 (2 %)
West Dvina	225 (4½%)	823 (3½%)

Note: Figures in parentheses show percentage of total river shipping.

The whole river shipping of Russia proper comprised 4,884 steamships and 23,175 other vessels, with a cargo-carrying capacity of 13,000,000 tons.

In Siberia and Turkestan the river shipping was distributed as follows:

<i>River</i>	<i>Steamships</i>	<i>Vessels other than Steamships</i>
Amur	324	510
Obi with Irtysh.....	210	965
Yenissey, with Lake Baikal.....	68	75
Lena	55	64
Amu-Daria	15	26

III

RAILWAYS

The Beginnings of Railway Construction

THE development of railways in Europe aroused a great deal of contemporary attention in Russia; but, for some obscure reason, the Russian Government—and not the Government alone, but the engineers and the general public too—regarded the new invention as unsuited to Russian conditions. The desirability of providing Russia with a railway-system was first pointed out by a foreigner, Franz von Gerstner, a professor at the Vienna Polytechnic.

At the invitation of the Mining Department, von Gerstner made a general survey of the Russian mining industry in 1834; and he became convinced that Russia, with her natural resources and her vast territory, stood really more in need of railways than any European country.

Accordingly, von Gerstner, in 1835, applied for a concession which should permit him to build railways in Russia with private capital. Owing to the prevalent general disbelief in the utility, or even the practicability of railway construction, von Gerstner's application was declined; but Nicholas I gave him permission to form a company for building an experimental railway from St. Petersburg to Pavlovsk. This 27 klm. line, the first in Russia, was completed in the autumn of 1837.

Emperor Nicholas I, at the time, was the only man in Russia who appreciated what railways could do for his country; but even he hesitated to use his autocratic powers to overcome the general distrust that reigned in Russia. In consequence, many applications for railway concessions, such as that for a line from St. Petersburg to Moscow (put forward in 1838), were refused. In 1839 the Tzar, however, gave a private company permission to build a horse-operated line in Poland, between Warsaw and Granitza (on the Austrian border); and in 1842 he ordered (in opposition to all his Ministers) the construction of a railway between St. Petersburg and Moscow at Government expense. Finally, in 1851 (also at the Government's expense) the building of a railway between St. Petersburg and Warsaw was begun. Altogether, between 1837 and 1855, 1,044 klm. of railways were built and opened for traffic.

Railway construction in other countries had, of course, made greater strides in the same period. Towards the middle of the century the great Powers had the following total extent of railways in operation:

In U.S.A.	14,515 klm.
In Great Britain.....	10,653 klm.
In Germany	6,044 klm.
In France	3,083 klm.

Second Half of the Nineteenth Century

The disastrous result of the Crimean War was rightly attributed, in large measure, to Russia's defective roads, and clearly demonstrated that, for the efficient defence of the Empire, improved communications were absolutely essential. As a consequence, both the Government and the public completely reversed their opinion as to the utility of railways. It was soon manifest, too, that the growing industry and trade of the country demanded far better transport facilities than were available.

The Government of Alexander II adopted decisive measures for improving communications. Naturally, their attention was chiefly centred upon the construction of railroads; a new and liberal programme of railway building was approved and secured unanimous support from public opinion.

During Alexander II's reign (1856-1881) 22,385 klm. of new lines were opened for traffic (this includes 875 klm. in Finland), so that by the end of 1881 almost all Russia proper was intersected by railway lines joining the principal centres. Railway building, however, though encouraged in every way, was not based on any definite plan. No general policy was pursued; the construction of the various lines was undertaken by private enterprises, often unrelated.

At the end of the seventies a temporary halt was called in the construction of new State railways. This action was forced on the Government by the external affairs of Russia—complications in the Near East—and the fluctuations of the exchange (owing to the failure of the crops in south Russia and the depression in foreign trade). Railway expenditure, too, had already reached a very high figure: Rbles. 100,000,000 were still needed for completing the railways under construction, while the Government owed about Rbles. 600,000,000 to the private railway companies and was paying out large sums to maintain the State railways in working order. The total of this expenditure considerably exceeded the provisions made for it in the Budget.

The delay in railway construction was not, however, of long duration. The failure of the crops during several consecutive years, a calamity which befell south Russia at the end of the seventies, gave rise to an urgent need for finding the starving population employment. Hence the construction of the Ekaterininsky railway, designed to connect the Don basin (coal) with the district of Krivoy Rog (iron-ore), and of the Baskunchak railway to facilitate the export of salt from the Baskun-

chak lake (Province of Astrakhan). A third railway line, from Ivan-gorod to Dombrovo (Poland) was commenced in 1881 to connect the Dombrovo coal mines with the industrial districts of Keltze and Radom.

Railway-building took a fresh lease of life in the eighties, which led to a great increase of construction towards the end of the century; between 1881 and 1888, the Transcaspian railway from Djebila to Samarkand was built in Turkestan; while the Ussuri railway in East Siberia (from Vladivostok to Khabarovsk-on-the-Amur) was opened in 1894.

The Twentieth Century

The greatest development of the Russian railway system was attained in the reign of Tzar Nicholas II (1895-1917), notwithstanding the fact that, during this period, Russia bore a heavy burden of two wars and the first Revolution (1905). These events naturally reacted unfavourably upon new industrial undertakings in general, and the formation of new railway companies in particular; yet during this reign 48,300 klm. of railroads were opened for traffic (2,025 klm. in Finland).

Railways were built in two new districts: North Russia, where the Vologda-Arkhangelsk line was opened in 1898; and Siberia, where the Cheliabinsk-Irkutsk line (with a branch line to Tomsk) was opened during 1896-99. By 1904 the great Trans-Siberian trunk line was completed, connecting Moscow and St. Petersburg (*via* the Eastern Chinese Railway) with the Pacific.

For the whole period 1837-1917, the total length of the Russian railways—including those in Finland and the two lines completed during the World War: the Murmansk (St. Petersburg to Murmansk on the Arctic Ocean) and the Amur (Chita to Khabarovsk) reached 85,510 klm. (excluding Finland—total length 81,260 klm).

State and Private Railways

In dealing with Russian railway construction it should first be noted that over one-third (37%) of the total Russian railway system was built at the expense of the State, and two-thirds (63%) with private capital; and that, during the period 1837-1917, the system of administration and finance of the railways was repeatedly altered.

In the days of Nicholas I, railways were principally built at the expense of the State, with the exception of the small experimental Tzarskoe Selo railway (from St. Petersburg to Pavlovsk) which was built with private capital. This was due to the general contemporary disbelief in railways. How difficult it was to obtain private capital for railway construction in Russia may be gathered from the fact that the company which received permission to build a railway from Warsaw to the Austrian frontier—a line offering direct advantages for foreign trade—was obliged to discontinue the work in 1842, owing to lack of means; it went into liquidation, and the line was completed at the expense of the State.

Matters took a different turn in the following reign, that of Alexander II. After the completion of the St. Petersburg-Moscow railway, the mistrust shown by foreign and Russian capitalists towards the Russian railways gradually diminished. On the other hand, the opinion was gaining ground in Government circles that the chief reason for the slow development of railways in Russia during the reign of Nicholas I was the Government's method of building them; and that no improvement was to be looked for while such methods were retained. Eventually, the impoverished state of the Exchequer and the chronic deficits in the Budget prevented any further important State expenditure upon railway construction. As a result the Government passed legislation enabling private capital to build and operate railways; foreign capital and enterprise were invited to enter the field, the Government having in view *"the utilization of the experience obtained in the construction of thousands of miles of railways in Europe."*

In 1857 a company of Russian and foreign capitalists applied for leave to construct the St. Petersburg-Warsaw railway, and a few years later, the railways from Moscow to Nizhni-Novgorod, from Moscow to Feodossia, and from Kursk, via Orel and Dvinsk, to Libava. In the same year (1857) permission was given for the formation of the Warsaw-Vienna Railway Company, to operate the (State) Warsaw-Granitz railway; and the construction of a line from Lovitch to the Prussian frontier by the Warsaw-Bromberg Railway Company was also sanctioned. A private contractor (Baron Stieglitz) was also granted a concession to build a suburban railway from St. Petersburg to Peterhof, with branch lines to Oranienbaum and Krasnoe Selo.

These concessions, granted to private railway enterprise, constituted the foundations of private railway building and operation in Russia. Altogether, 55 private railway companies were formed during the reign of Alexander II. Only four of these (the Warsaw-Vienna Railway, the Peterhof Railway, the Odessa Railway and the Southwestern Railway) were designed to operate existing railways; the remaining 51 companies undertook the construction of new lines, having a total extent of some 19,000 klm.

In the reign of Tzar Alexander II a total of 2,350 klm. of railway lines was constructed at State expense; during the same period, all the railways were handed over to private companies for operation. At the end of this reign only 62 klm. of railways (0.3% of the whole system) were under Government management, while 22,288 klm. (99.7%) were in private hands.

During the next reign (Alexander III) a very decided change took place. State enterprise and private capital took an equal share in railway building. During this reign 5,915 klm. were built by private means (47½%) and 6,515 klm. (52½%) at the cost of the State.

In addition, the Government began (in the beginning of the eighties) to buy out such railway companies as were working at a loss. As a result, 14,470 klm. of railways were purchased by the State from 26 private companies.

The total length of the lines which, at the end of Emperor Alexander III's reign (1895) were under State and private management were 19,805 klm. (57%) and 15,180 klm. (43%) respectively.

During the reign of Nicholas II, when the development of Russian railways reached its climax, a new aspect of affairs again presented itself. During this epoch, private enterprise obtained the greater share of railway construction, while the State assumed a similar position with regard to their management.

Altogether, 26,125 klm. were constructed with private capital; *i. e.* 56% of the total between 1895 and 1917.

The chief obstacle to State railway-construction during this period was a lack of available funds; sometimes, however, where strategic or political considerations were involved, this difficulty had to be overcome; such was the case with the Tiumen-Omsk, the Sedletz-Bologoe, and the Great Siberian railways, and the second line from Omsk to Narymsk. These lines, which had more political than economic significance, were beyond the resources of private capital to construct. Altogether, 20,170 klm. of railway lines were built at State expense—44% of all laid down during this period.

In 1917 of the total length of 81,280 klm. of railways 49,590 klm. (61%) were under State management and 31,690 klm. (39%) under private management.

Slow Development of the Railway System

In spite of the great total length of the railway system, it did not suffice for the needs of the country. It will be seen from the following table that even in 1917 Russia was far behind when compared with other countries resembling her in their principal transport requirements.

<i>Country</i>	<i>Klm. of line per 100 sq. klm.</i>	<i>Klm. of line per 100,000 inhabitants</i>
U.S.A. (incl. Alaska).....	4.5	48.6
Argentina	1.2	41.2
India	1.2	1.8
Egypt	0.64	5.2
Canada	0.57	61.2
Australia	0.41	60.6
Russia	0.38	4.5

Several reasons exist for this slow development of the Russian railways. To begin with, when first introduced into Russia, railways met with a frigid reception.

The second reason is, that for a considerable time Russia's railway policy followed the example of European countries, Great Britain, France and Germany, instead of, as it should have done, following the lead of countries such as the United States, Canada, Argentine and

Australia, whose requirements were more akin to her own. In these latter countries, railway construction and management was a commercial enterprise open to all, and one in which government interference, if it ever occurred, was negligible; in Russia, on the contrary, ever since railways were first started they were regarded as being primarily a State enterprise. Even if in private hands they were under strict State control and usually dependent on a State guarantee. Owing to this, only such railways were built in Russia as the Government might sanction; while in America, for example, all railways were built on a purely commercial basis at the sole risk of their promoters.

The third reason was the repeated fluctuation of railway policy. While Germany had strictly adhered to a State system of railway construction and management and while Great Britain, on the other hand, had exclusively relied upon private enterprise, Russia (as already explained) never definitely pinned her faith to either system but adopted both by turns—and even simultaneously.

Many mistakes were made by the Government as regards its attitude towards private railway enterprise. Having at first given a hesitating support to private companies, it very soon adopted a method of strict Government control, and fixed freight-rates (1888) at a level that was ruinous to private enterprise. It was also a mistake for the State to start buying out private railways as soon as it did. This premature purchase of private railways also acted as a deterrent to private railway enterprise.

Another unfortunate feature was, that for twenty-five years (1881-1906) the Government gave a monopoly of railway construction to the existing railway companies, and failed to encourage new ones. This plan was undoubtedly wrong: for it kept out all fresh blood, and left railway enterprise in the hands of a few whose interest it was to stick to old methods and avoid going further afield. This enforced absence of competition brought the railways, by 1905, into such a state of stagnation that they were unable to meet the ordinary needs of the country.

Lastly, in its dealings with the private companies the Government underestimated the probable volume of traffic and the consequent profits to be expected on the new lines it was asked to sanction. It did not rate highly enough the impetus that industry and trade would soon acquire by an extension of the railway system; even if at first such did not prove profitable. Eventually, the new lines must all have had sufficient work.

A change of policy took place in 1907, and private capital was given wider scope. Unfortunately, the World War and the Revolution, coming soon after, did not allow much time for improvement to manifest itself.

During the the War (1916) a Committee, under Engineer Borissov, was set up to draft a plan of railway building. About 60,000 klm. of new railways were projected. If the Revolution of 1917 had not oc-

curred, the railway system would have been increased, at the end of 1918, by 21,000 klm. Of these, 10,130 were completed in 1917.

	<i>Length of railways in klm. built, building or projected</i>		
	<i>State</i>	<i>Private</i>	<i>Total</i>
In use, 1917.....	30,053	51,227	81,280
Under construction, 1917.....	3,395	6,735	10,130
Projected for 1918.....	1,180	9,648	10,828
Total	34,628	67,610	102,238

The shortage of railways in Russia, naturally, had great influence upon the whole welfare of the country. Russia's economic life, in whole districts, remained stunted; she could not effectively utilize those untold riches with which Nature has so abundantly provided her; further, she was hampered in the colonization of her outlying districts, and was unable to assure a quick concentration of her armies on the frontiers; her industry, as well as her trade, suffered greatly; and at the time of her greatest national emergency, the World War, her weakness in railway transport had a terrible effect on her destiny.

Rolling-Stock

The condition of the railway rolling-stock differs greatly in various countries, and many do not possess a stock corresponding to the actual needs of their railways; such was Russia's case before the War.

The table given below shows, for 1914, the relative equipment in rolling-stock of the main European countries, and the United States. The best-equipped railways were those of Great Britain, and the worst those of the United States. As regards Russia, it will be seen from the table that she was behind all the principal countries of Europe—Great Britain, Germany, France and Belgium—with regard to her whole rolling-stock equipment, and behind Italy and Holland as regards locomotives and passenger carriages.

In 1913, the average load-capacity of the American goods-wagon was 35 tons, whilst in Russia it was about 15 tons, in Germany 14 tons, and in France and Austria-Hungary only 13 tons.

	<i>Number per klm. of line, 1914</i>		
	<i>Locomotives</i>	<i>Passenger Carriages</i>	<i>Goods Wagons</i>
Great Britain and Ireland.....	0.64	1.42	21.2
Belgium	0.47	1.80	19.3
Germany	0.47	1.10	11.0
France	0.33	0.77	8.9
Holland	0.39	0.96	4.2
Italy	0.35	0.70	6.7
Russia (excl. Finland).....	0.28	0.38	6.8
U.S.A.	0.17	0.18	5.9

In 1914, the turnover (1,600 thousand tons per klm.) of the British railway system was only 1.5 times that of the Russian (in 1913, 1,017 thousand tons per klm.), although Great Britain was equipped with twice the number of locomotives and three times the number of goods-wagons; Germany, equipped with 50% more locomotives and goods-wagons than Russia, did not attain a much higher figure (1,073 thousand tons per klm.) than the Russian; and lastly, France, using a greater number of locomotives and goods-wagons than Russia, had a figure not much more than half as large (583 thousand tons per klm.). It can be gathered from this, to what an extent Russian rolling-stock was overtaxed with work. When the average distance covered by a ton of goods is taken into account this becomes still more evident; in 1914 it was 114 klm. in Germany, 150 klm. in France, 240 klm. in the United States, and 475 klm. in Russia.

The reason for the insufficient equipment of the Russian railways at the outbreak of the War was the misdirected economy which had been usually adopted in the matter of increasing the rolling-stock. The following data of the actual production of the Russian locomotive-and-carriage-works during the latter pre-War years show, that the minimum scheduled production of 1,300 locomotives and 60,000 carriages per annum was never once reached. When an alteration in the carrying capacity of the wagons (from 12.3 tons to 14.8; and, later, to 16.4) was decided in 1906, the orders placed with the wagon-works considerably diminished; and, consequently, the equipment of the Russian railways with new rolling-stock progressed at a still slower rate than before.

The comparatively large number of goods wagons under construction from 1912 onwards may be attributed to the beginning of extensive new railway construction at the time; and not in any way to an increase of rolling-stock for the existing railways. This had been increasing, in Russia, by not more than a couple of thousands yearly; while, in France, during the same time, it increased by 12-18 thousand, in Germany by 25-30 thousand, and in America by 60-70 thousand wagons yearly.

Year	Russia Built			
	Locomotives	Wagons		Total
		Goods	Passenger	
1906	1,281	22,362	378	22,740
1907	755	14,892	221	15,113
1908	641	9,520	995	9,915
1909	514	3,155	2,334	5,489
1910	495	7,967	1,090	9,057
1911	416	7,206	1,652	8,858
1912	306	9,937	1,551	11,488
1913	535	18,994	1,435	20,429
1914	749	30,174	1,500	31,674

The total rolling-stock of the Russian railways in 1914 was: 21,857 locomotives, 567,274 goods-wagons and 20,868 passenger carriages.

Turnover of the Railways

The management of the Russian railway system can only be examined up to the War, no return to normal conditions having occurred since August 1914.

In 1913, *i. e.* the last year of normal working, the volume of transport on all the Russian railways was, as follows:

Passengers	284,000,000
Goods	264,000,000 tons.

Compared with similar figures for 1903, these show a five-fold increase in passenger transport and one of three-and-a-half times in goods transport. During the same period the total length of the Russian railway system had slightly more than doubled. This clearly shows the marked discrepancy between railway construction and the requirements of national economy.

	1893	1903	1913
Length of system, in klms.	30,590	54,415	81,280
Passengers, in millions.....	54	125	284
Goods, in thousands of tons.....	82,575	164,675	264,000

As regards financial results, the working of the Russian railways from 1900 to 1910 resulted in a deficit; the balance was adverse and the railways were, in fact, a heavy burden on the national budget. The railways began to show a profit again in 1910 (in 1909 there had been a deficit of Rbles. 54,000,000). In that year, the State's share of profits was Rbles. 9,000,000. The net profit for 1913 amounted to Rbles. 480,000,000, a yield of 6.3% (the nominal valuation of the entire system was Rbles. 7,600,000,000). For the State railways in particular, this yield was 5.8% (net profit Rbles. 327,000,000; invested capital Rbles. 5,500,000,000), and for private 7.6% (net profit Rbles. 153,000,000; invested capital Rbles. 2,000,000,000).

In other countries the net profit in 1913 was:

In Germany	5.5%
In France	3.7%
In Great Britain.....	3.6%
In U.S.A.	3.3%

Coincidentally with this growth in the revenue of the Russian railways during the last years before the War, the working cost of the railway-system began to decrease considerably, especially after 1910. The cost-index of the whole railway-system during the last three years of normal working (1910-1913) averaged 61.9, whereas the average for the period of 1907-1909 was 78.5.

In connection with the cost-index, it is interesting to point out the

difference in efficiency between the State and the private railways, the latter being more economically worked than the Government lines.

	1907	1908	1909	1910	1911	1912	1913
State Railways	83.5	83.9	76.6	70.4	64.1	62.6	60.7
Private Railways	75.3	71.7	64.7	59.2	57.4	54.9	54.5
All Railways	81.7	80.7	73.2	67.2	62.3	60.8	59.2

It must be noted that the cost-index of the private lines should really be put still lower than the above figures, for they had to provide for certain additional expenditure (taxes, insurance, stamp duty, etc.) from which the State railways were relieved.

The constructural cost per kilometer was comparatively low. It was due chiefly to the low price of land and the cheapness of labour.

	Cost of construction, per kilometre Roubles	
Great Britain	325,000	(£55,000 per mile).
Belgium	219,000	(Frchs. 585,000 per klm.).
France	179,000	(Frchs. 477,000 per klm.).
Germany	145,000	(Mk. 313,000 per klm.).
Russia (excluding Finland).....	100,000	
U.S.A.	94,000	(\$77,000 per mile).

IV

SEA TRANSPORT

Foreign Trade

TWO-THIRDS of Russia's external trade¹ were transported by sea. Thus for 1912, the last pre-War year for which detailed statistics are available, out of a total foreign trade turnover of 33,680,000 tons 22,140,000 tons were transported by sea. The proportion of two-thirds, as the following table shows, is applicable equally to imports and exports.

(In millions of tons)				
	1912	Exports	Imports	Total
By Sea		15.34	6.80	22.14
By Land		7.66	3.88	11.54
Total		23.00	10.68	33.68

The most important seas as regards maritime trade were the Baltic Sea—for imports—and the Black Sea (with the Sea of Azov) for exports. The role of the three other seas, White, Caspian and the

¹ Russia principally exported raw products (grain, timber, oil, manganese ore, agricultural produce, etc.) and chiefly imported manufactured goods; the imported raw products being almost exclusively, coal, some non-ferrous metals, cotton, and rubber.

Pacific Ocean was comparatively negligible. The following table gives some particulars as regards the distribution of trade among these seas in 1905.¹

<i>(In millions of tons)</i>			
1905	Exports	Imports	Total
White Sea	0.86	0.06	0.92
Baltic Sea	4.80	3.80	8.60
Black and Azov Seas.....	9.50	0.40	9.90
Caspian Sea	0.09	0.10	0.20
Total	15.25	4.36	19.61

In 1912, sea trade had increased to 22,140,000 tons, but its distribution among the seas remained practically unaltered. Thus 55% (8,590,000 tons) of all exports went through the Black (and Azov) Sea and 83% (5,710,000 tons) of all imports through the Baltic.

Coastal Trade

In addition to foreign trade, there was an important coastal trade. Some 20,000,000 tons of goods were transported in 1905 between the various Russian ports; equally distributed as the following table shows between imports and exports.

<i>(In millions of tons)</i>			
1905	Exports	Imports	Total
White Sea	0.08	0.08	0.16
Baltic Sea	0.56	0.77	1.33
Black and Azov Seas.....	3.56	3.33	6.89
Caspian Sea	6.30	6.30	12.60
Total	10.50	10.48	20.98

The Merchant Fleet

The total tonnage of all Russian sea-going vessels in 1913 was 756,605; the Black (and Azov) Sea fleet held first place with 281,895 tons and the Caspian second with 233,250. The average size of a power-driven vessel was about 480 tons and about 100 tons for a sailing vessel.

The distribution of the merchant fleet is shown in the following table.

<i>(Tons)</i>								
	<i>Steam Ships</i>		<i>Motor Ships</i>		<i>Sail Ships</i>		<i>Total</i>	
White Sea	70	12,230	10	361	410	22,432	490	35,023
Baltic Sea	243	112,908	5	232	715	72,898	963	186,129
Black and Azov Sea	413	230,826	18	798	891	50,274	1,322	281,895
Pacific Ocean	38	19,896	4	153	5	259	47	20,308
Caspian Sea	258	111,054	15	11,215	556	110,981	823	233,250
Total	1,016	486,914	52	12,847	2,577	256,849	3,645	746,605

¹ The Japanese War had reduced Russian trade in Pacific waters to zero that year.

The part played by the Russian merchant fleet in the country's foreign trade was very small, as may be seen from the following table, illustrating the movements of ships for 1911.

<i>Arrived in Russian ports</i>	<i>Russian Ships</i>	<i>Foreign Ships</i>	<i>Total</i>
White Sea	54	743	797
Baltic Sea	763	5,042	5,805
Black and Azov Seas.....	762	6,582	7,344
Pacific Ocean	417	651	1,068
Total	1,996	13,018	15,014

<i>Left Russian ports</i>	<i>Russian Ships</i>	<i>Foreign Ships</i>	<i>Total</i>
White Sea	51	743	794
Baltic Sea	762	5,075	5,837
Black and Azov Seas.....	632	6,531	7,163
Pacific Ocean	377	638	1,035
Total	1,822	13,007	14,829

Russian shipping transported not more than 15% of Russian foreign trade; whereas 35% was transported in British ships and 16% in German.¹ The remainder was transported by Norwegian, Swedish, Danish, Greek, Austrian and Dutch ships.

Importance of Various Ports

The Ministry of Trade in 1908 published an official report on Russian sea trade which well illustrates the comparative importance of the various Russian ports. A summary of this report is given herewith.

White Sea. The White Sea is free from ice, on the average, for 176 days a year. This, and the feeble development of communications with the centre of the country, greatly reduced its importance. The building of the Murmansk railway and port, in 1916, greatly increased the possibilities of Russian sea trade in the Arctic, as the port of Murmansk is free from ice all the year round. The works in connection with the railway and port construction were only terminated in 1916, on the eve of the Revolution.

The chief port in the White Sea was Arkhangelsk, and the chief articles of export and import were timber and fish respectively.

The Baltic Sea. This sea held first place for imports and second for exports. The chief items of the latter were agricultural produce, grain, flax, hemp and timber. Coal, cotton and manufactured colonial goods were the chief items of imports.

St. Petersburg was the most important port in the Baltic, handling about 50% of all its trade, in spite of its being frozen for some 150 days a year.

¹ It is interesting to note the Anglo-German competition for Russian Trade. In 1888 the figures were 55% and 9.5% respectively.

Riga, the present capital of Latvia, held second place, and handled 25% of all the Baltic trade. Libau, Vindava (both in Latvia), Reval (now capital of Estonia), Narva and Pornov (both in Estonia) dealt with the rest. It will be seen from this brief survey that all the ports in the Baltic (St. Petersburg excepted) have now, after the Revolution, passed under foreign rule. Among them, Reval and Libava were the best equipped in the Baltic.

The Black and Azov Seas. These two seas held first place for exports but compared to the Baltic were a very poor second for imports.

They were open all year round for navigation, and adjoined the grain growing regions of the black-soil belt (Ukraine, southeast Russia and North Caucasus). Their ports played an important part in the Russian grain export trade handling up to 40% of the total export (4,640,000 tons out of 11,600,000 tons in 1908).¹ Grain export constituted 75% of all exports from the Black Sea ports and 99% of the Azov. Other chief items of export were oil² and manganese ore.³

The most important port in the Black Sea was Odessa, handling some 25% of the general trade. Then came Nikolaev, Novorossisk, Batum, Feodossia, Kherson and Poti.

Odessa, Nikolaev, Novorossisk, Kherson and Feodossia exported grain almost exclusively (91% of the total export from the Black Sea). Batum exported oil and Poti manganese.

The chief port in the Azov Sea was Rostov-on-Don (with 50% of all the trade). Next came Taganrog, Mariupol, Berdiansk, Kerch, Eysk and Guenichesk. The chief article handled was grain; also coal from the Don basin for home consumption.

The Caspian Sea. This sea had no great importance for foreign trade. Some business was transacted with the Persians through the port of Enseli.⁴ Its role in internal trade, however, was very great, as oil from Baku and cotton from Turkestan were shipped via the Volga to the industrial centres (St. Petersburg and Moscow).

The most important ports were Baku, Krasnovodsk and Petrovsk.

The following table illustrates the trade turnover of the most important Russian ports for 1908.

Vladivostok, the chief port in the Pacific Ocean, played an insignificant part in Russian sea-trade before the War and the Revolution. Its importance has grown enormously since.

The Revolution of 1917 and the Civil War (1917-1920) completely disorganized Russian transport, and the reorganization of the system is one of the main problems of the Soviet Government. It is perhaps the weakest spot of the present economic regime, one that has continually blocked the plans of the Communists, and has and is causing them the greatest anxiety.

¹ 52% of all wheat exported (chiefly to Great Britain, Italy and Holland) and 49% of barley (Great Britain and Germany).

² Chiefly to Great Britain.

³ To Holland, Great Britain, Belgium and France.

⁴ Now called Pehlevi.

(In millions of tons)

<i>Name of port</i>	<i>Trade foreign and coastal</i>	<i>Foreign</i>
1. St. Petersburg	4.56	4.1
2. Odessa	3.63	1.65
3. Riga	2.36	2
4. Nikolaev	1.9	1.65
5. Rostov	1.73	1.41
6. Mariupol	1.46	0.43
7. Libava	1.33	1.12
8. Kherson	1.18	0.37
9. Novorossisk	1.08	0.9
10. Batum	0.88	0.7
11. Arkhangelsk	0.80	0.71
12. Reval	0.65	0.51
13. Taganrog	0.60	0.46
14. Poti	0.60	0.33
15. Feodossia	0.50	0.43

As regards foreign export

<i>mill. tons</i>	<i>mill. tons</i>
1. St. Petersburg 1.8	6. Novorossisk 0.86
2. Nikolaev 1.65	7. Arkhangelsk 0.7
3. Odessa 1.41	8. Batum 0.66
4. Rostov 1.41	9. Riga 1.3
5. Libava 0.96	10. Taganrog 0.45

As regards foreign import

<i>mill. tons</i>	<i>mill. tons</i>
1. St. Petersburg 2.3	4. Odessa 0.25
2. Riga 0.7	5. Reval 0.23
3. Libava 0.26	

TRANSPORT

PART II—SOVIET TRANSPORT

I

HIGHWAYS

OWING to the weakness of the Soviet railways, the highways play quite an important part in the national economy of the U.S.S.R.

At present, the roads of the Soviet Union are in a very bad condition. The total extent of the various kinds of roads is approximately 2,000,000 klm. of these about 20,000 klm. have a stone (hard) surface; some 50,000 klm. of ground roads are classed as "roads of general importance to the Union" and receive a certain measure of attention from the federal authorities. About 700,000 klm. of roads are in the care of local authorities and 1,200,000 receive absolutely no attention.

The following table gives an idea of the relation of the highways of the U.S.S.R. to its area, as compared with several other countries.

<i>Country</i>	<i>Length of all roads (in klm. per'100 sq. klm.)</i>	<i>Length of stone surface roads (in klm. per 100 sq. klm.)</i>
U.S.S.R.	3.3	0.3
Poland	16.8	10.0
Rumania	30.2	18.5
U.S.A.	62.7	11.5
France	129.0	115.0

These conditions could not fail to attract the attention of the authors of the Five Years Plan to the problem of road-building—one that acquires an ever increasing importance, both for commercial and military reasons.

The Five Years Plan proposes to put 1,700,000 klm. of roads into working order, in particular, the hard surfaced roads of various descriptions. (gravel, stone, paved, etc.). It is proposed to increase their total length to about 400,000 klm: a tenfold increase. The most important projects are the construction of the Aldan highway to connect the Ussuri Railway with the Lena district (E. Siberia: an important gold-mining area) also a series of roads, of an improved type, in the health-resorts of the Crimea, Transcaucasia and North Causasus, and

the construction of wide bridges across the rivers Dnieper, Sozh, Desna and Berezina.

According to the official reports, these provisions of the Plan are not being carried out. The shortage of money, labour and technical equipment, causes the work to lag behind the Plan. At the same time the waterways and, still more, the railways, urgently require that the branch roads serving them should be reconstructed sufficiently to allow of regular traffic. At present, just at the height of the autumn and spring traffic the roads become impassable; this causes enormous delay in the arrival of cargoes at the wharves and stations, and sometimes leads to a complete breakdown of the transport system.

Notwithstanding the importance of roads in the general scheme of transportation, the question of their maintenance is entirely ignored. The Five Years Plan proposes to entrust the upkeep of the secondary roads to those industrial enterprises which make most use of them. But the budget for industrial enterprises, in turn, does not provide any sum for the purpose; so that it is useless to expect any expenditure on roads from that quarter. This is of particular importance in view of the great efforts now being made by the Soviet Government to develop motor transport. The Plan in this respect is very ambitious. It proposes to create by 1933 an automobile and tractor industry with a yearly production of over 200,000 units,¹ and 100,000 tractors.

II

WATERWAYS

River Transport

THE total length of the rivers of the U.S.S.R. is some 300,000 kilometres; of these 173,300 km. allow of rafting operations, while 89,070 km. are navigable.

Russian river transport used, before the Revolution, to be exclusively a matter of private enterprise. The Soviet Government, in 1918, nationalized the whole of the river shipping. This was a heavy blow to river transport, as the Government was unable to make effective use of it.

The chaotic early years of the Soviet era resulted in a mass-destruction of sluices, canals, etc.; it also stopped all dredging, thus making any renewal of river transport extremely difficult. Besides this, the tariff policy of the Government did not tend to increase the volume of river traffic; and, as a result, the usefulness of the waterways diminished considerably in comparison with pre-war times.

- ¹ 1. Nizhni-Novgorod (Ford)—140,000 cars.
2. Amo Works (Moscow)—50,000 light ($2\frac{1}{2}$ tons) trucks.
3. Yaroslavl—25,000 heavy (5 tons) trucks.
4. "Red Putilov" works (Leningrad)—25,000 tractors.
5. Stalingrad Works—25,000 tractors.
6. Kharkov Works—25,000 tractors.
7. Cheliabinsk—25,000 tractors (caterpillar).

According to official Soviet statistics, the turnover of river transport in 1929 (the last official figure) was greatly inferior to that of 1913.

	<i>(In millions of tons)</i>	
	<i>In 1913</i>	<i>In 1929</i>
Grain	10.9	1.9
Oil	10.8	5.3
Timber	77.5	35.4

The turnover in 1929 was only 42.5% of 1913 in the three staple products of the country.

The reason why the internal river transport makes very little progress, in addition to the above, is explained also by the unsatisfactory condition of the river shipping. The following statistics will exhibit this: in 1913 there were 5,556 steam river vessels, and in 1929 only 3,315, *i. e.* 60.2% of the pre-war figure. The total horse-power fell about 55% and the average h.p. per unit to 32.6%. This, however, is partly explained by the present tendency to build smaller boats; the larger craft are no longer being built, and those remaining from pre-Revolution days are being neglected. Other boats numbered 24,186 in 1913; in 1929 there were only 10,120—about 42%. The carrying capacity of these boats fell still more (about 64%) from 13,480,000 tons in 1913 to 4,273,000 tons in 1929. In this case, also, a reduction in the size of boats was effected; the average carrying capacity being reduced from 558 tons to 422.

Although the actual length of river passenger communication was increased from 39,942 klm. in 1913 to 52,200 klm. in 1929, the length of properly equipped waterways decreased from 35,948 klm. to 33,363 klm.

The Five Years Plan proposed a considerable development of water transport, an increase in the river shipping and a series of stages in the reconstruction of the waterways. One of the most important of these measures is the building of sluices on the Dnieper—in the region of the cataracts—simultaneously with the building of the Dnieper hydro-electric power station (Dnieprostroy). This will permit of the Dnieper affording a continuous navigable route from the Black Sea to its headwaters, and to the Berezina canal system. It will considerably enhance its importance, both for the rafting of timber and for the export of Ukrainian grain, as well as supplying the Ukraine with oil by way of Baku-Batum, the Black Sea and the Dnieper. However, the work to be done on the Dnieper above the hydro-electric station will demand a considerable time—and it has not yet been begun.

Another big undertaking, which has a somewhat better chance of being realized, is the Volga-Don canal. The object of this is to connect the Volga with the Black Sea, and so facilitate the export of grain. Its completion would be an event of great economic significance; and the more so, as the Marinsky canal system will then provide a continuous water-route from the Black Sea to the Baltic.

It is estimated in the Five Years Plan that in the first year after the opening of this canal its volume of transport will reach 7,000,000 tons a year.

The third important project is the connection of the rivers Kama and Petchora by a canal which will connect these two great basins with the Arctic ocean and the Volga.

The fourth important project is the building of the Moscow-Nizhni-Novgorod canal (using the river Kliazma) which would give a through-route only 600 klm. long, as compared with the 1,100 klm. of the present river route *via* the Oka. Smaller schemes are in hand for developing navigation on the Siberian rivers. A programme of river shipbuilding has also been drafted.

At the present moment, work is only being undertaken on the Dnieper (in connection with the Dnieprostroy) and on the Volga-Don canal. According to the published accounts of the Five Years Plan, the Soviet Government's scheme for the building of new river craft has not produced a third of the intended number; this is partly due to the inability of industry to execute large shipbuilding orders, and partly to the shortage of materials and qualified workers.

In summarizing the present position of internal water transport in the U.S.S.R., it must be reiterated that this transport has greatly diminished since the Revolution. The Soviet Government's plans are so obviously beyond the country's possibilities at present, that it is more than doubtful whether the river transport can, in any reasonable time, increase sufficiently to meet the needs of the national economy.

III

SEA TRANSPORT

THE question of sea transport is closely connected with that of the Soviet Unions' foreign trade. Owing to the fact that the latter, at the present time, is little more than half its pre-war volume, sea transport plays a considerably less important part in the country's life than it did formerly.

The more important ports of the U.S.S.R. at present are: in the White Sea and Arctic Ocean—Arkhangelsk and Murmansk; in the Baltic—Leningrad; in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov—Odessa, Nikolaev, Kherson, Feodosia, Mariupol, Rostov-on-Don, Novorossisk, Tuapse, Poti and Batum; in the Pacific Ocean—Vladivostok; and in the Caspian Sea—Baku and Astrakhan.

The trade of these ports has greatly decreased since the War. Of this, Leningrad is a notable example—the import of foreign coal has entirely ceased, and the port's importance as an industrial centre has considerably diminished. Trade has also exhibited a marked diminution at Odessa, Nikolaev, Kherson and Mariupol, where the export of Ukrain-

ian grain has very considerably declined. Owing to the lack of colliers, the loading of coal (from the Don basin) at Mariupol has also dwindled considerably. The trade of Rostov has also decreased somewhat; partly owing to the shortage of grain and partly to the lack of grain carriers. On the other hand, the trade of Novorossisk, which exports grains from North Caucasus, has retained its pre-war volume; and so has that of Batum, which exports oil exclusively. As compared with the pre-war standard, the export of timber from Arkhangelsk has somewhat diminished. Vladivostok shows a considerable improvement in trade. The port of Tuapse (Black Sea), which now exports grain and oil, has also increased its trade.

Before the War, 75% of Russia's foreign trade was transported by sea; at the present time 90% of the U.S.S.R. foreign trade is conducted in this manner. The damage inflicted during the Revolution upon the equipment and machinery of the ports is a great obstacle to the development of overseas trade. But, owing to financial difficulties, the Soviet Government at present only contemplates the reconstruction and re-equipment of a few ports—Leningrad, Rostov, Batum, Kherson and Vladivostok—Leningrad and Vladivostok, as the main ports for the Baltic and the Pacific respectively, Batum as a port for oil export, Rostov as an outlet port for the Volga-Don canal and Kherson as one for the Dnieper. Here again, this comparatively modest programme calls for very considerable capital expenditure.

The mercantile fleet of the U.S.S.R. at present consists of 1,377 steamers and 809 sailing vessels, of 717,740 gross tonnage. All attempts at building new ships in sufficient numbers have, until now, been rendered abortive by the insufficiency of the Soviet ship-building industry. In so far as the shortage of vessels for the import and export trade can be made good by foreign tonnage, the lack of sea-going vessels is not very much felt in sea transport itself; but it greatly affects the coasting trade, a considerable portion of which is now conducted by rail (particularly in the Black Sea region). This, in view of the difficulties of railway transport, which have been acutely experienced in the last two years, merely complicates the whole problem of transporting goods.¹

IV

RAILWAYS

The Revolution

THE Communist Revolution, followed by a chaotic and unregulated demobilization of the huge Army, the seizure of executive power on the railways by Committees (Soviets) of workmen and the complete col-

¹ In 1929 and 1930 a number of old ships have been bought by the Soviet Government from the United States, Great Britain and Germany. In 1931 ships have been ordered from Italy. Detailed figures are entirely lacking.

lapse of labour discipline, with incalculable damage to the rolling-stock, permanent ways and buildings, all brought railway-transport to a state of complete collapse.

The Civil War, the economic conditions of the country, the depreciation of money, the restriction of trade, etc. greatly aggravated the crisis, and nullified all the efforts of the Soviet Government, to maintain even a semblance of railway transport. Both fuel and materiel (rails, sleepers and rolling-stock), were almost entirely lacking. The shortage of food and the generally hard conditions, too, depleted the ranks of the qualified railway workers, who abandoned their posts in order to seek better conditions in the villages.

It may be said that during 1919 all the rolling-stock excepting trains run by the military, came practically to a complete standstill.

The situation, at that time, may be summarized as follows:

The length of railways in operation, in 1913, was 65,049 km.;¹ in 1919 the length of the lines that could be used amounted to 36,000 km. The rolling-stock was in a shocking condition; the number of unserviceable locomotives rose from 17% in 1913 to 62% in 1921-22; unserviceable goods-wagons, numbering 5.8% in 1913, rose to 30% in 1921-22. The pre-war rolling-stock of the railways—21,000 locomotives, 570,000 goods-wagons and 20,000 passenger carriages—was reduced in 1921-22 to 6,832 serviceable locomotives and 291,690 serviceable goods-wagons; there were practically no passenger carriages fit for use. In addition to this, enormous damage had been done to the permanent ways and buildings during the War and the subsequent Civil War. In these, 4,332 bridges, with a total length of 90 km., 1885 km. of permanent way, 2,904 switch points, and 760,000 sq. meters of buildings were destroyed.

The volume of traffic on Soviet territory which, in 1913 amounted to 132.4 million tons, was only 39.9 million tons in 1921-22 (30%). The number of passengers, as compared with 1913, fell by 59%; those carried, consisted chiefly of troops and other army personnel.

The average daily mileage of a goods-train fell to 70% of the pre-war figures, and that of a goods-wagon to 50%; the load carried, also, diminished by 40%. The consumption of fuel by locomotives increased 120%. The efficiency-index of labour became catastrophically low. While the decrease in traffic reached 70% of the pre-war figure, the number of employees and workers on the railways increased from 690,000 in 1913 to 1,243,000 on April 1, 1921 (about 100%). Owing to the lack of provisions, and the time necessarily spent in obtaining them, an exceptional proportion of railway workers—up to 60%—absented themselves daily from duty.

The railways were no better off, either, as regards the supply of materials. At the time mentioned, they could only obtain 50% of the rails they required for the maintenance of the permanent ways, and 25% of the sleepers which they urgently required.

¹ On the present territory of the U.S.S.R.

Restoration of Transport

The NEP epoch, which saw a revival of economic activity in the Soviet Union, was marked by some improvement in the condition of the railways. It was then determined to increase the traffic capacity of the railway system to pre-war level only.

The financial aspect of the subject was a matter of no small importance. The Government clearly realized that their capital resources were totally inadequate to any radical reequipment of transport, or any new construction. However, it was hoped that it would be found possible to regain the pre-war standard without meeting unsurmountable obstacles. But even this modest project proved beyond the means of the Government. To this day, the Soviet railway system has not recovered from the damage sustained in the past, and the excess of work imposed on it since 1923.

How far the project miscarried can be best judged by the following figures: ¹

<i>Year</i>	<i>Estimated requirements of goods traffic</i>	<i>Actual goods traffic</i>
<i>In million tons</i>		
1913	132.4
1923-24	63.6	67.5
1924-25	73.0	83.5
1925-26	78.3	116.8
1926-27	83.0	135.0
1927-28	87.2	150.6

The comparison of these two columns of figures shows that the estimates formed by the People's Commissariat of Communications, when beginning the process of railway restoration, completely ignored the possibility of a comparatively rapid restoration of the country's economic activity through the renewal of private trading.

The People's Commissariat had expected that the volume of traffic would reach pre-war level in 1932; actually, it exceeded this by 1926-27.

Such a state of affairs represented a difficult problem, one rendered still more so by the marked changes in the direction of the flow of goods. The alteration of the frontiers, and the consequent redistribution of the centers of economic activity, made it imperative to develop various lines which had previously been of merely secondary character. On the other hand, some of the previously important, and hence better-equipped lines, declined considerably in utility.

This change in the flow of traffic is still an important source of the difficulties experienced by the Soviet railways. As early as 1926-27, the quantity of goods transported exceeded the pre-war figure by 2.7%.

¹ A. Samsonov—The Railways on the Eve of the Third Year of the Five Years Plan—Moscow, 1930.

At the same time the total mileage, expressed in ton-kilometres (this, to a certain degree, determines the locomotive and wagon requirements) exceeded that of 1913 by 24.3%.

Another important factor was the policy pursued by the Soviet Government towards the eastern parts of the country, which were suddenly called to participate in the economic life of the Union to a much greater extent than before. Here the railway system was particularly undeveloped and, in consequence of the increased economic activity, it became greatly overtaxed.

The passenger traffic, at this time, was of an entirely new character. As compared with 1913, the number of passengers carried had grown by 37.6%, but the mileage decreased by 12.2%. This is explained by the growth of the suburban traffic, caused by the housing crisis in large towns, which drove many urban workers to live in the suburban districts.

The Soviet Government, not expecting any such rapid development, had placed at the disposal of the Commissariat of Communications funds which were absolutely inadequate to cope with its ever-increasing responsibilities. Since 1922, the Transport authorities have had to provide as best they could for the upkeep of the permanent way, the railway buildings, and the rolling-stock; new railway construction and the renewal of rolling-stock have perforce formed but minor items of the general expenditure.

How small the funds assigned, before the Five Years Plan, to the railways really were, is apparent from the fact that, for the three years 1924-25, 1925-26 and 1926-27, the capital invested in the railways was increased only by 1.6%, whereas the capital invested in industry increased by 18.5%.

The principal device adopted was the introduction of more powerful locomotives, which, in turn, allowed of a greater load per wagon and a considerable increase in the total weight carried by the train. In this respect, the Commissariat of Communications achieved considerable success in building some high-powered locomotives of a type (Series E) never seen on the Russian railways before; orders for powerful locomotives were also placed in America (743) while 1,050 were ordered from Sweden and Germany. Owing to these measures, in 1928 about 50% of the locomotives of the Soviet Union consisted of high-powered engines (adhesion weight of 75 tons), as against 12% in 1913. This measure allowed for a more rational utilization of rolling-stock, and considerably increased the volume of traffic on the railways.

The technical improvement of the rolling-stock, however, did not keep pace with the locomotives; and this greatly diminished the latter's usefulness. One of the chief defects of the rolling-stock was the coupling system on the goods-trains. 40% of the goods-wagons are equipped with the so-called Russian screw coupling system, tested to stand a 12.5-ton pull. The rest are equipped with the so-called Improved Russian screw coupling designed for a 16-ton pull. This circumstance restricts the use

of powerful locomotives (having an adhesion weight of more than 75 tons); and, secondly, are often the cause of breakages on heavy trains at starting. In 1926-27 such cases were nine times as frequent as in 1913.

Another obstacle to the effective use of the heavy and more powerful locomotives, drawing heavier and longer trains, is the condition of the permanent way. Light rails are intermingled with heavy, the reconstruction of the bridges has not been attempted, the stations have not been sufficiently lengthened, and the sharp curves have not been eased.

In spite of all these impediments, considerable progress was made towards increasing the capacity of the Soviet railways; the average axle-load was raised from 5.35 tons in 1913 to 6.3 tons in 1927-28; the average load-capacity of a wagon was similarly raised from 15.2 tons to 17.1; the average weight of a goods-train increased, since 1913, by 29.3% and the average composition of a goods-train by 20.6%.

This permitted the railways, during the NEP epoch, to carry a passenger-and-goods-traffic exceeding the pre-war figure by 23%, although their rolling-stock had only been increased by 3.25%.

*The Five Years Plan*¹

The Five Years Plan raised, for the first time, the question of a systematic reconstruction of the Soviet Railways. However, it did not adopt any radical solution of the transport problem during the first five years but contented itself with a provisional improvement of transport.

It has been stated that during the NEP, the Government had allotted but small appropriations for railway reconstruction. The Five Years Plan pursued the same mistaken financial policy as before; and while proposing to increase the capital invested in industry threefold in the five years, it allows for an increase of only 50% in railway capital.

The Plan was based on the idea that railway transport would grow, (in thousands of millions ton-kilometres) as follows: first year, 121.5; second, 135.7; third, 152.6; fourth, 172.3; fifth, 198.1. Having in view this considerable growth in transport, the Five Years Plan considered it necessary to adopt measures for increasing the traffic capacity of the railways, especially in those sections where the flow of traffic had exceeded the pre-war figure.

Two conflicting factors, however, were present in the Plan.

1. In accordance with the projected development of industry, the economic activities of the outlying districts of the Union were being considerably developed; and this demanded an extensive construction of new railway lines.

2. Notwithstanding all the attention bestowed by the Plan to the increased production of metals, it could not provide sufficient material for the railways. Faced with this anomaly, the authors of the Plan came to the conclusion that the period of the first Five Years Plan must be considered one of preparation for a radical reconstruction of the rail-

¹ See Map.

ways. It relegated this, in other words, to a period subsequent to its completion—to the epoch of a second Five Years Plan. Thus, the error committed by the Commissariat of Communications at the beginning of the NEP epoch was repeated.

The Five Years Plan, in principle, proposes to develop the existing railway system to the utmost capacity consistent with the least possible expenditure of material and only to build such new railways as are absolutely indispensable. In connection with this, the main objectives are:

1. An increase in the average power of the locomotives (of the E series—weight over 75 tons); the total increase by the end of the Five Years Plan must be 14%.
2. The construction of new 20 and 50 tons goods-wagons.
3. The equipment of all wagons with automatic brakes, which will considerably increase both the safety and speed of the traffic.
4. The lighter couplings of goods-wagons to be gradually replaced by stronger ones.

The Plan does not propose to duplicate tracks, even in the more congested sections; instead, the introduction of automatic signalling and the building of more sidings and switches is proposed. Furthermore, in order to increase the permissible weight of the train, the gradients are to be extensively ballasted wherever possible.

Besides the measures enumerated above, the Five Years Plan proposed a series of others for more efficient working, unloading and fuelling, the introduction of impersonal driving of locomotives, extension of the radius of locomotive activity, special repair works, etc. Lastly, it was originally intended that, in the course of the five years, preparations were to be made for the introduction of automatic couplings, which would render possible the use of still more powerful locomotives; later, it was decided to postpone the adoption of this measure until the next five years.

According to the Five Years Plan, 23,650 klm. of new railway lines were to be constructed, of which 17,000 klm. were to be brought into operation before the completion of the Plan. Thus, towards the end of 1933, the railway system of the Union would have a length of 94,000 klm.

This was, indeed, a minimum estimate; one far below the real requirements of the country.

The Plan left the real railway problems unsolved; the connection of the Don basin with Moscow and Leningrad by an additional trunk line, the development of the routes to and from Siberia, and the question of an additional line between the Don basin and Krivoy Rog, a region at present extremely weak in railway transport, as compared with the needs and volume of production. In Siberia, it is true, the Plan proposed to complete the building of the new Kurgan-Sverdlovsk line and to lay a duplicate track on the Kazan railway between Sverdlovsk and Shemordan, as well as to construct a new line from Shemordan to Nizhni-Novgorod, with a bridge across the Volga.

The other items of new construction can be briefly described as follows:

1. *Timber-carrying and (partly) colonizing lines*, 2,800 kmls. The most important of these is the line connecting the Central Industrial Territory and Moscow with Kotlas, via Syvtyvkar (Ust-Syssolsk); others are the Yenisey line in Siberia, and a series of small timber-carrying lines in North Russia, the Urals, the Caucasus and the Far East.

2. *Agriculture and (partly) colonization lines*, 6,800 kml. The most important are: the Turkestan-Siberian (Turksib) trunk line (already in operation), and the Borovoe-Akmolinsk and Orsk-Aktubinsk lines in Kazakstan. Then come a series of agricultural lines (Troitzk-Orsk, Orenburg-Uralsk and Saratov-Millerovo) connecting the South Ural district and the Volga basin with the ports of the Sea of Azov. Besides this, a series of agricultural lines are being built in the Ukraine (Armiansk-Kherson, etc.) and in Turkestan (Chardjui-Khiva-Termez-Stalinabad, etc.).

3. *Mining and other industrial lines*, 1,700 kmls. These are principally intended to serve the Don basin, the new coal beds of the Ural, Transcaucasia, Turkestan and the Far East, the non-ferrous metal base (Kazakstan) and the phosphate beds of the Viatka district.

4. *Unloading and accessory lines*, 2,600 kml. To be built in various industrial districts.

The most extensive railway construction is projected for the following districts: Kazakstan comes first, then the Urals, Ukraine, Turkestan, the Lower Volga Territory, Transcaucasia, Viatka-Vetluga region, Siberia and the northeast. This enumeration clearly shows that the aim of the plan is to develop the outlying districts in order to bring the base of raw materials closer, and increase agricultural colonization.

The Present State of Railway Transport

The provisions of the Five Years Plan are far below the actual requirements of the country. In the third year of the Plan this became apparent, as the following table shows:

	<i>Provisions of Plan</i>	<i>Actually transported</i>
	<i>(In billions of ton-kilometres)</i>	
1928-29	121.5	136.4
1929-30	135.7	180.0
1930-31	152.6	243.3

Thus in the third year the railways were called upon to accomplish 50% more work than had been contemplated. The small amount of capital invested in transport, the continual postponement of any radical reconstruction of the existing railways or construction of new ones and the above-mentioned overloading, brought transport to such a state that

the autumn traffic of 1930, in spite of all the Government's efforts, was too much for the railways to cope with. Since then, the railways have been working in an atmosphere of deepening crisis.

The crisis depended not only on the faulty and defective estimates, always below the actual figures, of the Five Years Plan; but also, and to a greater extent, on the failure of the railway system (1931) to perform even the task which the Plan assigned to it.

Reports for the third quarter of 1931¹ (July–September) reveal the position of railway transport as catastrophic; so much so that, at the instance of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (October, 1931) the Soviet Government had made sweeping changes in the directorate of the People's Commissariat of Communications, Commissar Rukhimovitch, its head, being replaced by Commissar Andreev, President of the Central Control Committee of the Communist Party and (after Stalin) the most important member of the Party. This alone shows the anxiety felt by the Soviet leaders on the subject of transport.

The figures for the third quarter—the most characteristic for the whole year—would certainly dismay the most optimistic. After some improvement in the second quarter (April–June) due to the reintroduction of the double driving-staff system and the financial reform of the railways, as well as to other measures restoring the authority and responsibility of the railway staff, the third quarter showed a marked decrease in the number of goods-wagons loaded. Thus, as regards grain transport, the second quarter was behind schedule by 20,500 wagons, and in the third this figure rose to 98,000, *i. e.* it increased more than fourfold. The same was the case with the loading of coal—25,000 and 87,000 wagons for the second and third quarters respectively. The whole transportation plan of the third quarter was in arrears by 21.6%. The same quarter saw a decline in the average daily net run for locomotives and goods-wagons; the first fell from 149.6 klm. to 142 and the latter from 102 klm. to 97.

The daily returns for loading goods-wagons in the first six months of 1932, showed an average falling off behind estimates of 12.4% (138,000,000 tons instead of 158,000,000); the number of locomotives at the disposal of railways was 77% of the estimates and of wagons—85.7%.

The position was no better as regards the repair and increase of the rolling-stock. In 1931 the material delivered to the railways fell short of the Plan's provisions by 464 locomotives and 34,793 goods-wagons. To this must be added 3,400 locomotives and 25,600 goods-wagons which have been withdrawn as defective during the same period.

With regard to the construction of new lines and duplicate tracks on existing railways, only 41% of the work planned has, on the whole, been completed in 1931. For the "shock" front of the coal and metal base (Ural-Kuznetzk) alone, this proportion has reached 51.4%.

Although only about 75% of the Transport Plan's provisions for 1931

¹ "Economic Life" (official organ of the Supreme Council of National Economy) October 24, 1931.

have been fulfilled, the expenditure has been 40% above estimate, and the deficit of the railway system on October 1, 1931 was Rbles. 700,000,000. In view of all these facts, it is no matter for surprise that railways should constitute the "Achilles' heel" of the U.S.S.R. national economy.

New Projects

In view of the seriousness of the situation the Soviet Government has at last (autumn, 1931) promulgated a new programme of railway building. The Commissariat of Communications has drafted the plans for building three trunk lines: 1. Don basin—Krivoy Rog. 2. Don basin—Moscow—Leningrad. 3. Kuznetzk—Novosibirsk—Moscow. Each of these lines will carry heavy trains with locomotives of the largest types and wagons of 50–60 ton capacity fitted with automatic brakes and couplings. It is possible that later, these lines will be electrified.

1. The trunk line, connecting the Don basin with Krivoy Rog, is indispensable for carrying iron-ore from Krivoy Rog to the Don basin and for supplying the metallurgical works in that locality and also those in the district of Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozhie, with coal. This work can either be accomplished by completing and developing the existing Ekaterininsky Railway, or by electrifying it as it stands; or, thirdly, by building a trunk line between Chaplino and Marganetz and reconstructing the existing Marganetz—Krivoy Rog and Chaplino—Don basin lines. It will be decided later, when researches now in progress are completed, which scheme will be adopted.

2. The second trunk line (Don basin—Moscow—Leningrad) is greatly needed; the railways in this quarter are already overtaxed; while the traffic of the coal outflow from the Don basin to the north is continually increasing.

Coal imports, from abroad, at Leningrad ceased entirely after the Revolution. At present, the Leningrad district is entirely dependent on the Don basin. At the same time, the considerably-developed Moscow industrial district also requires an extensive supply of Don coal.

The Don basin is connected with Moscow by several railways, namely: (1) Liman—Kharkov—Kursk—Moscow. (2) Zverevo—Voronezh—Kolomna—Moscow, and (3) Popasnaya—Kupiansk—Valuyki—Eletz—Moscow.

Coal for Leningrad, besides being transported *via* Moscow is also sent via Liman—Kharkov—Lgov—Briansk—Vitebsk.

In the spring of 1932, it has finally been decided to connect Moscow with the Don basin by a trunk line via Ozherelie—Uzlovaya—Eletz—Valuyki—Nesvetaeva.

3. The necessity for a new Siberian trunk line was only realized in the third year of the Plan. Before this, it was supposed that the Siberian traffic would only increase slowly and it was hoped, by reconstructing several sections and increasing the traffic-capacity of the existing line, to evolve, in the course of ten years, a line which would well be able to

transport Kuznetzk coal to the Urals, and Siberian grain to the western districts of the Union. The Kuznetzk coal basin, however, instead of furnishing only the estimated 5.5 million tons, is already producing five times this amount; its maximum production is expected to reach 30,000,000 tons annually.

In consequence, the traffic on the Siberian trunk line has reached three to four times the amount presupposed by the Plan, and imperatively necessitates the immediate building of an additional trunk line, without which the pressing demand for Kuznetzk coal cannot possibly be satisfied.

Three alternative routes have been proposed: (1) Omsk—Tumen—Sverdlovsk, (2) Omsk—Kurgan—Sverdlovsk, and (3) Omsk—Kurgan—Cheliabinsk; while, to connect these with the western portions of the Union, it is also proposed to complete the Sverdlovsk—Kazan line, and to duplicate the Shemordan—Nizhni-Novgorod railway. The construction of a bridge across the Volga at Nizhni-Novgorod, and the development of the Moscow—Nizhni-Novgorod line, are also envisaged.

A decision upon the question of the new Siberian trunk line, however, has been continually deferred; in the meanwhile (in the autumn of 1931), its traffic had increased, as compared with the autumn of 1930, by 200%. Abandoning, temporarily, the idea of a complete new line, the Soviet Government decided to take immediate steps to construct duplicate tracks between Omsk—Samara—Ruzaevka and Perm—Viatka—Kotelnitch (a total length of 2,700 kilometres).

The present state of Soviet railway transport, however, cannot be much improved by a provision of duplicate tracks. In addition, their construction, in view of the chronic shortage in rails, naturally delays that of the new lines, so urgently needed both for internal and external trade. To begin with, the construction of new lines from West Siberia, south Ural and the Lower Volga Territory to the ports of the Azov and Black Sea is absolutely necessary. Before the Turkestan-Siberian railway was built, south Ural and the area beyond the Volga dispatched their grain to Turkestan. It is now proposed to supply Turkestan with grain from Siberia, thus releasing the surplus grain of south Ural and the Volga area for export. This would entail the building of a trunk line 2,334 kilometres long and a bridge across the Volga at Saratov.

The Problem of Electrification

According to the Five Years Plan, the electrification of railways was only to be effected on a very small scale—the Moscow nexus, and the Mineral-Water and Suram Pass lines (in the Caucasus). The question of electrifying the Don basin system was also mooted.

In 1931, when the congestion of the railways became catastrophic, the whole programme was reexamined by the Central Committee of the Communist Party (June, 1931). A resolution was passed, declaring the question of railway-electrification to be one of the most important of the problems connected with the Plan. In accordance with this resolu-

tion, the electrification of some 3,590 klm. (to be accomplished in 1933) is planned. Whether it will be possible to carry this scheme into effect is another matter: very considerable capital is required, as well as technical resources which, at present, are lacking.

Under the scheme it is proposed to electrify various lines, in the following order:

1. *The Perm Railway (Urals)*. Sections: Kisel—Chussovaya—Kalino; Chussovaya—Nizhni Tagil; Nizhni Tagil—Sverdlovsk; Magnitogorsk—Ufa; Magnitogorsk—Kartaly.

2. *The Tomsk Railway (Siberia)*.

3. *The Ekaterininsky Railway (Ukraine)*. Sections: Dolgintzevo—Zaporozhie; Zaporozhie—Chaplino; Yasinovataya—Chaplino.

4. *Southern Railway (Dnieper)*. Sections: Liman—Osnova; Debal'tzevo—Zverevo.

5. *Southeastern Railway*. Sections: Likhaya—Stalingrad.

6. *Moscow—Kursk Railway*. Sections: Moscow—Volovo.

7. *Transcaucasian Railway*. Sections: Stalinsk—Zestafoni; Navtlug—Stalinsk; Zestafoni—Samtredi; Navtlug—Akstapha; and some other less important branches.

This great plan of electrification depends on the completion in 1932 of the requisite power-stations. It may be noted, also, that none of the preparatory work on the above railways necessary to ensure speedy success has yet been completed.

Other Proposals for Reforming Soviet Railways

At the same time (June, 1931) the Central Committee of the Communist Party resolved to reconstruct a number of railways during 1932 and 1933. In other words, a belated decision was reached that efforts should at last be made to meet the pressing and long-standing needs of the railways.

The proposals include the introduction of still more powerful locomotives (adhesion-weight 150 tons), 50–60 ton goods-wagons and automatic brakes and couplings on certain sections of the Siberian trunk line and in North Caucasus; also on certain other lines: Kurgan—Sverdlovsk; Valuyki—Moscow; Balashev—Penza; Viatka—Bui—Leningrad; and Prokhladnaya—Beslan.

This reform was to be carried out in conjunction with the relaying of the permanent way, the reequipment of the water-supply and traction services, and the mechanization of all loading and unloading operations.

Changes in the Railway Service

Besides the fundamental reexamination of the electrification and reconstruction plans made by the Communist Party in June, 1931, a series of immediate reforms were introduced in the Soviet railway service which have radically changed the method of working the railways.

One of the most characteristic measures, adopted in 1928, was the

introduction of the so-called "impersonal driving" of locomotives, with no individual driving-staff attached to any definite engine. Prior to this, a system of double engine-staffs was employed, two crews being attached to each locomotive. In theory, the system of "impersonal driving" allows of a more extensive use of the locomotives, making them independent of the crew's hours of leisure or place of residence. As early as 1929, however, statistics showed that the increased work done by the locomotives, in consequence of this reform, did not compensate for the highly increased proportion of damage caused to them by mishandling. The number of accidents and of such troubles as the breakage of train couplings, stoppages on the way and damages to the locomotives themselves, became so numerous that the authorities decided, in 1931, to return to the double-crew system. Six months later the number of damaged locomotives had been greatly reduced.

Careful handling of the locomotives and wagons is of particular importance because, comparatively, there are so few of them. This is another proof of the folly of economizing in equipment, while increasing traffic.

The following table illustrates the rolling-stock of the Soviet railways:

	1913	1927-28	1931
Locomotives	21,857	17,417	17,520
Goods-waggons	567,274	464,000	510,900
Passenger carriages	20,868	22,360	31,080

Although the number of locomotives is still below the pre-war level, most of these are new.

V

AIR TRANSPORT

THE first air line in the U.S.S.R., the Moscow—Nizhni-Novgorod 430 klm. long, was inaugurated in 1923. It was operated only during the Nizhni-Novgorod fair.

Since then the Soviet Government has paid great attention to aviation both for commercial and military reasons. In 1928 the total length of air lines in operation was already 11,927 klm. The yearly flights covered some 2,400,000 klm. and carried 8,900 passengers and 230 tons of goods. The Five Years Plan proposed to develop the air lines to a length of 45,000 klm. to carry 110,000 passengers, 1,723 tons of postal cargo and 1,658 tons of goods.

The control figures for 1931 show that 44,962 klm. of lines have been established; the flights covered about 6,000,000 klm. and carried 20,500 passengers, 351 tons of postal cargo and 311 tons of goods. Of the total length of air lines in the U.S.S.R. 42,168 klm. were operated by the State through the *Aeroflot* (a department of the Council of Labour and

Defence) and 2,794 klm. by a mixed Soviet-German Company, the *Deruluft*, connecting Leningrad with Riga and Moscow with Berlin.

All the lines of the U.S.S.R. are divided into three categories, as follows:

First Class Lines: (1) Moscow—Leningrad (644 klm); (2) Moscow—Transcaucasia, via Kharkov, Rostov-on-Don, Armavir, Baku and Tiflis (3,025 klm.); (3) Moscow—Tashkent, via Penza, Samara, and Orenburg (3,050 klm); (4) Moscow—Vladivostok, via Kazan, Sverdlovsk, Irkutsk, Verkhneudinsk, Chita, Khabarovsk (8,042 klm); (5) Baku—Enseli—Persia (390 klm); (6) Tashkent—Kabul, Afghanistan, via Stalinabad and Termez (900 klm.); and (7) Verkhneudinsk—Uhlán-Batör, Mongolia (540 klm).

Second Class Lines: These are mostly situated in Siberia and Turkestan. The most important is the Turkestan line plying between Krasnovodsk on the Caspian and Semipalatinsk on the river Irtysh in West Siberia (3,573 klm). This line has two branch services: from Chardjui on the Amu-Daria to Turkul on the Aral Sea (534 klm); and from Taldy-Kurgan on the Turksib railway to Karaganda (825 klm).

Next comes the Kazak Line from Semipalatinsk to Magnitogorsk (Ural) via Karaganda (1,600 klm). The third, the East Siberian line connects Irkutsk with Yakutsk, via the basin of the Lena (2,706 klm) with a branch line to the gold mining centre Bodaibo, on the Vitim (288 klm).

Then come the Moscow—Stalingrad Line (945 klm); the Black Sea line from Rostov-on-Don to Tiflis, via Sochi, Sukhum (925 klm); Kharkov—Dniepropetrovsk—Odessa (625 klm) with a branch from Dniepropetrovsk to Simpheropol (435 klm); and Leningrad—Petrozavodsk on the Finnish border (365 klm).

Third Class Lines: These, of a length of some 12,750 klm. have only a local importance. They are divided into five groups: (1) the Amur group (6,631 klm) connecting the basin of the Amur with Yakutsk, Sakhalin, the Okhotsk littoral and Kamchatka; (2) the Ural group (2,010 klm) connecting Sverdlovsk with the basin of the Obi and Magnitogorsk; (3) the Turkestan group (1,868 klm) consisting of 3 sections: a) Tashkent—Samarkand—Termez and Tashkent—Andijan—Osh, Ferghana; b) Stalinabad—Kulab and Stalinabad—Garm; and c) Alma Ata—Djarkend and Serguiopol—Bakhtu; (4) the Northern group (1,515 klm) connecting Arkhangelsk with Syvtyvkar via Kotlas and Arkhangelsk with the Petchora basin; (5) the Don group (460 klm) connecting Artemovsk with Berdiansk on the Azov Sea via Stalino and Mariupol, and Lugansk with Shakhty.

Two separate lines also belong to the third class: the Novosibirsk—Kuznetzk (451 klm) and the North Caucasian connecting Ellista (Kal-muk Auton. Rep.) with Astrakhan (580 klm).

Regular services were operated on 37,000 klm. The remaining 7,962 klm. will be in regular use at the end of the summer of 1932. In 1932 it is proposed to open some 4,800 klm of additional air lines. Three of

these will be first class lines connecting Moscow with Kiev and Minsk, and Krasnoyarsk with Port Igarka (Yenissey estuary)—some 3,000 klm. in length. The rest will connect the existing lines, plying between Penza—Saratov (190 klm), Baku—Krasnovodsk (290 klm), Novosibirsk—Semipalatinsk (575 klm), Kazan—Magnitogorsk (720 klm).

The turnover for 1932 is planned at 10,500,000 klm., 40,000 passengers, 1,200 tons of postal cargo and 900 tons of goods. Thus the provisions of the Five Years Plan will not be attained, in spite of the fact that the length of the air lines will exceed the Plan's ambitious programme.

At the same time it is proposed to reorganize the existing first class routes for day and night traffic, at an average speed of 125 klm. an hour; this would bring Irkutsk and Tashkent to 30 and 40 hours' journey respectively from Moscow.

It is proposed to introduce a large but unspecified number of powerful aeroplanes during 1932.¹ The number of planes in exploitation now is not definitely known. It is variously estimated between 600 and 750 of different makes. The most frequent types are: the K-5 (one motor), the ANT-9 (three motors) and an all-steel plane STAL-2.

About 20% of all machines in exploitation are hydroplanes, used mostly on the lines Leningrad-Petrozavodsk (2 cl.) and along the rivers Obi, Lena and Amur (3 cl.).

An extensive programme for the equipment of flying fields with powerful lighting and radio-stations is to be carried out in 1932.

In addition to commercial exploitation the Civil aviation of the U.S.S.R. has performed in 1931 the following tasks: the aerial survey of some 180,000 sq. klm. of territory, the sowing of some 50,000 hectares (chiefly rice and grass), anti-insect campaigns over 800,000 hectares (chiefly forest) and anti-malaria work.

Dirigibles

There are three airships in commission at the present time (UK-1, 2,200 cub. met., UK-2, 5,000 cub. met., and UK-3, 6,500 cub. met.). All three are experimental ships; there is not a sufficient number of trained men even for these three ships.² It is proposed in 1932 to erect experimental airship stations to be completed in 1933. This will, it is hoped, enable the Government to develop the airship branch of aviation, to which great importance is being attached.

The problem of reorganizing transport remains very acute in the U.S.S.R. The first six months of 1932 have been characterized by the same failing to carry out estimates as in 1931. The Soviet Government, it is true, can be proud of its achievements in the field of aviation but

¹ Type ANT-14 weighing 17.2 tons, with a 40.4 m. span and a wing surface of 240 sq. m., five motors totalling 2,400 h.p. Maximum speed 236 klm. Carrying capacity 41 passengers and crew.

² "The Red Star" June 11, 1932. No. 134.

this does not even help to solve the major problems of transportation, which continue to be handled in an inefficient and irrational way. Yet the whole scheme of industrialization depends, to a great degree, on the solution of these problems and the failure to provide for them in a comprehensive and bold manner must inevitably bring about a serious, if not a fatal, breakdown in the task of economic reconstruction.

MONEY

I

WITTE'S MONETARY REFORM

PAPER money made its first appearance in Russia in the reign of Catherine the Great (1769) and held its place, circulating concurrently with gold and silver currency, till the end of the nineteenth century, when the gold standard was introduced.

The actual value of the paper ruble as compared with the silver standard (and, later, the gold), varied in different periods: the paper ruble fell to one-fourth of its nominal value after the Napoleonic wars (1817)—a fact which induced the Government, in 1830, to peg the value of the paper ruble at a standard ratio of 3.5 to 1 silver ruble. From this date until 1854 the value of the paper ruble remained stable, and at parity with silver.

The Crimean and Balkan¹ Wars caused violent fluctuations of the ruble; and after the latter war its value fell to 0.632 in terms of gold.

The continual oscillations of the ruble made it imperative to establish a more stable monetary system, based on the gold standard.

The establishment of the State Bank in 1860 provided a basis for a general monetary reform. This measure greatly improved the circulation of money; but the Bank was not authorized to issue bank-notes, nor had it sufficient reserves for such a purpose.

The practical adoption of the gold standard in Russia was the result of trade relations with the countries where this standard had been in use since the middle of the 'seventies. The honour of preparing the way for the introduction of the gold standard in Russia belongs to M. Reutern, Minister of Finance, who in 1876 stopped the free minting of silver, and introduced a law making Customs duties payable in gold rubles. He failed, however, to persuade the Government to permit ordinary business to be transacted in terms of gold. The War of 1877-78 had lamentable consequences for Russia's money-market. A drastic reform became imperative; and, although its actual introduction was delayed for some twenty years, the Government directed all its energies during this interval to increasing the gold reserve.

The following table shows the results of this effort:

¹ 1877-78.

<i>Year</i>	<i>Amount of paper money in circulation (in millions of rubles)</i>	<i>Gold reserve (in millions of rubles)</i>
1877	766.9	186.5
1890	928.4	475.2
1893	1,074.1	851.8
1894	1,071.9	894.8
1895	1,047.7	911.9

S. Witte, who became Minister of Finance in 1892, was destined to accomplish the work initiated by his predecessors for the improvement of the Russian monetary system and the establishment of the gold standard.

Witte's first act was to safeguard against the "silver danger." By Imperial ukaze (July 16, 1893) the compulsory acceptance of silver (in the form of bullion and old coin) by the Mint, was discontinued, and the import of foreign silver money prohibited (September 1, 1893). This did not apply to some of the Asiatic countries.

The Minister next took steps to stabilize the paper by restraining exchange speculation then especially rife in Berlin. He introduced a special (differential) duty on the export of paper rubles (March 29, 1893) and obtained stringent powers of control over stock-exchanges and banks. Later, he intervened in favor of the ruble by means of secret agents, and dealt a decisive blow to those Russian and foreign speculators who gambled on a fall in its value. By these measures, the value of the paper ruble was stabilized at 65-67% (in terms of gold).

Witte did not, however, risk permitting its immediate conversion into gold—Russia's trade-balance being somewhat unstable. Foreign gold payments (for debts, freights, foreign bills, etc.) reached the annual sum of Rbles. 250,000,000. Russia's yearly gold output was only about Rbles. 40,000,000; hence, about Rbles. 200,000,000 had to be met by a favourable trade balance. In the five years preceding the monetary reform, this balance did not exceed Rbles. 113,000,000. It is only after the successful result of his foreign loan policy that Witte felt it was safe to introduce the gold standard definitely.

Introduction of the Gold Standard

The following are the most important legislative Acts by which the gold standard was established.

On May 8, 1895, the Council of the Empire passed a bill permitting transactions in gold (payment being made either in Russian gold or in paper money at the current rate). This was the crucial feature of the reform, as gold became legal tender in all transactions.

On January 3, 1897, an Imperial ukaze fixed the value of the Russian 5-ruble and 10-ruble gold coins at Rbles. 7.50 and 15 respectively. The new unit, the gold ruble, was to be accepted at two-thirds of the old gold ruble (this was the amount of devaluation involved in

Witte's reform). Paper money became convertible into gold at a fixed rate; this had, of course, to be officially fixed, and the conditions governing further issues of paper money defined. This was done by a further ukaze (August 29, 1897) which for the first time in Russian history conferred powers of note-issue upon the State Bank.

After decreeing that "the circulation of bank-notes was to differ in no respect from the circulation of gold," it further laid down that "notes are to be issued by the State Bank in a proportion strictly limited to the demands of business, which must be guaranteed by a gold reserve; this must not be less than half the value of the bank-notes issued, so long as this sum does not exceed Rbles. 600,000,000. All bank-notes issued in excess of Rbles. 600,000,000 must be guaranteed in gold, ruble for ruble." A ukaze of November 14, 1897, declared that "exchange of bank-notes for gold is guaranteed by all the resources of the State," and that their "value is equivalent to gold throughout the whole of the Empire."

The ukazes relative to the minting of new gold and silver coins were made the basis of the new Mint Statute of June 7, 1899. Article 3 of this statute declared, "The Russian monetary unit is based on gold . . . it is the ruble which contains 17.424 dolia¹ of pure gold." Article 5 established the citizens' right to the free coinage of gold (with a duty of Rbles. 42.315 for every 36 lbs. of gold treated). Other articles dealt with silver which was divided into two categories—"full value" coins of Rbles. 1.00, 0.50 and 0.25, and "change coins" of Rbles. 0.20, 0.15, 0.10, 0.05. The first were legal tender up to Rbles. 25, the second up to Rbles. 3. Copper money, in denominations of Rbles. 0.05, 0.02, 0.01, 0.005 and 0.0025, was also legal tender up to Rbles. 3.

Rbles. 605,000,000 were transferred from the gold reserve of the State Treasury to the State Bank to "cover the debt arising from the issue of bank-notes." The last instalment of this sum was paid on April 28, 1900, and that day must be regarded as witnessing the formal conclusion of Witte's monetary reform.

The gold reserve of the State Bank reached the sum of Rbles. 1,095,500,000 in 1897, at which time the note circulation only amounted to Rbles. 1,067,900,000; so that the gold reserve was considerably in excess of legal requirements.

The following figures show the state of currency in circulation between 1900 and the war with Japan.

<i>Year</i>	<i>Bank-notes</i>	<i>Gold</i>	<i>Full-value silver</i>
	<i>(In millions of rubles)</i>		
1900	491.2	641.3	145.3
1901	555.0	682.1	145.7
1902	542.4	694.2	140.3
1903	553.5	731.9	137.2
1904	578.4	774.8	133.2

¹ 1 dolia = 0.686 grain.

Witte's reforms, however, had their weak points. The revision of the old statutes of the State Bank, undertaken on the eve of the reforms (1894), was left incomplete; the Bank was not transformed into an independent issuing agency; the amounts of the new issues of notes were determined by the exigencies of discounting not only trade bills but financial bills as well. Such factors should never have been allowed to govern the issue of bank-notes.

The excessive amount of silver in circulation was another defect, and gave an appearance of "lameness" to the Russian gold standard. Furthermore, the proportion of gold in circulation was in excess of trade requirements. This indicated a certain disproportion between Russia's productive power and her monetary system.

The Twentieth Century

The war with Japan, and the Revolution of 1905, tested the stability of Russia's monetary system. When the war broke out the Government was compelled to stop the free circulation of gold, and to increase the issue of bank-notes. Notes of small denominations—Rbles. 3, 5 and 10 (and in Siberia Rbles. 1) were issued. The population naturally regarded the new paper money with disfavour. The following table shows the changes in the circulation of currency during the Russian-Japanese War:

Year	Bank-notes	Gold coin	Full value silver
	(In millions of rubles)		
Eve of war.....	578.4	774.8	133.2
Jan. 1, 1905.....	853.7	683.6	123.0
At the conclusion of peace.....	924.0	854.1	112.7

By January, 1906 the position of the State Bank had become precarious. Bank-notes totalling Rbles. 1,207,500,000 were in circulation, while the gold reserve was only Rbles. 926,500,000 of which Rbles. 226,500,000 were abroad. At one time it was contemplated to discontinue the free exchange of bank-notes into gold. Owing to the successful floatation of foreign loans, however, this retrograde step was fortunately avoided, and the gold standard emerged unharmed from a severe trial.

Private Banks

The private banks which came into being at the beginning of Alexander II's reign developed, towards the end of the century, a strong credit system throughout the country. The State Bank played an important role in assisting the development of the private banking system. It supplied the commercial banks with capital by means of rediscount and loans on securities.¹

¹ The official discount rate in Russia, as in the case in young capitalist countries, was from 1 to 1.5% below the rate of private discount.

The Joint-Stock-Commercial banks played the chief role among the private credit establishments; they supplied trade and industry with capital, accumulated the floating masses of private capital, and issued stocks, bonds and debentures. Next in importance were the Societies of Mutual Credit, and then the Municipal Banks. Unfortunately, banks which could grant long-term loans to industry and agriculture were generally lacking; although sporadic transactions of this character were undertaken by a few private banks.

Small credit institutions were subsidized by the State Bank and developed rapidly; these undoubtedly played a useful part in the national economy.

Savings, in the strict sense of the word, were accumulated in the State Savings Bank, the popularity of which grew rapidly. The following table exhibits the rapid increase of current accounts and deposits in the principal credit institution—the State Bank excluded:

Balances—current accounts and deposits on January 1
(In millions of rubles)

	1908	1909	1910	1911	1912	1913
Jnt. Stk. Commercial Banks.....	898	1,060	1,395	1,909	1,865	2,330
Soc. of Mut. Credit.....	229	271	329	406	487	545
Municipal Banks	112	116	129	146	153	171

On January 1, 1908, the current and deposit accounts of the small credit institutions amounted to Rbles. 276,000,000.

The total deposits in the State Savings Bank on December 1, of each of the following years were:

(In millions of rubles)

1908	1909	1910	1911
1,403.3	1,503.8	1,629.9	1,750.5

At the close of 1913 all these balances exceeded Rbles. 2,000,000,000. The aggregate current accounts and deposits in all credit institutions were:

(In millions of rubles)

1908	1909	1910	1911	1912	1913
2,969	3,247	3,833	4,404	4,842	5,228

Discount and short-loan transactions (excluding the Savings Bank, which did not undertake this class of business) increased between 1908 and 1912, from Rbles 2,286,000,000 to Rbles 4,566,000,000. The following figures show the great development of the Russian money market in the years immediately preceding the War: on January 1, 1909,

stocks and shares amounted to Rbles. 11,300,000,000. This sum increased to Rbles. 19,000,000,000 in 1913.

Such was the condition of affairs when the outbreak of the Great War interrupted the normal development of Russia's finances and subjected them to an unprecedented test.

II

THE WAR

THE World War shook Russia's gold standard to its foundations, and the Revolution finally overwhelmed it.

The unrestricted exchange of notes into gold was suspended immediately war broke out, as was the case in all belligerent countries, except Great Britain. A paper standard was introduced; by a law of August 5, 1914, the State Bank was relieved of its obligation to change notes into gold, and its issuing powers were enlarged by Rbles. 1,200,000,000 not covered by gold reserves.

Despite the great increase in the note issues (from Rbles. 1,633,000,000 on July 16, 1914, to Rbles. 2,946,500,000 on January 1, 1915) the ruble did not depreciate on the home market. The disappearance of gold coin, and the general shrinkage in credit, increased the demand for paper money. During the first months of the War there was no difficulty (except in the actual military zone) with regard to small change; but inconvenience arising from the lack of such tokens began to make itself generally manifest in August 1915.

The position of the ruble was less favourable abroad. An important proportion of the Russian gold reserve lay in French vaults, and became subject to a moratorium. Only after difficult negotiations, and through the good offices of the Banque de France, did the Russian Government receive permission to use this gold to pay interest on loans and to cover other national expenditure. The export of goods across the Western frontiers diminished rapidly; it became a negligible quantity after Turkey had entered the War on the side of the Central Powers. The adverse trade-balance in 1914 was Rbles. 147,900,000. It is not surprising, therefore, to note that the ruble fell to Rbles. 10.50-11 to the pound sterling (parity being Rbles. 9.457).

After this, Russia entered upon a period of inflation which assumed an especially active form under the shortlived Provisional Government. From July 23, 1914 to October 6, 1917 the State Bank's power of issue was increased tenfold (before the Revolution of March 1917, by Rbles. 6,200,000,000; and after the formation of the Provisional Government, by Rbles. 10,000,000,000).

The amount of paper rubles in circulation is shown in the following table:

(In millions of rubles)

January 1, 1916.....	5,617.0
January 1, 1917.....	9,103.0
March 1, 1917.....	9,949.6
October 23, 1917.....	18,917.0 (the final balance of the State Bank)

Of the last sum, Rbles. 15,507,200,000 were printed for Treasury purposes. This was approximately 38%, or two-fifths of the military expenditure.

Owing to the fall of the ruble abroad, and general anxiety as to the outcome of the conflict, its purchasing power gradually declined at home. A "run" on the auxiliary coinage broke out in the capitals and large cities in the latter part of 1915. Not only full value silver coin, but also change silver and copper money, disappeared from circulation. The Government was compelled to issue special stamps—and, later, special Treasury notes (in denominations of Rbles. 0.01 to 0.50)—for use as small change. Russian money thus became "paperized" from top to bottom.

Depreciated Paper

Expenditure increased so greatly after the Revolution of March 1917 that the Government was compelled to lower the standards of bank-note paper and printing. The first bank-notes, of Rbles. 1,000 (called "Duma rubles" as a view of the Duma building appeared thereon), issued by the Provisional Government (April 28, 1917) were printed on poor paper. The succeeding issues of Rbles. 250 notes—and especially the 20 and 40 ruble notes (called "Kerensky rubles") were printed upon paper of a still lower quality. A difference in value between the old Imperial bank-notes (called "Romanov" and "Nicholas") and the new "Duma" and "Kerensky" notes quickly developed much in favour of the former. This involved the complete overthrow of the whole monetary system.

The purchasing power of the paper ruble diminished in proportion to the amount of the notes issued. It was only towards the end of the War, however, that the price of goods began to rise in spectacular fashion. Judging by the prices of commodities the paper ruble, so late as the middle of 1917, was equal in purchasing power to one-third of a gold ruble but it fell to one-fifth by October 1917. Both before and after the Revolution the Government put a premium on gold (paid in paper money); at first fixed at 30%, this premium rose by successive stages to over 50%.

The London quotations (on next page) show the course of the ruble abroad.

The fall of the ruble was still greater in some other European capitals. On the eve of the Communist Revolution the value of the ruble abroad was generally 20% in terms of gold.

(£10 sterling at par = rubles 94.57)

	<i>rubles</i>
December, 1914	117.4
December, 1915	154.6
December, 1916	159.8
January, 1917	165.3
July, 1917	220.5
October, 1917	346.7

The measures taken by the Government to guard against over-inflation can hardly be described as successful. Internal loans totalling Rbles. 10,099,400,000 (Oct. 1917) failed to withdraw the surplus of paper money from circulation. The greater part of it was hoarded, the remainder went to increase the prices of goods and to feed speculation.

The following table shows the growth of current accounts and deposits in Joint-Stock Commercial Banks.

(In millions of rubles)

On August 1, 1914.....	3,393.3
January 1, 1916.....	4,346.1
January 1, 1917.....	7,566.4
August 1, 1917.....	9,153.3

Company promotion was very active, as is shown by the total of capital raised for new and old companies.

(In millions of rubles)

1913	525
1916	923.4
1917 (8 months).....	1,351.5

The prosecution of speculators in commodities and the strengthening of the control exercised by the Ministry of Finance over the private banks did not give satisfactory results at home. Measures taken for the protection of Russian money abroad were more effective. These measures were based on the ukaze of November 15, 1914 prohibiting the export (without special license) of notes, precious metals and shares and bonds above the sum of Rbles. 500. On June 19, 1917 such exports were totally prohibited. A special Accounts Department was created at the Ministry of Finance, and the sale of foreign money to private persons was controlled by a special Committee. But all these measures came too late. The Government ultimately spent about a million pounds in London in a fruitless effort to support the ruble.

By October 16, 1917, the gold reserve at the State Bank had fallen to Rbles. 1,295,225,000—as against Rbles. 1,630,658,000 on July 16, 1914. This outflow of gold, chiefly occasioned by the transfer to Great Britain of Rbles. 636,000,000 was balanced, to a certain extent, by the

output of Russia's gold-mines and by the withdrawal of gold from circulation. The gold cover of the note-issue fell to 7%.

The Collapse of the Ruble

The Civil War, which broke out soon after the Communist Revolution, divided Russia into several regions, each issuing its own currency. The mere variety of these currencies, the cancelling of monies issued by enemy factions and the abuse of note-issue to cover military expenditure finally destroyed all popular faith in paper money. In this snow-storm of paper, the old Imperial 100 and 500 ruble notes were valued much above the rest. At the beginning of 1920 Rbles. 340,000,000,000 of different paper notes were in circulation on Soviet territory. Of this Rbles. 220,000,000,000 were issued by the Soviet Government; the different anti-Soviet factions issued about Rbles. 120,000,000,000 but these were annulled in 1920.

It was in these circumstances that the Soviet Government decided to attempt to establish integral (Militant) Communism. All private banks and credit societies ceased to function. Together with the old State Bank, they were merged in the People's Bank. This was, actually, a kind of department for the distribution of subsidies among the different nationalized undertakings which made it their chief aim to secure from the Bank as many newly-printed pieces of paper as possible. The gold reserve of the State Bank (which, after payments to Germany and Poland and the meeting of much other expenditure, still amounted to about Rbles. 1,000,000,000) was no longer connected with the paper money system. After the renewal of international relations, a large proportion of this reserve was rapidly expended in the purchase of goods and in Communist propaganda.

A new unit in terms of a labour standard, called the "trade ruble," was introduced but failed completely. It made no appeal to the people who began to make use of the forbidden gold and silver coins of the old regime; foreign money appeared in the cities and frontier districts but the bulk of the population, deprived of any form of money, was reduced to the ages-old expedient of barter.

"Money Must Be Destroyed"

"Money, as a bourgeois institution, must be destroyed"—so the Commissar of Finance several times declared. But, before its destruction, as much (paper) revenue as possible had to be extracted from it. The following table shows the abnormal rise in the note-issue:

<i>(In billions of rubles)</i>				
	<i>1918</i>	<i>1919</i>	<i>1920</i>	<i>1921</i>
On January 1	27.3	61.2	225.0	1,168.5
July 1	43.2	100.3	511.8	2,347.0
October 1	51.0	147.4	745.1	4,534.4

By January 1, 1921 the purchasing power of the paper ruble had fallen to 1/26,539 part of its pre-war level. By the middle of 1921 the ruble, in comparison with salt had fallen to 1/714,000, and in comparison with potatoes and sugar to 1/261,000 of its pre-war value. The smallest fall (1/15,000) was that in relation to gold. This, however, had no practical meaning, since the circulation of gold was prohibited.

The paper ruble was dying. This was one of those signs of economic deterioration which, in the spring of 1921 compelled the Government hastily to adopt the New Economic Policy (NEP). The limited toleration of private trading which it established delayed the complete collapse of the Soviet bank-note but could not save it.

III

THE NEP

WHILE granting a limited freedom of private industry and trading, the Government, instead of radically reforming the monetary system, adopted a policy of palliatives.

It was decided to "orientate" the monetary policy towards the gold standard. The pre-war (gold) ruble being taken as the theoretical unit, the method adopted was as follows: pre-war prices, in gold rubles, were compared with the prices in depreciated Soviet tokens; the comparison served to establish the rate of the Soviet ruble in terms of the pre-war ruble for any specified product; this was called the "price-index." This policy resulted in chaos. The fixing of these indexes was left to the discretion of the various Government departments—the Commissariat of Finance, a special Gold Ruble Quotation Committee, the Customs Department and even some Trade Unions—which only led to the establishment of competitive prices.

The Astronomical Ruble

In November 1921 the pre-war ruble was quoted at 60,000 Soviet rubles. The Government decided to diminish the issue of paper in order to stabilize the rate of internal exchange but this laudable plan was not carried out. The issue of paper continued upon an astronomical scale; and the value of the Soviet note fell in consequence.

	<i>Amount of paper rubles in circulation</i>	<i>Total value in gold rubles</i>
Jan. 1, 1921.....	1,168,600,000,000	44,000,000
Jan. 1, 1922.....	17,500,000,000,000	103,000,000
Jan. 1, 1923.....	1,994,500,000,000,000	100,000,000
Aug. 1, 1923.....	12,400,000,000,000,000	81,400,000
Sept. 1, 1923.....	16,684,000,000,000,000	60,600,000
Oct. 1, 1923.....	22,701,000,000,000,000	41,300,000

On September 1, 1922 the price-index was 5,600,000; and by October, 1923 it had risen to 550,000,000.

The Government twice had recourse to redenomination. On November 3, 1922, "notes of 1922" were issued. One ruble of this new issue was made equal to Rbles. 10,000 of previously issued notes; on October 24, 1923, the "notes of 1923" were issued, Rble. 1 being made equal to Rbles. 100 of the "notes of 1922," or to Rbles. 1,000,000 of prior issues. On September 8, 1922 the circulation of paper rubles issued prior to 1922 was prohibited. These measures, however, failed to relieve the situation.

Credit

The granting of restricted freedom to the private sector under the NEP determined a reversion to ordinary practices in banking; the State retaining only a monopoly of purchasing, and selling, precious metals and foreign currency. All this led to the resurrection of credit institutions. These had become imperatively necessary for the nationalized undertakings which were now deprived of State subsidies and compelled to operate on a commercial basis. Subsidies gave place to loans; and the Industrial Bank and various trade banks were founded.¹ A decree of December 26, 1922 revived the Savings Banks.

The public, however, had no confidence in the new banks; and, furthermore, no one had any money to invest. Hence the revival of these banks did not lead to a regeneration of the banking system. On September 1, 1923, the total of the bank-balances was Rbles. 920,600,000 (gold) of which Rbles. 732,500,000 belonged to the State Bank. Practically all the deposits came from different State institutions, and 75% of the advances were granted to nationalized industry. Only 0.375% of the bank-balances belonged to private persons and institutions (Rbles 35,500,000), while during the first year private clients obtained only Rbles. 40,000,000 in the form of loans.

The Chervonetz

A more decided step towards reforming the country's finance was promulgated by the decree of December 11, 1922, which empowered the State Bank to issue a new money unit—the Chervonetz—a special department being organized for this purpose. All Chervonetz-notes had to be covered up to 25% by precious metals—gold, silver, platinum or by "stable" foreign currency; and, as to the remaining 75%, by bills and other easily-realized obligations or goods. Advances to the Treasury by the State Bank had to be covered up to 50% in cash and the remainder in short-term bonds. The smallest denomination of note issued was to be one Chervonetz—equal to Rbles 10 in terms of gold.

At first, the Chervonetz was not made legal tender—State departments (the Customs excluded) could even refuse to accept it. By the

¹The Bank of Foreign Trade (in which foreign capital was invested), the Cooperative Bank and several Mutual Credit Banks.

decree of February 22, 1923, however, which put the Chervonetz into circulation, the new notes had to be accepted by State institutions at the current rate, while the Customs were forced to accept them at par.

Simultaneously, the minting of the gold Chervonetz was undertaken; but this, of course, did not pass into circulation. According to official data, the paper Chervonetz almost immediately lost a large part of its value in comparison with gold—it depreciated from 20 to 30% in the wholesale trade and still more in the retail.

From this time onwards, two money-systems existed, side by side in the U.S.S.R.; for the Soviet Government, while guarding the Chervonetz from depreciation by every means at its disposal, continued uninterruptedly to issue paper rubles in ever-increasing volume. The catastrophically falling Soviet token, still the legal tender of the State, circulated side by side with the Chervonetz, as issued in the form of State Bank or Treasury notes.

In February 1924, when the final Soviet monetary reform was inaugurated, the total of all paper-money in circulation, expressed in Chervonetz values, was:

1. Soviet paper rubles.....	39,000,000
2. Chervonetz in bank notes.....	273,000,000
3. ¹ Treasury bonds, accepted by State institutions at par.....	72,000,000
4. ¹ Railway certificates, in small coupons (loans to the Commissariat of Communications)	12,000,000
Total	396,000,000

It is quite obvious that the value of money in circulation was insufficient for any thorough restoration of the national economy.

IV

THE SOVIET MONETARY REFORM

AT THE beginning of 1924, it became evident that an end must be put to the paper-money chaos. Communist leaders declared that “the Soviet note was issued up to the limit” and that no more could be expected from it.

The first steps towards a monetary reform were concerned with the abolition of the Soviet notes. On February 5, 1924, a decree was published regarding the issue of State Treasury bills of one, three and five rubles in Chervonetz values. These bills were not redeemable in gold but had a fixed circulation value at par with the Chervonetz. They were issued by the Commissariat of Finance up to a limit of half the Chervonetz notes put into circulation. The first decree was silent as to

¹ 3 and 4 were money substitutes.

the exchange of the Chervonetz bank notes into Treasury bills; but this was afterwards legalized by special decree.

The new Treasury bills were intended to replace the Soviet notes. On February 15 the Commissariat of Finance ordered that the issue of Soviet notes should cease and the reserves held in various departments be destroyed. But Soviet notes, issued prior to February 15, were to retain, "until a further decree of the Government" their character of legal tender.

A new decree (promulgated on February 22) related to the minting of Soviet silver and copper money. With minor alterations, this decree is a repetition of the Money Statute of 1899. The old difference between "full value silver" (Rbles. 1 and 0.50) and "change silver" was maintained. The first became legal tender in private transactions up to Rbles. 25, and the second up to Rbles. 3. Paragraph 4 of the decree enacted that ". . . The amount of silver and copper coins in circulation is to be regarded as part of the normal issue of bank-notes." The Commissariat of Finance was instructed to mint silver coins to the amount of Rbles. 100,000,000 by January 1, 1925. To cover the intervening period, the Commissar was permitted to issue special bonds—of denominations ranging from Rbles. 0.01 to 0.50—which were to be withdrawn from circulation as soon as the new coins were ready. Government decrees prohibited as from March 1, the issue of monetary substitutes—such as orders to bearer, receipts for goods exchangeable for money, etc.

Finally, a decree of March 7 laid down the procedure for withdrawing all old Soviet notes from circulation. From March 10, one Chervonetz-ruble was made exchangeable for Rbles. 50,000 in "1923 notes," that is for 50,000,000,000 of Soviet rubles of issues prior to 1922. The old Soviet ruble was to be accepted as legal tender, in private transactions, till April 10, and in Government institutions till April 30.

The result of this measure was a drastic restriction of circulation of money and prices began to soar. The situation demanded a supreme effort on the part of the Government; for the continual rise in prices was threatening the very existence of the new monetary system.

It was at least necessary to stabilize commodity prices, and the Government issued regulations lowering the prices of manufactured goods by 15%, 20% and even more; local authorities were ordered, in case of necessity, to sell on the home market the grain collected for export. The Government also endeavoured to regulate retail prices in the large centres by organizing State shops.

The need for regulating prices on the home market led to the creation of a special Commissariat of Domestic Trade and the renewal of restrictions upon private traders whose activities were greatly feared by the Government. In order to diminish the deficit in the Budget, many measures of strict economy were enforced. The workers were called upon to "sacrifice" hopes of an improvement in wages, while salaried

employees had to face a cut of 20%. The banks were instructed to restrict their credit operations.

Such were the fundamental principles and methods adopted by the Government to effect its monetary reform. No actual gold standard was established; but an attempt was made to introduce a stable paper unit—the Chervonetz—based on a theoretical gold value. The Chervonetz, issued in the form of State bank-notes, became the currency of the country; on the other hand, the new Treasury bills provided a form of “change money,” which supplemented the Chervonetz. The Government was afraid to connect the pair too closely together; to use a Soviet expression, the Government was against “uniting the fates of the Bank currency and the Treasury currency.” As a matter of fact, there was no real difference between the two; they were both paper-money which could not be exchanged, as of right, for gold, and both were based on the same reserve, that of the State Bank. The increase in the bill issue therefore weakened the cover of the bank-notes.

Soviet Notes

Normal banking practice does not recognize Soviet notes as genuine bank-notes. First, it is not customary to issue bank-notes against goods; secondly, the trade bills which the nationalized industries draw on each other, and the Soviet trade drafts, do not represent the national turnover but merely serve as a base for the financing of the nationalized industries by the State Bank. As a result, the whole system resolves itself into a long-term indebtedness of the nationalized sector to the State Bank.

In other words, the State Bank does not issue bank-notes because commerce needs them but because there is no real commerce. This explains the steady increase of the number of notes in circulation. The issues were camouflaged subsidies to heavy industry. Soviet leaders openly recognized this and declared that “a vast amount of the working capital of the State Bank has been ‘frozen’ in great industrial undertakings.” A sharp fall in the Chervonetz resulted; on March 1, 1924, according to the wholesale index, it cost 0.635 and according to the retail index—0.492—in terms of gold.

The principal cause of the fall in the new Soviet money must be sought in the suppression of all private trading. The efforts made at the time, and still continuing, to support the Chervonetz at par with foreign currency do not testify to the strength of the Soviet money-system. The international money-market simply ignores the Chervonetz, since there is no free quotation for it. Having direct control over the import of foreign currency and precious metals (owing to its monopoly of external trade and of the sale and purchase of precious metals) the Soviet Government was able, though not without entailing heavy losses upon the country, to establish an arbitrary value for the Chervonetz on the home market. Its real value was disclosed only by illegal speculation.

The purchasing power of the Chervonetz fell slowly but uninterruptedly, reacting to the pressure on the private sector. The following were the principal dangers upon the road leading to the strengthening of the monetary system:

1. The chasm between private and State sectors, and the impossibility of establishing normal relations between them.

2. A persistently-growing deficit (concealed by advances from the State Bank—*i. e.* inflation) in the State enterprises, which were run at a heavy loss.¹

3. Interference with the normal accumulation and investment of private funds.

4. The absence of a normal banking system and a normal money market.

Nevertheless although there were technical defects in the Soviet monetary reform of 1924, it was not without its merits; and it could have assisted to restore the national commerce, if its normal development had not been hindered. The gold standard might, for example, have been established—possibly on the basis of a devaluated Chervonetz. The introduction of the Five Years Plan sealed the fate of the Chervonetz.

The following Soviet figures show the currency in circulation between the inauguration of the 1924 money reform and the beginning of 1930—when the first modest Five Years Plan was replaced by a new scheme of “Bolshevik acceleration”:

	<i>Bank Notes</i>	<i>Treasury bills</i> (in millions of rubles)	<i>Total</i>
April 1, 1924	289.7	103.8	393.5
April 1, 1925	402.4	363.3	765.7
April 1, 1926	674.5	472.2	1,146.7
April 1, 1927	772.9	511.1	1,284.0
April 1, 1928	906.2	612.0	1,518.2
Febr. 1, 1929	1,036.9	885.2	1,922.1
Jan. 1, 1930	1,501.0	1,261.8	2,773.0
Mar. 1, 1930	1,535.8	1,268.0	2,803.8

A special decree abrogated the regulation stipulating that the outstanding amount of Treasury bills must not exceed half that of bank-notes, and a new “change” currency was introduced—bronze coins being minted to the amount of Rbles. 10,900,000 by January 1, 1930.

It is curious that the increase of paper-money kept pace with the decrease in private trade and the growth of the Socialist sector. The Communists hoped that the Plan would cause a shrinkage in the issue of the Chervonetz; but such was not the case—it stimulated new issues. It is true that production and turnover increased also (but not so quickly as the amount of money in circulation) and gave the Communists, and certain foreign specialists, *e. g.* the German, Professor

¹ Particularly the heavy industries.

Elster, some excuse to deny that they were practicing inflation. But inflation there certainly was. The fall in the value of the Chervonetz on the home market was its first sign. The Communists' contention that the general rise in prices must be explained by a lack of goods does not square with their assertion that the turnover had increased.

The Commissariat of Finance was aware of the inflation; and, on the advice of eminent economists, insisted upon great care in the policy of note-issue. On the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the 1924 money reform the Commissariat issued the slogan—"retain the purchasing power of the ruble." But to no avail; during these five years the purchasing power of the ruble, on the home market, fell from Rbles. 0.50 to Rbles. 0.33 in terms of gold. The Central Statistical Bureau, on January 1, 1930, showed the price-indexes to be as follows:

1913 index = 1.0				
	<i>State Trade</i>	<i>Private Trade</i>	<i>Agriculture</i>	<i>Industry</i>
Jan. 1, 1930.....	2.08	4.10	4.80	3.72

It must be noted that the balance sheets of the State Bank exhibited a continuous increase in its reserves of precious metals and foreign currency.

	<i>Precious metals</i>	<i>Foreign money</i> (in millions of rubles)	<i>Total</i>
April 1, 1924	96.2	77.9	173.6
April 1, 1928	203.7	51.0	254.7
March 1, 1930	323.8	65.1	388.9

In spite of this, if one compares the amount of covering with the notes issued it will be remarked that the legal limit of 25% was always exceeded. According to the last statement published, only 13% of the paper money then in circulation was covered: and, in the opinion of many competent judges, it is doubtful whether even this reserve lies in the vaults of the State Bank. The greater part, it is believed, has been utilized to cover Soviet transactions abroad.

The Soviet Banks

The Soviet banking system inaugurated at the same time as the NEP and the currency reform, experienced fundamental changes, reflecting those of the Government's economic policy. Normal banking postulated the existence of free capital and the protection of private trading. The NEP only countenanced the latter on a small scale; but even this policy quickly gave way to the "rooting out" of all private trading. In consequence of this, the mixed commercial banks, half private, half official, and the credit societies lost all their *raison d'être*. The whole banking system became a purely State affair. A semblance

of cooperation with private capital was, however, retained by the Soviet banks abroad (in London, Paris, Riga, Copenhagen and Berlin).

At the end of 1927, a "credit plan" was elaborated, according to which all credit institutions had to conform strictly with Government instructions as to supplying State enterprises with funds from Government deposit accounts, from the issue department of the State Bank, and from the deposits and current accounts of the same enterprises. As the grandiose State reconstruction scheme was invariably in debt, the so-called "commercial credits" took the form of long-term loans, liable to compulsory renewal. Banking, in consequence, became merely the bureaucratic distribution of State funds among State institutions.

The following table shows the varying transactions of four principal banks; the State Bank, the Bank for Foreign Trade, the Bank of the Cooperative Union and the Moscow City Bank:

	<i>July 1, 1924</i>	<i>Oct. 1, 1925</i>	<i>Oct. 1, 1927</i>	<i>Oct. 1, 1928</i>	<i>Oct. 1, 1929</i>
	<i>(in millions of rubles)</i>				
Discounts and Advances.....	928	2,082	3,601	3,647	3,788
Deposits and Current accs.....	532	1,188	1,407	1,233	1,513

The transformation of Soviet banks into offices for the distribution of State subsidies among State enterprises required a central direction. This was affected by a decree of January 30, 1930, which placed all the Banks under the direct control of the State Bank (local Communal Banks, really local Treasuries were exempted from this). The State Bank received the exclusive right of sanctioning advances to State enterprises. The bill of exchange, the last relic of "bourgeois finance," was abolished. Credits were granted direct: a current account being opened for each concern. The value of production was placed on the credit side and its expenses on the other. The State Bank thus became a grandiose central accountancy department for the socialized sector (as in the early days of Communism). In addition, it assumed control over the production it financed.

Under such conditions, it is evident that the bulk of the transactions between State enterprises could be transacted without money—book-keeping entries alone were necessary. This "cashless" accountancy influenced the value of money unfavourably and increased the tendency to inflation, an expedient with which the Government still found itself unable to dispense. The State Bank, it may be added, completely failed to cope with the task of general accountancy and control imposed upon it by this decree, a task, which like the Communist scheme for the bureaucratic regulation of national economy from top to bottom, was practically impossible of fulfillment.

V

THE PRÉSENT STATE OF MONEY CIRCULATION

THE vicious circle to which the Soviet currency system had been reduced began to narrow down with the final abandonment of the NEP and the adoption of "planned economy." When the Government changed the original moderate speed scheduled for the execution of the Five Years Plan into "Bolshevik acceleration of production," the last hope for an improvement of the monetary system disappeared. A constant struggle was waged between the Commissariat of Finance and the various economic departments. The former endeavoured to defend the monetary system from abuse, while the latter insisted upon increasing issues of paper-money in order to secure the nominal capital necessary for the Plan. These Commissariats cared nothing for the value of money; they declared that money was by no means essential to the realization of Communism.

During 1930 many discussions took place in the U.S.S.R. about the "nature of Soviet money." The promoters of the currency reform and the officials of the Commissariat of Finance insisted that the basis of Soviet internal finance was a "goods-money" system, differing from that adopted in other countries because of State regulation of all economic activity. From this they argued that the issue of paper money should be carefully regulated, and that Soviet enterprises should be operated on strictly commercial principles. They affirmed that the currency system, recently restored with such difficulty, ought to be handled with very great care, as in Capitalist countries. These financial specialists belonged to the right wing of the Communist Party. Their left wing colleagues, on the other hand, declared that the adoption of the Five Years Plan had abolished the "laws of money values"—money must be transformed into a "special accountancy token."

The theorists of the "accountancy token" school cannot explain either the nature of this token or the conditions ensuring its stability. It is clear that such an "accountancy token" would be the unit, not of a monetary but of a natural (barter) system of national commerce. Such tokens should take the form of orders for rations in return for regulated labour. They would lose the appearance of money, and take the form of detailed lists of commodities; given to workers, peasants, etc. in exchange for their labour. Such rations are more easily made up locally than in a common centre.

It is therefore quite in the natural order of things that some collective farms and industrial undertakings should have demanded from the central authorities the right to issue special bonds wherewith to settle their accounts with peasants and workers. But such a system leads, eventually, to a complete financial chaos, in which no real money would exist. The Government, realizing this, declared that the theory of the

"accountancy token" was a "dangerous tendency of the left wing." Thus the supporters of the stable ruble, although dubbed with the offensive name of "bourgeois economists," were to some extent able to influence the Government's decision to pursue a more "capitalist" policy as regards the Chervonetz. Stable money was required, 1) for purposes of transactions between the socialized and the private sectors, the latter still playing an important role in the Soviet economic system; and 2) because the Government could not pay the full rations, promised to the collectivized groups of the population in kind; and was compelled to make up the difference in the form of paper-money which was spent on the private market.¹

The Five Years Plan and Inflation

Meanwhile, owing to the continual shortage of goods on the free market, the depreciation of the Chervonetz still continues.

The "shock rhythms" of the industrialization of the country have occasioned new money issues. The amount of money in circulation between January 1, 1930 and October 1, 1930 rose from Rbles. 2,773,000,000 to Rbles. 4,172,800,000 as a result of "direct advances" to industry. It is true that the State Bank at this period reported an increase of its reserves, which on August 1, 1931 stood at Rbles. 575,400,000—approximately 25% of the banknotes issued (Rbles. 2,315,300,000). The correctness of these figures is doubtful, as well as the ability of the State Bank to use its reserves, if these should be needed.

Although according to the original Five Years Plan, the amount of money in circulation was to be increased by no more than Rbles. 1,250,000,000 in five years, there was an actual increase of over Rbles. 1,400,000,000 by November 1, 1930 to Rbles. 4,300,000,000. This sum increased to Rbles. 5,800,000,000 by August 1, 1932.

Differentiation of Prices

The policy of "class prices" also affected the ruble adversely. The Chervonetz, which had not secured recognition abroad and had hence remained outside the international money market, lost its status on the home market because of differentiation of prices. Its purchasing power came to depend upon the "category" of its holder and the place of the transaction. It has one value in the hands of a workman, another in the hands of a peasant ("collectivized" or "individual"), and still another in the hands of a Communist, a Soviet employee or a "bourgeois." Its value also differs according to the place of purchase—the Soviet shops or the free market.

The difference in value for these various categories is enormous, and has left the population with but little faith in the ruble. The "ruling class"—the proletariat—until the spring of 1932 was compelled to secure 25% of their requirements on the free market; since the spring this proportion has risen to 65%.

¹ Payments abroad are made in gold or foreign currency.

Curiously enough, it is on the private market that the ruble still preserves somewhat its character of price-regulator. A comparison of prices on the socialized and free market establishes the ruble's value between 0.06 and 0.12 in terms of gold.

The Soviet Government in 1931 attempted to raise the value of the ruble by selling goods below cost in the State shops. The authorities, by still further restricting the permissible turnover of standard commodities, accumulated a certain amount of these and sold them, together with such luxuries as caviare, wine, etc. at prices as low as one-tenth of their cost in paper rubles. The events of the spring and summer of 1932, however, upset all calculations. Prices have once more soared up and the government's failure to secure even the modest rations for the workers have demonstrated that in the present circumstances any attempt to stabilize the ruble is doomed to failure. Only a definite return to a new NEP could save the last remains of a stable monetary system in the U.S.S.R. At present, its currency has become entirely disorganized and can no longer be used as a basis for any financial calculations.

FINANCE

I

PRE-WAR FINANCE

THE beginning of the twentieth century, following on seven years of unprecedented industrial development, was marked by a steady growth of national revenue which testified to the prosperous condition of Russian pre-War finance. The growth is shown in the following table:¹

<i>Sources of Revenue</i>	<i>1900</i>	<i>1913</i> <i>(in millions of rubles)</i>	<i>Increase</i>
Agriculture	2,985.1	3,995.0	33.8%
Forestry and Fisheries	626.1	588.4	— 4.3%
Industry	1,402.2	2,282.3	62.2%
Transport	531.2	803.5	51.4%
Building	473.1	703.8	48.8%
Trade	561.6	787.4	40.7%
Total	6,579.6	9,170.3	39.4%

Other indications—the increase in bank savings, investment of capital, the state of the credit system and the influx of foreign capital—concurred to prove the flourishing state of Russian finance.

The deposits in the savings banks were as follows:—

<i>Date</i>	<i>(In millions of rubles)</i>
January 1, 1900	679.9
January 1, 1906	831.2
July 1, 1914	1,704.2

If one adds to this last figure the amount represented by stocks, bonds and shares belonging to depositors, total deposits on July 1, 1914 amounted to Rbles. 2,073,000,000.

During the latter pre-War years the small deposits in petty credit institutions also amounted to a considerable sum. On January 1, 1909 the turnover of these institutions was Rbles. 258,000,000, while on July 1, 1914, it reached Rbles. 954,000,000. These were mainly the savings of the peasants, who also spent much money on farm development. The increase in the purchase of farm machinery, etc. is an indication of this. The purchase of foreign and home produced farm imple-

¹ S. Prokopovitch. "A Valuation of the Russian National Revenue in 1913."

ments rose from Rbles. 38,300,000 in 1906 to Rbles. 109,400,000 in 1913.

The following figures show the conditions of the credit institutions:—

	<i>Capital</i>		<i>Deposits</i>		<i>Total</i>	
	1909	1914	1909	1914	1909	1914
	<i>(millions of rubles)</i>					
State Bank	55	55	210	263	265	318
Private Banks	312	836	977	2,539	1,389	3,375
Municipal Banks	50	58	103	171	153	229
Credit Soc'ies	62	151	270	595	332	746
Total	479	1,100	1,560	3,568	2,039	4,668 ¹

Another sign of the flourishing condition of the national economy was the floatation of companies, accompanied by a considerable influx of foreign capital. In 1900 Russia had 1595 stock companies, with a capital of Rbles. 2,396,000,000. Of this sum Rbles. 691,000,000 belonged to foreign companies. During the period 1900–1914 the number of stock companies increased to 2,163, and their capital amounted to Rbles. 4,000,000,000, of which Rbles. 1,340,000,000 was foreign money.

While noting the progress made in pre-War national economy one has, however, to bear in mind some periods of depression, forming backwaters in the current of prosperity.

There is no doubt that, at the time of the monetary reform,² agricultural conditions in the central regions (particularly the Ukraine) were difficult, and called for prompt State assistance. This assistance was necessary to ensure the economic stability of Russia; and, above all, to help industry—which, in its turn, required the development of agriculture. Industry could not develop unless the home market developed also, as it depended upon the prosperity of the peasants. And the peasants were not prosperous. Economic reforms were necessary—above all, a land-tenure reform. It was only after 1905, however, that these reforms were introduced.

The Budget

The Russian State budget was first made public in 1863. During the period 1863–1913 it rose from Rbles. 432,000,000 to Rbles. 3,382,000,000, an eightfold increase in fifty years. It must be remembered that during this period the ruble lost a third of its value, but, even bearing that in mind, the Russian budget grew very rapidly.

The receipts of ordinary State revenue were as follows:

	1903	1908	1913
	<i>(in millions of rubles)</i>		
Receipts	2,032	2,418	3,415
Increase	19%	41%

¹ The figures quoted are taken from "The History of Russian National Economy" by Prof. Liatchenko, Leningrad 1927.

² 1897. See Money.

The increase, it will be noted, was more rapid in the second period. This is explained not only by the rapid development of national economy, but also by the increase in the volume of State economy—the new State railways, and the State spirit monopoly.

Between 1903 and 1913 State expenditures rose from Rbles. 1,883,000,000 to Rbles. 3,098,000,000 or by 64.3%. The surplus in revenue permitted the Treasury to form a cash reserve, which at the end of 1913, exceeded Rbles. 500,000,000. A part of the extraordinary expenditure was met from this source. In the period 1903–13, extraordinary expenditure was Rbles. 4,756,000,000, covered from surplus of revenue.

State Expenditure

In the period 1903–1913 State expenditure was as follows:—

	1903	1913	Increase	%
	(in millions of rubles)			
<i>1. General Administration:</i>				
Ministry of the Court (Civil List).....	15.9	17.3	1.4	8.8
Principal Offices of State ¹	3.7	9.4	5.7	154
Ministries:				
Interior	61.0	105.1	44.1	72.3
Finance	183.2	247.2	64.0	34.9
Justice	49.1	92.6	43.5	88.6
Foreign	6.1	11.5	5.4	88.5
State Control	8.4	12.1	3.7	44
Total	327.4	495.2	167.8	51.3
<i>2. Payments on State Debts.....</i>	288.7	424.3	135.6	47.0
<i>3. Defence:</i>				
War Ministry	352.4	581.1	228.7	64.9
Ministry of the Navy.....	113.9	244.8	130.9	114.9
Total	466.3	825.9	359.6	77.1
<i>4. Education and State Enterprises:</i>				
Holy Synod.	28.5	45.6	17.1	60.0
Ministry of Education.....	39.4	143.0	103.6	282.9
Communications (Excluding Railways).....	32.9	53.8	20.9	63.4
Ministry of Trade and Industry.....	40.2	84.5	44.3	60.4
Ministry of Agriculture.....	31.5	135.8	104.3	331.1
Department of Horse Breeding.....	2.1	3.3	1.2	57.1
Posts and Telegraphs.....	39.1	80.2	41.1	105.1
Total	213.7	526.2	312.5	146.2
<i>5. State Economic Activities:</i>				
Spirit Monopoly	170.6	234.9	64.3	37.7
Railways	416.3	586.8	170.5	41.0
Total	586.9	821.7	234.8	40.0
Grand Total	1,883.0	3,093.3	1,210.3	64.3

The increase in Russian military expenditure, as compared with that of other countries, was not exceptional. While Russia's grew, during this period, by 102%, Germany's grew by 109%.

¹ Excluding Ministries.

On the percentage basis the distribution of expenditure, in relation to the grand total was as follows:—

	1903	1913
General Expenditure	17.3%	16.0%
Payment on loans.....	15.2%	13.7%
Defense	24.6%	26.7%
Education and State Enterprises.....	11.8%	17.0%
Economic Activities	31.1%	26.6%
	100.0%	100.0%

To the ordinary expenditure must be added the extraordinary. It has been stated above that the total sum of extraordinary expenditure was Rbles. 4,756,000,000. In 1903–1913 the bulk of this expenditure was due to the Russo-Japanese War. This conflict cost Rbles. 3,016,000,000.

Other extraordinary expenditure between 1903–1913 was as follows:

	<i>In millions of rubles</i>
Railway construction	763
Improvement of State railways.....	18
Purchase of the Warsaw-Vienna Railway.....	32
Loans and subsidies to privately-owned railways.....	73
Capital expenditure on ports.....	24
Defense ¹	455
Military expeditions to China and Persia.....	20
Expenditure incurred by crop failure.....	403
Payment of loans before expiration.....	199
Other petty expenditure.....	47
Total	2,034

State Revenue

The following table indicates the sources of pre-War revenue:—

	1903	1913	Increase	Increase
		(in millions of rubles)		in %
Direct taxation	135	273	138	102
Indirect taxation	440	708	268	61
Customs and Excise.....	107	231	124	117
State receipts:				
Spirit Monopoly	542	899	357	66
Other receipts	65	126	61	92
State property:				
Railways	453	819	361	80
Other receipts	118	229	111	90
Receipts from peasants for land transferred at the Emancipation.....	89	1	— 88	
All other receipts	83	116	53	64
Total	2,032	3,417	1,385	68

¹ Excluding Russo-Japanese War.

It will be seen that indirect taxation considerably exceeded direct. The figures of indirect taxation, moreover, should be increased by the receipts from the Spirit Monopoly—a kind of excise. Direct taxation was raised from the following sources: property, capital and industry. Indirect taxation was drawn from spirit and beer excise, tobacco, cigarette-paper and holders, sugar, matches, mineral oil and Customs.

An analysis of the taxation figures shows that before the War the yield of direct taxation began to grow more rapidly than that of indirect. This healthy tendency opened the way to an increase in direct taxation, and made progressive taxation possible.

An examination of the sources of revenue may give the reader an unpleasant impression, because of the huge yield of the Spirit Monopoly (vodka). The net profits from this were as follows:

<i>Year</i>	<i>In millions of rubles</i>
1904 (The Monopoly began in 1893).....	374
1908	507
1913	678

It must be made clear, however, that during the whole existence of the Monopoly there was no great increase in the consumption per head. In 1903 this was 0.51 vedro,¹ while in 1913 it had only risen to 0.63 vedro. As a consumer of spirits, Russia took a low place in European statistics.

Whence was the extraordinary revenue derived? As indicated above, extraordinary expenditures amounted to Rbles. 4,756,000,000. Much of this (Rbles. 2,722,000,000) was covered by loans and short term credits and the rest (1,682,000,000) by the accumulated surplus of ordinary revenue over ordinary expenditure. In other words, extraordinary expenditure was, to a large extent, covered by ordinary revenue.

State Debts

The following table shows the condition of the State debts during the period 1903–13:—

<i>Year</i>	<i>Debt Contracted during year</i>	<i>Debt repaid (in rubles)</i>	<i>Balance at end of year</i>
1903	6,651,836,000
1904	452,508,000	22,598,000	7,081,776,000
1905	842,720,000	83,302,000	7,841,164,000
1906	1,275,152,000	490,756,000	8,625,560,000
1907	174,775,000	74,812,000	8,725,523,000
1908	376,940,000	251,681,000	8,850,782,000
1909	603,035,000	399,198,000	9,054,619,000
1910	3,188,000	27,601,000	9,030,205,000
1911	9,300,000	74,631,000	8,957,875,000
1912	179,679,000	279,500,000	8,858,054,000
1913	51,607,000	85,137,000	8,824,524,000

¹ A vedro equals 2.7 gallons.

Almost half of this sum was placed abroad—about Rbles. 3,000,000,000 in France, Rbles. 500,000,000 in Germany, Rbles. 430,000,000 in Holland and Rbles. 200,000,000 in Great Britain.

In the years immediately preceding the War, the State debt began to decrease and repayments exceeded new floatations.

Local Budgets

Local budgets must be added to the general budget, when dealing with Russian pre-War finance. The local budgets fall in two groups—the municipal and the Zemstvo budgets.

Zemstvo expenditure grew from Rbles. 89,100,000 in 1900 to Rbles. 290,500,000 in 1913. Of the latter sum Rbles. 90,100,000 were spent on education, Rbles. 71,400,000 on medical assistance, Rbles. 22,200,000 on improvements in agriculture and Rbles. 8,000,000 on veterinary measures.

The chief source of Zemstvo and municipal revenue were rates on lands, forests, country dwellings, factories, mines and other real estate.

Adding to the Zemstvo budgets those Provinces where no such institutions existed the total reached, in 1913, Rbles. 380,000,000. Municipal budgets rose to Rbles. 297,000,000 in 1913. The chief source of municipal revenue were the rates on town property. Municipal revenue was expended principally on education, sanitation, hospitals and hygiene, and city improvement.

II

FINANCE DURING THE WAR AND REVOLUTION

War Budgets

THE Russian finances were in an excellent condition until the War and gave ground for hoping that a needful financial reform would shortly be put in hand. The financial system had to be adapted to general economic conditions; the basis for progressive taxation was already prepared. With the introduction and strengthening of progressive taxation, the unwieldy system of indirect taxation could have been reconstructed.

The last pre-War State budget was very favourable. Ordinary revenue for 1914 amounted to Rbles. 3,572,100,000, and expenditure to Rbles. 3,309,500,000. Extraordinary expenditure amounted to Rbles. 304,000,000, covered, to a great extent, by ordinary revenue.

To understand the Russian War budgets, it is necessary to divide them into two parts; covering, respectively, ordinary and extraordinary revenue and expenditure. According to law, the military budget was not presented to Parliament; it came under the category of measures put into effect by Imperial ukaze. It will in consequence be more convenient

to examine budgetary expenditure apart from the purely military disbursements.

The following table shows the War-time budgets, as submitted to the Legislature:—

	Revenue	Ordinary Expenditure (in millions of rubles)	Extraordinary Expenditure
1913	3,417.3	3,094.2	288.7
1914	2,898.0	2,027.0	276.4
1915	2,827.0	3,068.0	193.9
1916	3,032.1	3,287.9	230.0
1917 ¹	3,998.6	3,734.6	284.1

State Expenditure

The following shows the State expenditure during the War (that for 1913 is given to facilitate comparison).

	1913	1914	1915	1916	1917 ²
Ministry of the Court.....	17.3	17.1	16.3	16.3	16.3
Principal Offices of State ³	9.4	9.2	8.3	9.2	9.8
Holy Synod	45.6	49.3	52.5	62.9	66.7
<i>Ministries:</i>					
Interior	185.3	207.3	202.8	214.0	265.0
Finance	482.2	445.7	356.8	326.3	354.0
Justice	92.6	100.6	101.4	106.1	118.9
Education	143.0	153.5	158.9	195.6	214.2
Foreign	11.5	9.0	7.7	7.1	7.3
Communications	640.6	705.2	707.4	676.9	978.7
Trade and Industry.....	64.5	59.8	54.6	55.3	67.9
Agriculture	135.8	146.2	143.4	137.5	144.3
Dept. of Horse Breeding.....	3.3	3.2	3.8	3.8	4.1
Army	581.1	427.4	500.4	580.0	560.0
Navy	244.8	214.1	199.8	181.5	181.5
State Control	12.1	12.9	12.9	12.6	13.7
Payments of State Debts.....	424.3	356.8	439.7	690.3	720.7
Unforeseen Expenses	10.0	10.0	10.0
Total	3,094.2	2,927.0	3,068.0	3,287.9	3,734.8

At first expenditure increased but slowly. In 1916, however, and especially in 1917, there were signs of acceleration. Much of this was due to the depreciation of the ruble. The most important increase was in the repayment of State debts, a direct outcome of military expenditure.

State Revenue

The following table shows State revenue during the War:—

¹ Estimates.

² Estimates.

³ Excluding Ministries.

	1913	1914	1915 (in millions of rubles)	1916	1917 ¹
Direct Taxation	272.5	280.5	359.9	359.6	596.0
Indirect Taxation	708.1	661.4	697.4	813.7	1,099.0
Customs and Excise.....	231.2	209.1	443.9	443.6	442.1
	1,024.8	646.9	208.3	251.6	279.5
State receipts, including the spirit monopoly	899.2	503.9	30.7 ²	51.3	49.6
State property	1,043.7	964.5	978.6	1,030.8	1,445.5
State Railways	813.6	733.8	783.2	728.6	128.7
Other	2.8	1.7	1.3	1.2	1.2
Peasants' payments on Eman- cipation bonds	1.1	1.9	1.7	1.5	1.7
Refunded Treasury Bonds....	116.6	107.5	129.0	112.5	142.2
Various	16.1	25.0	37.4	17.2	21.0
Total	3,417.3	2,898.0	2,827.7	3,032.2	3,998.6

During the War the Treasury was compelled to find new sources of revenue. Direct taxation on industry, land, town property and lodging was increased. Indirect taxation, derived from tobacco, cigarette paper and holders, mineral oil, matches, sugar, wines, spirits and beer, was also augmented. Excise duties were increased, also succession duties (property was revalued) and port dues. Three new emergency taxes were introduced on travellers and their luggage, on the transportation of goods and on cotton carried by rail. Postal and telegraph rates were also increased.

These financial measures introduced in 1914 could not take full effect that year. The results could only be judged in the next year. The deficit in the 1914 budget was partly covered by the balance available in the Treasury (which became, in consequence, almost depleted), but principally by loans.

The year 1915 showed a great decrease in the receipts from the Customs and the Spirit Monopoly, which could not be balanced by the new taxes or increased rates of the old.

In addition to loans, in 1915 a sum of Rbles. 196,400,000 came to hand as extraordinary revenue—Rbles 48,900,000 from the banknote issue, and Rbles. 145,800,000 from exchange.

Despite the unfavourable financial position, the Government did not introduce any considerable new taxation measures in 1915; it merely increased the existing taxes. This increased taxation was designed to yield Rbles. 100—110,000,000—which were insufficient to cover the decrease under other heads.

New Measures

In 1916 the Government at last resolved to act more radically; and at the beginning of the year it appointed a special Committee to consider the question of financial reform. The measures elaborated were

¹ Estimates.

² The sale of vodka was prohibited in 1914.

designed to yield additional Rbles. 663,300,000. The following were the most important provisions: introduction of progressive taxation on income and war profits (75,000,000); increased land tax (27,000,000); revision of the industrial tax (65,000,000); revision of death duties (10,000,000); increased stamp duties (28,000,000); introduction of a personal military tax (10,000,000); increased postal and telegraph rates (27,000,000); increase of the match excise (28,000,000); increase of the sugar excise (25,000,000); increase of the excise on mineral oil, tobacco and beer (104,500,000); new excise on textiles (150,000,000) and on electric power (17,500,000).

Only a small portion of this programme was carried out in 1916. The Government met with a great deal of opposition in the Legislature, which was for a much more radical reform of the old system of taxation. As a compromise the Government introduced a not very important income tax, while still preserving the well tried system of indirect taxes. This was a decisive blow to the old system. Once introduced, the income tax was bound to develop; and, in so doing, to affect the whole system.

The budget for 1917 was prepared by the Imperial Government but it never assumed legal form. It disclosed many improvements. Ordinary expenditure was covered by ordinary revenue, and only Rbles. 75,000,000 (to be obtained by loan) were necessary to cover extraordinary expenditure. The Provisional Government was left to operate this budget.

The Revolution

The Revolution occasioned a vast increase of expenditure. The causes were as follows:—

a. Workers' and officials' demands for increased remuneration. The Government was so weak that it could not withstand the pressure of the Council of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies on this point.

b. Projected reforms and reconstruction, all of which demanded very important expenditure.

c. Increase in the Civil Service.

d. Increased cost of labour and goods.

e. Increase in separation allowances for the dependents of soldiers.

How did the Provisional Government attempt to meet these new charges?

Its life was marked by many projects for reform, the introduction of which would have radically changed the whole system. The Government, however, only succeeded in putting a few of their measures into effect and, in general, the fiscal results of these were unimportant.

Its point of view, of course, differed somewhat from that of the old Government. Its projects were decidedly radical. If the old Government was slow to change old methods, the new Government was extremely hasty. A project establishing a grain and sugar monopoly was adopted and reforms of the property and succession taxes were discussed. A considerable alteration was made in the rates of the

income tax, this being increased two-and-a-half times, for large incomes, as compared with 1916. The special levy was the most cruel invention of the Revolutionary period. According to the law of June, 1917, persons whose incomes were lower than Rbles. 10,000 were not affected by this levy. On larger incomes the impost was up to 50%. If to this, other new taxation on income be added, the total tax amounted to 90% of the income. The war-profits tax was also increased. The Government expected to obtain Rbles. 1,000,000,000 from these two sources; but this hope was not realized.

A levy on capital ranging from 0.1% to 0.5% was contemplated; but the Government did not last long enough to enact this. The succession duties too, were to have been based on English practice, *i. e.* the more remote the relationship, the higher the duties.

In the field of indirect taxation, the Government increased the tobacco duty. A suggested State monopoly of mineral oil was turned down. Projects for State monopolies of tea, coffee, matches, cheap tobacco, etc., were only discussed in committees.

Military Expenditure

Military expenditure, in the Russian sense, was not only expenditure associated with military operations, in the strict sense of the words; it also covered such expenditure as separation allowances, assistance to refugees, and some of the amounts disbursed by the Ministry of Communications.

This expenditure amounted to:

<i>Year</i>	<i>(In millions of rubles)</i>
1914 (July-Dec.)	2,540
1915	9,380.9
1916	15,267
1917 (until Aug.).....	14,204.8
Total	41,392.7

Of this sum Rbles. 30,944,600,000 figured on the estimates of the Ministry of War; Rbles. 2,900,000,000 on those of the Ministry of Communications; Rbles. 2,000,000,000 on those of the Ministry of the Navy, and Rbles. 4,100,000,000 on those of other Ministries.

The amount directly expended on the Army and Navy was Rbles. 33,000,000,000. Another large item of military expenditure was that of allowances to soldiers' families—Rbles. 3,200,000,000.

A rough estimate of the military expenditure in 1917 would be Rbles. 25,200,000,000. To this would have to be added Rbles. 1,224,000,000 as interest on short-term loans. Thus the total military expenditure, including the whole of 1917, was Rbles. 51,400,000,000.

How was this huge sum covered?

The following sums were devoted (up to September 1, 1917) to this purpose:

	(In millions of rubles)
Cash reserves of the Treasury in 1914.....	2,611.6
Loans: Home	11,408.2
Foreign	8,070.7
Short-term obligations in Russia.....	16,425.5
Total	38,516.0

As mentioned above, the total expenditure up to the end of 1917 was Rbles. 51,400,000,000. Thus in 1917 about Rbles. 13,000,000,000 had to be found to cover military expenditure. It must be borne in mind that not all the short-term obligations were placed on the market. About Rbles. 12,000,000,000 were underwritten by the State Bank. This necessitated the issue of banknotes, amounting to:

Year	(In millions of rubles)
1914	1,425
1915	2,612
1916	3,488
1917 (until Sept. 1).....	6,317

As may be seen, the issue of paper-money gradually became more and more important in defraying military expenditure.

Of the total military expenditure, 61.9% was covered by loans (without taking into consideration Treasury obligations underwritten by the State Bank), 7% by free cash in the Treasury, and 31% by the issue of banknotes.

State Debts

As stated earlier, the pre-War Russian debt amounted to Rbles. 8,800,000,000. The War greatly increased this. Foreign loans, chiefly from the Allies, totalled over Rbles. 8,000,000,000 (at pre-War exchange values); of this Great Britain supplied Rbles. 5,500,000,000, France about Rbles. 1,350,000,000 and the United States Rbles. 500,000,000.

Home indebtedness increased also. Long-term loans attained Rbles. 11,500,000,000. In addition, Treasury notes for Rbles. 850,000,000 and short-term Treasury debentures for Rbles. 21,000,000,000 were also issued. Only about Rbles. 4,500,000,000 of these obligations were taken up.

Thus without reckoning Treasury notes, and short-termed debentures and the Liberty Loan (floated by the Provisional Government, which the Communists put into circulation as money) the Russian debt at

the time of the Communist Revolution amounted to Rbles. 28,000,000,-000; local budget debts were Rbles. 500,000,000.¹

Local Budgets During the War

There is a great lack of accurate information as to the local budgets during the War period. The details of municipal budgets are especially incomplete.

In 1914 the Zemstvo budgets showed a tendency to rise—the total of these amounting to Rbles. 346,600,000 as against Rbles. 290,600,000 in the previous year. The following year was a difficult one for the Zemstvos, as revenue did not increase. The total of the Zemstvo budgets in that year was Rbles. 342,800,000. There is no information as to the budgets of 1916 and 1917; but, as an inquiry in 1916 showed, most of the Zemstvos suffered severe financial reverses.

There is no information as to municipal budgets during the War, but most municipalities were confronted by the same difficulties as the Zemstvos. Their revenues fell; the first effect of this being a reduction in house-building, formerly carried on with the help of municipal loans.

Summing up the state of Russian finance in pre-Revolutionary times, the following conclusion may be drawn. In pre-War days Russia's finances, based on the stability and development of the national economy, were in a favourable state. The financial system, however, stood in some need of reform (income-tax, etc.).

During the War the Government endeavoured to stabilize the ordinary budget by additional taxation, and without radically changing the financial system. The new measures, however, did not offset the deficit caused by the suppression of the Spirit Monopoly. In 1916 the Government was forced to consider a radical reform of the finances. It strove to find new sources of revenue by improvement in the old system, adding only a few new taxes. It was disinclined to change its policy, and counted upon an increase of revenue by a rise in indirect taxation. Events, however, compelled the introduction of the income-tax, an event marking an improvement in the whole taxation system.

If the old Government was slow in reforming this, and failed to keep pace with the demands of the time, the Provisional Government hustled on premature reforms in its endeavours to foster "social justice"—the burden of taxation had, somehow, to be transferred to the shoulders of the rich.

As to military expenditure, Russia followed the example of all other belligerents, and financed the War by means of loans. As hostilities proceeded, however, it became clear that this source was too limited; and it became necessary to increase the note-issue.

¹ This information is taken from "The Social Revolution and Finances," published by the Soviet Commissariat of Finances.

III

MILITANT COMMUNISM

What the Word Finance Meant Under Militant Communism

IN THE Communist programme the problem of finance is defined vaguely and only in general terms. It declares: "When the Socialization of the means of production, expropriated from the Capitalists, begins, the Government ceases to be a parasitical apparatus controlling production—it becomes an organization that directs the economic life of the country, and the State Budget becomes the budget of the whole national economy. Under such conditions, the balancing of the Budget is only possible if the State system of production and distribution is perfect. In order to cover direct State expenditure, the Russian Communist Party will gradually change the system of special levies on Capitalists, which is historically inevitable in the early days of the Social Revolution, into a progressive income-tax. And as this tax eliminates itself because of the expropriation of the wealth of the rich, State expenditure will be covered by revenues from different State monopolies." This quotation indicates that the Communists have pictured finance as something different from all former conceptions of the word. Apparently, they desired to make finance a minor factor of the national economy.

The Commissariat of Finance acted in accordance with this programme. In a Soviet survey of the financial legislation of 1917–1921, it is declared that "so far as financial policy is placed by the Soviet Government, in close dependence upon a general economic policy, all changes in the latter are directly reflected in financial legislation." Until the spring of 1921 the idea guiding economic policy was the complete expropriation of trading, industrial and financial capital, the absorption of private enterprises by the State, the payment of wages in kind, and the reinforcement of Socialist principles by the wealth left over by the Capitalist regime. In accordance with this idea, the Soviet power pursued the following aims in its financial policy: the expropriation of the bourgeoisie by means of financial pressure; the transformation of the old State budget into a budget of "organized national economy"; the transformation of the old financial apparatus into a central book-keeping office of the Proletarian State; and the inauguration of the "moneyless State."¹

During this period the State budget was an unimportant item. It is true that estimates were drawn up but they did not reflect the whole turnover, and they were not taken into any serious consideration. They could not reflect the whole of the State's finance because many items of revenue were not included. Such were: the values of produce taken

¹ Survey of Financial Legislation, 1917–21, by the Institute of Economic Research, Petrograd, 1921 P.I.

forcibly from the peasantry, revenue from nationalized property, revenue from paper-money, etc.

A general survey of the State budget during these years shows the contempt with which it was regarded by the Communists.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Revenue</i>	<i>Expenditure</i>	<i>Deficit</i>	<i>Proportion of deficit</i>
	<i>(In millions of Soviet rubles)</i>			
Jan.-June 1918	2,853	17,603	14,750	83.7%
July-Dec. 1918	12,728	29,103	16,376	56.2%
Jan.-June 1919	20,350	50,703	30,353	59.8%
July-Dec. 1919	28,605	164,673	116,068	82.6%
1920	158,108	1,048,875	890,767	84.9%

These figures need no explanations: they speak for themselves. In effect, there was no budget. The extraordinary increase in the amounts is not surprising, as it was not so much an increase in the budget, as a depreciation of Soviet monetary tokens.

State Expenditure

How was the expenditure distributed during the period of Militant Communism? The following table is illuminating:

	<i>1918</i>	<i>1919</i>	<i>1920</i>
	<i>(In millions of Soviet rubles)</i>		
Administration	4,304	14,269	78,832
Education	2,976	17,211	114,366
Protection of Labour, Health and Social Services	1,402	25,155	155,427
Nationalized Industry	7,663	55,117	238,711
Food and Supply (goods of general consumption)	4,525	33,322	175,154
Agriculture	657	3,000	63,011
Communications, Posts and Telegraphs.....	8,404	18,584	82,932
Defence	15,695	40,842	132,847
Various	1,082	7,902	7,395
Total	46,706	215,402	1,048,875

It must again be emphasized that these figures do not fully reflect the actual position. They have to be considered merely as the raw material of Soviet finance during the period of Militant Communism. With this reservation it must be understood that they do nevertheless indicate the Soviet Government's economic policy. This is evident from the heavy expenditure on Soviet nationalized industry. Compared with this, the expenditure upon agriculture is small, and the difference reflects the Communist Party's relations with the peasants, the majority of whom it regarded more as its enemies than otherwise.

Military expenditure occupied an important portion in the budget. It held first place in the first year, second in the following year and fourth in the third year. The cessation of the Civil War naturally led to a decrease in military expenditure (1921).

It is impossible to compare early Communist expenditure with that of the preceding regime. The catastrophic fall in the value of Soviet tokens prevents any attempt to determine their equivalent in gold. The rate of this fall varied in different regions, and at different periods.

State Revenue

State revenue in the period of Militant Communism was as follows:

	1918	1919	1920
	<i>(In millions of Soviet rubles)</i>		
Taxes and Excise.....	11,834	7,165	471
Revenue from State Economic Activity.....	3,636	40,586	150,835
Revenue from External Trade.....	3,300
Expenditure refunded	85	406	2,809
Various	25	798	693

This classification does not include all Soviet revenue; one had, therefore, to make use of another classification, covering all revenue during the period of Militant Communism. This revenue—some of it shown in the estimates and some not—may be divided into the following groups:

1. Revenue associated with the expropriation of the bourgeoisie.
2. Revenue from taxation.
3. Revenue derived from State economic activity.

Expropriation of the Bourgeoisie

The Communists when expropriating the bourgeoisie, did not aim at making economic use of their possessions so much as destroying a class-enemy; they imposed enormous taxes not with the idea of obtaining revenue, but of breaking-up the regime which they intended to overthrow. First of all, therefore, they closed all private banks by decree (Dec. 14th, 1917). This measure was adopted, "in the interests of the just organization of national economy, in the interest of the total liberation of the peasants and the working class from exploitation by banks, and in order to create a real people's bank to serve the poorest classes"; this decree further declared banking a State monopoly, and stated that all existing banks are merged in a People's bank which assumes their assets and liabilities. It also stated that the "interests of small depositors will be safeguarded."

The subsequent events showed that the Communist Party was unable either to create a People's Bank or to safeguard the interests of small depositors. The People's Bank was abolished by a decree of January, 1920.

How were the credit institutions wound up? On December 14th, 1917, there were, in the R.S.F.S.R.—according to the Commissariat of Finance ¹—572 private banks. By December 1, 1918 the balances of

¹ Report to VIII Congress of Soviets, Dec. 20, 1920.

two hundred and thirty had been sent to the People's Bank. The balance-sheet of the People's Bank shows that various assets, to the amount of Rbles. 12,669,003,407, were handed over; i. e. 94% of the assets of the private banks. Along with the private banks, the mutual credit societies, municipal banks, and the Moscow People's (Cooperative) Bank were also wound up. The closure of these last-mentioned institutions was obviously opposed to the interests of small depositors. On the basis of the balance sheets submitted, the Commissariat concludes that small depositors received only about 50% of their deposits.

It is impossible to estimate the total loss involved by the closure of the private and public banks; it has been estimated that private capital invested with the various banks amounted to at least Rbles. 10,000,000,000 of which about Rbles. 2,000,000,000 were small deposits. How much of this money went to swell the Treasury, and how much was lost on the way, shall never be known.

The Government also decreed the confiscation of precious stones and metals, and ordered the opening of all safes. The Commissariat of Finance, however, was unable to secure the full contents of these, as the local Soviet agents displayed an acute interest in them. Out of the total number of deposits—amounting to 150,000–160,000—about 90% were confiscated by local authorities. What was the value of these deposits? No answer is possible. The valuation of the contents of safes was not complete when Militant Communism terminated, although a special depository was created to house the valuables.

Stocks and shares were annulled by various decrees (Annulment of State Debts, January 21, 1918; Annulment of State Bonds, October 26, 1918; Confiscation of Private Bank Shares, January 26, 1918; Annulment of Town and Zemstvo Debentures, October 9, 1919; and Registration of Shares and Bonds, April 13, 1919).

How were these liquidated? The report of the Commissariat of Finance states that they were handled by the *Principal Commission for the Liquidation of Stocks and Shares*, afterwards renamed *Special Commission*. This Commission effected the liquidation "urgently" at the end of 1919 and the beginning of 1920. The report states, however, that "in accord with instructions from the Commissariat of Finance, the Commission put aside all stocks and shares, connected with foreign firms and Governments, when issued in foreign currencies." The report is silent as to the amount.

By annulling State debts the Communists freed themselves from the payment of sinking funds and interest, which, in 1917, amounted to Rbles. 720,000,000 (gold).

All these measures combined did not provide the Government with excessive funds but they at least cleared the way for Socialist construction. An estimate of the value of the property nationalized cannot be attempted. Not only were factories and trading concerns nationalized, but houses and even portable property, such as clothing, furniture, and sewing machines, food, libraries, typewriters and precious

stones. No valuation of these things is possible. Furthermore, it must be remembered that not all the goods expropriated reached their intended destination; much remained in the hands of the Soviet agents who searched private houses.

Revenue From Taxation

The expropriation of the bourgeoisie, and the destruction of the existing economic regime, naturally removed any foundation for a stable system of taxation. The expropriation, however, was not completed at a stroke and taxation died a slow death.

The necessity for a temporary retention of taxation was formulated at the Congress of Representatives of the State Financial Departments (May, 1919) in the following terms: "Before a complete Socialization of the means of production, following the abolition of the private producer, Soviet State expenditure must be covered by taxes, which are a portion of the profits of these producers. Taxes are not only a source of revenue, they are a social weapon used against the bourgeoisie, which must be deprived of unmerited accumulated wealth."

In a time of rapidly depreciating money-values the Communists were not to be satisfied with taxes paid in money tokens; they introduced special taxes in kind.

How was taxation levied under Militant Communism?

The period between November, 1917, and the end of 1918 is described as one in which no new stable foundations were laid. Taxation, therefore, was confined to property not yet nationalized; its rate, only, being increased. As this property was quickly absorbed by the State, the Commissariat of Finance was obliged to seek new forms of taxation.

The beginning of the new era starts with the end of 1918. The following taxes were abolished: that on capital (Decree of October 13, 1918), all land taxes (Decree of October 30, 1918), the industrial tax (Decree of December 29, 1918), and rates on town property (Decree of February 19, 1919).

Indirect taxation was abolished later. The Communists professed to dislike this form of taxation. This consideration, however, did not prevent them from employing it. The Congress of Representatives of Financial Departments (May 1919) recognized, that "with the Socialization of large industrial and trading concerns, indirect taxation loses the larger part of its anti-democratic character." Although the Communists recognized that indirect taxation deepened the economic divisions between classes, they retained it because of its vast contribution to the Treasury. Owing to nationalization, however, the receipts from indirect taxation were decreasing. In connection with the new order, in which the population was to be supplied with all the necessities by the State, the Council of People's Commissars abolished all existing forms of excise and established special imposts on the prices of all products. Brief experience, however, made it clear that, under the regime of nationalized industry, these imposts would yield practically nothing to the

Treasury, and would only influence the fixed prices unfavourably. Accordingly, these imposts were abolished (January 17, 1920) by decree.

Income Tax

When reorganizing the income-tax in 1918, the Soviet Government endeavoured to tax the well-to-do classes to such an extent, as to leave them no more than was requisite for their personal needs. Later, a decree of January 21, 1919, sought to include as many peasants as possible in this category. A list of taxpayers, showing the amount of their incomes, was published, and special village income-tax commissions set up. In other words, the Communists, having exterminated the rich taxpayers, endeavoured to cover their losses by taxing the poorer classes.

The principles of the income-tax show that the Communists not only desired to tax larger incomes but to confiscate them. For this purpose, two "revolutionary" taxes were introduced: a tax in kind, on those agriculturists who had surplus (October 30, 1919), and an "extraordinary" tax (March 2, 1918).¹ These taxes were intended to provide funds for State defence "by the exaction from parasitic and counter-revolutionary elements of wealth accumulated during the period of the Imperialistic War and the beginning of the Revolution." These taxes did not exhaust all ingenuity in the invention of new imposts. Special local taxation flourished, and during the early period of their power the Communists used this both as an emergency source of revenue, and as an effective social weapon.

What did these ordinary and extraordinary taxes yield?

The table of Soviet revenue, quoted earlier, gives the aggregate yield of taxes. In 1918 the estimated sum was Rbles 11,834,000,000 or 17% of the total Budget; while in 1920 the revenue from taxation was Rbles 471,000,000, and the percentage fell to 0.2%!

These figures (from "The Report of the Commissariat of Finance to the VIII Congress of Soviets" 1920) only show the estimated receipts. But even these expectations were not realized. For instance, the extraordinary tax—which was estimated to yield Rbles 10,000,000,000—yielded only Rbles 1,600,000,000 by December 1920.

As receipts from monetary taxation were insignificant, the question of its abolition was raised. At the beginning of 1921 the proposal to abandon such taxes was laid before the Central Executive Committee but was not adopted, as the Soviet Government was then on the point of introducing the NEP; though actually, from the end of 1920 to the middle of 1921 no monetary taxation was levied. In view of the rapid depreciation of the ruble, it would have been useless.

Paper Issues

According to Soviet official information, paper-money was issued as follows ²:

¹ A tax in kind, supplementary to the food monopoly.

² "Social Revolution and Finance," pp. 8, 9 and 15.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Amount of money in circulation (in billions of rubles)</i>	<i>Value in gold. Index of the Commiss. of Labour (in millions of rubles)</i>
On January 1, 1917	9.2
On January 1, 1918	27.3	525
On January 1, 1919	61.3	386
On January 1, 1920	225.0	186
On January 1, 1921	1,168.6	69

The period of Militant Communism—the bridge from a transitory to a real Socialist regime—had, in theory, to witness the complete abolition of money; actually, however, it was an “extraordinary money period,” for never, in the history of Russia, was the issue of paper-money so abused. By thus imposing a huge new taxation (as in effect, paper-money was) the Communists dealt, above all, an unjustifiable blow at the working class.

Taxation In Kind

Soviet revenue in money fell rapidly, so another source of funds was established. This was a levy in kind, imposed upon the agricultural population. This measure pursued two aims: the providing of the Government with food for the towns and the industrial population; and to curb the “petty bourgeois” peasantry. The levy in kind (food monopoly) was spread on all surpluses of agricultural production: grain, vegetables, meat, poultry, fodder, etc. The amount of the tax was very vaguely stated and in practice was reduced to confiscation of all produce except the minimum necessary for personal needs; this minimum varied considerably. In theory the Communists promised to give the peasants manufactured goods in exchange for the grain and other produce forcibly taken from them—to organize, in effect, a kind of Socialist barter between agriculture and industry. Actually, this system proved unworkable, because industrial production diminished with catastrophic speed. The peasants were forced to deliver their surplus, but little, if anything at all,—as the Communists openly acknowledge—was given in exchange.

The following table shows how much agricultural produce (cereals only) was secured by compulsion in R.S.F.S.R.—excluding Ukraine, Turkestan, Azerbaijan and the Crimea.

1917-18	800,000 tons
1918-19	1,800,000 tons
1919-20	3,500,000 tons
1920-21	4,700,000 tons

In addition to cereals the Soviet Government secured potatoes, various vegetables, vegetable oil, hay, straw, fruit, mushrooms, honey, meat,

skins, wool, furs, flax and hemp, cotton, eggs, fish, horns and horse-hair; and also expropriated sacks and packing-cases. This policy led to a rapid decay of agriculture.

Revenue From State Economic Activities

As designed, this source of revenue was to assume exceptional importance after the destruction of the Capitalist regime. The Communists successfully accomplished this preliminary. But they not only failed to draw revenue from Socialistically organized production, but found the effort to develop this production the source of an ever-increasing deficit.

In the period of Militant Communism, nationalized industry and the railways were the chief branches of Soviet economic activity. The following table shows the profits and losses of nationalized industry.

<i>Years</i>	<i>Receipts</i>	<i>Expenditure</i>	<i>Balance</i>
	<i>(In millions of Soviet rubles)</i>		
1918	12,000	7,663	4,437
1919	14,674	55,117	—40,441
1920	52,631	238,711	—186,080

This table, however, does not imply that nationalized industry was not a source of revenue. The profit from industry merely took a peculiar form. The Soviet Government existed by absorbing industrial capital (machinery, stocks of raw material, etc.). Referring to the use of nationalized industry M. Sokolnikov, then Commissar of Finance, said . . . "the system of using industry for the purposes of the Soviet State led in practice to the eating-up of the State's basic and reserve capital by industry; and the State, having almost nothing in its Treasury, lived on industrial capital." (Sokolnikov's report to the Central Executive Committee 1923. Financial News, No. 28, 1923).

Railways and river shipping, which constituted the other branch of Soviet economic activity, presented the following picture:

<i>Years</i>	<i>Receipts</i>	<i>Expenditure</i>	<i>Balance</i>
	<i>(In millions of Soviet rubles)</i>		
1918	1,627	7,489	—5,862
1919	10,164	33,322	—23,158
1920	71,062	175,154	—104,092

It is thus clear that direct Communist economic activity, in budget form, showed enormous deficits.

Local Budgets

In the early years, the local budgets swelled enormously—because they not only included items which appeared in Zemstvo estimates, but all house property and small industrial undertakings, even baths, and hairdressing establishments. In addition, some of the former State expenditure was passed on to the local budgets.

In 1918, a decree relating to local budgets was promulgated. In theory, independent local budgets existed until 1922; but in practice these were inseparable from the State budgets. The local authorities were unable to collect rates, because there was no private property left, while the nationalized houses yielded nothing because they were mostly rent-free. Local institutions existed upon subsidies received from the State, *i. e.* issues of paper-money.

The following conclusions must be reached after a study of Soviet finance during the period of Militant Communism.

The economic policy of the Government led to the complete abolition of industrial, trading, banking and cooperative activity. The Soviet Government took under its control the greater part of economic life; but after seizing all the branches of national economy the Communists merely wasted the accumulated capital in meeting current expenditure. This dissipation of capital did not long suffice, and the Communists were compelled to exploit agriculture—still largely in the hands of private individuals. In addition, the Government availed itself of a rough-and-ready form of taxation in the shape of the paper-money issue. Socialism was realized at the expense of revenue derived from private enterprise; it entirely ignored the interests of national economy.

IV

THE NEP

Reasons for the Change

THE attempt to reconstruct the economic life of the country on a Socialist basis, in short order, proved a complete failure. The Communists put the blame for that failure on the Civil War and the blockade. These, of course, hindered economic development; but they were not the principal cause of impoverishment. In 1921, Lenin himself declared: "We have made a mistake in attempting to put Communist production and distribution into immediate operation."¹ It is quite clear, then, that the Soviet economic measures adopted under the NEP were more or less a reversal of its earlier policy. Their purpose was to create such conditions as would restore the private economic activity of the population, especially the peasantry.

The report of the Commissariat of Finance for 1923 declares that "It was necessary to create stimuli to induce the peasants to enlarge the sowing area, and industry to increase its production. These were the principal reasons for the introduction of the New Economic Policy."

It was not agriculture alone that was emancipated; private individuals received certain (limited) rights to engage in trade and industry; and, in addition, even the nationalized trade and industry, previ-

¹ "Izvestia," April 19, 1921.

ously tied hand and foot, was given permission to buy and sell in the private market.

State Budget During the Nep

M. Brukhanov, Commissar of Finance, in explaining the budget to the Central Executive Committee (March, 1925) said: "In effect there was no State budget during the Militant period. Such simply could not exist. We lived upon so-called 'extraordinary revenue,' which was used in meeting 'extraordinary expenditure.' Our extraordinary revenue was derived from the issue of paper-money, the wealth that fell into our hands, and the tax in kind. Our extraordinary expenditure arose primarily through the needs of the Red Army; but even when the Civil War ended we could not at once solve the budget problem. In order to replace 'extraordinary' by 'ordinary' budgets, we had first of all to create a definite basis of revenue. We had to invent a taxation system. We had to learn how to develop revenue systematically."¹

Accordingly under the influence of the NEP, especially in its early period, the Communists took finance more seriously and spent revenue more judiciously. The Soviet Press was full of counsels of moderation. It urged that the budgets should be kept within the limits of the national income. For example, *Economic Life* declared (No. 153, 1927): "While in certain years the Budget may be enlarged to a point in excess of national income, a permanent tendency in this direction may undermine the taxable capacity of the population, and hinder the development of production."

This, however, did not last long. It must be borne in mind that the NEP was a retreat; that it was intended to permit the accumulation of wealth for the purpose of using it at the opportune moment for further Communist plans. In the last years of the NEP, accordingly, the Communists declared that Soviet budgets differed greatly from those of Capitalist countries. They affirmed that theirs were budgets making for the redistribution of national wealth, and for economic reconstruction. These generalizations respecting Soviet budgets under the NEP must be borne in mind when, later, examining the finances of the Five Years Plan.

The totals of the budgets (revenue) from 1922-23 to 1927-28 were:

<i>Year</i>	<i>In millions of rubles</i>	<i>% of increase as comp. with prev. year</i>
1922-23	14,610
1923-24	22,981	57.4
1924-25	29,352	27.4
1925-26	39,020	24.8
1926-27	51,250	31.3
1927-28	63,903	24.8

¹ *Economic Life*. March 10, 1925.

It must be remembered that revenue estimates and realities did not coincide. From January 1, 1924 until 1928, the index of labour was increased by 33%, while the index of free prices rose by 44%—indicating that the purchasing power of the Chervonetz had fallen in the interim, and that the 1923-4 ruble differed in value from that of 1927-8.¹

It is clear, nevertheless, that the Soviet revenue increased rapidly. According to Prof. Bogolepov's estimate, the revenue derived from taxation increased with greater rapidity than the total national income. The same Soviet specialist points out that "our budget must be strained because our national economy is surrounded by an inimical external world. We must rely exclusively upon our domestic resources, and look only to them for the sources of budgetary development."² The Communists did not attempt to conceal the extraordinary growth of the budget, and the strain which it imposed on the U.S.S.R.; but they always found justification in declaring that the revenue was used for the creation of a new social system. It is for this that the population over-paid huge sums for Soviet goods, and was itself underpaid for produce sold to the Government. This primarily concerned the peasants who were subjected to the full force of the "price-press."

State Expenditure

The following table shows State expenditure under the NEP.³

<i>(In millions of rubles)</i>				
	1922-23	1923-24	1924-25	1925-26
Supreme Administration	149	402	715	343
General Administration	537	910	886	1,142
Defence	2,309	4,023	4,438	6,024
Cultural Needs	800	1,208	1,713	2,313
Finance	1,449	1,869	1,977	2,456
Trade and Industry.....	2,208	8,130	10,280	14,697
Financing national economy.....	2,400	2,661	3,989	5,385
Treasury operations	216	1,137	1,674	1,828
Subsidies to local institutions.....	779	1,188	2,730	3,347
Reserve Fund	248	200	66	1,644
Increase of State Bank capital.....	365
Unemployment	89	60
Various	236	1,148	146	1,178
Total	11,331	22,876	29,068	40,417

Unfortunately, detailed figures for the budgets of the last NEP years were not published. Roughly, expenditure in 1926-27 was distributed as follows:

¹ "Finance and National Economy," No. 38, 1928.

² "Economic Survey," Oct. 1927.

³ "Finance and National Economy," No. 13, 1926, Moscow.

	<i>Amount in millions of rubles</i>
Union Commissariats	712.7
Defence	702.8
Commiss. of Trade and Industry.....	1,794.5
State loans	97.1
State funds	152.9
Financing of national economy.....	830.4
Various	470.2
Total	4,760.6

The above figures show that the heaviest expenditure was incurred in the financing of national economy, administration and defense.

State Revenue

The adoption of the NEP did not mean the abandonment of the system of nationalized land and industry and the State retained complete control of the majority of the houses in the towns; this limited the field of taxation, and led to the necessity of adopting a system of revenue-collection suited to the economic conditions of the country. It was impossible to create a perfect taxation-system in an impoverished country. The Communists were compelled, therefore, to rely chiefly upon those indirect taxes which they habitually described as "an odious bourgeois institution." They were thus compelled to restore a financial system which, on the surface, did not differ appreciably from that of the despised bourgeoisie.

The change of system primarily affected the peasants—who, during the previous years, had paid taxes only in kind. They were now gradually called upon to pay in money. During the early days of the NEP, taxes in money existed side by side with those in kind.

The budget estimates in the NEP era show revenue received in monetary form only: the revenue from taxes in kind did not appear, although it was substantial. The bulk of this revenue consisted of agricultural produce.

Categories of Revenue

NEP revenue may be divided into the following groups:

Taxes.

Revenue from nationalized industry.

Revenue from paper issues and loans.

Revenue from State economic activities.

It must be again emphasized that in proclaiming the principles of the NEP, the Communists did not affect to regard them as permanent. M. Bukharin, in his article, "The New Direction of Economic Policy," wrote: "Under any conditions, the development of heavy industry is that most suitable for Communist reconstruction. It is the basis of technical development; it is the basis of economic relations in Communist

society. It is the prop and stimulus of the Communist Revolution of the industrial proletariat." He adds to this that new material resources must be found to strengthen and develop industry; and such must be "drawn from the outside." What did he mean by "outside" sources? "These sources are the following," he said, "agriculture, light industry, leases, concessions and external trade." This shows that in granting economic freedom to private persons, and especially to the peasants, the Communists desired to accumulate capital wherewith to execute their plans. In his opinion the NEP could be abandoned as soon as industry was sufficiently strengthened by private initiative. "When heavy Socialized industry is built up by the additional supplies of goods received from the people, the helm may be put hard over."

Thus, the policy in view was eventually to deprive the country of even the limited economic freedom conferred on it by the NEP, and the application of that policy led inevitably to the adoption of the Five Years Plan.

Direct Taxation

The Communists inaugurated the NEP by restoring direct taxation. The chronology of this move is as follows:

<i>Taxes</i>	<i>Time of introduction</i>
In kind (afterwards the "sole agricultural tax").....	March 21, 1921
General tax on citizens.....	February 11, 1922
Industrial tax	July 26, 1921
Cartage and labour tax.....	1922
Income tax	November 16, 1922
Inheritance tax	November 11, 1922
Rent tax	November 12, 1923
Super tax	July 18, 1926

The "tax in kind" replaced that levied, under the food monopoly system, in the days of Militant Communism. The advantage of this tax was, that it put a limit upon the amount of produce compulsorily handed over. Under the monopoly system, the peasants were obliged to surrender all their produce, with the exception of the small amounts deemed essential for their existence. The food monopoly was abolished in 1921, when the currency was still in a state of complete chaos; in consequence, the Communists still partly maintained taxation in kind.

The collection of the "tax in kind" was very expensive. The cost of collection was normally about a third of the yield; while in some cases it even exceeded the value of the total produce collected. In 1923-24, therefore, taxpayers in certain regions were permitted to pay either in cash or kind. In the following year, the tax was changed to the "sole agricultural tax," payable in cash.

This very gradually assumed the form of a progressive tax on the peasantry. The Communists increased its amount yearly. Before 1926-

27 only cereals and cattle were taxed, but afterwards technical crops were taxed also. About 25% of poor-quality peasant land was freed from taxation: but, on the other hand, the taxation of the well-to-do peasants amounted to 25% of their income. Such treatment naturally hindered production—but it was dictated by Communist class-policy: which, after 1925, played an increasingly important role in the Soviet taxation system.

During the early years of the NEP the "sole tax" occupied the first place. The following table indicates its yield in relation to all other direct taxation.

<i>Year</i>	<i>"Sole tax"</i>	<i>General yield from direct taxation (In thousands of rubles)</i>
1922-23	176,468	281,323
1923-24	230,975	410,128
1924-25	332,004	601,211
1925-26	251,800	641,200
1926-27	305,500	842,500
1927-28	345,000	937,000 ¹

In the latter years of the NEP agriculture, in addition to paying money taxes, was made the object of very heavy new taxes in kind—taxes which found no place in the budget estimates.

It was only in 1927-1928 that the industrial tax began to play a leading part in direct taxation. A registration tax was first introduced; followed by a tax on turnover, based on the operations of the previous years. The Communists were unable to tax industrial profits—so they described their industrial tax as a "general excise."² The amount raised by the industrial tax increased from Rbles 59,000,000 in 1922-23 to Rbles 351,000,000 in 1927-28.

In 1922 two "general" taxes on citizens were introduced. The first was a poll-tax; the second was not absolutely general, as certain categories of employees were excluded. The sum raised was insignificant, amounting only to a few million rubles.

The cartage and labour taxes were, at first, essentially taxes in kind; but their collection caused much dissatisfaction. In 1922 only 29% of the labour tax's estimated yield was obtained, and 43% of that of the cartage tax. In 1926 these taxes became payable in cash. According to the State Plan Committee they yielded Rbles 28,000,000 in 1922-23. They were later merged in the "sole agricultural tax."

Income-tax was collected from the urban population which was exempt from the agricultural tax. It was levied on incomes derived from trade and industry, from credit operations, from town property, from capital, from the liberal professions, and from salaries and wages. It

¹ "Finance and National Economy" No. 1, 1926; Nos. 2 and 42, 1927.

² "Financial News," No. 25, 1925.

was a progressive tax, the highest rate being 45% of the income. A portion of this tax was styled a property-tax, and was levied upon valuables which did not show profit, such as precious stones and metals, etc. The income-tax was not very important at first, yielding only Rbles 12,000,000 in 1922-23. It increased, however, to Rbles 233,000,000 in 1927-28; and it occupied third place among the direct taxes. The Communists regarded it not only as revenue but also as a measure for "the regulation of the accumulation of private capital." Conjointly with the super-tax, it was designed to extract from private individuals anything up to 60% of their income.

The rent-tax was an extraordinary invention, considering the economic conditions of the U.S.S.R. It was levied upon urban lands leased to private persons. In 1925-26 it brought in Rbles 8,000,000 only. It was merged with the local taxes in the following year.

The inheritance tax was an anomaly. According to Soviet civil law, only Rbles 10,000 could be inherited; the surpluses of estates went to the State. Only direct descendants of deceased persons could inherit. The profit from this tax was quite nominal, and was included in the budget under the item "various."

The following table shows the part played by direct taxes in Soviet revenue under the NEP:

<i>Years</i>	<i>Millions of rubles</i>	<i>% of total revenue</i>
1922-23	281.3	19.2
1923-24	410.1	17.8
1924-25	601.2	20.5
1925-26	583.4	14.5
1926-27	773.3	24.1
1927-28	937.0	15.6

Indirect Taxation

The Communists introduced more radical indirect taxes than the Imperial Government. The following goods were subjected to the excise duties:

1. Wine, beer and mineral waters:
2. Tobacco, cigarette paper and holders:
3. Sugar, matches and tea:
4. Benzine and kerosene:
5. Salt (abolished in 1926):
6. Rectified and natural alcohol:
7. Coffee:
8. Yeast:
9. Candles:
10. Saccharine:
11. Goloshes:
12. Textiles:
13. Customs duties on all foreign goods.

The following table shows the results of indirect taxation:

<i>Years</i>	<i>Millions of rubles</i>	<i>% of total revenue</i>
1922-23	170.2	11.7
1923-24	410.2	17.8
1924-25	609.7	20.8
1925-26	1,127.2	27.9
1926-27	1,387.0	25.7
1927-28	1,475.0	22.8

The revenue from indirect taxation increased very rapidly. It is interesting to note that the growth of the yield from the spirit-excise was more rapid than any other. The Communists did not at once restore the Spirit Monopoly but they made a gradual approach to this famous old fiscal measure. In 1923-24 vodka yielded Rbles 62,000,000 rising to Rbles 860,000,000 in 1928-29.

Revenue From Nationalized Industry

Almost insuperable difficulties attend the definition of revenue from the nationalized industry during the NEP. Its amount may technically be arrived by balancing receipts and expenditure—as is done in budget estimates. This method would, however, not give a true picture. Soviet industry was financed not only from the State budget but also from other sources, chiefly banks. According to calculations made at the time of the tenth anniversary of the Communist Revolution (Nov. 1927) this additional expenditure on industry was figured at Rbles 3,900,000,000. During the same period (1922-1927) revenue from industry was figured at Rbles 1,668,000,000, leaving an adverse balance of over Rbles 2,000,000,000.

It may be suggested that obtaining money from the State and from the banks are quite distinct operations; the former is a subsidy, whereas the latter is credit which must be returned. This, however, is not the case with Soviet industry. The credit operations of the newly-founded State-controlled banks were merely Treasury transactions. The larger part of the credits granted to industry became, in effect, irredeemable State subsidies. The Soviet Press of the period recognized this fact; and declared that, if the advances had been called in, the majority of Soviet industrial undertakings would have had to be put up for auction. This was recognized even by the Communist Party. At the XIV Party Congress, held in December, 1925, it was declared that the economic difficulties, and the excess of paper-money issued, were due to the abuse of such issues for financing industry. The issue of new paper-money for this purpose became necessary¹ because the bank credits had become irredeemable subsidies. It is impossible, therefore, to ascertain how much bank-capital Soviet industry swallowed during the NEP period. Short-term loans became long-term; and long-term loans developed into bad debts. Sometimes, in fact, the loans were simply written off.

¹ "Finance and National Economy" No. 1, 1926.

Obviously, with such financial methods in application it is impossible to estimate the profits resulting from Soviet industry. Also, it may be asked, what is to be understood by profits? How are they to be calculated? From time to time Soviet economists assessed the annual profits from industry. That for 1925-26 was given as 8.2%.¹ The methods employed in assessing this, however, were far from perfect; and the huge loans from banks were not taken into consideration.

The nature of this profit must also be borne in mind. Soviet industry was a monopoly, and could thus fix its own prices—which were considerably higher than those of pre-Revolutionary times. On the other hand, although industry was a State monopoly, in the days of the NEP it was not always profitable. Any profit derived from industry, moreover, was regarded by many Soviet economists as forming part of the revenue derived from taxation; this, perhaps is the only proper way to regard it.

Thus to the number of indirect taxes already mentioned should be added the indirect revenue derived from the fixed prices for State-produced goods.

Revenue From Paper-Money and Loans

Was paper-money a source of revenue during the NEP? Soviet official declarations differ greatly on this subject. According to some, the issue of paper-money was only used to cover State expenditure in 1922-23 and 1923-24, and not later. Such, however, is far from being the fact.

In 1923, when the new Chervonetz-rubles were first issued, there were two kinds of money in existence; the new stable money, and the old depreciated Soviet rubles. The former were chiefly used for State purposes—or as the Communists say, for “the Socialist sector of economic life”; the latter circulated principally amongst the peasants. At the end of 1923 the Government, after first making an excessive issue of Chervonetz-rubles, next increased the issue of the old depreciated money in order to save the Chervonetz.² The peasants, requiring money to meet taxation, had to accept these rapidly depreciating tokens for their produce. The following table shows the depreciation of the Soviet token in the NEP period before its final abolition.³

	<i>Rubles</i>
On January 1, 1921.....	26,000
January 1, 1922.....	280,000
May 1, 1923.....	5,800,000
January 3, 1924.....	5,500,000,000
March 1, 1924.....	62,000,000,000

¹ “Finance and National Economy” No. 38, 1927.

² See “Money.”

³ “Economic Life” May 31, 1923.

Thus in spite of currency reforms, and at a time when the Chervonetz was already in circulation, the Soviet Government printed a huge quantity of the old, depreciated tokens. In February, 1924—i. e. on the eve of the new monetary reform which abolished these tokens—the amount issued was 150% greater than all other money then in circulation. From this it followed that the taxation involved in paper-money issues was actually very heavy. It is exceedingly difficult to estimate its amount but some U.S.S.R. economists have essayed the task. They conclude that in 1923–24 the Treasury received the equivalent of 100,000,000 gold rubles in taxation as a result of the excessive paper-money issue.¹

The Government not only abused the issue of the old depreciated money but also that of the new Chervonetz. The Communists did not deny this. At the XIV Party Congress (1926) Rykov² openly mentioned “the excessive growth of the Chervonetz issue” and “the excessive use of money issue for the collection of agricultural products and the financing of industry.” M. Yourovsky, at one time on the Board of the State Bank, demanded that “the paper issue be only used to facilitate current transactions.” These declarations had no effect: the issue of paper continued to be a source of revenue. This led to a fall in the value of the Chervonetz and Treasury notes, as indicated in the following table³:

<i>Years</i>	<i>Bank and Treasury notes in circulation</i>	<i>Purchasing power</i>
	<i>Rubles</i>	
1922–23	156,900,000	91.8%
1927–28	1,674,600,000	58.8%

What place did loans occupy in Soviet finance during the NEP period? The following figures show the condition of the State debt at that time: From 1922 to April 1, 1929 loans amounting to Rbles 3,766,500,000 were raised. Repayments aggregated Rbles 1,724,000,000. The balance on April 1, 1929 was Rbles 2,042,500,000. These were internal debts. Soviet official publications do not mention external debts, since no foreign loans were raised during the NEP period. Financial transactions abroad were limited to trade-credits.

State indebtedness grew rapidly—but Soviet loans were not as other loans. In the late NEP period they gradually lost their usual meaning; and, subscription to them being compulsory, became a kind of taxation. Compulsion took the form of collective subscriptions voted by the workers in different Soviet institutions. Open voting made success inevitable, as, under conditions prevailing in the U.S.S.R., it was not

¹ “Economic Life” May 9, 1924.

² Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R.

³ “Finance and National Economy” No. 42, 1928.

"healthy" for anyone to refuse. The part played by collective subscription was very great. That to the Second Loan for Industrialization (1928), for example, yielded 19.3% of the total.

Revenue From State Collection of Agricultural Produce

Soviet economists never refer to this kind of revenue. During the NEP the State collection of agricultural products was officially only a *purchase*, from the peasants, of cereals, cattle, dairy produce, flax, cotton, etc. necessary for the State. The peasants were paid; at least there was an appearance of purchase—but, in effect, the position was quite different.

The Government did not pay "free market" prices but fixed its own; which did not correspond with the general economic conditions. It is true that, at the beginning of the NEP, the Government endeavoured to purchase agricultural products in the private market. But this policy was quickly changed. There was a shortage of grain and other produce, and prices rose rapidly. The Government could not afford these enhanced prices; so a system of fixed prices was inaugurated, considerably lower than those of the free market; and, in order that the necessary amounts of produce should be obtained, the peasants were compelled to hand over their goods. The collection of produce became a State exaction at prices much below the real value. It is impossible to estimate the amount of this underpayment. The "free prices" fluctuated in different years and at different places. The purchasing power of the ruble, also, was unstable. Therefore, only a general outline of this type of revenue can be given.

The Soviet Government collected ¹:

<i>Years</i>	<i>Cereals only (millions of tons)</i>
1923-24	4.1
1924-25	4.3
1925-26	8.1
1926-27	11.5
1927-28	10.7

Thus, in five years, 38,700,000 tons of cereals were taken from the peasants. The following table indicates that the collections of other produce were also considerable:

	<i>1926-27</i>	<i>1927-28</i>
Veg. oil (tons).....	346,100	238,500
Flax (tons)	125,500	121,600
Oil (tons)	75,100	74,800
<i>Skins:</i>		
Large	6,439,100	9,760,200
Small	921,900	19,619,600

¹ "Finance and National Economy" No. 46, 1929.

The following Soviet figures show the gap between fixed and free prices for wheat per pood (36 lbs.) ¹:

	<i>Fixed Dec. 1927</i>	<i>Free Oct. 1928</i>
The Black Soil Belt.....	2.30	4.42
Urals	2.53	4.41
North Caucasus	2.06	6.30
Ukraine	1.22	8.80

If the fixed prices for wheat are expressed in gold, the Soviet Government in 1928 did not pay more than Rbles 0.45-0.47, while the pre-War price of wheat fluctuated between Rbles 1 and Rbles 1.35.

The Government thus defrauded the peasants of huge sums. The exaction yielded considerably more to the Treasury than the "sole agricultural tax." For the peasants it was the heaviest, and most ruinous, form of taxation possible. At the end of the NEP period, these collections hardly differed from those carried out under the food monopoly during the period of Militant Communism.

Local Budgets

Local budgets underwent great changes during the NEP period.

The following table shows local revenue ²:

	<i>1926-27</i>	<i>1927-28 (In millions of rubles)</i>	<i>increase</i>
Provinces etc.	608.0	618.4	1.7%
Towns	789.1	964.6	22.1%
Villages etc.	441.1	540.4	30.2%
Total	1,812.0	2,123.5	17.1%

The following table shows the sources of local revenue:

	<i>Towns</i>				<i>Villages, etc.</i>	
	<i>1926-27</i>	<i>1927-28</i>	<i>1925-27</i>	<i>1927-28</i>	<i>1926-27</i>	<i>1927-28</i>
	<i>(In %)</i>					
Local Revenue
Taxation	30.5	27.2	35.2	26.8	15.8	18.6
Non-tax revenue.....	14.5	14.6	46.9	35.2	12.1	9.9
Other receipts	5.1	5.0	3.8	5.0	2.3	3.9
State subsidies	40.5	41.1	4.5	5.9	63.9	60.2
Various	9.4	12.1	9.6	15.1	6.3	7.4

It must be borne in mind that under the NEP the field of economic activity of the local Soviet authorities was enlarged. Many industrial undertakings were placed under their control. Upwards of 30% in fact,

¹ "Economic Life" No. 24, 1929.

² "Finance and National Economy" No. 48, 1928. Moscow.

of the total production of Soviet industry was derived from locally-controlled factories. This fact prevents a comparison between Soviet local finance and that of the *Zemstvos* and municipalities of pre-Revolutionary days.

The following are the conclusions that must be reached.

In the NEP period, as in the preceding, the Soviet Government did not create new sources of revenue. It availed itself, as previously, of the resources in money and goods of private persons; or as it was described, of the "private sector of the national economy." The extraction of wealth from the population gradually became more intensive, a fact adversely affecting the restoration of the country's economic life.

The NEP was planned to give a breathing space and to permit the accumulation of private wealth which would later be "extracted" by the State for its main purpose—the creation of a heavy nationalized industry.

V

THE FIVE YEARS PLAN

The Origin of the Five Years Plan

WHAT made the Communist Party abandon the NEP, which according to Lenin, was to hold the field for a long time?

M. Bukharin has stated that the chief object of the NEP was to create additional economic values for the use of the State by the temporary granting of relative freedom of private enterprise. How were these profits to be used? They might be used in a manner which offered no hindrance to the development of private economic activity. That would mean the recognition of private initiative. On the other hand, the State might make use of the accumulated reserves for purposes in which private activity could find no place.

The Soviet Government felt no inclination to adopt the former course. Despite the NEP, the Party did not abandon its intention of begetting a Communist Society. It could not look with equanimity upon a well-to-do peasant, a private trader, a private industrial undertaking, or a private credit-institution. If accorded complete freedom, the private sector would compete successfully with the Socialist sector; and the latter would be faced with greater opposition from the people, who were already convinced that private traders sold goods at lower rates, and that private employers paid higher wages.

The attack made against the NEP by the left wing of the Party¹ at the XIV Party Congress (1926) was the first sign of a coming change; but the peasants were still very poor, so the majority decided for a continuation of the NEP. The activity of the Opposition at the XV

¹ By Trotsky and his followers.

Congress, held in 1927, was considered more dangerous. M. Molotov, a majority leader, showed by statistics that, year by year, the kulak class grew in numbers (it was 6.9% of the peasant population in 1924-25, 7.6% in 1925-26, and 7.9% in 1926-27). A resolution carried at this Congress called for the reconstruction of peasant farming upon a Socialist basis.

There were other signs that Socialism was in danger. The Party realized that private traders competed successfully with Government agents in the collection of agricultural produce, and that the peasants preferred to deal with these rather than with Soviet officials.

It was considered that the population had accumulated capital and was using it not to forward the interests of Socialization but for the creation of a new bourgeoisie; and once this was firmly rooted the whole regime would collapse. Some way out had to be found; and it took the shape of a complete abrogation of all economic freedom, and the subjugation of all national activities to the requirements of the Five Years Plan. Such subjugation inevitably led to the imposition of severe discipline upon the population, and to the complete removal of all direct personal interest in economic activities.

If this be the economic and social basis of the Five Years Plan, it is clear what its financial policy must be. It entirely ignores the interests of the individual and even of the population as a whole. The direct purpose of the Soviet State is to exact as much as possible from the people. This exaction is a sort of redistribution of national resources which have to be given a Socialist bias. There cannot possibly, in such circumstances, be an independent sector in national economy. Such are the main features of financial policy under the Five Years Plan.

The Financial Plan

Since the Five Years Plan was put into operation, its first conception has radically changed. At first, by "financial plan" the State budget was understood; but when the Plan was finally adopted it became necessary to enlarge the budget to cover every item of national economy, including individual consumption. Thus, instead of State and local budgets, a "single financial plan" was drawn up—a plan which the Communists steadily endeavoured to improve; the budget forms only part of this plan.

The Government wished to bring all economic transactions within the framework of the Plan—since only in such case would it be possible to utilize the material resources of the country to their highest extent. The financial plan, for example, aims at controlling all small savings deposited in banks, and compelling their owners to contribute such to State loans. It includes even the control of the capital of Soviet cooperative societies, workers' insurance, and so on.

What is the nature of the expenditure for which the Government had to find revenue?

Expenditure under the Five Years Plan may be divided into the following groups:

- A. State economic activity.
- B. Social services and education.
- C. Administration and defense.

The total expenditure for the whole period of the Plan, according to the last enlarged version, is to amount to Rbles 86,000,000,000. The following table shows the expenditure under different heads:

	<i>In billion rubles</i>	<i>% of total sum</i>
Group A.	54.3	63.5
Group B.	24.4	24.9
Group C.	10.0	11.6
	<hr/> 86	<hr/> 100 ¹

The greater part of the expenditure is associated with State economic activity. It could not be otherwise, for the aim of the Plan is "by methods of the energetic industrialization of the U.S.S.R. and the gradual strengthening of Socialist elements, to attain and then surpass, in our time, the level of the most advanced Capitalist countries—in order to secure the victory of the Socialist system in its historical struggle against the Capitalist system."¹ The realization of this plan is, of course, impossible without great capital expenditure.

The use of the greater part of the revenue for economic construction transforms the bulk of the expenditure under the Five Years Plan into extraordinary expenditure—which, in pre-Revolutionary days, was covered to a great proportion by extraordinary revenue—loans. To cover it from ordinary revenue meant the imposition of unbearable burdens on the population and all governments would have been appalled at the prospect.

But what of the revenue from the Socialist sector in which over Rbles. 20,000,000,000 had been invested during the NEP?

Extraordinary expenditure could certainly not be met from revenue derived from this sector; it could, perhaps yield ordinary revenue but not extraordinary. The various metallurgical works might, for instance, show very high profits; but they would certainly not suffice to cover the cost of duplicating these works. Certain parts of the Socialist sector might make profits in the exchange of goods with other parts; but taking the sector as a whole its profits and losses must ultimately balance. It would, therefore, be quite useless to expect assistance from this quarter, and the Communists decided to look to "outside" resources to cover the expense of their scheme of industrialization.

As this "outside" capital could not be procured in sufficient amounts by internal or external loans, there remained only one way open—to

¹ "The Five Years Plan for the Economic Construction of the U.S.S.R."

lay the burden of the Five Years Plan on the population by limiting its consumption to the extreme and even beyond the extreme of human endurance and by extracting the utmost out of it in the shape of taxation of every kind. More than that, in addition to pitiless fiscal measures, the population was to be subjected to a labour discipline which reduced it to a state of serfdom. Its interests had to be disregarded until such a time when society would be reconstructed on new Communistic lines.

In analyzing the financial estimates of the Five Years Plan all this must be borne in mind.

Expenditure Under the Five Years Plan

The following table shows the distribution of expenditure, estimated for the duration of the Five Years Plan:

	<i>In billions of rubles</i>	<i>Percentage of increase</i>
<i>A. State Econ. Activity.....</i>	54.6	274.5
Industry	17.78	234.0
Agriculture	6.79	268.3
Irrigation	0.45	351.4
Forestry	0.58	275.0
Electrification	2.90	303.3
Transport	9.47	324.0
Posts and Telegraphs.....	0.31	180.6
Trade and Cooperatives.....	7.63	310.5
Local budgets	2.44	330.5
Housing	4.02	297.5
Short term credit	0.70
Various	1.46	141.0
<i>B. Social Services</i>	21.39	245.2
Education	10.38	291.1
Health	4.71	201.4
Soc. Insurance	6.30	215.7
<i>C. Administration and Defence.....</i>	9.98	140.6
	86.00	273.8

This table does not present an accurate picture of expenditure. It must be borne in mind that the Soviet Government could always divert revenue, at any time, from one head of expenditure to another. This relates in particular to military expenditure. The Government asserts that expenditure under this head is modest. M. Grinko, the Commissar of Finance, in his report for 1931 declared that Great Britain, France, Italy and Poland spend the greater portion of their revenues upon armaments and the payments of War debts. "As to our financial plan for 1931," M. Grinko said, "military expenditure amounts to only 6.1% and debt repayment to 1.9%; and this at a moment fraught with danger of military intervention by Capitalist States! We consider that the

growth of our industry, and the general development of our national economy, *is the best method of defence.*"¹

Do the Commissar's declarations correspond with reality? Actually, military and naval expenditure occupies an important place in the budget but the Communists prefer to suppress most of the expenditure of this kind in the published financial plan. Under the head of "Administration of Defence" the greater portion of the expenditure is devoted to defence. In 1931, for example, Rbles 1,310,000,000 were appropriated for the Army and Navy, and Rbles 696,000,000 for Administration.² The Commissar of Finance certainly spoke the truth when he said "*The growth of industry is our best defence.*" Such indeed is the case. Expenditure associated with defence is split up between several departments—and mostly between departments which control industry. The Soviet Press panics almost daily about "intervention" in order to justify the militarization of the whole national economy.³

REVENUE UNDER THE FIVE YEARS PLAN

General Characteristics

The general theory of the revenue policy under the Five Years Plan can be best expressed in the words of a Soviet economist, writing in "Finance and National Economy" No. 37. 1928:—"The revenue for the period of the Five Years Plan is derived from high and progressive rates of taxation, the struggle with the kulaks by fiscal means and the limitation of *unproductive consumption*. Funds received from these sources will be spent on the financing of Socialist industrialization and of the cultural revolution."

How did it work in practice?

The private sector, now reduced exclusively to the peasantry, was subjected to a fiscal press which gradually ruined it. Moreover the Socialization of peasant farming, which began when about half of the period allotted for the completion of the Plan had only elapsed, precipitated its ruin. This Socialization was carried out more rapidly than the Plan had intended—62% instead of 25.3% of peasant farms were collectivized by 1932. The majority of the peasant farms were to have been left outside the Socialist sector in order to preserve one of the sources of revenue necessary to meet the cost of Socialist construction.

This was a suicidal policy. On the one hand, the Communists desired to enlarge the Socialist sector at the expense of the private, while on the other they still hoped to obtain considerable revenue, by taxation, from the rapidly-dying private sector. The remains of the private sector were so heavily taxed that the peasants were unable to meet the demands—a proceeding which practically arrested their economic activity.

When the private sector was practically destroyed, the burden of the

¹ "Economic Life" January 6, 1931.

² "Economic Life" January 13, 1931.

³ See Armed Forces.

Five Years Plan fell on the Socialist sector, *i. e.* on those engaged in nationalized industry and farming.

It is doubtful, however, whether the Government was able to create many real sources of extraordinary revenue by these methods. In any event, it was compelled to look elsewhere, *i. e.* towards foreign credits.

Budgetary Revenue

The revenue scheduled to accrue under the Five Years Plan is divided into two categories: A. Budgetary revenue, and B. revenue not shown in the Budget.

The following table ¹ shows the relationship of these two classes:

	<i>Rubles</i>
Budgetary revenue	44,700,000,000
Other	38,300,000,000
Total	86,000,000,000

Budgetary revenue is distributed under the following headings:

	<i>In millions of rubles</i>
Taxes	28,749
Non-tax revenue	8,839
Profit from Transport, Posts and Telegraphs.....	4,146
Local	1,806
Loans	6,000
Various	1,415
Total	50,955

It is interesting to note the difference in estimates. The financial section of the Five Years Plan was put together very carelessly. Thus, for example, in the second volume of "The Five Years Plan" the gross revenue is estimated at Rbles 44,700,000,000 (p. 401) while in detail (p. 338) it is put at Rbles 50,955,000,000.²

Taxes

It was estimated that direct taxation would yield Rbles 12,500,000,000. How could this huge sum be obtained when the private sector was diminishing rapidly? The answer is, that direct taxation was paid by the Socialist sector. In 1930 all the taxes associated with industry were merged into a single tax. In these circumstances, direct taxation assumed the form of indirect, because the socialized enterprises paid direct taxes in the form of excise upon the goods produced. The process was similar to that prevailing in the NEP period; the difference between direct and indirect taxation disappeared.

¹ "Five Years Plan" Vol. II.

² "Five Years Plan" Vol. I.

Indirect taxes were to yield Rbles. 10,400,000,000—the remaining Rbles. 5,849,000,000 were to be derived from excise duties.

Non-Tax Revenue. The bulk of this revenue is derived from the lowering of the costs of production while high prices are maintained for manufactured goods. It is estimated at Rbles 3,200,000,000. In theory, this is only a portion of the profits made by industrial undertakings. Under the Five Years Plan industry is a monopoly, and it is difficult to say whether profits are real, or whether they are explained by the monopolistic position of industry.

The remainder of non-tax revenue is derived from timber (Rbles 1,952,000,000), trade (Rbles 853,000,000), banking profits, etc.

Profit From Transport Posts and Telegraphs. This revenue, amounting to Rbles 8,500,000,000 may also be considered a non-tax revenue. Its growth is explained by the anticipated development of national economy. But, as the destruction of the private sector proceeded, the transportation of State goods by the State railways became merely a subject for practice in book-keeping.

Local Revenue. This is estimated at Rbles. 1,800,000,000. Soviet publications do not show whence this sum is derived.

Loans. Under this heading internal loans only are meant (external loans will be dealt with later). Although the estimate indicates that the revenue from loans will be Rbles. 6,000,000,000, a closer examination shows that only Rbles 4,600,000,000 will be actually received—the remainder being accounted for the conversions of old into new debentures, and the profit accruing in these operations. Of this sum of Rbles 4,600,000,000, Rbles 1,300,000,000 is expected from the Socialist sector, in other words, it does not represent an actual profit but is again a book-keeping operation. Of the remainder, about Rbles 1,300,000,000 were to come from savings-banks, and Rbles 2,000,000,000 to be raised on the "voluntary" market.

What is the method of loan subscription? If in the NEP days, loans were raised to a great extent by compulsion, this method has since been intensified. As the well-to-do class has been completely destroyed, the compulsory subscription of loans now affects peasants and workers. In effect, loans are not raised by subscription but by an organized distribution of bonds amongst the population—accompanied by deduction from wages.

Revenue Not Shown In the Budget

This revenue, under the Five Years Plan, is distributed as follows:

<i>In billions of rubles</i>	
Credit system	6.5
Social insurance	9.1
State enterprises	18.9
Resources attracted	6.5

Information regarding this class of revenue is very defective, especially in the case of social insurance and "resources attracted." Their examination, therefore, cannot be conclusive.

Credit System. This is rather a fantastic means of meeting expenditure for Socialist construction. From the explanatory notes to the Five Years Plan, it may be gathered that short-term credits to nationalized industry were to be drawn from current-account deposits, profits and bank capital. In five years, this source has to yield Rbles 2,300,000,000. On the other hand, the balance of bank transactions is to be increased by Rbles 3,200,000,000.

But from what source? It cannot be the influx of money from the private sector, which has no money to invest. Nor can deposits of nationalized enterprises be this source; they are nothing but State subsidies in a disguised form.

Much the same may be said of long-term credits. Long-term credits for Socialized enterprises are only a method of redistributing the capital of these enterprises. In five years the Communists intend to increase this redistributed sum to Rbles. 4,000,000,000; but this will be only a book-keeping transaction.

Social Insurance and Resources Attracted. No explanation of "resources attracted" can be found in the Five Years Plan. As to revenue from "social insurance," this presupposes the prosperity of U.S.S.R. workers. It also presupposes the absence of any expenditure on the relief of unemployment. In the absence of unemployment, social insurance becomes a special tax, imposed upon the insured, in order to accumulate capital for the Socialist sector.

Resources of State Enterprise. The Communists' explanation of this item is very meagre. It is as follows: during the operation of the Plan the index of the cost of goods must be brought down by 30%; while the selling price of these same goods must be lowered by only 19%; the difference in the respective decreases, after the deduction of a certain sum for the budget, must yield Rbles. 2,500,000,000 in five years. Where the remaining sum of Rbles. 1,600,000,000 is to come from is not shown. Moreover, the above expectations have not materialized.

THE FULFILMENT OF THE FINANCIAL SCHEME OF THE FIVE YEARS PLAN

General Characteristics

About four years have passed since the inauguration of the Five Years Plan, but its financial results are as yet unknown. There is no lack of statistics relating to these years. But the closer these are examined, the greater is the impression of their unreality. Far from elucidating the position, they conceal the real state of affairs.

A study of the Five Years Plan shows that the original financial arrangements have been expanded, in course of execution, into something

much more grandiose and fantastic. It is even doubtful as to whether a real plan exists.

To what extent have the original financial schemes been carried out?

Execution of State and Local Budgets

According to the original plan, the text of which is published in "The Five Years Plan for Economic Construction of the U.S.S.R.," budgetary revenue for 1928-29 and 1929-30 was estimated at Rbles 16,900,000,000 (for the State Budget) and Rbles 440,000,000 for the local budgets. Has this money been received?

Soviet statistics would appear to show that budgetary receipts have exceeded the estimates. They assert that in 1928-29 not merely the estimated Rbles 7,700,000,000 but Rbles 7,900,000,000 were received. Revenue, as originally estimated for the 1929-30 budget, was Rbles. 9,200,000,000; this estimate was later increased, and the Communists aver that Rbles. 12,800,000,000 were actually collected. The success of local budgets would appear to be equally astounding.

M. Grinko, the Commissar of Finance, explains this phenomenon in his report on the fulfilment of the financial scheme for 1931.¹ He declared that this scheme was brilliantly executed—Rbles 20,400,000,000 being collected instead of the projected Rbles 19,000,000,000—because in the previous years the national income had vastly increased. He asserted that in 1928-29 it had increased by 11%, in the following year by 20%, and in 1931 by 17%.

Accordingly the budget for 1932 was passed and estimated at Rbles 27,500,000,000; an increase of the national income of 30% was expected.²

A comparison with the pre-War development of the national economy shows that such increases are highly improbable. As stated earlier, this development was very rapid—yet between 1900 and 1913 Russia's national income increased by only 39.4%, *i. e.* an average of 2.8% *per annum*.³ How is it then that Soviet national income is supposed to increase so rapidly?

It is hard to believe that industry is responsible for this increase; 1931 has shown a substantial decline not only of estimated but also in actual production, in some important branches, as compared with 1930. Still it may be allowed that owing to the continual increase in equipment the gross income from industry has augmented considerably. But that does not yet mean net profit, as Soviet industry has no independent sources of capital and is maintained at the expense of the taxpayer. It will be sufficient to say that, whereas income from industry in

¹ This financial year began in January, the final quarter of 1930 being added to the previous financial year 1929-30, which began on October 1, 1929.

² Report to TZhK. "Economic Life" Dec. 28, 1931.

³ M. Prokopovich, National Income from 1900 to 1913.

1932 is estimated to reach about Rbles 1,000,000,000, the capital expenditure on it, as projected, will be Rbles 8,000,000,000.

Nor can agriculture be responsible for this increase, in the last year especially.

In the absence of reliable statistics it will be necessary to judge other proofs bearing on the question. Events in 1932 conclusively prove that official optimism was out of place. The collapse of the State system of supplies necessitated a relaxation of the control over consumption. The artificially low prices fixed for agricultural produce resulted in a restriction of production not only in the private sector but even in the collectivized. As a result of an unsatisfactory harvest taxable income has diminished still more. In the light of all this, the figures provided by the Commissariat of Finance appear fantastic.

But even if one were to accept the Soviet figures, the disproportion between the growth of the budget and the national income remains. The following table illustrates this disproportion.

	<i>Budget</i>	<i>National Income</i>
1928-29	100 %	100 %
1929-30	155 %	111.5%
1931	213.8%	131.5%
1932	244.9%	161.5%

Another interesting illustration is the disproportion between the estimates for expenditure and income for 1932; the former will be Rbles 27,400,000,000 and the latter Rbles 23,000,000,000 (Rbles 16,700,000,000 from taxation and Rbles 6,300,000,000 from non-tax revenue); Rbles 4,400,000,000, it is expected, will be collected through loans. The compulsory nature of the latter is well known.¹

Non-Tax Revenue

Soviet reports maintain that revenue under this heading was received in full. How could that be done? The Soviet Press frequently admits that the costs of production—from which funds for financing industry would be derived—in national industry have not been reduced to the extent estimated and, in 1931, a reverse tendency manifested itself. "Economic Life" says, for example, that production costs were lowered in 1929-30 by only 6.5%, as against the 11% estimated, and that during 1931 they had risen by 5%²; during the first six months of 1932 production costs have been lowered 2% instead of 7% as planned.³ According to all previous Soviet declarations, a reduction in costs was a necessary prelude to the execution of the financial scheme; yet, though this reduction is lacking, the Communists assert that receipts have greatly exceeded estimates. This is a clear indication, if any were still needed, that official figures cannot be relied upon.

¹ "Statistical Survey." Moscow. 1932.

² *Economic Life*. June 23, 1932. No. 144.

³ *Economic Life*. July 7, 1932. No. 157.

As to trade returns, they have been almost invariably unfavourable to the Soviet Treasury.

Non-Budgetary Revenue

The question naturally arises: how can the Five Years Plan be still in progress, seeing that the original finance plan has failed? The explanation lies in the fact that the Government had resort to revenue which did not appear in their financial estimates:

- A. Revenue from direct expropriation.
- B. Revenue from paper-money issue.
- C. Foreign Loans.
- D. Revenue from State collection of agricultural produce.
- E. Revenue from the so-called self-taxation of the population.

A. *Revenue from direct expropriation.* This affects the peasantry almost exclusively and is intimately associated with the Five Years Plan which proclaimed the enlargement of the Socialist sector at the expense of the private sector. This latter was exploited, not only by means of heavy taxation and compulsory loans, but by direct expropriation.

It is impossible to estimate "revenue" received in this fashion. The Government first destroyed the kulaks and took their property. Next the meaning of the word was considerably broadened, and a new category—"kulak-minded" peasants—was created. This category comprises all peasants who are reluctant to hand over their produce to the State, who will not take part in collective farming, who will not subscribe to loans, etc. The term is continually made to embrace further sections of the peasantry.

The only statement relevant to this source of revenue was contained in the report of the Commissar of Agriculture to the XVI Party Congress (1930) that 40% of the capital of the Kolkhoz was provided by the expropriation of the kulaks.

B. *Revenue from paper-money issue.* According to the Plan, during five years, between 1928 and 1932, the purchasing power of the ruble was to increase by 20%. In order to achieve this the precious-metal and foreign currency reserve was to be increased by Rbles. 500,000,000. The Commissariat of Finance was authorized to increase the paper-money circulation only by Rbles. 1,250,000,000 in five years, which was to serve as the source of short-term loans. As indicated earlier, the increase in deposits, to carry out the plan for raising short-term loans, was lacking.

Necessity, however, compelled the Government to continue the inflation of paper money, far beyond the above mentioned sum. On January 1, 1928 there were Rbles. 1,600,000,000 in circulation. By January 1, 1931 this figure had risen to Rbles. 4,300,000,000, and to Rbles. 5,800,000,000 by August 1, 1932. The issue of paper-money to the sum of Rbles. 4,200,000,000—more than three times the plans' provisions—

in four years can hardly be accepted as a proof of the brilliant state of Soviet finance, as advertised in the budget.

As a result of this excessive paper issue the Government saw itself forced to suspend the law governing the metallic and foreign-currency covering of the paper-money in circulation; the metal and foreign currency fund of the State Bank was stated to be Rbles. 762,900,000 on September 1, 1932 which, by the law, permits the emission of paper-money to the sum of Rbles. 3,051,000,000. The actual sum of the latter on the same date was Rbles. 3,430,300,000; the Government had also issued twice the amount of Treasury notes permitted by the law. In these circumstances optimism is out of place—the Soviet Government has had to resort to paper-money taxation as it did during the period of Militant Communism.

In addition grave doubts exist as to the veracity of the reports on the increase in the reserves of foreign currency and precious metals. This fund, on October 1, 1928, was Rbles. 279,000,000, and on September 1, 1932—Rbles. 762,900,000—an increase of Rbles. 483,000,000. Whence came this increase? It might have been derived from a favourable trade-balance. But between 1929 and 1932 it has been unfavourable to the U.S.S.R., the deficit amounting to Rbles. 382,300,000, and, moreover, the Soviet Government has had to transfer abroad over Rbles. 300,000,000 for payments on foreign credits.

Precious metals mined in Russia would certainly assist in increasing this fund. What is the output of such metals in the U.S.S.R.? The Communists are not disposed to supply ample information about gold mining but certain statistics are available, and it is possible to estimate gold production at some 100,000 klgms. (to the value of about Rbles. 140,000,000) for the last four years, perhaps a little less. This source will still not provide an increase of Rbles. 483,900,000 between 1928 and 1932, even if to this the value of other precious metals be added. Only one conclusion remains—the *returns of the State Banks include foreign credits in the total of the metal and foreign currency fund*, and so far these returns are fictitious.

C. *Foreign Loans*. Nothing appears in the Soviet Press about foreign loans. When elaborating their plans the Government, apparently, were not certain that they could secure such loans; or, if so, to what amount. Such are, therefore, shown under the heading "Various revenues," originally estimated at Rbles. 800,000,000.

Actually the foreign financial transactions of the Soviet Government are not loans in the strict sense of the word, as they are granted in the form of credits for Soviet imports and exports; but in practice they play a very important part in the financing of the Five Years Plan.

The Communists have secured, in many countries, State guarantees covering their export business. The British Foreign Trade Facilities Overseas Trade Credit and Insurance Act, 1920, applies to the U.S.S.R. as well as other States. In 1925 the German Government increased the sum guaranteed for facilitating trade with the U.S.S.R. to Marks 350,-

000,000. Austria guaranteed Sch. 15,000,000, Italy Lire 200,000,000 and Norway Crowns 20,000,000. Thus the total sum guaranteed, excluding Great Britain, amounts to Rbles. 225,000,000.

Other countries trading with the U.S.S.R. have granted credits derived from private sources alone. In this respect the U.S.A. occupies the most important place, American credits being only second to the German.

It is impossible to state the amount actually received by the Soviet Government in the form of credits. These are very fluid, and the amounts fluctuate continually. They have been estimated at Rbles. 1,430,000,000 (long-term credits alone) on June 1, 1932. The short term credits have been variously estimated at between Rbles. 750,000,000 and Rbles. 1,000,000,000. This of course is an important item in the financing of Soviet industrialization, the more so because the Soviet ruble is worth not more than 35% to 40% of its face value and translated into Soviet tokens the credits become much more important.

But foreign credits are, in Soviet conditions, not easy to handle; interest is very high—for short-term credits it is not less than 36%—and payments are met only with great difficulty. These payments are one of the reasons for Soviet dumping and explain the methods of Soviet foreign trade in general; the necessity to possess foreign balances, not the usual principles of trade, determining this policy. There can be no foreign investment of capital, in the strict sense of the word, in Soviet industry; and the present system of credits in the long run will prove very disadvantageous to all parties concerned.

D. Revenue from State collection of Agricultural Produce. There is no mention of this type of revenue in the financial scheme of the Five Years Plan, but it plays an important part all the same.

The collection of agricultural produce from the peasants during the NEP increased in volume every year. Bought at prices fixed extremely low, it was an important source of revenue to the Government. However, owing to the burden of taxation of every kind the peasantry curtailed production and threatened to upset the Government's calculations. This was, from a fiscal point of view, the explanation of mass-collectivization, which was carried far beyond the estimates of the Plan. In the circumstances, Stalin had but little choice. Soviet economists consider that these measures have yielded positive results, and that the revenue under this head was very large until 1931, when 19,900,000 tons of agricultural produce was collected for the State. It was one of the most important sources of the funds necessary for the continuance of Socialist experiments. It was also one of the principal reasons for the cheapness of Soviet grain, manufactured goods and raw materials, when exported. Since the spring of 1932, when State rationing collapsed, conditions have radically changed.¹

E. Revenue from the so-called "self-imposed taxation" of the population. It would seem that with such enormous pressure exerted upon

¹ See Agriculture.

the whole of the national economy, self-imposed taxation would be impossible; but the Government insists on this. In 1928-29 such taxation yielded Rbles. 104,000,000, and Rbles. 193,000,000 in the following year. For 1931 the yield of this taxation was estimated at Rbles. 226,000,000.¹ It takes the shape of compulsory contributions to the Treasury, cuts in wages, etc.

What are the possible conclusions?

As indicated above, expenditure under the Five Years Plan is largely extraordinary expenditure. The extraordinary revenue necessary to meet this expenditure had to come from outside. It is obtained by a merciless taxation of the population, by an issue of paper-money reminiscent of the period of Militant Communism, by the sale of goods at monopolistic prices and by compulsory collections of agricultural produce. The Soviet Press estimates that in 1931 about 60% of the national income was extracted for capital investment. Any difference between taxes and loans, and between the purchase of agricultural produce and their requisition, disappeared during the last years of the Five Years Plan's operation. Bearing in mind the extraordinary demands of the Government upon the national economy, such could not be otherwise.

Under the Five Years Plan, the Communists have reverted to general indirect taxation, they have restored taxation in kind, abolished after the period of Militant Communism, and they have renewed the expropriation of "accumulated wealth." Only this time it is not the bourgeoisie but the proletariat, the workers and the peasants, who suffer.

The difference between the actual cost of Socialist construction and the revenue of the Soviet State is made up by foreign credits, which enables the Communists to continue their work. Germany and America are the U.S.S.R.'s chief creditors.

There is no equivalent in other countries to the financial scheme of the Five Years Plan. It is unique, for it is built upon a complete negation of private economic initiative. This system reflects the political and economic regime of the U.S.S.R., where freedom does not exist, and where Socialism is transformed into a rigid system—a new kind of slavery which is mitigated neither by law, nor by tradition. The Government still pursues its chosen course. New and heavy demands upon the population are projected, in conjunction with the termination of the first Five Years Plan and the inauguration of a second.

1932 seems a crucial year; the whole scheme has shown decided cracks. As to the financial plan it has been continually altered, and today not even its rudiments remain standing. Under these conditions it is impossible to apply the word "plan" to the financial projects of the Five Years Plan.

¹ "Economic Life," August 7, 1931.

TRADE

I

CONDITIONS BEFORE 1917

Foreign Trade

THE following figures of Russia's foreign trade since 1900 may serve as an illustration of her growing importance in the world's markets ¹:

	Imports	(In millions of rubles) Exports	Balance
1896-1900	607.3	698.1	90.8
1902-1906	637.6	1,008.0	370.4
1907-1911	982.5	1,303.9	321.4
1912	1,171.8	1,518.8	347.0
1913	1,274.0	1,420.1	146.1

A summary of the main tendencies of Russian foreign trade, prior to the War and the Revolution, may be helpful to a better understanding of the changes which the Soviet economic and political regime has brought about in that trade's organization and development:

1. The character of Russia's national economy, as a mainly agricultural country where industry only began to develop on a national scale at the end of the nineteenth century, naturally determined the composition and direction of Russian foreign trade. On the average of the five years—1908-1912, Russian exports were divided as follows among the main commodity groups ²:

Foodstuffs	60.8%
Raw materials and semi-manufactured goods.....	33.1%
Animals	1.7%
Manufactured goods	4.4%

Grain, butter and eggs in the foodstuffs group; timber, oil and flax in the group of raw materials—such were the staple articles of Russian export prior to the War. It should be noted that the increase of Russian

¹ Published by the Ministry of Trade and Industry. 1914.

² M. Sobolev,—"The Foreign Trade of Russia, in "RUSSIA, its Trade and Commerce." London, 1918.

exports by nearly Rbles. 1,000,000,000 in the last 20 years before the War was not effected at the expense of satisfying the needs of the people. This is confirmed, among other indications, by the fact that, in spite of a rapid absolute increase, the export "quota" (relation of exports to total production) was declining in respect of most of the country's staple export products, owing to the development of the domestic market, stimulated by the progressive industrialization of the country. Thus in respect of grain, exports declined from 55.3% of the total in 1900 to 48.6% in 1912.

Exports of manufactured goods were mainly limited, in harmony with the general economic character of the country, to goods exported over Russia's Asiatic frontiers to neighbouring Eastern countries—Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, China—where Russia enjoyed natural transport advantages over her more advanced industrial competitors. On the other hand, Russia's rapidly-growing industrial production was readily absorbed by the internal market, as yet unhampered in satisfying its needs by any restrictions or rationing—whether of food, textiles or shoes.

2. Similarly, the country's economic structure determined the composition of Russian imports. This can be seen from the average import figures for the same five years, (1908–1912):

Foodstuffs	19.1%
Raw materials and semi-manufactured goods.....	48.5%
Animals	0.9%
Manufactured goods	31.4%

Imports of raw material, in which American cotton played a prominent part, were satisfying the demand of the rapidly-growing industry for such materials as were not produced in Russia, (*e. g.* rubber), or in which domestic production lagged behind the demand, (cotton).

3. In the group of manufactured goods, the imports of machinery were rapidly increasing—*pari passu* with the country's industrialization and the modernizing of Russian agricultural methods. The imports of machinery and implements, industrial and agricultural, increased as follows from the beginning of this century:

(<i>In millions of rubles</i>)	
1903–1907 (average)	60.5
1908–1912 (average)	118.0
1913 (average)	169.0

Another characteristic feature of Russia's pre-war foreign trade was a favourable trade-balance which enabled her to pay interest and amortization charges in respect of both her public debt (the major part of which consisted of loans applied to the development of the

country's railway system), and of the private foreign capital invested, in Russian industry.

4. The predominance of foreign capital, and foreign firms, was also noticeable in Russia's foreign trade, both import and export.

Import trade was largely carried on by foreign firms. Among these German firms, in harmony with Germany's dominating position in Russian imports (45.4% in 1912), occupied by far the foremost place. Thus 50% of German imports of metal goods and machinery were sold through branch offices and subsidiary agents of German firms. In chemicals the corresponding percentage was 73%, in paper 62%, and in textiles 42%.

The position was similar in the export trade; where a few foreign firms, with a network of branches and agents all over Russia, often controlled the greater part of the export trade in several commodities, (grain, butter, eggs, etc.). However, here a certain process of emancipation was noticeable in the years which immediately preceded the War. Russian firms began to take an active share in Russian exports, and to enter the world-market.

Domestic Trade

Few statistical details are available relating to the growth of Russian domestic trade before the War. It can be said, however, that its turn-over rose in proportion to the rapid development of the Russian railway system, which carried the products of the Moscow industries into the remote districts of the country. Moscow was also the great trading centre of Russia, with an active and enterprising merchant-class; while the great annual fairs of Nizhni-Novgorod and Irbit formed an important link between Russia and the East.

In the absence of other statistical indications, the number of trading-licenses issued (for fiscal purposes) to firms engaged in marketing goods may give an idea, though perhaps an inadequate one, of the growth of the Russian distributing organization during the first decade of the twentieth century.

	<i>Number of Trading Licenses issued (in 1,000)</i>	<i>Percentage of increase in comparison with 1899</i>
1899	853.8
1905	892.9	4.6
1910	1,130.4	33.5
1911	1,177.6	37.9
1912	1,221.1	43.0

The War and the Isolation of Russia

The World War marked the beginning of Russia's isolation from world markets, which was carried to an extreme after the Bolshevik Revolution. It was not only the fact of Russia's finding herself at war

with Germany which suddenly distorted the whole structure of Russian foreign trade, and limited Russian imports, for years to come, almost exclusively to munitions and the material and equipment absolutely necessary for the conduct of the War. It was rather Russia's unfavourable geographical position which left her, so far as her foreign trade was concerned, at the mercy of her adversaries. Almost 80% of Russia's foreign trade was conducted, before the War, *via* the Black Sea and Baltic Ports. The closing of the Bosphorous and the Dardanelles by Turkey, and the impossibility of exporting or importing goods through Baltic ports left Russia with two ports only. One was Vladivostok, on the Pacific, some 10,000 klm. distant from Moscow. The other was Arkhangelsk on the White Sea, closed by ice during the greater part of the year, and connected with the centre by a single-track railroad. There was also the port of Murmansk on the Arctic Ocean, which possessed the great advantage of being ice-free all the year round. It was connected with St. Petersburg by a railway completed only in 1916.

Given this extremely unfavourable strategical position of Russia in regard to her foreign trade, it was only natural that Russian exports declined from Rbles. 1,420,000,000 in 1913 to Rbles. 956,000,000 in 1914, (of which year, only the latter half was affected by the outbreak of the War), and to Rbles. 401,000,000 in 1915. If the decline in the value of imports was less manifest (these only diminished from Rbles. 1,274,000,000 in 1913 to Rbles. 1,077,000,000 in 1914, and Rbles. 1,198,000,000 in 1915), this was due mainly to the effect of price-inflation on import values.

II

DOMESTIC TRADE UNDER THE SOVIET REGIME

The Period of Militant Communism

AFTER the Bolshevik Revolution, the new Communist Government immediately started to translate its theories into action, so far as the distribution of goods was concerned. "Parasitic" private trade was anathematized, both in theory and in practice. It was either rendered illegal by a series of decrees proclaiming the nationalization of private trade, or strangled by confiscatory taxes, the avowed aim of which was not to produce revenue but to tax the private distributor, or dealer, out of existence.

This attempt to organize the distribution of goods in accordance with the Communist doctrine was facilitated, to some extent, by the fact that the Soviet Government, when assuming power, already found in existence a number of official and semi-official organizations which were created during the War to regulate the distribution of foodstuffs, fuel, raw materials and manufactured goods. These War-time organizations, subsequently formed the nucleus of the new People's Commis-

sariat of Supplies. Thus a "War-time Socialism" unwittingly furnished a foundation for the new distributing organization of the Communist regime.

With regard to retail trade, the task of the new rulers was much more difficult. The main obstacles which it encountered in this respect were not only of a technical character. In the case of food products, for instance, the actual producers and suppliers were still economically-independent individual farmers. Free purchase of farm produce was therefore replaced by the commandeering of goods from individual farmers, or from whole villages. Farmers were allowed to keep only limited rations to afford food for themselves and fodder for their cattle. The remainder was to be delivered to the State, either against payment in depreciated paper-money or against a promise by the Soviet Government to deliver, in exchange, manufactured products from the nationalized factories—a promise which, as a rule, was not fulfilled. In one way or another the farmers were depleted of all their stocks (especially grain). Not getting any return for their farm produce, either in money or goods, the farmers began to limit the acreage of the crops sown to the strict minimum necessary to provide food for themselves. This was their only weapon in their fight against the Communist Government; but it proved effective.

The effect of stock depletion, and of the farmers' "production strike," was further aggravated by the failure of the crops in the greater part of the country—a failure which subsequently led to the famine of 1920 and 1921.

The NEP

In the spring of 1921 the Soviet regime was facing an economic and political catastrophe. The urban population was suffering severely from the almost complete cessation of the natural flow of supplies from the villages. In fact, it was only saved from starvation by the efforts of the so-called "bag-men" (*meshochniki*). These were individual peasants, workmen, or ex-soldiers who travelled sometimes distances of several hundred miles with a single sack of flour; which they sold at a fantastic price (or, preferably, exchanged some for old garments or a piece of cloth) to the starving townspeople. The activities of these "bag-men" were conducted at the greatest personal risk: hundreds and thousands of them were shot by the so-called "barrage detachments" of the Tcheka, which searched all trains and guarded all highways on the approaches to Moscow, and other big cities, in an effort to prevent this illicit trading.

The "return of free trading" became the slogan not only of agrarian rioters throughout the country, but also of the starving workmen in the Soviet factories. Still more serious, this was also proclaimed as one of the main objectives of the sailors' revolt (early spring 1921), at Kronstadt, the naval and defence base of St. Petersburg—a revolt which was only suppressed after some days of severe fighting.

In these circumstances, no course was open to the leaders of the Party except to sound the retreat. On March 17th, 1921, Lenin issued the first of a series of decrees which inaugurated the policy, known as the NEP or New Economic Policy. Its main feature was that, in order to placate the active discontent of the farmer, it replaced the commandeering of all farmers' surpluses by a tax payable in kind, chiefly in grain but also in other agricultural produce (the "sole agricultural tax"). The resurrection of a relatively free private market was the immediate and spectacular outcome of the NEP. The supplies of food and other agricultural produce improved markedly, to the benefit and satisfaction of the starved industrial population of the cities.

Simultaneously, the commercial community of the country seemed to revive and creep out of its hiding-places with astonishing rapidity. In Moscow, wholesale firms sprang up like mushrooms, and were actually supported in their transactions by credits which they were now able to obtain from the State Bank. Derelict retail shops took down their shutters and displayed the scanty goods which the nationalized Soviet factories were able to deliver, or which were supplied—as was more often the case—by the reviving small private industrial enterprises, or by peasants' handcraft.

It seemed as if the Communist regime had entered a path of peaceful evolution and would gradually return to more or less Capitalist conditions. In so judging, observers wilfully shut their eyes to a statement made by Lenin: "We are now starting on a retreat, but we are doing this merely with a view of taking a better run later on and then advancing further at a bound. This is the motive of our withdrawal when proclaiming the New Economic Policy—so as to resume our offensive later with still greater tenacity."¹

The Communist Counter-Offensive

The Communist counter-offensive against the reviving private trade started in 1924. The policy of Militant Communism was resumed; but it was now carried out more systematically, utilizing the lessons taught by the previous failure. Hundreds of thousands of private traders, wholesalers and retailers, who were misled by the *Fata Morgana* of the NEP, paid with their livelihoods—sometimes with their lives or freedom—for their credulity. In the year 1926-7 alone, 102,898 private firms were, according to official data, forced to liquidate, abandoning the uneven fight against the all-powerful Communist Party. It is easy to understand that the wholesale trade was the first to succumb in this fight. The retail trade entrenched itself for some time in the villages, where the necessarily slow growth of the new State retail organization gave it a few months, if not years, of grace. But here also the Communist offensive was successful.

The victorious progress of the Soviet State in securing complete control of the distributing and selling organization of the country is

¹ Lenin, Complete Works, Vol. XVIII.

reflected in the official statistics indicating the share of official (State), cooperative, and private enterprises, in the total turnover of wholesale and retail trade of the U.S.S.R. during the years 1923-1929:

Years ¹	State		Cooperative		Private	
	Wholesale	Retail	Wholesale in per cent	Retail	Wholesale	Retail
1923-24	52.1	11.3	26.1	31.0	21.8	58.6
1924-25	51.5	19.6	39.0	36.1	9.5	44.3
1925-26	48.6	17.6	41.2	43.7	9.4	38.8
1926-27	49.0	17.0	42.0	47.5	9.0	35.5
1927-28	41.8	13.1	56.3	59.5	1.9	27.4
1928-29	38.1	14.2	60.9	69.7	1.0	17.1

Present Organization and Operation of Government Trade

Trade is at present carried on in the U.S.S.R. by a great variety of organizations, differing from each other in the manner of their financing and control. All these organizations can be subdivided into three groups: 1) the State trading organizations, 2) the cooperatives, and 3) the private trade. The first two groups are usually referred to as the *socialized sector*, and the third as the *private sector*. The combination of the first two groups into one sector, which may appear strange at first sight, is well-founded in Soviet practice. Soviet cooperatives are something entirely different from free consumers' and producers' organizations, as such have developed in most Capitalist countries during the last decades; they are not the result of the free, spontaneous efforts of consumers or producers; they are not free and autonomous organizations at all, but are established and operated by, and in accordance with, strict rules laid down by the State. They are, therefore, rightly considered by the Communists themselves as merely a special link in the State organization of distribution. Even if there is a certain amount of independence to be found in the lower links of the cooperative system (such as village and factory cooperatives) this freedom entirely disappears higher up. Thus the central cooperative organizations of the Soviet Union, such as the Centrosoyuz and Selsoyuz, are under the complete control of the State—or, which amounts to the same thing, of the Communist Party. The higher executives are nominated in the same manner as those of any other State trading organization.

As regards the operation of this new distributing organization of the Soviet State, its lack of efficiency and elasticity, its bureaucratic methods, and its high working expenses are matters of constant complaint, not only on the part of controlling organs of the State and of the Communist Party organization and Press but also of prominent Soviet leaders.

¹ The figures for the years 1923-24 to 1926-27 are taken from A. Ginsburg, "Private Capital in the national economy of the U.S.S.R." (Russian) Moscow 1927; for the years 1927-28 and 1928-29 from the official "Soviet Trade" 1929, Nos. 45-46 and 1930, No. 3.

One of the constantly recurring charges against Soviet cooperatives, and the State distributing organization in general, is that, through neglect or inability to reduce operating expenses, and through the high retail prices, they tend to reduce the real wages of Soviet workers. In this connection a speech by Stalin—in which all the defects of the Soviet merchandising apparatus were passed in review and severely criticized—is deserving of particular attention. Whatever minor technical improvements may have been effected during later years, the authoritative statements made by Stalin in his address at the XVI Congress of the Communist Party in June 1930,¹ must be regarded as a convincing proof that the inherent faults of the Communist trading organization were fundamentally the same in 1932 as in 1925 or 1928.²

Stalin pointed out that the Soviet Government had not been able to increase the real wages of its workmen. "The fault," he said, "lies with the bureaucratic character of our entire distributing organization, and, in particular with the bureaucratism of our cooperatives. According to information furnished by the Gosplan the socialized sector should have controlled, in the year 1929-30, 99% of the wholesale and 89% of the retail turnover of the country. This means that the cooperatives should have exterminated the private sector, and become the monopolist organization of the entire domestic trade. This, of course, is all right. What is unfortunate is that, in many cases, this monopoly impairs the interests of the consumers. It appears that the cooperatives, in spite of their monopolistic position in domestic trade, prefer to supply the workmen with 'profitable' goods (such as textiles), and avoid or neglect supplying them with less profitable goods (foodstuffs) which, however, the worker needs more. This forces the workmen to obtain 25% of their requirements from private traders, and to pay higher prices. . . . As a result of this situation the cooperatives do not act as parts of the Socialized sector, but as a peculiar sector of their own, which is poisoned by a 'nep-man' spirit. I must ask, what is the use of such a cooperative organization and what advantage do the workmen derive from it, when it does not fulfill its task of actually raising the level of real wages?"

These quotations show that the new Socialist system of distribution established after the abandonment of the NEP, far from fulfilling its task of moving goods from the place of production to the ultimate consumer with the maximum of convenience for the latter and the minimum of cost, tends, on the contrary, to accentuate still further the absolute shortage of all kinds of commodities already prevalent in the Soviet Union.

Press and other reports are often received to the effect that "congestions" of goods can be observed in some wholesale trading organizations—goods of which there is a shortage throughout the whole of the U.S.S.R.

¹ Stenographic report in "Pravda" June 29, 1930.

² The collapse of the State trading organizations in the spring of 1932 bears witness to this.

The NEO-NEP

Towards the year 1931 it seemed as if the distribution of goods along orthodox Communist lines had reached a final stage. The Soviet co-operatives were victorious on the whole economic front. Not only were the majority of goods rationed, but it was found necessary to assign the consumers to individual cooperatives, whether of a factory, a Government office, or a district. A system was created, the so-called *closed distributing centres*, to which only the employees of the respective enterprise or office were "fastened" or assigned. These stores offered certain privileges to those professional groups whom they served; *e. g.* as a rule they were served first. Conversely, those who, for some reason or other, were not assigned to any such store found themselves always at a disadvantage.

However—just at the time when this development seemed to have been completed—a new, reverse process began in the years 1930 and 1931, and reached a climax in 1932. By some foreign economists and correspondents, this was designated by the name "NEO-NEP," implying that the Government were about to carry out a new retreat in domestic trade, a "manoeuvre" similar to the one executed by Lenin in 1921.

There is, however, a fundamental difference between the NEP (1921) and the new development: one which it is necessary to bear in mind in order to see things in correct perspective. Lenin's NEP acknowledged the failure of the Communist system in respect of the distribution of goods. This entailed making important concessions to the private trader—who, with singular energy, attempted quickly to regain his former position in the internal trade of the country.

Nothing of the sort happened in the last years. The trading system of the State did not cede a single inch of ground to the private trader, nor did it in any other way make any concessions to private trade, private initiative and capital.

What actually happened was this: as in many other fields the Communist Party decided to apply certain Capitalist methods *within* the Socialized sector. Side by side with the ordinary cooperative stores, whether "open" or "closed"—which were selling rationed goods in insufficient quantities but at relatively low prices—the Soviet Government started to open "commercial stores" where the same goods were sold freely to all, in unlimited quantities, but at prices which were four, five and more times higher than those ruling in the cooperatives and approaching those obtaining on the free market. This was done for the purpose of extracting as many paper rubles from the population as possible. The cynicism of this measure is very striking. The authorities knew that the "closed distributing centres" could provide no more than 75% of the rations.

Along with these two types of stores, cooperatives and commercial—both Government-owned—a new type was opened under the name of

"Torgsin"—an abbreviation for the Russian words "Trade with Foreigners." In these stores, everything could be had in unlimited quantities and at comparatively low prices, sometimes even lower than in the cooperative stores. There was, however, an important "but": only foreign currency was taken in payment—at par. Theoretically, these stores were open both to foreigners and to Soviet citizens who happened to be in possession of foreign currency. But the number of the latter was few; and besides, for a Soviet citizen it was not really "healthy" to disclose the possession of foreign money. Thus the "Torgsin" actually confined its activities to catering for foreign tourists and such foreigners as were in Soviet employ. If the objective of the commercial stores was to extract paper-money from the pockets of its own nationals, the Torgsin's was to attract the maximum of foreign currency from the pockets of foreigners resident or travelling in the U.S.S.R.

The supply crisis which developed in the spring of 1932, led the Government to adopt emergency measures. It had to officially recognize the collapse of the State distributing machinery and by the decree of May 6, 1932 it was ordered to reduce the State collection of grain by 20% of the estimates, to 20,000,000 tons; all grain surplus in the possession of the peasants to be marketed free from January 15, 1933; this applies to some other categories as well. A decree promulgated on May 10, 1932 reduced the State meat quota by over 700,000 tons; all the remainder is to be left at the free disposal of the peasants. Lastly on May 20, 1932 a decree permitted the free marketing of all agricultural surplus by Kolkhoz and individual peasants, and freed all such surplus from special duties and established that collectivized peasants would pay no agricultural tax on the surplus marketed and the individual no more than 30% of their trade profits.

In spite of these measures conditions have not improved. In September 1932, grain collection was 25% behind the reduced schedule, meat 31.7% and various goods of mass consumption—from 15% to 4%.

It would be a mistake to think that the new measures signify a return to free trade. First of all the State quota must be collected before the surplus can be marketed. Secondly the State quota must be delivered at fixed prices. And lastly only direct trading between the consumers and the producers is permitted. The Government, while recommending to the factories, State institutions and various collectives to acquire the provisions they need on the free market, has repeatedly issued strict orders, to suppress any activities on the part of "private traders, kulaks and speculators." The measures described above are, thus, not a change of policy but a grave symptom of the disorganization of Soviet supply.¹

¹ As a result of the soaring of prices the new regulations for the trading of surpluses have been abrogated on Sept. 24, 1932. The condition of the distribution of consumers' goods had at that time reached an unprecedented crisis.

III

FOREIGN TRADE OF THE SOVIET UNION

The Monopoly of Foreign Trade

IN STRIKING contrast with the fluctuations of the policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government towards domestic trade, their policy in regard to foreign trade has been characterized by a remarkable steadiness of purpose throughout the fifteen years of Communist rule. The monopoly of foreign trade, proclaimed shortly after the Bolshevik *coup d'état*, by the decree of April 18, 1918, was regarded, from the start, as one of the main "commanding heights" of the Communist economic front.

Whatever changes the system of foreign trade monopoly may have undergone during the past fifteen years, these have merely affected the questions of organization; *e. g.* the amount of centralization of its functions and various organs in the U.S.S.R. and abroad. Unlike the striking revival of private enterprise in domestic trade during the period of the NEP, private foreign trading in the same period never exceeded a small percentage of the total foreign trade turnover, and was confined mainly to the Eastern frontiers of the Soviet Union (Persia, China), where, owing to specific local conditions, the Government was obliged to tolerate private trade and barter, until the official trading organization could be sufficiently developed. For some time it seemed as if the various foreign industrial concessions in the U.S.S.R. (timber, manganese-ore, etc.) would become an important factor in Soviet foreign trade, particularly in supplying material for export; but with the gradual failure and subsequent suppression of these "Capitalist Oases" their share in Soviet foreign trade became negligible.

In a pamphlet issued in Moscow on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Communist Revolution, and dealing with the achievements of the Soviet State in the domain of foreign trade during these ten years, the necessity for the foreign trade monopoly is defended by the following arguments: "Considering that there only exist in the world two economic systems, the Socialist and the Capitalist, and in view of the fact that Capitalism reigns everywhere with the exception of the Soviet Union, the Soviet economic system can only survive as an independent unit under the protection offered by the monopoly of foreign trade. The system of free trade,¹ or any system under which all foreign trade transactions are licensed by the State, are incompatible with Socialist economy; especially at a time when the Soviet Union is surrounded by Capitalist states. The system of State-planned economy cannot be worked in practice, when goods are permitted to be freely imported and exported. The reconstruction of Soviet industry

¹ The author means here the system of "free trade" as opposed to monopoly, and not—in the usual sense—as opposed to protectionist tariffs.

would be impossible under such conditions: or, at least, would be rendered much more difficult.”¹

The supreme executive organ is the Commissariat of Foreign Trade; which, after having been merged for some years with the Commissariat for Domestic Trade, was again reorganized (1929) as an independent unit.

Foreign trade transactions are carried on by a variety of organizations, either cooperative or exclusively controlled by the State. The latter are usually formed to take charge of exports and imports either of a certain commodity or for a given branch of industry. Thus, for example, the “Stankoimport” deals with all imports of lathes and tools. On the other hand, special cooperative organizations have been created for the export of grain (“Export-Khlebs”), lumber, eggs and so forth.

Foreign trade operations, whatever organization (State or cooperative) may carry them out, have to conform to the plan of exports and imports annually drawn up by the central economic organs in Moscow. Import and export licenses for definite quantities of goods are issued to the several organizations handling single commodities. Their selling and buying operations are subject to strict control by the Commissariat of Foreign Trade and its organs abroad. These organs are either the so-called trade delegations—*official commercial* bodies which, in some countries, enjoy diplomatic privileges (including extritoriality) for their premises—or else they take the form of private companies, organized under the laws of the country in question but owned, openly or through “strawmen,” by the Soviet Government. This latter form of organization is employed in such countries as have not officially recognized the Soviet Government.

An outstanding example of the first form is the Soviet Trade Delegation in Berlin, an immense trading organization which, until recently (when, on grounds of economy, a reduction of staff took place), had over 2,000 employees, involving, according to official Soviet data, an annual expenditure of Mrks. 15,000,000 (\$3,600,000).² While such heavy bureaucratic apparatus must inevitably be lacking in efficiency, expert knowledge and commercial initiative, one must bear in mind that the concentration of purchasing power in the hands of a central organization often constitutes a tremendous advantage for the U.S.S.R. in its dealings with mutually-competing foreign firms.

The Amtorg Trading Corporation of New York is an example of a Soviet organ operating as a private company. This is responsible for the placing of Soviet orders in the United States, and for the purchase of American goods for import into the U.S.S.R.

Foreign Trade Balances

The Civil War, and the blockade of the Soviet Republic by the Allies, completed that country's economic isolation: a process which its un-

¹ “The Foreign Trade of the Soviet Union in ten years” (Russian), Moscow 1928.

² Dr. Rudolf Anders, “Der Handelsverkehr der U.S.S.R. mit Deutschland,” Berlin 1928, p. 97.

favourable geographical position had already initiated in the course of the War. According to official Soviet statistics (which cannot claim particular accuracy) during the years of Civil War—when important ports were often changing hands several times in the course of one year—Russian exports only amounted to 6% of those in the last year preceding the War. The imports during the same years reached a somewhat higher figure—Rbles. 118,000,000.

The following years brought about a gradual revival of foreign trade, both export and import. The stimulating influence of the NEP on agricultural production enabled the Soviet Government to pay for more of its imports in goods instead of gold, although an unfavourable trade-balance remains the outstanding characteristic of Soviet foreign trade since 1920.¹

<i>Years</i>	<i>Exports</i>	<i>Imports</i> (<i>In millions of rubles</i>)	<i>Balance</i>
1920-21	10.0	118.0	— 108.0
1921-22	64.0	270.0	— 206.0
1922-23	133.2	147.9	— 14.7
1923-24	522.6	439.4	+ 83.2
1924-25	551.0	720.3	— 169.3
1925-26	667.7	755.6	— 87.9
1926-27	749.5	693.2	+ 56.3
1927-28	778.8	945.5	— 167.3
1928-29	877.8	836.3	+ 41.2
1929-30	1,002.0	1,068.7	— 66.5
1930	1,036.0	1 058.0	— 22.0
1931	811.2	1,105.0	— 293.8

According to some statistics of international trade published by the Secretariat of the League of Nations (Geneva) on the occasion of the World Economic Conference in 1927, Russian foreign trade constituted, in 1913, 3.9% of world trade; in consequence of which Russia occupied the sixth place among the principal trading nations of the world. In 1925, eight years after the Communist revolution and five years after the Allied blockade of the Soviet Union had been raised, her share in international trade was only 1.06% of the total; and it occupied, in order of importance, the 23rd place—behind such small countries as Denmark and Switzerland. Soviet statisticians computed the U.S.S.R.'s share of world commerce as 1.14% for the year 1926.² In relation to the pre-War trade of Russia, the foreign trade of the Soviet Union—according to Mikojan, Commissar for Trade,³ at the time, did not exceed 42%. This contraction of foreign trade was not caused exclusively by territorial losses, since these did not affect more than 15% of the total turnover. In spite of a further recovery since 1926 Soviet

¹ Statistical data relating to Soviet foreign trade often differ in various official publications without satisfactory reasons being given for this discrepancy. The above table is compiled from figures quoted in "Soviet Trade" (1932) official organ of the Commissariat of Trade.

² "Soviet Trade" 1927, No. 43.

³ "Pravda," November 3, 1927.

foreign trade has still not reached the pre-war level—in sharp contrast with the increase of agricultural and industrial production advertised in Soviet statistics.

Structure of Soviet Foreign Trade

Still more important, than this contraction in the volume of Soviet foreign trade, are the changes which the composition and structure of both exports and imports has undergone in comparison with pre-war times.

The outstanding change in the composition of exports under the Soviet regime is the relative increase of the share of industrial exports, *i. e.* exports other than agricultural produce. According to Soviet statistics, the share of these two groups in the total exports of the Soviet Union has undergone the following changes:

<i>Years</i>	<i>Exports of industrial products %</i>	<i>Exports of agricultural products %</i>
1909-13	19.2	81.8
1925-26	40.2	59.8
1926-27	42.4	57.6
1927-28	54.4	45.6
1928-29	58.7	41.3
1930	59.0	41.0
1931	58.0	42.0

This striking alteration of the composition of exports has been regarded by Soviet economists as an indication of the progress of industrialization under the Communist regime. It is, however, hardly supported by facts. In reality, the furthering of industrial exports (which, by the way, also include, such industrial raw materials as oil) was a matter of necessity; since the agrarian policy of the Communists—especially the compulsory collectivization which reacted unfavourably upon so many agricultural values, particularly cattle and poultry—prevented a revival of those agricultural exports which constituted the backbone of Russian exports before the War. The Soviet Government was forced to fill the gap thus created by developing the export of industrial raw materials and finished goods—in spite of the fact that there is an acute shortage of these goods in the U.S.S.R.

As regards imports, it is a matter of particular pride and boast on the part of the Soviet leaders that these have, especially since the inauguration of the Five Years Plan, assumed an increasingly “productive” character. This means that the quota of “productive imports”—comprising industrial equipment, raw and auxiliary materials and agricultural machinery and implements—has been given a decisive preference in the purchase of Soviet trade organs abroad, and has been steadily increasing, both absolutely and relatively; while, conversely,

the quota of imported consumers' goods has been reduced to a minimum. According to official Soviet figures this process is illustrated as follows:

	1913	1928-9	1929-30
Productive imports	64.8%	84.8%	86.8%
Imports of consumers' goods.....	28.8%	14.7%	13.0%
Other merchandise	6.4%	0.5%	0.2%

This new trend in Soviet foreign trade was the result of a deliberate policy on the part of the Soviet Government—a policy which sacrifices the most urgent and legitimate needs of its own people to the requirements of a too-rapid industrialization under the Five Years Plan. The extent to which this policy of “self-blockade”—at least, as far as consumers' goods are concerned—is being carried, can be gathered from the following figures, giving an instructive comparison of the quantities of certain commodities—impossible to regard as “luxuries”—imported in 1912 and 1930 respectively.

	1912 (In thousands of tons)	1930
Rice	127.25	1.6
Tea	66.5	23.0
Coffee	11.5	0.35
Lemons and Oranges.....	98.9	none
Textile goods	41.1	none

It might be argued—and this is the argument actually brought forward by the Soviet leaders—that the country and its people are called upon to make these heavy sacrifices in personal consumption in order to accelerate the pace of the country's industrialization; which will, in turn, bring about, within a certain space of time, greater prosperity and—this is always particularly emphasized—the economic liberation of the Soviet Union from Capitalist countries.

Soviet Dumping

The question of Soviet dumping has become a matter of controversy, in practically all Capitalist countries, during the last two or three years. This does not necessarily imply, however, that there has previously been no such thing as “dumping” in the practice of the Soviet foreign trade. To begin with, so long as one understands by “dumping” export sales at prices below those ruling in the domestic market, such has commonly occurred ever since the Soviet Union entered foreign markets on a large scale. Significantly enough, the fact itself has on several occasions been confirmed by the Soviet economists, and by the Soviet Press.

It has been pointed out that grain, eggs, flax, butter and lumber are

exported at a loss. In a report of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate on the operation of the Export and Import plan in 1925-6 the following occurs: "In respect of the main exported articles, transactions were carried on without profits during the economic year 1925-26. Some exported goods were sold at a loss."¹

With regard to the following year, 1926-27, Larin, a leading Communist and prominent Soviet economist, in his interesting book "Private Capital in the U.S.S.R." quotes official data (furnished by the Commissariat of Finance) according to which, "out of a total export value of Rbles. 770,000,000 in the year 1926-27, goods to the value of Rbles. 345,000,000, or 44% of the total, were exported at a loss. Out of the latter, Rbles. 235,000,000 worth was exported at a *heavy* loss."

Soviet dumping began to attract more public attention when the Soviets started to "dump" all sorts of *manufactured* goods, including matches, soap, rubber footwear, textiles, electric bulbs, etc. By way of preliminary remark, it should be stated that in this particular case it is more than ever necessary to issue a warning against the indiscriminate use—in speaking of the economic conditions obtaining in the U.S.S.R.—of terms borrowed from the "Capitalist" system; such terms as trust, dumping and so forth.

The motive underlying dumping in the practice of Capitalist trusts and cartels is to obtain a better utilization of the capacity of the industrial plant, and thus reduce the overhead costs and increase profits. This implies two natural checks upon Capitalist dumping which it is important to bear in mind when speaking of Soviet dumping. In the first place, a Capitalist manufacturer will never dump goods abroad which he can sell in the domestic market at higher prices; nor will he sink his price beyond a certain limit, dictated by the necessity of showing a profit on the gross sales of his total production, even though part of this be sold at a loss.

Soviet dumping does not comply with any of these conditions. In the first place, the Soviet Government is exporting goods which could be sold at home at considerably higher prices; and even goods of which there is so acute a shortage that their consumption has been rationed. Secondly, the loss which the Soviet Foreign Trade Monopoly sustains on a single group, or even several groups, of commodities exported is of no great consequence; since the Soviet State, owing to its monopoly of foreign trading, is in the peculiar position of being able to conduct its entire export at a loss—of course, in terms of Soviet rubles—provided that it can make that loss good at some other point of its economic system by means of taxation, the profits of industrial enterprises, or some other expedient.

In view of this, the question of the specific motives underlying Soviet dumping is of secondary importance. The immediate motive which forces the Soviet Government to sell its goods, in some instances, at any price obtainable is the necessity of obtaining foreign currency at

¹ "Economic Life," September 1, 1929.

short notice, in view of the chronically precarious state of Soviet financial credits abroad. Whether this fundamental motive is sometimes mingled with the desire to upset the markets of the Capitalist world in order to produce unemployment and disorder is, for obvious reasons, difficult to prove in individual cases. It is enough, however, to remark that—whatever the immediate motive might have been—such consequences can be, and have actually been, produced by Soviet exports. In view of the “non-economic” character of these exports, and the absence of any natural economic limit upon their amount, it may undoubtedly be said that Soviet dumping does constitute a serious danger to the economic system of the world.

The potential dangers ensuing from Soviet dumping have been realized, on various occasions, by different countries. Some European countries (France, Belgium, Hungary, Rumania), have passed retaliatory measures. The question of international action in this matter was discussed at a session of the League of Nations at Geneva in 1930; Soviet dumping has been one of the important topics at the Ottawa Conference. Nevertheless, all attempts at creating a “united front” of Capitalistic countries to oppose Soviet dumping have hitherto failed. One of the fundamental causes of this failure is, no doubt, the fact that certain countries—as consumers of goods which they do not produce themselves and want to buy at the lowest price, irrespective of origin—welcome Soviet dumping. So far the rivalries of Capitalistic states have proved stronger than their realization of the common danger resulting from the Communists’ control of the natural resources of a country occupying one-sixth of the earth’s surface.

Planning of Foreign Trade

The planning of foreign trade is an important element of the Soviet system of planned economy.

Whatever the achievements and shortcomings of Soviet planning may have been in other fields of economic activity, it is obvious that the planning of foreign trade is fraught with special dangers and difficulties. To “plan” the volume or value of operations in foreign trade, where many important factors are entirely beyond all control of the Soviet Government, has, actually, proved to be impossible. World markets decided upon what prices the Soviet Government should receive for the goods it was selling; they also determined the prices which the Soviet importing organizations had to pay for the machines and other goods they purchased. The uncertainty was further accentuated by the fact that, in spite of all the success of industrial exports, the bulk of Soviet exports still consisted of agricultural produce, in respect of which the result of the crops largely determined the amount of goods available—even when the Soviets undertook to curb domestic consumption.

The developments of the year 1925-26—i. e. of the period when the NEP was at its height—may be taken as characteristic in this respect. The Control figures for that year had planned exports to the amount

of Rbles. 1,059,000,000 and imports to that of Rbles. 1,009,000,000. The programme of industrial production was based on this forecast. The fact that the export programme could not be carried out only became clear in February 1926; four months after the beginning of the corresponding economic year which formerly began on October 1. The export plan was at once reduced from Rbles. 1,059,000,000 to Rbles. 720,000,000. But in the meanwhile import-licenses had been issued, to various Soviet purchasing organizations, to the amount of Rbles. 500,000,000; and the bulk of these orders had actually been placed with foreign manufacturers; so that the subsequent revision and readjustment of the import plan could only be effected at the expense of certain branches of industry—which were forced sharply to curtail their production programmes in view of the impossibility of importing the necessary raw materials.

However, the most important and fateful discrepancy between actual exports and the plans drawn up in Moscow appeared in 1931, when the full weight of world-depression began to be felt. In spite of an 11% increase in the volume of exports during the first half of 1931 (as compared with the corresponding period of the preceding year), the value of exports for the year declined by 22%.

The greatest defect of the planning system in the domain of foreign trade was that during eleven years only three actually showed a favourable trade-balance. The accumulated deficit which resulted from this series of adverse trade-balances, and which was temporarily covered by credits obtained in foreign countries, is one of the main reasons for the strained condition of Soviet finance which became apparent during the summer and autumn of 1931.

Credits and Balance of Payments

As already indicated, the huge deficit in the trade-balance of the U.S.S.R. accumulated during the last ten years could only be covered by the ever-increasing credits granted by foreign manufacturers and, to a large and also increasing extent, guaranteed by various Governments—notably the German: which guarantees to the German manufacturer 70% of the amount of the Soviet order.

If the U.S.S.R. was losing heavily on her exports owing to an unprecedented fall of prices in the world-markets as a result of the depression, she was at the same time benefitting by this depression: inasmuch as both manufacturers and Governments were particularly anxious to secure Soviet orders in order to keep their plants busy and avoid a further swelling of the already high unemployment figures. Under these conditions the Soviet Government was, though reluctantly, granted such terms of credit, as, in more normal circumstances, it could scarcely have hoped to obtain. The total of Soviet foreign indebtedness (long-term credits alone) by Aug. 1, 1932, may be roughly estimated at Rbles. 1,400,000,000, or \$700,000,000, more than one-half of this amount consisting of German credits.

In estimating the balance of payments effected by the U.S.S.R. it must be kept in mind that it cannot rely upon any "invisible exports," apart from the comparatively insignificant receipts of tourist traffic during the last few years. Therefore, to determine the extent of its balance of payments it is necessary to add the amounts spent by the Soviet Government for the chartering of foreign vessels (these have been estimated by Soviet statisticians at Rbles. 50-60 million *per annum*) and the amounts—which it is difficult, if not impossible to determine—expended on the maintenance of Soviet Commercial delegations abroad, in subsidies to Communist parties in foreign countries, and in other similar ways. Consequently, the deficit in the U.S.S.R.'s balance of payment is actually greater than the amount by which imports have exceeded exports.

How did the Soviet Government cover the accumulated deficit of its balance of foreign payments during the last three years?

In the first place, this was partly covered by the exports of gold—which, between 1928 and 1931, amounted to some Rbles. 300,000,000. Strangely enough, these exports were not shown in the monthly statements of the Soviet State Bank.

Secondly, the deficit was partly offset by the fact that both the amount and the period of credits obtained by the Soviet Government abroad were increased, especially during 1931. Thus Germany extended the maximum period of credits guaranteed by the Reich from 24 to 28 months.

Considerable speculation has been rife lately with regard to the eventual ability of the Soviet Government to meet its obligations in full. Without venturing any prophecies in this respect—which are particularly risky in view of the many unknown quantities—it may be useful to indicate the main factors which will determine the ability of the U.S.S.R. to meet her foreign obligations in the coming years. The question of the maturing of these obligations is of great importance. At present only Germany has published exact figures on this point. They indicate that the Soviet Union will have to meet notably heavy maturities in the last quarter of 1932. According to official data, the nearest Soviet maturities in Germany are distributed as follows over the period from Oct. 1, 1931 to Jan. 1, 1933: 1931 fourth quarter—\$9,500,000; 1932: first quarter—\$13,100,000; second quarter \$18,600,000; third quarter—\$19,500,000; fourth quarter—\$39,300,000. Total for 1932—\$90,500,000 (Rbles. 181,000,000).

No exact figures are available for other countries, but it may be said in a general way that in the second half of 1932 the Soviet Government will have to make provision for meeting heavy liabilities in most countries where it has heretofore obtained large credits.

As already mentioned, the U.S.S.R. has been able, notably in Germany, to cover during the last few years the increased deficit in its balance of trade by an extension of the volume of foreign credits and

of the period for which these are granted.¹ It has had to reckon with a serious *volte-face* in both respects in the year 1932. Foreign manufacturers have lately been showing a growing reluctance to do business except on cash terms; when credits were still granted they were in most cases not extended beyond a period of 6 to 9 months. Germany, in her present financial straits, will not—to say the least of it—be able to increase her credits beyond their present volume; and she has already announced her firm resolution of not granting fresh guarantees until old obligations are met by the U.S.S.R. Great Britain is adopting the same policy, reducing the maximum limit of the guarantee of Soviet export credits from 24 to 12 months, and gradually reducing the amounts guaranteed from the original £12,000,000 to £6,000,000.²

As the result of the World-depression the U.S.S.R. is meeting with increasing difficulty in disposing of its goods in foreign markets. Soviet exports dropped from Rbles. 1,036,400,000 in 1930 to Rbles. 811,200,000 in 1931. At the same time the tonnage of exports increased from 21,500,000 to 21,800,000. It may be concluded that increased dumping, whether of agricultural or manufactured products, leads only to a further fall of prices in importing countries.

The difficulties with which the Soviet Government is confronted may be partly off-set by the advantages and facilities which its control of all the resources of the country, and the “manoeuvring” of a foreign trade monopoly, offer in case of emergency. Yet even these are incapable of obviating the effect of an eventual failure of the U.S.S.R. crops, or of a financial and business crisis unprecedented in the economic annals of the last century.

APPENDIX A—RUSSIAN-AMERICAN TRADE

Russian-American Trade Before the War

Before the War, the trade relations between Russia and the United States were only partially developed, and America occupied one of the rearmost places in the foreign trade of the Russian Empire. Thus according to Russian statistics the United States only took 0.9% of Russian exports and supplied only 3.5% of the goods imported into Russia.

It must be remembered, however, that the substantial part, if not the majority of Russo-American trade was carried on *via* Germany, not only in the geographical sense of transit through German territory, but also through the medium of German firms. This accounts for the fact that the Russo-American export and import trade was in reality larger than appeared from the Russian statistics—the latter not indicating the country of origin correctly.

¹ Also by payments in gold.

² Rbles. 120,000,000 and 60,000,000 at par. The depreciation of Sterling affects Soviet credits in Great Britain adversely.

To gain a correct impression of Russian-American foreign trade before the War it is therefore preferable to turn to U.S. statistics; which, though also incomplete, are nevertheless nearer the truth than the Russian. During the last nine years before the War the commerce of the United States with Russia exhibits the following developments:

<i>Years</i>	<i>Exports from Imports to U.S.</i>		
	<i>U.S. to Russia</i>	<i>from Russia</i>	<i>Balance</i>
	<i>(in millions of rubles)</i>		
1906	37.6	27.6	— 10.0
1907	43.6	35.4	— 8.2
1908	36.8	22.8	— 14.0
1909	37.6	23.6	— 14.0
1910	35.6	37.6	+ 2.0
1911	49.4	27.4	— 25.0
1912	45.4	44.2	— 1.2
1913	53.0	58.6	+ 5.6
1914	62.6	46.6	— 16.0

The explanation of this slow development of mutual trade relations is no doubt to be sought in the economic structure of the two countries. The United States and Russia were both large exporters of foodstuffs and raw materials. Their exports were more of a competitive than a complementary nature. On the other hand, with the important exception of cotton and a few minor products, Russia offered no market for the staple American exports. The United States were just entering the world-markets as exporters of machinery and manufactured goods generally—they were as yet unable to compete with Germany, which had secured the lion's share of Russian business, and occupied a quasi-monopolistic position in the supply of machinery and other equipment, for which the rapidly-growing Russian industry offered a promising market. Germany's dominating position in this respect was supported, apart from her geographical situation, by old economic and cultural ties which did not exist between Russia and the far-distant American continent. Thus American exports of machinery to Russia were chiefly limited to agricultural machines and implements, a line in which European industry was unable to compete with the more advanced American mass-production.

In the years immediately preceding the War, a tendency towards closer economic relations between the United States and Russia became manifest. It was indicated, in the first instance, by the rapid development of direct trade relations, and a mutual endeavour to eliminate the German middleman. This tendency was considerably furthered by the opening of two direct steamship lines from Russian Baltic ports to New York (the Russian Volunteer Fleet, a Government-owned steamship company, and the Russian East-Asiatic Steamship Company, a Russian corporation financed by Danish capital). These new lines were also able to secure a substantial share in the transport of Russian emi-

grants to the United States, a traffic which had previously been the virtual monopoly of the German shipping companies.

Secondly, shortly before the War, big American manufacturing corporations began to open up their own Russian plants, with the view of saving import duties and ocean freight. Prominent among these were the plants of the Singer Manufacturing Company at Podolsk and the International Harvester Corporation at Lubertzy (both in the neighbourhood of Moscow).

It can be considered as certain that, had it not been for the War and the Revolution, a direct and steadily growing Russian-American trade would have been the outcome of these first steps, and that American capital and enterprise would have become an important factor in the industrialization and economic progress of Russia. Unfortunately, this process was interrupted by the War.

It is true that the War, with its consequent demand for war materials by Russia, swelled American exports to that country from Rbles. 62,600,000 in 1914 to Rbles. 938,000,000 in 1916. This increase in American exports to Russia—which was accompanied by an almost complete cessation of Russian imports to the U.S.A. (Rbles. 31,400,000 in 1914, and Rbles. 17,400,000 in 1916)—had, however, little connection with normal trade relations. Besides, the Bolshevik Revolution and the ensuing repudiation of all debts and liabilities towards the U.S., as towards other countries, brought this war-time boom of Russian-American trade to an abrupt end. The subsequent years of Civil War, the blockade and general distortion of the whole machinery of Russian foreign trade during the first years of the new regime, led to an almost complete interruption of American trade with Russia.

Soviet-American Trade

The trade relations were resumed—if one disregards sporadic transactions in the years 1922 to 1924—on an entirely new basis after the formation in New York of the Amtorg Trading Corporation on May 28th, 1924. The Amtorg, owned and controlled by the Soviet Government, though officially a private American concern, was to become, during the following years, the only channel of Soviet-American Trade.

The amount of this trade during the last five years may be seen from the following table ¹:

Years	<i>Exports of U.S.A. Imports to U.S.A. to the U.S.S.R. from the U.S.S.R. (in millions of rubles)</i>	
1926	99.8	28.2
1927	129.8	25.8
1928	148.2	28.0
1929	170.0	45.0
1930	228.8	48.8
1931	229.9	22.7

¹ Compiled from American statistics.

The substantial growth of American exports to the Soviet Union in the five years under review was a reflection of the emphasis which the Soviet Government placed on the necessity for assuring the cooperation of American technique in carrying out the industrialization programme of the Five Years Plan. Consequently, imports of American machinery acquired a growing importance in the import trade of the Soviet Union during 1929-30; the United States, for the first time outstripped Germany—with total imports valued at Rbles. 280,000,000 as against Germany's Rbles. 234,000,000. This advantage was, however, not maintained in the year 1931, owing mainly to the extensive credit-facilities granted in that year to the German manufacturers by the German Government; while American firms showed a growing reluctance to extend long-term credits to the Soviets.

Without going into details, it is of interest briefly to summarize the outstanding features of Russian-American trade as at present carried on.

1. In conformity with the general one-sided composition of Soviet foreign trade which is manifest in the prevalence of machinery and other industrial equipment in the total imports of the Soviet Union, the exports of the United States consists, to an overwhelming degree, of machinery and vehicles. In 1930 such accounted for Rbles. 186,300,000, or 82%, of the total American exports to Russia. This one-sided specialization of American exports, which has been further accentuated by the almost complete cessation of the export of cotton since the beginning of 1930 (as the result of the efforts of the Soviet Government to promote cotton growing in Central Asia), has two important consequences: in the first place, it artificially limits the number of industries and firms participating in exports to the U.S.S.R.; secondly, the volume of these exports is entirely dependent on the success or failure of the Five Years Plan; if, in consequence of inherent financial difficulties, the Soviet Government should be forced to abandon or considerably slow down the construction of some of its mammoth plants, this will affect American exports to an extent which it is difficult, at present, to foresee.

2. Another feature of American-Soviet trade which ought to be mentioned in this connection is that it flows entirely through the channels of a monopolistic organization which is in a position to direct the stream of commerce into artificial channels. This accounts for the fact that orders placed by the Soviet Government are often shifted from one country to another, on considerations which have little or nothing to do with motives of commercial profit. This also is bound to deprive Soviet-American trade—as at present organized—of that element of continuity and stability which, in spite of all tariffs and other trade barriers, is inherent in the commercial relations of countries, the foreign trade of which is unhampered by politics.

3. It must further be remembered that, while dealings with a monopolistic trade organization may present certain advantages—inasmuch as it eliminates the question of individual credit-risks, it has the dis-

advantages of an *unhealthy concentration of risks* which is fraught with considerable danger. Therefore, the Soviet-American trade, in its present shape, not only lacks, as already indicated, that element of variety in exported commodities which characterizes normal trade-relations between other countries but also that distribution of credit-risks which is essential to sound export-finance.

APPENDIX B—ANGLO-RUSSIAN TRADE

The Beginnings of Anglo-Russian Trade

So far as can be ascertained, commercial intercourse between Great Britain and Russia originated in the sixteenth century, as an episode in the history of maritime discovery.

In those days, it was a matter of necessity for the private trader to go about his business prepared for all contingencies; such as battle, murder, and sudden death. In consequence, it was natural that traders should find themselves practically compelled, by force of circumstances, to form trading associations—"chartered companies," sharing risks and expenses, and backed by the Government. Such was the origin of the trading corporations which were formed, at this period, both in England and in other countries. The first English company was: The Company of Merchant Adventurers¹—1553.

The Company of Merchant Adventurers came to be known as the Moscovy Company; and, later, as the Russia Company—under which title it still existed, albeit somewhat obscurely, at the date of the Great War. How it obtained that title is somewhat curious.

The original intention of its founders was to open a trade with the East by way of northern Russia, whose extent and climatic conditions were practically unknown. There seemed to be at least a possibility that the Far Eastern seas could be reached by sailing along the northern shores of Asia. The Company, accordingly, determined to send an expedition to attempt this. Needless to say, it did not succeed but it laid the foundations of a lasting trade with Russia.

Ever since Richard Chancellor reached Arkhangelsk in 1553 Anglo-Russian trade increased annually in volume, except during the Crimean War. The nature of the trade changed but little: Russian raw materials (flax, hemp, timber, furs, foodstuffs etc.) were imported into Great Britain, and manufactured goods exported to Russia.

Although occasionally fluctuating, it exhibited one fixed characteristic—a trade balance permanently adverse (except in one or two abnormal years) to Great Britain. This was, however, far more than balanced—before the Revolution—by the "invisible exports," the interest on British capital invested in Russia. Such capital became available, in the

¹ The full original title of this company, as it appears in the articles of association, was "The Mysterie and Companie of the Merchants adventurers for the discoverie of Regions, Dominions, Islands and places unknown."

seventies, for many enterprises in Russia; both for railway construction (Great Britain also supplied much of the material for this) and also for such purposes as the exploitation of Russia's minerals (notably her copper) and oil.

Pre-War Years

If a cause be sought for the comparatively slow growth of Anglo-Russian trade during the second half of the nineteenth century, it will be found in the fact that Great Britain then encountered a formidable competitor in Germany.

In the palmy days of Great Britain's industries—say, roughly, between 1840 and 1880—she could find markets, more or less, wherever she could ship her goods. There was little need to study markets, or to modify products in conformity with the demands of consumers. In the majority of cases, the overseas customer must buy British goods or go without—he could find no substitute at a competitive price. This Elysian state of matters could not, of course, last very long: but it endured long enough to engender in too many British firms that unfortunate "take it or leave it" attitude of mind which has not yet entirely vanished, even under the fierce stress of modern competition for world-markets. Its main features may roughly be defined as an unwillingness to study or meet the actual requirements of any particular market, a curtness in business correspondence, and a tardiness in the dispatch of goods.

Great Britain's commercial dealings with Russia during this period did not fail to exhibit these stigmata, and others; and full use was taken of this fact by her more enterprising competitor. Possessing the great advantage of contiguity, Germany enhanced this in many ways: by a careful study of the Russian market, by an admirable system of clearing and forwarding agencies, by an excellent commercial intelligence system, and by affording her traders powerful official aid and protection through her consul service—all these being facilities of which British merchants trading with Russia were practically destitute. It is not in the least surprising, therefore, that from about 1890 to 1914 Germany should have secured a large share of that trade with Russia which Great Britain had come to regard as being more or less her exclusive right. That the fact was not more apparent in the trade-returns may partly be due to belated British efforts on German lines; but there can be little doubt that the principal cause of this was that factor which has so often proved the greatest recommendation of British products—their superior quality and endurance.

Indo-Russian Trade

Before dealing with the effect of the War, and its aftermath, upon Anglo-Russian trade it may be well to devote a little space to a side-line—the trade between Russia and India. This was greater in amount, in the years immediately preceding the War, than might at first be sup-

posed, particularly in view of the fact that direct transport of goods between India and Russia, via Afghanistan, was impracticable.

Actually, the volume of trade—almost exclusively imports into Russia from India—is not very easy to ascertain. Much of it went in German bottoms, *via* Hamburg; this being due to the fact that, while, by agreement between the various shipping companies, freights from various Indian ports to Hamburg, and to London or Hull, were almost identical, freights from Hamburg to the Baltic ports were one-half (and sometimes even one-third) of the similar freights from English ports. The Germans were thus enabled to obtain the lion's share of the carrying trade; and—more important—of the middleman's profit. From a careful analysis of the data, an official report published by the Indian Government in 1917¹ indicates that while the total value of Russia's imports in 1913 was Rbles 1,454,000,000, that of her exports from India was Rbles. 36,600,000.² The chief articles supplied by India were tea, coffee, rice, pepper, raw hides, copra and jute. Of these, tea was shipped to Vladivostok, thence proceeding *via* the Siberian Railway; the remaining produce, as already explained, chiefly found its way to the Baltic ports, *via* Hamburg.

The War

The outbreak of the War in 1914 produced, of course, great changes in the volume, and also the route, of Anglo-Russian trade. Imports from Russia diminished to one-half, or less, of their pre-War volume, while exports from Great Britain correspondingly increased. The latter increase, however, was more in declared value than in tonnage, since it is mainly attributable to cargoes of munitions—some of the most costly of all manufactured articles. In 1916 the trade-balance, for the first time, was in favour of Great Britain—her exports to Russia totalling Rbles. 343,309,950³ against imports of Rbles. 182,518,380; while in the succeeding year the pendulum swung still further the same way (exports Rbles. 527,394,940, imports Rbles. 162,620,160).

These imports and exports were transported, practically without exception, by sea—along the route which Chancellor had pioneered more than three centuries earlier. Owing to the failure of the Dardanelles expedition, and to Germany's practical closure of the Baltic, Anglo-Russian trade was compelled once more to take the old route round the North Cape; a disadvantage intensified by the unprecedented enterprise shown by the German submarine service, and only partially offset, in 1916, by the completion of the Murmansk railway.

The Revolution, and Its Aftermath

After the hectic trading activity of 1916–17 came the debacle—the pitiful collapse of Imperial Russia, the overthrow of the Provisional

¹ Report on Indo-Russian Trade. Simla, Government Central Press, 1917.

² In round figures.

³ In round figures.

Government, the seizure of power by the Communists and the emergence, of the new State—the U.S.S.R. In such times it would have occasioned no great surprise, to a detached observer, if Anglo-Russian commerce had ceased as suddenly and completely as it did during the Crimean War. This, however, it did not do. True, Great Britain's imports from Russia fell, in 1918, to Rbles. 55,850,080, and her exports to the meagre total of Rbles. 3,075,360¹; but during the Civil War period both rose again to amounts comparable with the pre-War figures. But with the final withdrawal of the British forces from Arkhangelsk in 1919, they sank to the lowest joint total ever recorded since the Napoleonic era.

De Facto Recognition

It is probable that there are few events in history which, at first sight, appear more surprising than Great Britain's *de facto* recognition of the Soviet Government, on March 16, 1921, and her simultaneous conclusion of a trading agreement with the U.S.S.R. That State had recently, with a stroke of the pen, repudiated all debts incurred by the Imperial Government; and had, moreover, expropriated the Russian properties of the various foreign associations which were working concessions obtained from that Government. So far as Great Britain was concerned, the result of this action was a loss to her which was and is, officially estimated at the respectable figure of Rbles. 17,462,741,820, (about £1,750,000,000).

The British Government, however, had (one must presume) become convinced that since Great Britain was not, technically, at war with the Soviet Union, she could not prohibit commerce between her nationals and that country, while, by declining to enter into official relations she was leaving them very much in the lurch. In addition Great Britain, after the post-War boom of 1919–20, was in the throes of a correspondingly severe trade-slump.

Commercial relations, accordingly, were resumed; and a considerable—if fluctuating—volume of import and export trade has since been transacted. The fluctuations are, to some extent, symptomatic of political events. Thus the sudden increase in 1924 and succeeding years coincides with the *de jure* recognition accorded to the U.S.S.R. by Great Britain on February 1, 1924 (shortly after Lenin's death). Following upon this a number of important British firms accepted Soviet orders on long-credit terms, ranging from three to five years. A projected Russian loan, however, which (coupled with an agreement providing for the gradual repayment, by the Soviet Government, of certain pre-War debts) was sponsored by the British (Labour) Government later in the same year, fell through as a result of that Government's heavy defeat in the so-called "Zinoviev letter" election. Another event was the denunciation by Great Britain on May 24, 1927 (as the result of the

¹ In round figures.

Arcos¹ raid) of the 1921 trading agreement. A diminution in trade, particularly exports, naturally followed.

The British Trade Delegation to Russia, 1929.

Some two years after this event, a British Trade Delegation visited the U.S.S.R. for the purpose of obtaining first-hand information. Consisting of 84 members, representing over 1,500 British firms, it reached Moscow at the end of March, 1929, and remained in the U.S.S.R. some seven weeks.

The delegation was supplied by M. Piatakov, acting Chairman of the State Bank, with figures indicating that the share of Russia's import trade which had formerly fallen to Great Britain was now passing to other countries—particularly Germany and the U.S.A. His percentages were as follows² :

Percentage of U.S.S.R. imports supplied by various nations:

	1925-6	1926-7	1927-8
Great Britain	18.6%	15.5%	5.5%
Germany	25.5%	25.2%	29.5%
U.S.A.	17.7%	22.9%	22.1%

He went on to point out that under the Five Years Plan (which had just been brought into operation) the U.S.S.R.'s requirements from foreign countries had been enormously increased. His Government, he stated, could easily place orders in Great Britain amounting to Rbles. 1,500,000,000—while, if British capital would take up concessions and contracts in the U.S.S.R., this figure might even be increased to Rbles 2,000,000,000 (in round figures).

The delegation replied that there seemed no likelihood of the U.S.S.R. obtaining any financial aid on a large scale (either as a loan, or as private investments) from Great Britain unless the U.S.S.R. first made some effort to satisfy the claims of British nationals. They did not add—perhaps they felt it to be sufficiently obvious—that unless the proposed loan amounted to more than Rbles. 17,462,741,820—the present official figure of the U.S.S.R.'s debt to British nationals and the British Government—a final adjustment of the transaction would necessitate the U.S.S.R.'s sending money to Great Britain, and not *vice versa*.

Recent Developments

It may be noted that the rupture of relations between Great Britain and the Soviet Government in 1927 did not connote a complete cessation of trade between the two countries. Moreover, on April 16, 1930 Great Britain again concluded a provisional commercial agreement with

¹ The Anglo-Russian Trading Corporation, London.

² These figures are taken from "Report of the Anglo-Russian Committee of the British Trade Delegation to Russia"—London, 1929.

the Soviet Government, while in October of the same year negotiations were opened upon the subject of the Russian pre-War debts. However, the effect of these diplomatic moves upon the commercial situation was considerably off-set by the result of the Lena Goldfields arbitration. The finding of the Commission was an award of Rbles. 130,000,000 to the Lena Goldfields Co.¹; an award which the Soviet Government has shown no intention whatever of paying.

But if unsuccessful—and rather naturally so—in attracting the British investor—the Soviet Government has had no difficulty in having the requirements mentioned by M. Piatakov met, so far as it may need this, by British manufacturers. The Five Years Plan is discussed elsewhere in this book, and will only be referred to incidentally here; it is sufficient to say that the heavy imports which it calls for in the shape of material are being supplied by British firms, as well as those of other nations, on terms of deferred payment—the Soviet order being backed, in great part, by the British Government's guarantee (Trade Facilities Act).

Yet, in spite of this demand on the part of Russia for British machinery, etc. the trade-balance is still heavily in favour of the U.S.S.R. At present, Great Britain takes something like 30% of all U.S.S.R. exports—a much greater proportion than any other nation.

The Future of Anglo-Soviet Trade

The U.S.S.R. is at present obtaining from Great Britain, as from other countries, large supplies of material designed to be employed in the gigantic task of transforming the Union into a modern industrial nation.

As such, her competitors, of course, would chiefly be Great Britain, the U.S.A., Germany and France. But there is one fundamental point of difference between the first-named and the other three. None could regard with equanimity the advent of a new and formidable competitor for the bulk of the world's export trade. But there is only one to whom export trade is, literally, a matter of life and death. The U.S.A., Germany and France all produce more food than their own nationals require; a serious diminution of their export trade would impoverish them, but their national life would still continue on a smaller scale and with a reduced standard of living. But Great Britain cannot feed a quarter of her population; and she must buy food for them, in great measure, by her exports.

A successful outcome of the Five Years Plan, then would not mean to Great Britain simply a reduction in the amount of goods purchased from her by the U.S.S.R. It might, not at all improbably, connote the imminent loss of a great portion of her overseas markets—markets glutted with U.S.S.R. goods, perhaps not inferior in quality to her own, and available at prices with which she could not begin to compete.

If matters should reach this stage, it is more than doubtful, in fact,

¹ A British company, holding a concession for gold mining in Siberia.

whether any nation could successfully compete with U.S.S.R. production.

Volume of Anglo-Soviet Trade

The following table gives the gross value, in rubles (and in round figures) of the British imports from, and exports to Russia during the period 1900-1932. The figures have been obtained from the annual "Statistical Abstracts" issued by the Board of Trade.¹

The table does not include gold, specie or bullion, imported or exported, nor does it cover the Indo-Russian trade or any other subsisting between Russia and British Dominions or colonies.

In general, it may be taken that the percentage of imports reexported was slight in comparison with that of British imports (from other countries) reexported to the U.S.S.R. Thus for the last normal year (1913) the figures are:

	<i>Rubles</i>
Value of goods imported from Russia and retained in Great Britain.....	402,705,390
Value of such goods reexported to other countries.....	20,986,550
Percentage of goods reexported.....	5.2%
Total value of goods exported from Great Britain to Russia.....	276,939,530
Value of foreign (reexported) goods in above total.....	95,912,700
Percentage of reexported goods.....	34.7%

<i>Year</i>	<i>(in rubles in round figures)</i>	
	<i>Imports</i>	<i>Exports</i>
1900	249,839,520	163,604,750
1901	219,035,740	142,109,530
1902	256,739,958	138,927,720
1903	309,329,970	161,639,120
1904	329,808,250	152,851,570
1905	340,196,850	148,840,500
1906	314,972,750	159,420,570
1907	328,700,900	190,634,210
1908	297,192,490	205,052,080
1909	379,700,850	183,258,440
1910	436,446,480	212,207,270
1911	431,544,110	223,166,790
1912	405,385,320	217,414,860
1913	402,705,390	276,939,530
1914	217,921,860
1915	214,249,980	248,972,880
1916	182,518,380	343,309,950
1917	162,620,160	527,394,940
1918	55,854,080	3,075,360
1919	147,392,510	174,940,670
1920	312,428,870	167,433,830
1921	16,671,333	33,912,900
1922	68,236,360	46,110,270
1923	54,687,980	44,811,260

Outbreak of the Great War. Data lacking re imports.

Trade balance favours Great Britain.

Trade balance favours Great Britain.

Trade balance favours Great Britain. Highest recorded figure for exports.

Lowest recorded figure for exports. Communists seize power.

Civil War in Russia.

Civil War in Russia.

U.S.S.R. recognized *de facto* by Great Britain March 16, 1921.

¹ Those for 1929-1932 are from the "Accounts of Trade" issued by the same Department.

Year	(in rubles in round figures)		
	Imports	Exports	
1924	150,794,220	110,725,290	U.S.S.R. recognized <i>de jure</i> . Credits accorded.
1925	200,791,280	192,569,290	
1926	199,191,130	144,013,660	Diplomatic relations between U.S.S.R. and Great Britain severed 24, V, 1927.
1927	166,520,950	112,897,750	
1928	215,761,070	48,007,520	Relations resumed, April.
1929	264,874,990	65,420,330	
1930	342,350,020	92,913,010	For the first six months only.
1931	321,788,680	90,443,500	
1932	77,231,430	55,040,770	

COOPERATION

I

HISTORICAL SURVEY

The Artels

THE growth of the Russian cooperative movement in the nineteenth century had its roots in the *artels* (business combines of workers). Such trades as fishing, lumbering, primitive mining, etc. required the united effort of many hands under a single leader. It was not only necessary to regulate production, but also to distribute the profits fairly among the co-workers. The problem was solved by a special organization called the *artel*, which was very popular.

In addition to the fishing, timber and mining *artels*, agricultural *artels* figured prominently in Russian economic history. They assumed the form of organizations of neighbours to work on the common land, pooling their cattle and tools. The most popular *artels* were those associated with handicrafts. Wood, flax, hemp, wool, clay etc. were worked by country craftsmen, who devoted their enforced winter leisure to provide additional revenue for the family exchequer.

The *artels* usually lacked capital. In consequence, they often had to pledge their production to private individuals and firms. The cause of this weakness is clear—the *artel* movement had stopped at the primitive stage of its development. So long as the *artels* were merely some thousands of small discreet organizations, mutually exclusive and independent, they were powerless; had they attempted to amalgamate into larger unions their history would have been different.

The year 1865 marks the inauguration of actual cooperation, as now understood, in Russia. During the next half century, various different forms of cooperation speedily developed; but as these had no close association one with the other, it will be best to give a short history of each in turn.

Credit Cooperative Societies

In 1870 the Moscow Agricultural Society established a "Committee for the Protection of Village Credit, Productive and Consumers' Societies," which was to assist the new cooperative movement. In 1872, a branch was opened in St. Petersburg: and this, until 1904, played the leading part in the Russian cooperative movement.

During the first thirty years (1865–95) Credit Cooperative Societies

developed in Russia in the form of associations with large and compulsory subscriptions (from Rbles 50 to 100) which granted short-term loans (not exceeding nine months). Such form of loans was not very suitable for the agricultural population which still practised a natural economy. Money circulation was little developed, and cooperative societies which would grant long-term credit were absolutely indispensable. Yet at first such did not meet with any great measure of success. The chief reason for this, lay in the large proportion of bad debts. During the first thirty years of the movement, only 680 societies survived out of 1460.

The First Legislation

Investigation showed that the main cause of the trouble lay in the badly-drawn statutes of the societies. Early in the nineties the St. Petersburg branch of the Moscow Agricultural Society presented an important memorandum to the Government, which gave it very careful consideration. Shortly after the *Statute of the Institutions of Small Credit* was promulgated (June 1, 1895); it led to a complete reorganization of the Credit Cooperative Societies, and to the appearance of a new type of cooperative associations, which did not depend on subscriptions, the State Bank providing the necessary capital. The new law introduced a system of long-term credits (up to five years). These had to be secured upon the agricultural or industrial products of the borrower. The activities of the societies were enlarged. They were permitted to furnish their clients with raw materials as well as money, and to have an interest in the sale of goods. Finally, the State Bank was to exercise a general supervision over all their transactions.

Consumers' Cooperative Societies

Between 1865 and 1900, 850 Consumers' Cooperative Societies were formed all over Russia, but, by the end of the century, only half of them survived. Most of them were located in towns and industrial regions: only 22.6% in villages. The urban Consumers' Societies may be divided into three groups—workers', civil servants' and general—according to the composition of their membership.

The growth of the workers' societies was largely due to the interest shown by factory owners and the railway companies. The Government, in the same manner, befriended the Civil Service and Army and Navy Cooperative Societies. The peasants' societies received much assistance from the *Zemstvos* and the landowners.

The technical side of the village cooperative trade was very inefficient. Salaried salesmen ran most of the concerns. They generally accepted liberal commissions from wholesalers and frequently filled the shops with unsuitable goods, a proceeding which sent customers to other shops. In general, business in the cooperative shops was very poor, and their capital failed to increase. At this time the Consumers' Cooperative So-

cieties did not organize production—a feature which had greatly assisted the development of the Rochdale system in England.

Other Cooperative Societies

In the latter part of the nineteenth century, a few Agricultural Societies were founded; but, owing to the factitious nature of their constitutions, they failed to survive. Such were the Cheese-making Cooperative Societies which appeared in many of the northern and central Provinces in the sixties and seventies; and the Siberian Butter-making Cooperative Societies which were founded at the end of the nineteenth century and underwent extensive development in the twentieth.

The Crafts Cooperative Societies were largely organized by the Zemstvos but these were short-lived, owing to the defects in their trading system.

Finally, cooperative history records the existence of many cooperative societies of carpenters, shoemakers, book-binders, laundrymen, tailors, mechanics, etc. These were to be found chiefly in the great cities: St. Petersburg, Moscow, Odessa, Kharkov, and others.

In general, the cooperative activities of the nineteenth century may be described as tentative—as marking a period in which the field was merely surveyed with a view to future development.

II

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

THE pre-war years of the twentieth century were years of exuberant growth for the Russian Cooperative movement. It expanded and covered all Russian territory: it permeated all branches of the national economy; its organization was greatly improved by the creation of several important unions; and it attained great economic importance.

Historical and statistical records show that this great development in the cooperative movement was associated with the general improvement of the economic situation which followed the first Russian revolution (1905–06) and the Russian-Japanese War.

Credit Cooperative Societies

On June 7, 1904, the new “Statute of the Institutions of Small Credit” was inaugurated. While retaining the old form of the Credit Cooperative Societies, the new law simplified the formalities attending the formation of the new ones. The powers of the Zemstvos and municipalities were enlarged. State control was strengthened; and, most important of all, a comprehensive scheme was laid down for financing the Credit Cooperative Societies by the State. Later, from 1910 onwards, large sums—in the form of long-term loans—were made available at the State Savings Banks for the Credit Cooperative Societies, which were thus greatly strengthened.

By January 1, 1917, the number of Credit Cooperative Societies had reached 16,500. They were divided into Savings and Credit Societies (in the narrow sense of the word). The peak year was 1912, in which 2040 societies were formed.

The membership of the societies, in round figures totalled ten millions. The total turnover of these societies was approximately Rbles 1,000,000,000.

It is of interest to ascertain the sources of their capital; and the balance-sheets of the societies show that 60% was composed of deposits. In other words, the people willingly lent their savings to these institutions.

The results of cooperative work on such lines were very considerable. According to official figures, from 1909 to 1913 the loans advanced totalled Rbles 1,500,000,000—an average of Rbles 300,000,000 per annum. There is every reason to believe that the greater part of this vast amount of capital was used for the extension and improvement of peasant agriculture. The principle of "productive credit" was strictly maintained in the transactions of the societies. Half of the capital was lent in the form of short-term advances, and the remainder for terms varying from three to five years.

The Credit Societies, in addition to their purely financial transactions, turned their attention to supplying their members with agricultural machinery and to assisting in the disposal of their produce.

They got into touch with the largest firms manufacturing agricultural implements and acted as intermediaries between these and the smaller agricultural units. Frequently they organized hiring stations, where expensive agricultural machinery was available for the use of members.

Side by side with this new activity went a large growth of trading operations, at first chiefly in grain. Many societies erected granaries capable of containing from 300 to 1500 tons. In some cases, small elevators up to 3000 tons capacity, were erected. According to estimates in 1914, approximately 500,000 tons of cereals were marketed by cooperative societies. In the sugar growing regions, the societies made contracts for the collective supply of sugar-beet to the refineries. Some societies, too, traded in dried fruits, honey products, wine, preserved vegetables etc.

How Village Life Benefitted

Owing to the varied activities of the cooperative societies these became cultural centres in the villages. They purchased land or, more frequently, received it as a gift from the village communes, for the erection of their premises (offices, warehouses and granaries) and often organized experimental stations where the principles of animal and plant-breeding were demonstrated. A new feature in Russian cooperative work was the undertaking of auxiliary postal operations, if requested by the postal authorities.

Consumers' Cooperative Societies

Consumers' Cooperative Societies developed very rapidly in the twentieth century also. By January 1, 1917, the number of such societies was about 20,000,¹ comprising some 5,000,000 members. Their yearly turnover amounted to Rbles 1,500,000,000.

The Centrosoyuz

The development of the Moscow Union of Cooperative Societies, formed in 1898 as a local union, and afterwards reconstructed as the Central Union of Russian Cooperative Societies (Centrosoyuz), must be considered the most important feature in the development of the Consumers' Societies. The movement towards grouping the societies into unions soon acquired great impetus; by the middle of 1917 there were 250 unions of Consumers' Societies. Coincidentally with this, the activities of the Consumers' Societies underwent a new and important development. They gradually started forming their own productive enterprises, on a cooperative basis. The Centrosoyuz began by opening candy and inexpensive tobacco factories; while, little by little, progress was made in the manufacture of other goods for sale by the Consumers' Societies. Other unions took up the manufacture of soap, matches, leather goods, etc. Twelve thousand five hundred Consumers' Societies (62% of the total) joined these unions.

Agricultural Cooperation

Agricultural Cooperation may be divided into three categories—Agricultural Societies, Agricultural Associations, and Butter-making Societies.

The Agricultural Societies, confined their activity to agricultural education, and did not engage in economic activity. By January 1, 1917, they numbered 6132. Their development was chiefly encouraged by the Ministry of Agriculture, which gave them generous subsidies. On the other hand, the Agricultural Associations were engaged in trade, supplying goods to members and undertaking to dispose of their produce. By the middle of 1916 they numbered nearly 2,000, while there were 1,000 butter-factories in Russia proper, and 2,000 in Siberia, belonging to cooperative societies. The Siberian were on a very large scale, and represented an important factor in Siberian trade. Here the first cooperative butter factory was established late in the nineties; and in January 1908, the Union of Siberian Butter-making Artels was organized in the town of Kurgan. By the middle of 1915, these were 800. The Union opened an agency in London, and Siberian butter quickly achieved a good reputation in Great Britain.

The development of Crafts Cooperative Societies was comparatively slow, but it must be borne in mind that many such existed *de facto*, without a formal cooperative charter.

¹ Of these 27% were located in towns, and 73% in villages.

The Zemstvos and Cooperation

The participation of the Zemstvos in the movement proved of great advantage. The law of 1904 permitted the Zemstvos to establish small credit institutions with a view to financing various cooperative organizations. They availed themselves of this right very freely, and by 1917 quite half of the provincial and district Zemstvos had petty-credit institutions in operation; their total capital amounted to Rbles 100,000,000.

The Cooperative Banks

The Warsaw Bank of Cooperative Societies (est. 1910) was the first of its kind in the Russian Empire. Then in 1911 came the Moscow People's Cooperative Bank. These banks were organized on the basis of the Statutes of Joint-Stock-Banks.

The growth of the Moscow People's Cooperative Bank was remarkable; it rapidly became the financial centre of the Russian Cooperative movement. Beginning with a modest capital of Rbles 1,000,000 it had increased this by 1917 to Rbles 100,000,000, an increase, even taking in consideration the fall of the ruble, of not less than 50%.

A very active trading-department was a particular feature of this bank. It supplied the agriculturalists with goods and assisted them to dispose of their produce. This department was the model for later centres of agricultural cooperation. The Moscow Bank opened branches in London and New York, and all over Russia.

In 1915 the Central Association of Flax-growers was established in Moscow, with the assistance of the Cooperative Bank. It was an amalgamation of cooperative societies engaged in the flax business, chiefly in the provinces of Pskov, Novgorod and Tver. This organization grew with amazing rapidity; and, despite the difficult War-time conditions, it acquired a good name on the London market.

Other societies followed suit. By 1917 many agricultural cooperative associations had been formed in Moscow. Such were the Potato Union, dealing with potato growing and potato by-products; the Hemp Union, for the manufacture and disposal of hempen products, *Plodovostch* ("Fruit-vegetables"), a union which preserved vegetables and fruit and produced wine; and the Cattle Breeding Union. The All-Russian Union of Agricultural Cooperation (*Selskosoyuz*) was formed to supply various cooperatives with machinery and implements.

III

THE WAR AND REVOLUTION

THE War did not adversely affect the cooperative movement. After a small decline, chiefly noticeable in the towns, deposits began to increase

again. More money being in circulation, the Consumers' Societies increased their turnover. Those engaged in handling agricultural produce flourished exceedingly. The huge Russian armies absorbed great quantities of foodstuffs, and the cooperative societies became great military purveyors of flour, oats, hay, fat, and vegetables. The Crafts Societies also flourished. The armies required hundreds of thousands of sheep-skin coats, leather and felt boots, warm gloves, etc.

By 1917 the cooperative movement had attained great economic power. Its legal basis, however, still required strengthening; a uniform cooperative law was necessary. This was furnished by the Provisional Government.

Much was expected by the cooperators from the Revolution of March 1917. The leaders then sought to achieve the legal uniformity necessary for the progress of the movement.

A Uniform Cooperative Law

The idea of a uniform cooperative law had long been before the public mind. It was first discussed at the All-Russian Cooperative Congress held in 1908, when a special committee was formed to draw up a draft bill. This was ready by 1912, and was adopted at the St. Petersburg Congress of that year. A Congress held at Kiev, in 1913, presented to the bill legislature. However, it was not passed by the latter until December 1916, and then only by the Duma. It should have come before the Council of Empire in the following spring, but the Revolution intervened. An All-Russian Cooperative Congress held in Moscow in the beginning of March 1917, requested the new Government to pass the cooperative law without further delay—a request which was at once granted. The new law allowed cooperative societies to be formed by simple registration. But, under the conditions then existing, the new law was inadequate. It made no provision against a flooding of the movement by alien elements; hence a few months later public attention was drawn to the formation of pseudo cooperative societies, comprising persons who pursued nothing except their private interests.

The new law, however, favourably influenced the further unification of the societies. It is estimated that by the end of 1917 about 1,000 amalgamated cooperative unions, varying in importance and activities, existed in Russia.

First Effects of the Revolution

The Revolution of March 1917 affected the cooperative organizations unfavourably in two ways, psychologically and materially. Witnessing the general overhaul of the administration, the peasants and workers concluded that similar measures were called for in the cooperative societies. General meetings therefore, were hastily convened; and councilors and committeemen were ordered to resign on the pretext that they had served under the old regime, and therefore must be replaced. The new elections placed unworthy persons in control, a proceeding which

shattered the whole movement; customers began to lose confidence. The cooperators quickly realized their error, and by September the old, experienced workers were back at their posts but confidence could not so easily be reestablished.

The material decline of the movement was due to the fall of the ruble, the shortage of goods, and the disorganization of transport. The cooperative societies made heroic efforts to overcome the lack of goods by starting their own production but, owing to transport difficulties, their success was limited.

IV

COMMUNISM v. COOPERATION

THE Communist Party had a definite plan for reorganizing the whole cooperative system so as to dovetail it into their general scheme. Its leading feature was, to make cooperation a State institution. It postulated that the cooperative movement had not only to accept the general Communist programme of national reconstruction but had also to take an active part in that reconstruction.

The early pronouncements of the Communist Government on the subject of cooperation were imbued with a certain amount of goodwill. They showed a condescending recognition of its services to the nation. Cases of aggressive action towards cooperation by local Communists, however, soon became more and more frequent: cooperative factories, houses and buildings were seized and stocks confiscated. These acts were not officially approved by the central Government; it solemnly appealed to the people to refrain from destroying "the wealth of the people." This appeal had no effect, and the cooperative societies declined—victims of the prevailing anarchy.

The Communists began their projected reorganization of the cooperative societies with the Consumers' Societies. At the beginning of 1918 the Soviet Government decreed the organization of *Consumers' Communes*, which the entire population was compelled to join. These Consumers' Communes were subordinate to the Commissariat of Food, and were charged with the distribution of food and commodities among the population. They were not permitted to manufacture or buy goods; their activities were confined to distributing food rations.

Nationalization of Banks

The next decisive step was the nationalization of the Moscow People's Cooperative Bank.

After the forced nationalization of the private banks, that bank remained for a time in a somewhat privileged position, since it handled the financial business of the Commissariat of Food. In the course of time, the Bank found itself heavily in debt to the Government for sums

drawn from the current account of the Commissariat of Food: and in October, 1919, the Government issued an ultimatum, the Bank must either cover its debt within three weeks, or apply for nationalization. It was impossible to find many hundreds of millions of rubles at short notice, and by the decree of December 3, 1920 the Bank was nationalized.

The 1920 Decree

On January 27, 1920, a decree was promulgated ordering the fusion of all types of cooperative societies, which were then placed under the control of the Consumers' Union. The Credit Cooperative Societies were entirely abolished, the Government averring that they were "nests of petty bourgeoisie." The decree further outlined the reconstruction of the cooperative system. The All-Russian Union of Consumers' Societies was retained. All Crafts and Agricultural Unions, and their property, were merged in it. Provincial Unions of Consumers' Cooperatives (*Goubpotrebsoyuz*), were established under the central organization. Finally, the primary cooperative organizations suffered a change, the Consumers' Communes being replaced by the United Consumers' Cooperatives (EPO). The Credit Societies were rapidly liquidated, and their assets handed over to the Union of Consumers' Cooperative Societies.

The decree effecting these changes was a logical outcome of the Communists' policy at that period. It was intended that money should shortly disappear. The labour of the individual citizen was to be the main standard of value. Money, therefore, was replaced by special labour "log-books," entitling the workers to rations. All goods produced by cooperative bodies had to be placed at the disposal of the EPO which distributed them to the population, in accordance with notations in the "log-books." Theoretically, all was for the best in the best of all possible worlds but tragedy lurked in the obvious fact that the scheme was altogether impracticable, ignoring both human psychology and the force of tradition.

The 1920 decree could never be fully enforced; the merger of all cooperative societies did not take place; and, apart from the concentration of some societies under the same roof, the practical failure of the reform was speedily recognized by the Communists. Owing to the complete lack of goods, the branches of the Union of Consumers' Cooperative Societies closed, one after another. The end of the movement seemed imminent.

The NEP and Cooperation

The adoption of the New Economic Policy, however, gave cooperation a new lease of life as the old system was nominally restored and many of the old cooperative unions were reestablished.

In the Consumers' Cooperative Societies, subscriptions and voluntary membership were again legalized; the societies were permitted to ac-

cumulate working capital by attracting money from their members for investment and by collecting in advance against a later supply of goods. In turn, all three types of societies (Agricultural, Crafts and Credit) were restored; the last-named took the form of Savings Societies familiar to the people. The confiscated assets were returned; a General Council of Cooperation was organized; and The Moscow Cooperative Bank was revived under the name of Vsekokbank (Bank of all Branches of Cooperation).

One of the reasons for the revival of the cooperative societies was the Government's desire to secure a place in the International Cooperative Union. Till 1922, the Communists failed in this object. The International Union declared that there were no cooperative societies, in the accepted sense, in the Soviet Union. At the Basel Congress of 1922, the Soviet delegates, after presenting all the recent decrees affecting cooperation, convinced the Union that the cooperative movement in the Soviet Union was restored to a normal state, although in an amended form "adapted to the peculiarities of the Soviet regime." Following upon this, the Soviet cooperative societies were admitted to full membership.

Communist Penetration of Cooperation

The cooperative societies of the NEP period have one interesting feature. The revival of the Societies was carried out from the top, downwards. First the Unions were restored; then came the provincial organizations, and lastly, the primary units. This procedure was designed to secure complete control of the movement for the Communist Party. Elections of committees and councils were carried out by means of lists, calling for voting *en bloc*. Every member had to cast his vote openly, and this assured the success of the official Communist candidate.

In the summer of 1924, soon after this revival, the Soviet cooperative societies were much in evidence at the International Cooperative Exhibition, held at Ghent. Outwardly they made a creditable showing, and only the experienced eyes of old cooperators could notice the artificiality of the exhibits. For instance, there was a splendid fur section in the pavilion of the Centrosoyuz; this, despite the fact (known to all, who had any knowledge of Soviet conditions), that the cooperative societies at the time had no customers at home who could afford a silver-fox coat!

Actually, the cooperatives conducted their business under most difficult conditions. The Credit cooperative societies did not attain their former importance, and they were unable to obtain capital because the population was practically ruined. Deposits amounted to only 2% of the turnover; in other words, they were quite nominal. It was also difficult to collect subscriptions. The Government from time to time inaugurated "daily, weekly or monthly" subscription and deposit campaigns, but very little money was collected.

In order to augment the working capital, the Soviet Government founded the Central Bank of Agricultural Credit in Moscow, with

branches all over the country. This measure improved the position to a certain extent but not to anything like pre-Revolutionary standard. The Credit Cooperative Societies, moreover, were not favoured by the Soviet Government, which continued to look upon them as a bourgeois survival. Later, the experiment was tried of dividing the Credit Societies into two branches: Agricultural and Crafts; in this, the interests of the movement were not consulted, the sole idea being to place co-operation under the control of two different Government departments—the societies serving the Agricultural under the Commissariat of Agriculture, and the Crafts under the Supreme Council of National Economy.

The Shortage of Goods

The scarcity, and unequal supply, of goods was another source of difficulties for the movement. According to the Communist Party's plan, the Consumers' Cooperatives were to serve as a link between the (nationalized) heavy industries and the people. The State industries had to dispose of their products through these societies, according to rules drawn up by the Government. This system was a burden on the co-operative societies, which frequently received goods quite unsuited to the needs of the population. The societies had to dispose of the unsuitable goods at very low prices, and buy the goods in demand at extremely high prices on the free market. Such transactions were equally ruinous for the societies and the consumers.

The Crafts Cooperative Societies suffered greatly from a lack of raw materials. The Supreme Council of National Economy controlled and distributed all of these and as the heavy industries were the Government's chief concern, the cooperative societies received only that material which those industries rejected. In spite of this, the cooperative societies increased their activities and entered new fields of production. In 1929 there were 16,727 Crafts Cooperative Societies in the Soviet Union.

Grievances of the Cooperators

All cooperatives, engaged in handling agricultural produce, protested, as far as they could, against the policy of fixing the prices at which their members were compelled to sell to the State. The high prices of manufactured goods added to the general discontent. The peasants felt that they were the exploited class of the Soviet Union. And, finally, the privileged position of all Communists in the cooperatives provoked protests, not very violent, of course, as the reprisals were apt to be swift and strong.

The trouble arose largely because the Government appointed unsuitable men to office in the cooperative societies. They were selected for their political views; many incompetent or undesirable persons obtained responsible posts on this sole ground. When the cooperative movement was placed under the entire control of the Communist Party

in 1925-26, an epidemic of robbery and embezzlement broke out. In some cases, societies lost their whole capital and the delinquents were chiefly Communists.

Among further regulations affecting the cooperative societies which aroused a great deal of indignation may be noted a decree directing the creation of a special fund, derived from profits, to assist poor peasants in paying their subscriptions.

The NEP showed the incompatibility of free cooperation with a system of nationalized and State-controlled activity. The attempt to combine these two systems met with insurmountable difficulties. The cooperative movement continued to be in theory, a voluntary organization of independent individuals, united in economic activity. The Communists, on the other hand, could not tolerate any freedom of the cooperatives. Thus the cooperative movement and Communism inevitably found themselves at cross-purposes.

V

THE FIVE YEARS PLAN

THE most radical and important reform of the movement was that carried out by the Government in 1928. Associated with the general Five Years Plan, and particularly with agricultural collectivization, it radically changed the character of the Agricultural and Credit Cooperative Societies; while even the Crafts Societies felt its effect.

Since 1928, cooperation has been definitely included in the Socialized sector. The new policy of the Soviet Government is well outlined in a report by Commissar Yakovlev to the XVI Congress of the Communist Party. Here are some extracts from his report: "All future cooperative work must be conducted under the stimulus of collectivization. . . . We cannot long tolerate a situation in which the Agricultural Cooperative Societies, involving Rbles 250,000,000, do not meet the requirements of either the collective or the individual farms. That is the reason why the Central Committee of the Party decided to reform the cooperative societies. The reform means that a new organization is being created to supply the needs of the collective farms . . . and alongside it, another cooperative organization has to be set up to supply individual farmers, and to collect their produce." (Proceedings of the XVI Party Congress, 1930.)

The Agricultural Cooperative Societies accordingly have been divided into two sections—one privileged, the other only tolerated. The privileged are the Kolkhoz. But their activities are entirely supervised by the State, their very creation depending on a Central Government Department.¹ As to Credit Societies they have come under the direct control of the government and have lost every vestige of independence.

¹ Kolkhozcentre.

The remnants of "free" or "NEP" cooperation are being gradually taxed or bullied out of existence, just as are its members, the individual farmers.

A report, presented to the XVI Party Congress by M. Baker, the chairman of the Union of Crafts Cooperatives, shows how collectivization affected the non-privileged branches of the cooperative movement. In many places the societies were compelled to close, and their assets were confiscated in favour of the collective farms. In one case, when a Crafts Cooperative was "invited" to join a collective farm, the members were told that if they did not agree, they would be declared counter-revolutionaries . . .

No information is available relative to the "free" cooperation in the U.S.S.R. The Kolkhoz, on the other hand bear only a superficial resemblance to cooperation. They are dealt with in another part of this publication.¹

CONCLUSIONS

Cooperation and Communism cannot exist together; for the one implies service rendered, the other service imposed. Thus by the very nature of their system the Communists cannot tolerate cooperation. That they have done so to a limited extent, at times, has been solely due to expediency.

As early as 1920 at the IX Party Conference a resolution was passed to the effect that all cooperative organizations, without distinction, should be subjected to the control of the State, and that members of the Party should obtain a predominating influence in every branch of the movement. The policy laid down in this resolution remains to this day unaltered.

It is true that in 1921, when the NEP was introduced, the cooperative movement received and for a while again enjoyed a measure of freedom but only for a time. The Communists never lost sight of one of the fundamental principles of their doctrine: production on a large scale must supersede any other in a Socialist society. Cooperation as a free association of "small-scale producers and distributors" was doomed to disappear as soon as the Communists felt strong enough to introduce a system of State distribution. This started in 1928 and was rapidly developed in 1930 during the process of the integral collectivization of the peasants. Cooperation lost its character of a voluntary movement and became part of the Socialized sector.

The system of State cooperation introduced since 1928 is not co-operation in any real sense of the word; it is State-run and State-controlled from top to bottom and nothing but the name remains. The General Council is nominated by the Party and is packed with Communists; even in the primary units, the election of officers is a mere

¹ See Agriculture.

farce. The economic activities of cooperatives are fixed by the State both in respect to the financial and the goods turnover. It is only the Crafts Societies which have preserved an outward appearance of independence. But even they are subjected to State control and must buy their raw material and sell their wares at State-fixed prices.

Yet such is still the prestige of the name that it would be a mistake to consider the movement as irretrievably ruined. Were conditions to force the Communists to revert to a NEP policy, it would be round the cooperatives that a revival of independent economic activities could be first expected.

LABOUR

I

BEFORE THE REVOLUTION

Birth of the Proletariat

It is sometimes said that the history of the Russian proletariat began with the eighteenth century. Peter the Great wished to emulate the technical development of the West; but since serfdom still prevailed in Russia he could only do so by making use of forced labour, a system which in Europe¹ had largely passed away with the Middle Ages. The workers in the factories which he founded on behalf of the State, and which he licensed others to found, were serfs drawn from private or State dominions. Yet factory industry in Russia at this period never reached a scale comparable even with factory industry in mediaeval Europe. In 1804 it employed about 100,000 workers, in 1850 about 317,000. Forced labour survived almost to the middle of the nineteenth century, but long before that time it was in disfavour. Experience showed that it was inefficient, and that it tended to become more so with the increasing use of machinery. Eventually industrialists themselves were anxious to be rid of it. At the beginning of the nineteenth century at least half of the workers were former serfs who, by making payments to their owners, had acquired the right to abandon the land and enter factories, or any other occupation of their own choosing. After the emancipation in 1861, there first appeared a proletariat in the Communist meaning of the word: for between that year and 1871 the number of factories doubled while that of the workers almost trebled. It should be explained that in the Russian statistics the definition of "factory" was insufficiently comprehensive; actually, therefore, the proletariat was somewhat larger than officially recorded.

There is no occasion to dwell at length upon the growth of the working-class in Russia during this epoch. Large numbers of peasants, either through their own incapacity or through the inadequate amount of land allotted to them, were unable to wring a livelihood from the soil. Consequently, they had no alternative but to migrate citywards and enter factories. This movement coincided with a quickening development of industry, for which time was ripe. All but a small proportion of the population consisted of peasant cultivators, leading a self-contained existence. Before their standard of living could be raised, large markets

¹ It still prevailed, to some extent, in pre-Revolution France.

had to be created in which they could exchange their products for manufactured commodities (including modern implements). At that time they required facilities for reaching these markets, which could only be established in thriving urban centres, accessible by road or railway. Hence industrialization was unavoidable—and with it came the proletariat.

Distribution of Workers

Not long before the War (1913) official statistics showed that the distribution of workers among factories was as follows:

	<i>Workers employed (in thousands)</i>
Textile	823.3
Metallurgical	551.9
Food	386.4
Miscellaneous (including paper, wood, chemicals, etc.).....	492.4
Total	2,254.5

In addition to the above total in 1913 the number of persons employed on the railways was 790,000.

A second return (for 1912) relating to the number of workers employed in such factories as were under inspection gave a total of 2,151,191, made up as follows:

Children (under 12).....	30,314	including	12,978 females
Minors (aged 12-15).....	201,282	including	82,608 females
Adults	1,919,595	including	571,721 females

With the growth of industry during the early twentieth century, the number of women employed in factories increased. The following table shows (in thousands), the totals employed in different years:

1901	453.3
1909	565.0
1912	667.3
1913	723.9

All the figures which have been cited relate to workers in mechanical or specially equipped factories with a personnel of not less than 15—that is, to proletarians in the strict Communist sense of the term. Unfortunately such figures are incomplete. Many peasants were part-time labourers on the land of others. How large their number was, it is difficult to say; but certainly it ran into several millions. If, moreover, the statistics had embraced *all* workers engaged in manufacture, an

ministration were far from good. For this lack of harmony the political power exercised by the police was mainly responsible. Against such power the labour laws afforded no protection. A worker could be summarily deported; anyone deemed to be a strike-leader could be thrown into prison. The purpose of these measures was to prevent revolutionary conspiracy—but while the apprehension which inspired them was by no means illfounded, they often led to grave injustice. In these conditions the right of combination was never freely enjoyed or fully recognized.

Despite the fact that permission had to be obtained from the authorities before the workers could form an association of any kind, the Revolution of 1905 was followed by a wide extension of the labour organizations. At a conference of Trade Unions held in February, 1906, 200,000 workers were represented. Yet at this period the Unions led a harassed existence. Frequently they were suppressed (sometimes for trivial causes) and their leaders imprisoned or exiled. They were constantly under close police supervision, and were required to give notice to the authorities before taking official action of any kind.

Labour and Revolutionary Propaganda

Organized labour, was seriously compromised in its work for the proletariat by the simultaneous development of the revolutionary movement.

In 1902 and 1903 Lenin advocated the formation of a party which should be rigidly controlled by a Central Committee of trained professional revolutionaries, its membership to consist of persons belonging to factory organizations, approved by the Committee. He continued to urge on the workers a policy of armed revolt; and on the Social-Democrats the duty of assisting them to collect explosives and firearms, and of teaching them how to use these weapons.

Words were backed by deeds, and consequently the labour movement came to be largely an underground world of revolutionary conspiracy. This circumstance has to be remembered when judgment is passed upon the conduct of the governing authorities.

II

THE WAR AND REVOLUTION

DURING the War the labour laws were suspended. By 1917, the year of the Revolution, over 15,000,000 men (36.7% of the effective male population) had been mobilized. Included in this number were many skilled workers, indispensable to the maintenance of normal production. When the Revolution broke out Lenin urged the workers to assume control of the factories; and while the Provisional Government was still in office they began to act upon his advice. But they went further than

he had recommended; seizing the factories and, in some instances attacking and expelling the owners. Later, when the Communists obtained power, this form of expropriation became endemic. Thereafter, the workers of each separate enterprise regarded themselves as its proprietors, and attempted to manage it. Anarchy naturally resulted; at that time only the embryo of a State existed, and this was powerless to impose restraint upon the masses. Equally important too were the Trade Unions; for they had only just been revived and could do little but pass resolutions. For nearly eight months the workers remained in complete possession of all industrial undertakings.

Then, under the menace of the Civil War and deepening chaos, authority renewed its strength. Industry was nationalized, and "factory committees" subordinated to Trade Unions. All enterprises were placed under the management of committees of four or five persons—representing the Supreme Economic Council, the Trade Unions, and the workers of each particular undertaking. This control proved a complete failure; for one thing it gave rise to much friction between the Supreme Economic Council and the Trade Unions—each blaming the other for the increasing paralysis of the country's productive forces. Hence no sooner had the rank and file been induced to abandon their anarchistic pretensions, than a new problem arose—the relation of the Trade Unions to the State.

The Trade Unions, the State and the Communist Party

The controversy over this problem lasted several years, during which various conflicting groups were formed. One group urged that industry should be wholly controlled by the Trade Unions. Another, held that instead of labour being conscripted in a partial and disorganized manner, as was then done, it should be completely mobilized, and militarized. A third group standing between these two extremes, advocated that the Trade Unions should retain their independence, but should gradually become merged into the economic departments.

The policy of this central group eventually prevailed; but was never carried out. In the Soviet system there was no place for independent bodies. First, a decision was reached that management by individuals should replace management by committees; then, at the end of 1921, a circular—issued jointly by the Central Committees of the Communist Party and of the Trade Unions—defined the relations that were to exist between the Unions and the State economic organs as follows: "The directive economic organs have full authority in all matters connected with the management of the undertakings entrusted to them. . . . When appointing the management of the trusts the economic organs must invite the Trade Unions to submit candidates and must place before them the list of their candidates; although final decision lies with the economic organs, nominations must be examined in co-operation with the Trade Unions. Trade Unions must be represented on committees for drafting the programmes of economic organs. . . .

They must also make representations in regard to matters arising from collective contracts, the determination of the standards of work, the conditions of piece work and the regulation of wages. At intervals, the managers must make reports on the progress of production to general meetings of workers."

Nearly ten years elapsed since it was determined that individual management should be substituted for collective management. In the interval this decision has frequently been confirmed. Yet as recently as July, 1931 Stalin announced: "The one-man system of management must be established everywhere." Here we have a characteristic example of the manner in which far-reaching decisions promulgated by the Government are ignored in the U.S.S.R.

It will be noted that the circular just quoted was issued by the Central Committee of the Trade Unions in conjunction with the Central Committee of the Communist Party. This circumstance need occasion no surprise. The Party dominates both the State and the Unions. All the chief Union officials are prominent members of it; and no one except its members and nominees hold office of any kind in the State. Thus the Party decides; the State and the Unions acquiesce.

All that remains to be done is to discipline the masses. To a large extent, this task is delegated to the Unions, who are made answerable for the loyalty and obedience of the proletariat. For them the Party is the State, and the State both employer and employee. Hence they are a blind instrument of policy—without wrongs to redress or rights to defend. In these circumstances it is not surprising that the workers, generally, take but little interest in Trade-Union matters.

There are altogether 23 Unions, organized on the principle of "one factory, one Union"; that is to say, all the workers in any one undertaking—regardless of their trade; skilled and unskilled, manual and non manual—join the Union to which this undertaking belongs and contribute 2% of their wages to its funds. For example, all workers in a textile factory are members of the Textile Workers Union, all workers in a metal factory are members of the Metal Workers Union.

It should be stated that the Unions provide clubs and cultural facilities, both physical and mental; as a consequence, the Soviet worker of today has undeniably more social activity, and more opportunity for enjoying his leisure, than the Russian worker of pre-Revolutionary times.

The aim of Communism is to transform the population into proletarians, in the employment of the State, not of individuals or groups of individuals, as were the proletarians of former times. To ascertain what progress has been made towards the realization of this aim, the statistics relating to Trade Union membership must be consulted. These reflect with fair accuracy the numerical strength of the proletariat; for in the U.S.S.R. the privileges granted to workers are confined for the most part to members of a Trade Union—and few eligible persons therefore refrain from joining one of these. Trade Union membership

is regarded as a certificate of citizenship. The following table shows the growth of Trade Union membership over a period of years:

1922	6,000,000
1923	4,000,000
1924	5,551,000
1925	6,430,000
1926	7,300,000
1927	9,624,000
1928	10,390,000
1929	11,200,000
1930	11,757,000
1931	15,800,000

The fall in membership between 1922 and 1923 was a consequence of the New Economic Policy (NEP) and the substitution of voluntary for compulsory membership. As time went on, this substitution lost its meaning—for, as already remarked, citizenship was conditional upon membership. The following table shows in thousands the membership of various Trade Unions on April 1, 1929, and April 1, 1930.

	<i>On April 1, 1929 Totals of Members (in thousands)</i>	<i>On April 1, 1930 Totals of Members (in thousands)</i>
Agriculture and Timber	1,496.1	1,691.9
Paper	44.9	45.9
Mining	537.6	569.1
Woodworkers	184.8	192.3
Leather	142.3	168.5
Metalists	1,038.9	1,191.6
Printers	129.4	129.7
Food	472.8	450.8
Sugar	109.1	97.1
Textile	894.3	868.7
Chemical	273.8	304.1
Tailoring	108.8	115.5
Total	3,936.7	4,133.3
Building	800.0	941.8
Water Transport	173.6	172.2
Railways	1,116.2	1,064.2
Local Transport	174.8	183.4
Posts and Telegraphs	116.7	120.7
Total	1,581.3	1,540.9
Art	96.3	94.8
Medical and Sanitary	568.7	581.3
Educational	841.2	856.5
Soviet Trade Officials	1,295.1	1,297.2
Total	2,801.3	2,829.8
Municipal	263.7	260.8
Public Feeding	341.2	358.6
Grand Total	11,220.3	11,757.1

Growth of the Proletariat

As the Communists gave so wide an interpretation to the term "proletariat," it is impossible to make even an approximately accurate comparison between the foregoing details and the numbers of the proletariat in pre-War times. But if the comparison be restricted to manufacturing industries, some interesting conclusions may be drawn. The workers in such industries, it should be added, are regarded as the élite of the proletariat, the rock upon which the system is built. According to official Communist figures, by 1931 the total number of workers and employees had increased to 5,800,000, at least two million more than the total so engaged in 1913. In considering this increase, the circumstances must be borne in mind that the Soviet Government took drastic measures for the suppression of handicraftsmen, the number of whom is not included in the official statistics relating to the workers and employees engaged in industry in 1913. Thus the increase in the total employed in large-scale industries was accompanied by the extinction of individual workers.

Yet when allowance is made for this circumstance, the growth of the factory proletariat during the Soviet regime remained considerable; more particularly when it is borne in mind that, as a result of the War, the U.S.S.R. lost large industrial regions—and with them, according to some estimates, at least one-third of its factory workers. At the same time it must not be forgotten that, according to Soviet statistics, the population of the territories which now form the U.S.S.R. has increased, since 1914, by about 21 millions. It would appear therefore, that under the Communist Government the increase of the proletariat has not done much more than keep pace with that of the population. One explanation of this fact was the need, owing to shortage of skilled labour, of employing more workers than would otherwise have been required.

The number of women engaged in industry in 1931 was about 1,300,000, compared with 750,000 in 1913. The proportion of women to the total number of factory-workers employed, was much the same for both periods. At the International Women's Conference held in Moscow on March 5th 1932 it was stated that in June 1931 the proportion of women to the total number of workers in heavy industry was 18%. It was mentioned that the proportion of women in the total number of workers in coal-mines was 13.7%.

III

WAGES

For various reasons, the question of wages is a complicated one. In Soviet publications, no two statements agree as to the average wages

paid in any industry. According to the labour-control figures, the average yearly wages (calculated in rubles) in all industries, over a period of three years, were as follows:

1927-28	759.7
1928-29	835.6
1929-30	911.6

Statistics relating to rural workers are incomplete, and altogether unsatisfactory. According to the State Planning Department ("Gosplan"), permanent labourers on state farms (Sovhoz) in 1929, earned about Rbles. 500 yearly; forestry workers about Rbles. 1.75 daily. The Labour Code recognized that, in general, there should be equal wages for equal work; but this principle has never been applied to women, whose wages have always been below those of men—even in occupations where they perform the same tasks.

The following table shows the average wages (calculated in rubles) for the workers in various industries during the month of January, 1930:

Coal	68.96
Iron and Steel	85.39
Metal and Engineering.....	93.22
Chemical	85.54
Cotton	64.36
Wool	67.80
Flax	46.34
Paper	77.40

Average for all industries, including those mentioned above 77.74

In actual amount, wages in the Soviet Union are much below those in the United States and in Great Britain. In Great Britain, in 1930, a general labourer was paid at the rate of £10 to £12 monthly, whereas in that year the average monthly wage of the workers of all industries in the Soviet Union, including the most skilled, was a little less than £8 (taking the ruble at par). But the ruble was never anywhere near its theoretical gold parity. The level of wholesale prices in the Soviet Union at the end of 1930 was 80% more than that in Great Britain, which country may be taken as fairly representing the international price-level. As regards retail prices, these were then a little more than double the pre-War level, and at least 50% higher than those prevailing in Great Britain. It is therefore clear that U.S.S.R. workers are much worse off than the workers of leading Capitalist countries, both in respect of the actual amount of wages received and the purchasing power of the monetary unit in which these wages are paid. At the end of 1931 it was officially stated that the money wages of the workers in the large-scale industries had increased by 17%; no information

was published regarding real wages. But data gathered from various reliable sources plainly indicated that there had been a rise in the cost of living almost twice as much as that in real wages.

Rations

But under Soviet conditions factors other than money wages enter into the reckoning; some of which tend to raise, and others to lower, the value of remuneration. A system of rations exists similar to that which prevailed in European countries during the War. Prices of food, clothing and other necessities are periodically fixed, and the quantities purchasable at State and cooperative shops prescribed monthly; but it frequently happens that some articles on the authorized list of rations are unprocurable, while others can only be obtained after the purchaser has stood for many hours in a queue. Often, therefore, Soviet price quotations relate to non-existent commodities, and the value officially placed upon the monetary unit is fictitious. The following are typical monthly ration-scales:

Manual Workers

Bread	62	lbs. (2 lbs. for each day)
White Flour	2	lbs.
Vegetable Oil	1	lb.
Margarine	1	lb.
Cereals	5½	lbs.
Meat	11	lbs.
Fish	6½	lbs.
Eggs	10	lbs.
Tea	1	oz.
Laundry Soap	1	lb.
Toilet Soap	1	cake

Non-Manual Workers

Bread	30	lbs. (1 lb. for each day)
White Flour	1	lb.
Vegetable Oil	½	lb.
Margarine	½	lb.

(Note: The quantities of the other commodities for non-manual workers are the same as those for manual workers, with the omission of eggs.)

Children are allotted the rations detailed above, but butter is substituted for margarine, and milk added. It must be repeated that the official lists are often little more than catalogues of rations which would, it was hoped, be available. It should also be explained that the rations did not always represent the whole quantity of food consumed. Many workers could obtain meals at factories, or in public dining-rooms; but from these meals, as from rations, certain staple articles of diet were always missing.

It might be supposed that this rationing would bring about an equalization of real wages. Although the scales for manual and non-manual workers differed, all these in either category received the same rations regardless of the wages they were paid or of the skill they

possessed. Since rations are the basis of existence itself, a certain tendency towards equalization was inevitable. But this tendency was limited by several factors, one being the margins available for expenditure upon unrationed commodities. These margins are restricted, and unrationed commodities are dear. Consequently, the purchases cannot be very considerable. Non-manual workers of higher grades, being paid the most, can buy more of such commodities than manual workers.

Other factors limiting the equalizing influence of common ration-standards were the introduction of supplementary rations as reward for those workers (chiefly manual) engaging in intensive, or what was known as "shock brigade," work; and the general adoption of piece-work throughout industry.

The following table, prepared by the Central Committee of Trade Unions, gives the result of investigations carried out during March, 1930, in a large number of enterprises. It shows, with other information, the number of "shock brigades" in the enterprises, the number of the workers composing them, and the proportion belonging to the Communist Party.

<i>Unions</i>	<i>Total number of enterprises examined</i>	<i>Workers (in thous.) Actually in Shock Brig.</i>	<i>Percentage of Workers trans- ferred to Shock Brig. Work</i>	<i>Members and Candidates of Communist Party</i>
Miners	273	121.2	28.9	70.6
Metalists	263	370.4	46.9	66.8
Textile	201	354.0	37.2	63.4
Chemical	80	64.6	35.9	55.2
Woodworkers	180	79.4	32.6	68.4
Leather	94	49.9	41.6	73.7
Builders	271	150.9	33.4	57.4
Transport	1,326	475.5	30.1	74.9
Agriculture	200	109.6	11.0	60.7
Others	2,166	1,273.5	28.7	57.8
Total	3,963	2,009.5	34.2	67.2

It will be seen that out of two million workers in the enterprises examined, over a third (the majority of whom belonged to the Communist Party) had been transferred to shock-brigade work. Within the favoured class—the proletariat—there is thus a still more favoured category which receives larger rations and enjoys more privileges than the rest.

In discussing the wages of Soviet Union Workers, more particularly with a view to comparing them with those of workers in Capitalist countries, considerations other than rations are involved. Rents are much lower on the whole, but accomodation is much worse in the Soviet Union than that provided for workers in Capitalist countries. Again, the benefits of social insurance, and of the arrangements made

for the care of mothers and infants, have to be taken into account; but these benefits also exist in many other countries, and in some they are even more substantial than those available in the U.S.S.R.

On the other side of the balance-sheet must be reckoned the arbitrary deductions which are made from the wages of Soviet Union workers. They are compelled to subscribe to Government loans, and to make contributions to various movements and causes—one of which is the World Revolution. The aggregate amount of these levies is a serious item.

The following is a typical monthly budget of married manual workers in large industrial regions and of married non-manual workers, of lower grades, in both large and small towns.¹

<i>Source of Income</i>	<i>Average Monthly Incomes in rubles</i>		
	<i>Manual Workers</i>	<i>Manual Workers</i>	<i>Non-Manual Workers</i>
	<i>July-September 1929</i>	<i>October-March 1930</i>	<i>October-March 1930</i>
Wages of the head of the family, from chief occupation	86.92	102.72	95.68
Wages of members of family from chief occupation	12.50
Social insurance	7.28
Other income	2.19	16.07	13.60
Own produce	4.32
Other items	5.70
Repayments	0.50	0.25	0.07
Taken from savings	0.01
Total	119.51	119.04	109.36
	<i>Average Monthly Expenditure in rubles</i>		
Rent	10.36	6.87	9.18
Heating and Light	2.27	3.10	4.90
Food	55.92	55.34	50.01
Alcohol and Tobacco	4.95	4.52	2.37
Clothing and Toilet	21.19	19.43	13.66
Household Utensils	4.75
Health and Medicine	1.39
Education, Reading Amusements	2.57
Payments to Trade Unions, Communist Party etc.	3.84	28.30	28.76
Help to relations	2.01
Repayments	0.77
Other Expenses	6.46
Balance	2.71	1.13	0.45
Total	119.19	118.69	109.33
Number of budgets considered	1,352	1,403	886
Average number per household of:			
Persons	4.01	3.97	3.55
Adults	2.64
Workers	1.27	1.29	1.21

¹ Extracted from "Labour in U.S.S.R."; Handbook for 1926-30.

It will be observed that the wages of the heads of families are insufficient to meet expenditure, and that these wages need to be supplemented by income from other sources.

So different are the conditions in the U.S.S.R. from those of pre-War Russia that it is impossible to make really a satisfactory comparison between the corresponding wages. Expressed in terms of rubles, such a comparison reads as follows:

	<i>Rubles</i>
1913 Average for all industries.....	204
1929-30 Average for all industries.....	911.6

In monetary units, Soviet wages are therefore greatly in excess of those paid in 1913. It might be imagined that the increased margin is more than sufficient to cover the higher cost of living. But it must not be forgotten that the common necessities of life are sometimes unprocurable, and often can only be obtained by private purchase, at exorbitant prices. Nominal wages may, therefore, be higher than those of pre-War days—but real wages are decidedly lower.

IV

LABOUR LAWS AND CHANGES IN LABOUR POLICY

THE first Soviet Labour Code was promulgated in 1918 and was revised in 1922.

The intention was that the Code should serve as a basis for all future legislation; but in practice it proved to be an extremely unstable basis, for numerous provisions were either frankly experimental or riddled with exceptions.

The existence of a dictatorship enabled amendments, revocations, and additions to be made with great frequency and suddenness. The Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. is the supreme legislative authority of the Soviet Union; but in normal circumstances it does not meet oftener than three times a year. In the intervals between these sessions a Praesidium acts on its behalf and jointly with the Council of People's Commissars, issues decrees relating to labour and other conditions. Such decrees always reflect previously-reached decisions of the Communist hierarchy, and become operative immediately. In accordance with the requirements of this constitution, they are submitted to the full Committee for confirmation—but this procedure is a mere formality.

In addition to the easy facilities which the Constitution affords in amendment of the laws, various departments—*e. g.* the Commissariats of Labour and Justice, and the OGPU—claim and enjoy a free hand

in the framing of regulations and instructions affecting labour. Thus a complicated structure of laws and by-laws has been erected upon the loose framework of the Code, and in the control of labour became largely an administrative function. It should be added that local authorities and enterprises frequently put their own interpretation upon the law; some wholly or partially ignored it.

In the following pages is contained the summary of the provisions of the Code and of the various decrees and regulations introduced from time to time, together with an explanation of the various phases of Communist labour policy through Militant Communism and the NEP to the present period of Integral Socialism.

Hours

Shortly after the Communists assumed power they issued a decree declaring that the working day for adults should not exceed 8 hours— $3\frac{1}{2}$ hours less than the legal working day under the old regime. The Code confirmed this provision, and enacted that in certain undertakings (scheduled) the working day should not exceed 7 hours. It also enacted that on Saturdays and the eve of holidays the working day should be reduced by two hours, and that night work for adults should not exceed 7 hours. Further, it prescribed that the working day should not exceed 6 hours, and night work 5 hours for persons engaged in heavy, unhealthy or underground operations.

It was also enacted that for persons between 16 and 18 years the working day should not exceed 6 hours; that for children between 14 and 16 it should not exceed 4 hours, and that the last-mentioned category should be restricted to those who had urgent need to earn a livelihood—for example, orphans, and children whose earnings contributed to the support of relatives—and that in each instance a permit should be obtained from the Labour Inspector concerned. Night work was forbidden for all persons under 18.

Overtime

The Code also contained rules governing overtime and periods of rest. It stipulated that overtime should not, as a rule, be allowed. It then set forth that exceptions were permissible for public works in connection "with water supply, lighting, drainage and communications," for the completion of technical tasks whose postponement would cause damage to material or machinery, or for effecting repairs when failure to do so immediately, might lead to a suspension of work.

In such cases only, overtime could be resorted to with the consent of the local Assessment or Disputes Committee; or failing this, with the approval of the Trade Union or Labour Inspector concerned. But it was also provided that on other exceptional occasions overtime could be worked—so long as the Labour Inspector was subsequently informed.

Lastly, it was laid down that in no circumstances should overtime exceed 120 hours yearly, and that on any two consecutive days it

should be not more than 4 hours. For seasonal occupations such limits could, with the consent of the Commissariat of Labour and the Central Committee of Trade Unions, be ignored.

It was also provided that after continuous work for 4 or 5 hours, each worker should be allowed a rest of between half an hour and two hours; and that he should be free to dispose of this time as he desired—even, should he wish to do so, to absent himself from the factory and its precincts.

Holidays

Further, the Code provided that each worker should have a weekly rest of 42 consecutive hours—including, if possible, those of Sundays. In addition, it declared the following days to be compulsory holidays:

January 1—New Year's Day.

January 22—In memory of January 9, 1905 (old style)¹

March 12—In memory of the downfall of the Autocracy, 1917.

March 18—In memory of the Paris Commune, 1871.

May 1 and 2—International Day.

November 7 and 8—In memory of the October (Bolshevik) Revolution.

In addition to the national holidays mentioned, the Code originally conferred upon the local authorities the power to declare special holidays at their discretion—those not to exceed 10 yearly. Later this total was cut down to 6.

Lastly, it was enacted that every worker who had been employed continuously for 5½ months of a year, should be entitled to a holiday, on full wages, of not less than 2 weeks—or, if engaged in unhealthy occupations, to one of not less than a month. The Code also permitted an extension of this statutory holiday in the case of young persons under 18.

In pre-Revolutionary Russia, apart from those public holidays recognized by law, numerous others—usually associated with religious festivals—were observed; bringing the total number of non-working days up to 108. The Communists reduced the maximum number of public holidays to 14 that is, to 336 hours. In addition they introduced a regular respite of 42 hours weekly. Thus the total number of non-working hours in the year was 2,520 or 105 days. When to this number 14 days' regular holiday allowed for each worker be added, it will be found that the Soviet worker is officially entitled to 119 days' rest (over 30%) in the year.

Working Week

On September 24, 1929, a decree was issued establishing what was called a "continuous working week" (a week consisting of four days' work with one day's rest)—for all undertakings except those engaged in transport, and in seasonal activity. It was also stipulated that the

¹ Bloody Sunday.

number of weekly rest-days for each worker should be not less than 72 during the year, inclusive of those weekly rest-days falling within the period of annual leave; that, actually, the period of unbroken weekly rest should be longer than a day—amounting, in all, to 39 hours; and that this should be allotted to each individual worker in accordance with a time-table drawn up by the management in consultation with the factory committees. Further, the decree stipulated that the workers on shifts should be allowed to accumulate their weekly rest-periods and take them in the lump at the end of 4 weeks. It also permitted the 5-day week to be suspended in cases of national, regional or local importance.¹ Lastly, it cut down the national revolutionary holidays from 8 to 6, the dates of which were laid down as follows:

January 21—In memory of Lenin's death.

January 22—In memory of January 9, 1905.

May 1 and 2—International Day.

November 7 and 8—In memory of the October (Bolshevik) Revolution.

All workers were divided into five shifts, each shift taking its rest in turn.

The decree of September 24, 1929, had several objects in view. It was hoped that the reduction in the yearly number of non-working days from 119 to 95 would quicken production. The introduction of the short "continuous" working week was also designed to serve the same object; first, by diminishing the actual hours of the workers' weekly respite; secondly, by allowing uninterrupted use to be made of plant and equipment. It was also intended as a blow to religion, for it compelled four-fifths of the population to work the whole of Sunday, and thus effectually prevented many from attending church.

In practice, the innovation did not work smoothly. Persons who had employment in several places sometimes found that they had been allotted a holiday in one but not in others; thus they were wholly deprived of their weekly rest. Responsible officials were often unable or unwilling to discharge the tasks of colleagues who were on weekly leave; consequently, decisions were delayed and the routine of administration impeded. Again in any one family the free days of its members rarely coincided. This circumstance did not trouble the Communists. They wished to destroy the family, no less than to abolish religious observances. But the family was not alone in being inconvenienced. Frequently, friend could never meet friend; for when one was free the other was at work. Moreover, since the old calendar (based upon a seven-day week) was still retained, it was difficult to calculate with certainty the day when one's leave would fall due; thus business relations were rendered difficult. After a trial lasting well into 1931 it was decided to abandon the five-day week and revert to the seven-day.

On January 2, 1929, a decree was issued declaring that by October

¹ By decree promulgated in November 1931.

1, 1930, all industrial undertakings of a productive character, and all transport and communal enterprises (except those whose activity was seasonal) should adopt a working day of 7 hours only. As is usual with most Soviet legislation, exceptions could be made at the instance of a proper authority, in this case the Commissariat of Labour. As those engaged in unhealthy occupations already worked a 7-hour day, no reduction was made here. But it was stipulated at the same time, that the permissible period of night work for those working the 7-hour day should be increased by 1 hour.

By the middle of 1930, one-third of all industrial workers were on the shortened day. A year later, it was decided that the eight-hour day should be restored in a disguised form. This measure was one of a number designed to increase the volume of production, and thus render possible the realization of the Five Years Plan. Unwilling openly to announce a return to the eight-hours' day, the authorities decreed that the working day should still be called a seven-hours' day, but that all workers and employees should remain an additional hour at their posts every day "in order to improve their technical proficiency." It was announced that the working day would later be reduced to six hours—the extra period for technical training being simultaneously increased to two hours.

Standard of Output

Another section of the Code provides that a definite standard of output should be determined by the management and the Trade Unions jointly; that if by reason of his own negligence, an employee failed to attain it, he should be paid only for what he had done—such amount not to fall below two-thirds of the total due to him under the contract. For repeated failure to reach the standard output, he could be dismissed.

Wages

Yet another section dealt with remuneration. Amongst other things it was provided that wages should not be less than the standard minimum determined by the State; that they were to be payable according to time or piece-rates; that for the first two hours of overtime, payment should be not less than one and a half times the normal wages; that wages should be paid not less frequently than once a fortnight; and that an employee who performed work requiring special qualification should be paid at the rate fixed for such work, even though he did not possess an educational certificate or diploma.

Piece-Work

In the summer of 1931 instructions were given that piece-work should be made general. Hitherto, while piece-work had been practised in a number of enterprises, the tendency in industry, on the whole, had been towards the equalization of wages. It was now plainly stated

that the payment of approximately equal rewards to varying degrees of competence was "monstrously unfair" and directions were given that henceforth piece-work should be obligatory in all enterprises, and should take the form of "progressive wages," all workers exceeding fixed standards of production being entitled to higher rates, increasing if and as their output grew.

The Code provided that whenever workers were elected to membership of Soviets, or executive posts in connection with these bodies or with Trade Unions, their positions should be kept open for them; also that workers required to attend conferences or assemblies convened by a State authority, trade association or cooperative society, should be paid at the rate of full wages for the period of their working-time thus taken up.

Protection of Workers

A number of enlightened provisions were made for protecting the life and health of the workers, and for insuring hygienic conditions in factories. There was little novelty in these provisions. The only unusual feature which they presented was the nomination of Labour Inspectors by Trade Unions. But in the Soviet Union, as has been frequently said, there is nothing to distinguish such bodies from government departments.

The laws relating to women are conspicuously enlightened. It is stipulated that, except with consent of the Commissariat of Labour and the Central Council of Trade Unions, they shall not be employed on night work, or in underground occupations and others injurious to health. It is further provided that when employed by permission in such occupations they shall be given a special allowance enabling them to purchase nourishing food: *e. g.* butter and milk. Their employment on heavy work (scheduled) is prohibited.

The Code confers special privileges upon women who are pregnant, or who have just become mothers. It is provided that they shall be allowed to absent themselves from work, on full pay, for 8 weeks before and after giving birth to a child. This period is reduced to 6 weeks (before and after) in the case of women engaged in clerical or intellectual occupations (with certain specific exceptions). Monetary allowances are also made in all such cases; but as these are derived from the Social Insurance Fund they are dealt with in the section of this chapter which discusses that Fund.

The Code also stipulates that women about to become mothers shall not be dismissed without the consent of a Labour Inspector, that where reduction of employees is unavoidable such women shall be the last to be dismissed; and that, even then, not until they had found other work, shall they be evicted from dwellings belonging to the factory or to the enterprise where they are employed, nor shall their children be discharged from factory school nurseries. Here it should be noted that in some large factories, nurseries were established for

the care of children, free of charge. The law provides that a nursing mother employed in such factories shall have the right to visit her infant on three occasions daily, during working hours.

It may be mentioned that the laws of the old regime prohibited the employment of women on night work or in heavy tasks. They also stipulated that a mother should not be allowed to return to work until 4 weeks after her confinement. During such period, she became eligible for the benefit from the Health Insurance Fund.

Insurance

At this point, a brief account of the Social Insurance Fund may be interposed. The Labour Code declares that such insurance is compulsory for all workers, including those engaged in domestic occupations. The Fund upon which it is based consists mainly of:

1. Contributions, payable by the employers only, *i. e.* by enterprises and institutions of all kinds.

2. Fines imposed for infringement of the Labour laws.

In 1923, only 4,900,000 persons were insured. By 1929 this total had increased to 10,460,000. The chief authority for the control of the Fund is the Central Insurance Department, a branch of the Commissariat of Labour. According to the regulations governing the Fund, as amended on February 13, 1931, the benefits derivable were as follows:

- a) Workers, both manual and non-manual, permanently incapacitated as a consequence of accident during work or of occupational illness, are entitled to a pension, equal to the full wages which they had previously received. Others are only eligible for pensions if they have been employed for a stipulated period; not less than eight years for manual workers, or twelve for non-manual. The amounts of such pensions are regulated according to the degree of incapacity of the recipients, but the maximum allowable is two-thirds of the wage to which they were entitled when in employment. Persons eligible for pensions may claim them within two years after giving up employment; or at any time if in receipt of unemployment relief. Dependents of deceased workers are entitled to pensions varying from four-ninths to two-thirds of the wages of the bread-winners; but only when such bread-winners had themselves been entitled to a pension. Dependents of workers who, for some reason or other, have disappeared, are also entitled to pensions on the same scale.

- b) Men of 60 who have been employed for not less than 25 years, and women of 55 who have been employed for not less than 20 years, are entitled to old-age pensions amounting to not less than half their wages, provided that they have been engaged in one of the following industries: mining, metallurgical, chemical, textile, printing, glass and china, tobacco, railway and water transport. It is within the competence of the Central Insurance Department to extend this list. Miners who have worked not less than 20 years, ten of which must have been underground, are entitled to receive old age pensions at 50. In addition,

it is provided that pensions shall be awarded to all persons insured against old-age.

c) Relief is also given to persons temporarily incapacitated for work, and to those who are compelled temporarily to leave their work in order to look after sick relatives. It is also given to women during the period of pregnancy and confinement. Payments are made to bereaved relatives towards funeral expenses.

d) The unemployment benefits payable from the Social Insurance Fund are determined by the Central Committee administering it.

At no time did the total resources of the Fund admit of paying more than two or three rubles weekly to each person; but the practice was followed of dividing the available resources among a limited number of persons. Thus some were paid larger amounts than would otherwise have been possible, whilst the remainder were deprived of aid altogether. The benefits paid were supplemented by small grants from Trade Union funds. Although the monetary allowances to the unemployed were absurdly inadequate, the latter were also accorded privileges of some value, being either excused altogether from paying rent for housing space and charges for water and light, or only required to pay nominal sums for these services. In 1931, unemployment benefit was completely abolished.

Persons disenfranchised for any of the following causes, were excluded from benefits of social insurance: class origin, activity under the old regime or in any form hostile to the Soviet system or association with religious beliefs (priests, ministers, or in any other *official* capacity). Other persons excluded from benefit were those either permanently or temporarily deprived of employment in State undertakings by order of revisionary committees, and those who had been convicted before the criminal courts and had received sentences, including deprivation of rights.

At times, many enterprises, particularly those belonging to the State, fell heavily in arrears with their contributions to the Soviet Insurance Fund, and received subsidies from the Treasury to enable them to meet these deficits. Such subsidies were not always devoted to the purpose for which they were granted. Furthermore, owing to the lack of experienced officials the administration of the Fund was grossly inefficient. Of late years the financial condition of the Fund has improved and such abuses have tended to diminish—though they still exist to a serious extent. The amounts expended upon social insurance during the three years were as follows:

	<i>Rubles</i>
1927-28	984,000,000
1928-29	1,155,000,000
1929-30	1,314,000,000

In addition to receiving most of the benefits of social insurance, the workers also profit more than any other section of the community from expenditure designed to promote health. Much has been made of the fact that a number of confiscated palaces and large private residences were converted into rest-homes and sanatoriums for the workers and peasants; but, on the most favourable assumption, such homes have never been available, in any one year, to more than 1% of the population.

According to the statistics of the State Planning Department (Gosplan), the amount expended during 1929-30 upon social insurance, workers' dwellings and the maintenance of hospitals and health services was equal to 28.3% of the wages bill. No corresponding calculations have been made for Capitalist countries; but it would not be an exaggeration to say that Great Britain, with a population one-fourth that of Russia, spends yearly more than twice as much (in actual amount) upon social insurance and health services.

Labour Contracts

The Labour Code prescribed that employment might be made the subject of what was known as a "collective contract," a contract between two or more persons. A collective contract determined the conditions of work for the wage-earning and salaried employees (except the managing staff) of an undertaking or group of undertakings. It was negotiated by the Trade Union concerned and was equally applicable to union and non-union men. But it should be added that in the Soviet Union the latter were so few as to be hardly worth counting. A contract of such nature could be either "general" or "local"; by "general," was meant one applying to a whole group of undertakings, constituting a complete branch of production or any other sphere of employment. Trade Unions preferred this form of agreement, and it therefore found wide acceptance.

A second form of contract for which the Labour Code made provision was one between two or more persons on either side. If for a long term, a probationary period was allowed. At the expiration of the contract the employer was to furnish the employee with what was known as a "wages book"; and, if requested to do so, with a certificate stating how long, and in what capacity he had been employed.

Dismissal was permitted for the following reasons:

1. When an undertaking was partially or wholly abandoned.
2. When an establishment was closed down for more than two months through difficulties connected with production.
3. When an employee was clearly unfit for his work.
4. When, for no sufficient reason, an employee failed to discharge the duties assigned to him.
5. When an employee was convicted of a criminal offence in connection with his work, or was sentenced to two or more months' imprisonment for a criminal offence of any kind.

6. When an employee, for no sufficient reason, absented himself from work more than three days in the course of a month.

7. When an employee was physically incapacitated from working for more than two months.

8. When an employee had only been engaged to fill the place of another who was subsequently reinstated by order of a court of law.

In the first three instances mentioned above, a fortnight's notice was to be given.

The Code also allowed the employees to terminate contracts, before the date on which they would ordinarily expire, for the following reasons:

1. If wages were not paid when due.

2. If the employer failed in the fulfillment of his contractual obligations.

3. If an employee were subjected to ill-treatment.

4. If the sanitary conditions of the place of employment were bad.

An employee legally dismissed had no right of appeal, such as he possessed when disputes arose in normal circumstances; but his grievances could be adjudicated departmentally. Even under the provisions described, moreover, an employer could not dismiss a worker without the assent of the local Assessments and Disputes Committee.

Trade Unions and Factory Committees

The Code described the status of the Trade Unions and the powers of the committees known as "Factory Committees." It enacted that the Unions should represent the workers in all matters touching the State; and that the State should place at their disposal "labour palaces" and offices, and grant them various privileges in the use of communications—including transit by rail and water. The Code also stipulated that in all relations with separate enterprises the Trade Unions should be represented by Factory Committees, composed of workers; but it made also provision for such representation to consist, if necessary, of a delegation from the Unions concerned. The duties of the Factory Committees were defined as follows:

1. To safeguard the interests of the workers.

2. To represent the employees in matters involving the Government authorities.

3. To ensure that the workers receive the benefits secured to them by law.

4. To take measures for improving the workers' welfare.

5. To participate in economic activity.

Meetings of the Unions may be of a general character—that is, of all members—or of delegates only. Such meetings may be held during working hours when the purpose in view is to elect representatives to State or Trade Union bodies. Meetings of Factory Committees are to be held outside working hours. The Committees have the right to scrutinize all engagements; and, should the terms violate collective

agreements or the Code, to raise objections. The expenses of the Committee are to be defrayed by the management of industrial undertakings up to a limit of 2% of the total remuneration of the employees in the enterprise concerned; and in addition it is the management's duty to put at the disposal of the Committee a properly equipped room for meetings. It is also laid down that no part of the building or buildings of an enterprise shall be inaccessible to the Committee.

In practice the *yacheika* or "cell"—which consists of all the Communists among the workers of each factory or enterprise—is the dominant authority. It decides important issues for itself, and these decisions are usually accepted without question by the Factory Committee.

Strikes and Arbitration

Under the labour laws, the right of the workers to strike is preserved. In reality a serious strike is impossible in the Soviet Union. The Communists argue that the workers have no employer other than the State, and that they would be foolish to strike, in effect, against themselves. Yet from time to time, a number of strikes have occurred—but they were usually of short duration. Some of them were suppressed by the OGPU, who arrested and exiled the ringleaders.

The procedure invariably followed, in the event of a labour dispute arising, is as follows: A representative of the Trade Union executive visits the undertaking and investigates the cause of the trouble. Having decided in his own mind which of the workers' demands should be accepted and which rejected, he negotiates with the management. If he fails to obtain satisfaction, he formally declares the existence of a dispute, and instructs the workers to return to work pending a settlement of the outstanding questions by arbitration.

For the purpose of arbitration, or conciliation as it is alternatively called, the following bodies are set up by the Code.

1. Assessments and Disputes Committees—composed in equal numbers of representatives of the employers and of the Factory Committees. They must confine themselves to disputes concerning the application of laws, contracts and regulations, and cannot repeal clauses, or in any way amend contracts.

2. Conciliation Boards and Arbitration Courts. These authorities are set up by the Commissariat of Labour for specific occasions; they consist of one representative from each side.

The chairman of the Conciliation Board is nominated by the labour organization concerned; and an award, to be valid, requires the assent of the two representatives of the disputing parties. The chairman of the Arbitration Court is nominated by both sides, or if the arbitration is declared by the labour organization to be of a compulsory character, at the request of one or both sides. Whenever one party to the dispute is a State undertaking, the arbitration is "compulsory."

3. Labour Sessions of the People's Court. The function of these

sessions is to adjudicate upon (1) issues in regard to which no decision has been reached by the Assessment and Disputes Committee, or on which a decision has subsequently been revoked on revision; (2) all accusations of such infringements of laws and contracts as come within the criminal Code.

Labour Regulations of 1928

In 1928 regulations were issued explicitly defining the functions of the authorities established for the purpose of dealing with labour disputes—i. e., the Assessments and Disputes Committees, Conciliation Boards, Arbitration Courts and Labour Sessions of the People's Courts.

It was stipulated that, in addition to the powers already granted to Assessments and Disputes Committees under the law, they should determine issues within the limits of collective agreements relating to the following: normal wage and piece rates, allocation of work, percentages of rejected work, and all other conditions of labour.

At the same time, a number of matters were specifically excluded from the jurisdiction of the Committees; e. g. breaking of labour agreements consequent upon the demands of Trade Unions, departures from the scales of wages laid down by the State, distribution of dwelling space, and disciplinary punishments.

Matters which the Committees were compelled to investigate were also set forth. They included: payments of wages below the standard prescribed; dismissals for incompetence or for failure to carry out duties; shortening of working day and lengthening of holidays. In addition, the Committees were empowered to investigate payments made or required for various reasons, and to determine the justice or otherwise of such payments. Included among such were the following: payments to workers for the use of the tools belonging to them, for overtime, for time lost in stoppages not due to their fault, for piece-work allotted but incompleting through no fault of the worker, and for time expended in piece-work.

It was also stipulated that the Committees should adjudicate upon deductions from wages for losses occasioned by negligence—either as a consequence of damage done to property, or of defective output. A comprehensive clause conferred upon the workers a right of appeal to the Committees—or, alternatively to the Labour Sessions of the People's Court—in regard to all issues other than those mentioned. A clause was also inserted obliging the representatives of the workers on the Committees, to inform the authorities of any action by the employers which was an infringement of the Labour Code, or which was indicative of criminal mismanagement, greed or tyranny.

The regulations further provided that the decisions of the Assessments and Disputes Committees should only become operative in the event of their being accepted by the parties concerned. Failing such acceptance, the issue in dispute must be referred to a Conciliation or Arbitration Court (if labour conditions only were involved), or to a

Labour Session of the People's Court (if criminal acts were alleged). The same procedure was provided for the reexamination of decisions reached by the Committees but revoked by higher authorities.

The regulations then defined the functions of the Conciliation Boards, as distinct from the functions already indicated, these should decide all disputes arising out of collective contracts. But it was laid down that their jurisdiction should apply only to such undertakings and institutions as were scheduled by the Commissariat of Labour in consultation with other Government departments and the Central Committee of the Trade Unions. The task of the chairman was confined to conciliatory effort, and he had no casting vote. As with the Assessments and Disputes Committee, a decision of the Board could only become operative after acceptance by the parties concerned. Failing such acceptance, decisions were to be referred to the Arbitration Courts.

Next, the regulations defined the functions of the Arbitration Courts. It will be recalled that Conciliation Boards were empowered to consider disputes in regard to which the Assessments and Disputes Committees had been unable to reach any decision. Similarly, the Arbitration Courts were empowered, within certain limits, to hear disputes in regard to which the Conciliation Boards had failed to agree. But their chief task was to determine disputes as to the interpretation or amendment of collective agreements. It was provided, that if the parties concerned did not accept a decision, the President of the Court might, on his own authority, declare it to be operative; a final decision being thus reached. It was also laid down that the decisions of these three tribunals could be rescinded by a superior labour authority—but only when such decisions conflicted with the law or with the collective contracts; when they had been affected in some vital manner by non-observance of regulations governing the constitution and procedure of the adjudicating tribunals; when they were subsequently proved to be false; or when essential circumstances, not previously disclosed, came to light. The regulations also provided that in the event of the non-payment of sums awarded, the competent labour authority might issue against the employer a document which should have all the force of a writ of execution; and that, if so disposed, they might in addition prefer a criminal charge against him.

Finally, the regulations described the functions of the Labour Sessions of the People's Court. These sessions were empowered to dispose of the following cases:—

1. Those which the Assessments and Disputes Committees had been required to investigate and could not decide.
2. Those which the workers had a right to bring before the courts;
- i. e. all disputes other than those relating to issues which the Assessments and Disputes Committees were required to hear.
3. Those disputes in respect to which the decisions of the Assessments and Disputes Committees had been reversed.

In most instances, an appeal to the Provincial or District Courts was permitted.

At the same time, regulations were issued for the reinstatement of workers wrongfully dismissed. Characteristic reservations were again made. Thus it was enacted that the new provisions should not apply to workers dismissed by persons upon whom the right of engaging and dismissing workers had been conferred, and of whom a list had been drawn-up by the Commissariat of Labour, nor to persons dismissed as a consequence of demands by the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate. It was further enacted that the reinstatement of such individuals could only be granted by higher tribunals or officials; but that other dismissed individuals could be reinstated and awarded compensation at the instance of the Assessments and Disputes Committees, or the Labour Sessions of the People's Courts. One clause stipulated that any official who wrongfully dismissed a worker, should be required to pay compensation to the undertaking concerned for the losses incurred by his action, such compensation not to exceed three months' wages.

Comrades' Courts

In 1929 a decree was issued establishing what was termed "Comrades' Courts." It was provided that these Courts should be established in all industrial undertakings and in State institutions; and that they should consist of a chairman, and two members, elected for a period of six months, at general meetings of workers and employees.

The functions of these tribunals were defined as follows:—To adjudicate upon cases arising from disputes involving sums less than Rbles. 25; from breaches of labour discipline—as, for example, absenteeism or drunkenness during working hours, or the careless use of machinery; and from complaints of minor misbehaviour. All such cases could only be brought before the Court at the instance of the workers' organization, with the consent of the management; or, alternatively, by this management.

Further, the decree allowed Comrades' Courts to refer cases to People's Courts whenever they thought heavier penalties were merited than those which they themselves were competent to inflict. It was expressly stipulated that the Courts should have no jurisdiction over superior officials and members of the managerial and technical staffs; that hearings should be in public and the procedure simple; and that the following methods of applying what was termed "comradely pressure" should be employed—comradely admonition; censure with or without publicity—in the event of publicity, the terms to be exhibited on a notice board or published in the Press; infliction of damages up to Rbles. 25 and fines up to Rbles. 10, the proceeds to be devoted to funds for the defence of the country, for the development of aviation and chemical industries, or for children's welfare. Lastly, it was stipulated that the decision of the courts should be final and enforceable by deductions from wages—or, in cases where the individuals con-

cerned, though not employed in the factory, lived within its precincts, by agents of the court or police.

Labour Discipline

In November, 1929, a decree was issued, declaring that the quality of goods produced had seriously fallen off, and giving instructions that the criminal code should be amended so as to entail:

1. Deprivation of liberty for not more than five years, or forced labour for not more than one year, for those persons responsible for the systematic or mass production of inferior goods.

2. Deprivation of liberty for not more than two years, or forced labour for not more than one year, for those persons responsible for producing goods of a quality below the prescribed standard.

In November of 1930 severe disciplinary regulations were introduced for all workers engaged in transport, both on land and water. These regulations authorized the heads of departments to punish delinquents with reprimands, imprisonment for periods not exceeding three months, reduction to lower grades or summary dismissal. Any person so punished could appeal to a higher authority, but such appeal had to be lodged within five days of the passing of sentence and a decision upon it given within the same period. Moreover, it was laid down that this procedure should not delay the sentence, which must take effect as soon as pronounced.

Alternatively, for conscientious work, good conduct, energy, initiative, self-denial and heroism, rewards were prescribed—such as the granting of additional leave, of sums of money, of decorations, of certificates of honour, promotion, or the naming of a ship, locomotive, railway station or invention after the worker or workers' organization.

Regulation of Labour

Prior to the introduction of the New Economic Policy in 1921, the Government had power under the Constitution and Labour Code to impose compulsory labour upon the whole able-bodied population. This power was based upon the theory that the State was entitled to become the sole employer and distributor of labour. Yet no serious attempt was made to organize conscripted labour—nor, indeed, in the prevailing chaos, was any such attempt possible. From time to time, however, compulsion was freely applied with sufficient severity to deprive individuals of all possibility of disposing of their labour as they wished, and to set limits to their freedom of movement.

The State parted reluctantly with its power to enforce compulsory labour; although such power was obviously in conflict with the NEP. This policy restored private enterprise (to a limited degree), and for private enterprise a free labour market was indispensable. As a first step, the workers employed in State undertakings, cooperative societies and Trade Unions were exempted from compulsory labour, but such exemption did not apply when "disasters" occurred; to "disaster" a

wide interpretation was given. For the rest of the population, compulsory labour was retained. No secret was made of the fact that, whenever a State undertaking required workers and none were procurable through ordinary channels, resort would be had to conscription.

The Trade Unions protested that owing to the flow of peasants into towns, the supply of labour was abundant; and as a consequence of their pressure the Commissariat of Labour issued a circular, formally expressing the view that compulsory labour was no longer desirable. Yet though temporally abandoned as a general practice the principle of compulsion was retained, to be applied later—at first sporadically and on a limited scale, and then more frequently and on a larger scale.

Labour Exchanges

The revised Code of 1922 stipulated that all workers should be engaged through the medium of Labour Exchanges; but as usual, reservations were made in language so vague as to permit of the law on the subject being frequently reduced to a dead letter. The definition of the categories which could be engaged without the intervention of the labour exchange, was very wide.

At first, a worker had the option of refusing any post offered to him. But in 1923 this privilege was greatly modified; it was stipulated that, within certain limitations, a person must accept the employment assigned to him—provided that the conditions and wages were not lower than the standard prescribed by law and collective agreement, and that at the time no dispute was in progress between the employers and employees of the enterprise concerned.

If a worker refused an offer of employment without adequate reason, he was deprived of relief; for a second refusal he incurred the same penalty and was, in addition, placed at the bottom of the register; while for the third refusal he was suspended, for a certain period, from registration.

On the other hand an employer who, having notified a vacancy to the exchange, rejected the worker sent to him, was required to pay all the expenses which his action involved, including wages for the days lost by the individual concerned.

The Exchanges worked badly. They were largely staffed by uneducated officials, who often treated the workers contemptuously. They were quite incompetent to judge of the qualifications of an individual for a particular post; consequently, they disposed of the applicants in a haphazard manner, forcing them to undertake work of an uncongenial or degrading character and compelling enterprises to engage persons who were of little or no use to them. Favouritism, too, was commonly practised. In the end, many employers either named the workers whom they wished to engage or refrained entirely from applying to the Exchanges; whilst many workers, on their part, abstained altogether from registration. Thus these institutions had but a limited value.

At last, a number of unofficial or private exchanges began to open. Only then, when the situation had become scandalous, was an attempt at reforms made. In August 1923, the regulations governing the exchanges were revised. It was provided that henceforth employers should be allowed access to the registers for the purpose of selecting skilled workers to be engaged by themselves direct; also, that the same procedure should be permitted as regards non-skilled workers when 10 was the minimum number which it was desired to employ. At the same time, it was stipulated that in filling vacancies trade-unionists should no longer be given preference over men who were otherwise better qualified. Some improvement in the working of the Exchanges followed, but they continued to be very inefficient.

Unemployment

On April 1st, 1930 the Commissariat of Labour declared that the number of persons without employment was one million, of whom 585,000 were women, while of the remainder a large proportion consisted of youths below the age of 23. A little while later, it was officially stated that the number of vacancies in large industrial areas greatly exceeded the number of applicants. At the end of 1930 the announcement was triumphantly made that unemployment no longer existed, and that the Soviet system had then definitely demonstrated its superiority over the Capitalist system.

That there was a great and increasing demand for labour in consequence of the intensive industrialization, resulting from the Five Years Plan, there could be no doubt. But the assertion that unemployment had been wholly abolished was not provable. One specific circumstance indicative of its unreliability may be mentioned. On April 1st, 1930, as has already been mentioned, the Commissariat of Labour stated that 585,000 women were out of work. In that year the total number of women employed in industry was 1,240,000. In the following year 1931 this total only increased by 60,000. What, it may be asked, had happened to the remaining 525,000 out of the total number officially stated to be unemployed in 1930?

On more general grounds, the Communist claim that unemployment, as the term is commonly understood, has been eliminated in the U.S.S.R. could not be accepted. It must be borne in mind that the Soviet unemployment statistics related only to proletarians, who alone were entitled to registration when out of work. The disenfranchised classes, composed of the categories known as "bourgeoisie" and "kulaks" were left entirely out of the reckoning. Following upon the rigorous repression of private enterprise which recommenced in 1929, the number of unemployed in these two categories must have been very large—certainly not less than a million. A rough and ready solution was found by condemning many of them to forced labour. Others, not of this pariah class but genuine proletarians in the Communist sense of the term, were driven to accept whatever work was given to them

—for only by so doing could they obtain the right to receive food rations.

It might be said that in the U.S.S.R. as in Capitalist countries, an individual who cared to run the risk of starvation could refuse work that was uncongenial to him. But had he done so, his prospects of finding alternative employment would be slender; for in the U.S.S.R. the State is virtually the sole employer and the monopolist of food supplies.

Lastly it must be remembered that the enlargement of the labouring class which has taken place during the Soviet regime is the direct consequence of the insufficiency of skilled labour and of the resultant need to employ semi-skilled men, a circumstance which is reflected in low productivity and inferior workmanship. At the Conference of Young Communists held this year (1932) it was stated that 40% of the industrial workers were youths.

Abolition of Unemployment Benefits

Yet ignoring all the considerations which have been set forth, the Government on November 11th, 1930 published a decree, dated October 9th, in which it was stated that henceforth unemployment benefits would be discounted and that no further provision for them would be made in the Budget. It was considered that the chief problem connected with labour would be to plan its distribution. This task was entrusted to organizations known as "Labour Cadre Departments," which replaced the Labour Exchanges. It was enacted that these Departments should record, register and allot all labour throughout the country. Undertakings could only engage workers through this medium, the most important branches of industry having first call upon such supply of labour as was available. To this rule, the customary exceptions were made. It was stipulated that the following could be engaged without the intervention of the Departments: responsible administrators; technical workers and specialists; workers leaving one undertaking for another with the consent of their original employers; apprentices to craftsmen employing not more than two workers; poor peasants on farms employing but one man; shepherds, domestic servants, and persons belonging to other occupations selected in agreement with the labour organizations concerned. Special provision was made for the transference of specialists and skilled workers to enterprises where their services would be most useful.

It was laid down that workers who had distinguished themselves as organizers or members of "shock-brigades," or in competition between one specialist enterprise and another, who had a long record of service in any one undertaking; or who had been responsible for inventions, or for useful ideas, should be eligible for the following privileges; improved living accommodation, priority for their children in educational facilities, priority for themselves in admission to rest-homes, in transference to other undertakings, or in selection for travel abroad to study

their calling, and priority for members of their family (whenever possible) in employment in places where they themselves were employed.

At the same time, it was enacted that persons who wilfully disorganized production by leaving their employment without permission should be deprived of further employment for a period of six months; and that the names of those who, without sufficient reason, refused to accept such work as was offered to them should also be removed from the unemployment registers for six months.

Towards the end of December 1930, further regulations were issued governing the Labour Cadre Departments. These Departments were enjoined to follow class principles when filling up vacancies. It was provided that men discharged from the Red Army should be found work on the day of their registration, and others within three days of this. The penalty of six months' suspension from registration—also prescribed, in the preceding decree, for those who left work without permission—was likewise confirmed; and it was added that a special list of such persons should be kept. The clause prescribing the same penalty for those who refused to accept such work as was offered to them was amended so as to apply only to persons who refused to work at their own calling; or, when there was no employment available in their own calling, to undergo training for another.

Restoration of Compulsory Labour

Even when Labour Exchanges existed, the unskilled worker had little voice in choosing his own employment; when they were replaced by Labour Cadre Departments this was entirely withdrawn from him. Before, also, he had the right to change his place of employment. As life became harder, he made increasing use of this right. Large numbers of workers, "fliers" as they were called, migrated from factory to factory in the hope of securing higher wages and better conditions. Desire to arrest the movement led to the issue of instruction which had the effect of "tying" employees to the particular enterprises in which they were engaged. Thus a system was established reminiscent of that denial of the right of removal to the peasantry at the end of the sixteenth century, which had laid the foundation of serfdom.

Labour "books" or "sheets" were introduced. Upon these documents were inscribed the records of their holders, including a list of any fines imposed upon them. In the event of their dismissal, they were thus prejudiced in obtaining work at other factories or undertakings, and were compelled to accept such employment as was offered them by the Labour Cadre Department.

On February 13, 1930, a decree was issued enacting that, provided a resolution to the necessary effect was passed at a general meeting of peasants (from which general meeting, however, priests and other class enemies must *ipso facto* be excluded), a village could bind itself to undertake what was called a "self-imposed task," consisting of felling and hauling timber; that any person failing to comply with the decision of

the general meeting should be liable to a fine; and that in default of payment his property should be sold at auction—or alternatively, criminal proceedings might be instituted against him.

Where the supply of labour was inadequate, the local authorities were empowered to resort to compulsory paid labour, and to requisition of the necessary transport. It was enacted that wealthy peasants should be paid on the lowest scale of wages.

In another document, issued on the same day, it was recounted that the strictest disciplinary measures were essential for the organization of the Labour market. It was recommended that some agreement should be arrived at between the local Labour offices and the collective farms, for placing labour at the disposal of the lumber organizations, and that, in addition, the recruiting of workers in the villages for these organizations should be pushed forward energetically.

A month later (March 17), a circular was issued declaring that the members of a collective farm were eligible for employment, not merely in the occupation of lumbering, but in all “seasonal branches of national economy”—a term so widely drawn as to embrace productive activity of all kinds. The procedure laid down was briefly as follows:—In the first instance the local Labour Departments were to conclude an agreement with the management of a collective farm, subsequently conveying an intimation to them of the number and qualifications of the workers desired, and the place where, and the time when, they were required. Any person who refused to go wherever he was sent, or to undertake such essential work as was allotted to him, was to be adjudged guilty of disobeying the rules regulating the conduct of collective farms.

In June, further orders were issued for the purpose of securing more labour for stevedore work. The object in view was not merely to facilitate the movement of timber, but also of grain, flour and other commodities, both for export and import. Labour Departments were directed to recruit labourers from among the poor peasants and farm hands. It was also enacted that henceforth any unemployed person whether classed as “intellectual” or “manual,” and irrespective of sex—should be required to undertake loading and unloading operations, and that any person refusing to perform such work should be struck off the employment registers.

Other instructions directed that Labour Departments should prosecute those who by promising work at higher rates of pay, enticed labourers in large numbers from loading or unloading operations; and also that these Departments should take strict measures to prevent such labourers from shifting from one employment to another to secure more remuneration.

Forced Labour

Forced labour¹ is one of the chief punishments provided by the

¹ “Forced Labour” as distinguished from “Compulsory Labour” is imposed as a penalty for a criminal or political offence.

Criminal Code. The Courts determined whether such labour should be performed with or without deprivation of liberty. The minimum sentence prescribed in the first instance was one year, the maximum ten years. Periods of three years or more were to be served in correctional camps located in remote parts, periods less than three years in ordinary places of confinement. The courts could also substitute compulsory labour for fines.

The penalty for refusing to perform compulsory labour was a fine not exceeding five times the cost that would have been involved in employing others to undertake such labour. For a second refusal, a sentence of deprivation of liberty, or of forced labour for one year, was inflicted. For refusal to undertake work of national importance, the same penalties were prescribed.

The courts could also banish delinquents, and specify the localities where they should take up their residence—a sentence which might compel the unfortunate individual to change his occupation, or condemn him to destitution. Further, they could debar anyone from engaging in a particular calling. In addition they could in all cases order the property of offenders to be confiscated.

The general power of the courts having been described, an explanation of the laws governing the fulfilment of forced labour is called for. Such laws formed what was called the Correctional Labour Code, the main provisions of which were formulated in 1924. It was enacted that the chief purpose in view was to deter “untrustworthy” members of society from the commission of crime; and that, for their reformation, labour was the most effectual measure possible. Hence in the Soviet Union definitions of crime were exceedingly wide, including a multitude of acts which, under Capitalism, would be regarded as normally inoffensive. This circumstance swelled the number of “malefactors” to enormous proportions, thus placing at the disposal of the State a great reserve of labourers who were at the same time its hostages. The punishment thus inflicted was described in the Soviet Code as a measure of social defence; but, in reality, it represented the enslavement of the vanquished by the victor.

It has been said that the courts could impose sentences of forced labour, with or without deprivation of liberty, for terms not exceeding three years. In the former case, the persons implicated were not placed under arrest. Sentences of less than six months were served there, where the offenders resided; of more than six months, partly where they resided and partly in some neighbouring locality.

Forced Labour offices allocated convicted persons to various enterprises, and generally supervised the performance of their sentences. These persons had to present themselves for registration within a stipulated time, when they received “wages books,” in which records of their work were made. Where no such offices existed, they were set to work by the local authorities on the repair of roads and bridges; or drafted to

collective farms and Red Army detachments for employment on civilian tasks.

Persons, sentenced to forced labour, who had habitually worked for wage or salary were paid the minimum rate prescribed by the State. Such of these as served their sentences where they resided were given half of their wages, the remaining being retained by the supervisory department. All other "malefactors" received no remuneration at all.

In 1929 an order was issued providing that persons undergoing a sentence of forced labour, without deprivation of liberty, in localities other than those where they resided could be employed, in gangs, for the purpose of loading and transporting timber—and on forestry work generally. It was stipulated that each person so sentenced should provide his own cart and horses or oxen, and his own tools.

For persons sentenced to forced labour "without deprivation of liberty" who absented themselves from or arrived late for work, who presented themselves not properly equipped, who performed their tasks negligently, who damaged property by their carelessness, or who disobeyed any law or regulation relative to compulsory work, the following punishments were prescribed:

Transfer to heavier tasks.

Prolongation of sentence.

Disciplinary imprisonment for periods not exceeding 14 days.

Full authority was conferred upon the Commissariat of Justice and the administration to issue supplementary regulations for increasing the productivity and the discipline of forced labour.

Those provisions of the Code which related specially to "forced labour with deprivation of liberty" were comprehensive and complex. As the categories of forced labour were varied, so, too, were the places of detention. All persons whose sentences did not exceed six months were confined in detention centres; the remainder, in correctional labour camps.

Offenders—belonging to the working classes, and sentenced to terms not less than five years—whose crimes in the opinion of the courts were due to poverty or to "unenlightenment"—were sent to special labour colonies, where the work performed was either industrial or agricultural. In these colonies, except for the fact that the occupants were not allowed to go beyond certain bounds, life was organized on the collectivist principles generally prevalent throughout the Soviet Union.

For convicted "bourgeoisie," whose crimes were ascribed to their class origin, places of strict isolation were provided. In these places anyone, no matter to what class he belonged, could also be incarcerated if he were considered a dangerous enemy of the State, or could be sentenced to disciplinary punishment. Lastly, there were "transitional labour centres" where those who had acquired capacity for collective work whilst completing sentences elsewhere were detained for a further period, although allowed a measure of liberty. For juvenile delinquents, special labour centres were established. The Red Army had its own labour

settlements, or "colonies," for offenders against its disciplinary regulations.

Commissions composed of representatives of the courts, of varied bodies, and the Trade Unions dealt with all questions concerning the distribution, transference and grading of prisoners. A Supervisory Inspectorate had branches in each region. The number of officials empowered to visit institutions other than those connected with their own administration was large and varied.

Each place of detention was under the control of a chief officer, whose functions were those customarily exercised by the governor of a penal settlement. All officers carried arms. Those who acted as warders were armed with revolvers and rifles, and could fire upon any prisoner attempting to escape. Outdoor work in the stricter camps and settlements was performed under guard; disciplinary punishment consisted of restriction or deprivation of various rights, or of solitary confinement (for periods not exceeding 14 days). All prisoners were paid for their work at piece rates determined by the authorities; and, although the rations which they should receive were not defined, it was stipulated that their food should be increased whenever their expenditure of energy demanded such a measure. This matter was, however, left entirely to the discretion of the prison authorities.

OGPU Camps

In April 7, 1930, a decree was issued establishing special penal labour camps under control of the OGPU. It was laid down that these camps were to be reserved solely for persons regarded as "socially dangerous," who had been sentenced by the courts, or the OGPU tribunals to deprivation of liberty for periods of three years or more. The Commandants of OGPU camps were vested with wide powers; and no supervisory or visiting authority, other than the Public Prosecutor, was provided. It was stipulated that the prisoners were to be divided into three categories; the first two consisting of proletarians and peasants convicted of offences "not of a counter-revolutionary character," and the terms of whose sentences did not exceed five years; the third consisting of prisoners not belonging to the working class, and those guilty of "counter-revolutionary offences." Three regimes were also prescribed. Prisoners undergoing the first and severest were to be segregated within the camps, and employed on gang or mass labour under convoy. Those subjected to the second regime were to be allocated to work in factories, enterprises and institutions under the management of a camp; and in the event of good behaviour, were to be eligible for rewards. The same privileges were to be enjoyed by the prisoners relegated to the third regime; but in addition, they could be employed on administrative or domestic duties, and could occasionally be given permission to leave the precincts of the camp.

It was enacted that the first and second categories or grades of prisoners—those composed wholly of proletarians—should undergo six

months and one year respectively of the severest regime, and that the "bourgeois" and "counter-revolutionary" offenders should be subjected to the same regime for not less than two years. Further, it was enacted that the last-mentioned should in no circumstances be employed on administrative or domestic tasks.

The decree provided for four different kinds of rations; basic, working, supplementary and penal. It stipulated that the basic ration should be determined by the OGPU. The disciplinary measures authorized were much more severe than those prescribed for other camps. They included solitary confinement for periods not exceeding 30 days and penal labour for one year.

The decree contained an article setting forth that mothers should be allowed to keep with them children under two years, but that older children belonging to women-prisoners should be sent to institutions, or entrusted to the care of persons nominated by the parents.

It must be noted that in the case of concentration or penal camps the OGPU did not limit its activity to its legal function of gaoler or "reformer." By entering into contracts with various State Trusts to provide goods—chiefly lumber—it became commercially interested in maintaining a steady supply of labour. It was easy for the OGPU to achieve this object, as its arbitrary courts could play the part of press gangs unhampered by any legal restrictions.

"Class-enemies" and political criminals are not the only victims of the press-gang methods of the OGPU. Its secret agents penetrate all workers' organizations, and many offenders against disciplinary or labour regulations are sentenced by special OGPU courts to terms of forced labour in penal camps.

A study of the outstanding provisions of the laws affecting labour, as summarized in the preceding sections of this chapter, admits of but one conclusion; that the State claims the power to dispose of the lives of its citizens as it will. If they are industrial workers, they can be compelled to accept whatever employment is assigned to them; and while performing it, they must submit to a severe discipline, for breaches of which they may be fined, degraded, dismissed, and (in certain circumstances) imprisoned. A close record of their delinquencies is kept; and their record follows them wherever they go.

Peasants are subjected to even more rigid restriction. If they enter a collective farm, their conduct and achievement are carefully noted down. At any time, they may be sent in gangs to carry out work other than an agricultural character. Whole village communities, women as well as men, may be required to undertake compulsory labour. If peasants are well off, they may be stripped of their possessions, separated from their families, and transported to remote parts where they are compelled to toil at whatever tasks are chosen for them. An individual who is neither proletarian nor peasant must do whatever he is bidden by the State if he is to live. And all who labour are paid according to the amount of

work which they accomplish. Thus the strongest receive the most, the weakest the least.

After fifteen years, the Revolution reverted to compulsory labour, the basis upon which it was founded; although one, which after the introduction of the New Economic Policy, was partially abandoned. Unemployment is officially abolished by the process of either ignoring its existence or enforcing conscription by means of civil and criminal proceedings.

Of the numbers performing forced labour in camps as a consequence of legal decisions, no exact estimate can be given. There are many penal camps, both ordinary and under the management of the OGPU, in the U.S.S.R. situated in the North, and in Siberia. Of the OGPU camps the most notorious is that on Solovetzky Island in the White Sea (Solovki). Official reports as to the number of people detained in it, and as to its regime, are entirely lacking. The information to hand, based on the accounts of a few escaped prisoners, describes it—allowing for natural exaggeration, the result of the sufferings endured—as a place where inhumanity is reminiscent of the worst periods of the Inquisition.

It must be said that in general Soviet practice differs greatly from Soviet theory. If the Correctional Code provides for safeguards and stipulates conditions of the camps and other plans of detention, practice very frequently disregards these provisions. Even Soviet data indicate that the death-rate in the camps is extremely high, that the sanitary equipment is dreadful, and that the food is bad and insufficient. An official of the OGPU who escaped to Finland informed the *Times* (London) correspondent at Helsingfors (January 29, 1930) that 745,109 persons were incarcerated in the camps in the North (exclusive of Siberia), of whom 652,892 were men; 73,285 women and 18,932 young persons between the ages of 13 and 17. He added that the number of deaths among these during 1928–30 was 72,000.

No official statistics are available to show the number of persons serving sentences of "forced labour without deprivation of liberty"; but the number must be considerably larger than that of persons deprived of liberty. *Periodically the authorities issue directions to the judges that they are to be more diligent in imposing sentences of forced labour.*

Of these directions, two examples may be cited. On January 14, 1929, the Commissariat of Justice circulated an instruction which contained the following passage: "Local Courts shall henceforth pass no sentence of short-term deprivation of liberty which does not exceed one year. The courts are notified that, in the event of any infringement of this instruction, the judge who had passed the sentence shall himself be indicted for non-fulfillment of the desires of the Central Government and shall thus acquire from personal experience some knowledge of the meaning of forced labour."

In October 1930 instructions were sent to local judges and court officials in the Northern Territory, enjoining them to use the mechanism of the courts to the fullest possible extent in order to stimulate activity

in the cutting down and floating of timber. They were ordered to harmonize their policy with that of the Communist Party, to wage fierce war upon the kulaks, to make themselves responsible both by word and deed for the lumber campaign, to show no mercy to "wreckers" and "opportunists." . . . Thus the judicial system was debased into an administrative organ for supplying forced labour, and for carrying out commercial operations.

Occasionally, accounts have been published from escaped prisoners and others, showing that conditions in the camps and other places of detention are abominable. *So far, no impartial or competent witness* has been allowed to visit any one of these camps. "Despite the fact," wrote the Moscow correspondent of the *Observer* (London) on June 2, 1931, "that Molotov last March, in denying reports about forced labour in the lumber industry, declared that foreign Press correspondents had 'freedom of movement' and should therefore contradict false reports, on request to the OGPU authorities to visit some concentration camps, I met with a curt refusal. It was therefore quite impossible for me to gain any first-hand impression about the kind of work which was carried on there, or about the food, housing and other conditions of the prisoners."

It is necessary to recognize that a large section of the factory proletariat is enthusiastic for the existing regime; and the factory proletariat, it cannot too often be said, is the rock on which the present regime is founded. One indication of the strength of the proletarian supporters of Communism is the large number of workers who have volunteered for "shock-brigades" work. It might be thought that their sole motive in so doing was to secure privileges. In reality, they are only partially prompted by such a desire. There is no reason for doubting that they believe that they are the ruling class. Nor can it be denied that they regard the Soviet Government as a genuine workers' Government, and wish to serve it with all their energy. For their faith and deeds, they receive good rewards. They work longer hours but they are more highly paid and better fed than the rest of the workers, while many of them are promoted to managerial posts. Such circumstances explain to a very large extent, why the Soviet system maintains its hold upon the workers.

The majority of "shock-brigade" workers, it should be added, belong to the Communist Party and form the Party cells established in factories. Thus they are integral units of the vast bureaucracy which is centred in the Party, and which controls both State and the Trade Unions. Ruled by this bureaucracy, which regulates their every action, the attitude of the remainder of the workers may perhaps be best described as one of friendly apathy towards the Communist regime. In order to prevent this apathy from being replaced by hostility, the workers are continuously flattered. From time to time numbers of them are introduced into the bureaucracy, being given posts for which they are ill-fitted and where the real work is done by others. Various

mediums for the expression of criticism exist. Worker correspondents are attached to the newspapers, and "wall gazettes" are posted upon factory walls in which the workers are freely allowed to criticise, and sometimes even to lampoon, the management. Workers' brigades or detachments may enter any State undertaking and question the directors concerning its conduct; or they may assist at a "cleaning" of staffs; when they are allowed to question various employees—even those of the highest grades—regarding not merely the performance of their duties but also the mode of their personal lives. But they must never criticise the Communist Party or its dogmas or the principle of the Five Years Plan.

The object of all those inquisitorial activities is to distract the workers from the increasingly severe discipline which is being imposed upon them, to afford them an outlet in baiting the bourgeoisie, to delude them into thinking that they are participants in the system, and that there is no one above them whom they cannot criticise, or, if needs be, censure.

PART FOUR—CULTURE

RELIGION

I

INTRODUCTION

IN ORDER to understand the religious situation in the U.S.S.R. it must be clearly realized that Communism is not merely a programme of political, social and economic reconstruction. It is more than that, for it aspires to destroy the present order and to create a new world on its ruins. In destroying society as it exists today, the Communists fervently believe that they are setting humanity free from the chains of ignorance, superstition, and exploitation.

The Communist doctrine condemns every system that is not based on materialism; for materialism, they hold, is the only true, the only possible base of culture that can bring plenty and happiness to humanity. Denying and rejecting every other philosophy of life, Communism does not recognize any value in non-materialistic cultures. These are at best pseudo-cultures, based on ignorance and backwardness. At their worst—and this concerns the Christian culture and religion in particular—they are deliberate attempts of the rich and powerful to keep in ignorance and exploit the masses of the people.

In its war against religion Communism rests on a dogmatic materialistic belief—which is essentially religious. In this consists its paradox; Communism is the genuine religion of a militant materialism, which aims to create a new society, to explain all material phenomena, and to give a new direction to life. Therefore in its conflict with religion, it is fanatical and wishes to usurp the place in human life which always has been and always will be occupied by religion. Its hatred of religion is boundless. Hostile pronouncements against religion are common among all the theorists of Marxism. A remark of Lenin's is characteristic—"The purer a religion and the better its servants, the more dangerous it is to Communism." Thus it is most essential to apprehend the fundamental fact that to Communism anti-religious activity is not accidental or temporary but logical and inevitable. It is a fundamental principle of Communism, and anyone who does not fully recognize this cannot be accepted as a Communist.

This hostile attitude to religion had evolved long before the Russian Revolution. In 1917 the Communists came to power with a programme

already matured. Their successful *coup d'état* gave them power over an enormous country in which they could carry out their programme. To do this it was necessary for them to eradicate religion—that religion which completed existence, gave a meaning to all life, dictated conduct and was the measure of all values. It was necessary to supply the masses with another view of life, another religion—that of materialistic Communism.

For a new world, it was necessary to train new citizens. Therefore, from the first days of Communist power dates their anti-religious work—a struggle for the souls of the people, which has been waged in Russia for the past fifteen years. At this juncture a short survey of religious conditions in Russia before the Revolution may not be out of place.

II

RELIGION IN RUSSIA BEFORE THE REVOLUTION

THE cultural development of Russia has always been closely connected with religion, and religion played, and still plays, an important role in the everyday life of the Russian people.

Among the religions practiced in Russia, the Greek Catholic or Orthodox confession has always played the principal part. The greater majority of the population belonged to it. It was the official religion of the Russian State; and under its aegis were developed art, principles of statesmanship, family life and the very customs of the people. Until the end of the seventeenth century the Orthodox Church was almost the sole cultural agent in Russia and was solely responsible for the education (both spiritual and material) of the people.

After the reforms instituted by Peter the Great, Russian cultural life was subjected to non-religious influence introduced from the West. But religion continued, almost until the dawn of the Revolution, to exercise its accustomed influence on the Russian mind. However, the number of unbelievers, particularly among the intelligentsia, grew steadily—and therein lay a great danger for the future.

Roman Catholicism played a very important part in the Ukraine—where it was forcibly implanted under Polish rule. A large proportion of the upper classes embraced it but the lower remained faithful to the Orthodox Church. Catholicism prevailed chiefly among certain races of non-Russian origin, such as the Poles and the Lithuanians.

Protestantism, especially Lutheranism, began to penetrate Russia in the sixteenth century. It was then exclusively confined to foreigners who had been invited by the Russian Tzars to serve as instructors for the army or as craftsmen. In modern times Protestantism existed mainly among communities of alien origin, such as the German colonists in the south of Russia and in the Baltic Provinces.

Various sects chiefly influenced by Protestantism, such as the Dukhobors and Molokans, appeared in the eighteenth century. These increased their numbers in the succeeding century, which witnessed the event of other similar bodies, such as the Stundists, Baptists, Adventists and Redstockists.

Of the non-Christian religions, that of Islam was especially prominent. In addition, there were Jews, Buddhists and Lamaists.

According to statistical data for 1897 the percentages of various religions were then as follows:

1. Greek Catholics (Orthodox).....	71.1%
2. Roman Catholics	8.9%
3. Mohammedans	8.7%
4. Protestants	5.2%
5. Jews	3.2%
6. Old Believers	1.4%
7. Armenians	0.8%
8. Other non-Christian Religions.....	0.7%
	<hr/>
	100.0%

Toleration

Outside Russia today there seems to be a widespread impression that in pre-Revolution days the State, which was closely connected with the Orthodox Church, used to persecute other religions. This is an exaggerated view. But it is true that the Orthodox Church, being the established religion, enjoyed certain privileges not accorded to others. For example, all important Orthodox holidays were also official State holidays; and the children of mixed marriages, where only one of the parents was Orthodox, were christened in the Orthodox faith. Needless to say, all members of the reigning dynasty and their consorts belonged to the Orthodox Church.

With regard to most other religions, the general principle of the Russian law was non-interference. There were, however, certain exceptions; notably its attitude towards the Jews, who were *ipso facto* deprived of many civic rights—although they acquired these automatically on conversion to any other religion.¹

This anti-Semitic legislation was the principal, though not the only, exception. Administrative pressure was also brought to bear against religious bodies whose tenets infringed the established law. Such were sects whose teachings forbade taking the oath of allegiance to the established authority, service in the Armed Forces, or payment of taxes; and those whose teachings contravened the laws of morality. However, some sects—*e. g.* the Mennonites—whose members refused to bear arms, enjoyed full civic liberties, and were enrolled in the Army only as medical assistants; they were, however, forbidden to spread their teachings.

¹ See chapter on Jews.

Other restrictions were of a less reasonable nature; in particular, those based on the ground of nationality. It must be noted here that the Orthodox Church was not directly responsible for these; but it was so closely associated with the State that a policy for which the latter was entirely responsible was often blamed upon the Church. This was particularly the case with the policy of Russification carried out, between 1885 and 1910, in the Southwestern Provinces, Bashkiria, Turkestan, N. Caucasus, etc. Here every encouragement was given to the missionary activities of the Orthodox Church and the local religions often suffered much petty oppression. But it must again be emphasized that the responsibility for this rested entirely on the State.

The Holy Synod

From the days of Peter the Great, the administration of the Orthodox Church was always directed by a layman—the Procurator General of the Holy Synod (an office created by Peter the Great to perform the administrative functions formerly exercised by the Patriarch of Moscow). The powers of the Procurator General gradually superseded those of the board of bishops and the State came to regard the Church as one of its departments—one to be used like any other, for its own purposes and benefit.

All who regarded the Church's complete loss of freedom with apprehension were successfully silenced. The bishops, being appointed by the Crown, and no longer elected (as the canons of the Church direct) were chosen from among those conspicuous for their implicit obedience. The few bishops who opposed such a policy could always be—and were—removed from their posts and relegated to distant monasteries.

A strict censorship was exercised by the Holy Synod and its Provincial Offices over the sermons of the clergy. None could be delivered unless previously approved by the ecclesiastical authorities. Any reference in them to questions of Church policy, politics, etc. was absolutely prohibited.

Such a state of affairs did, of course, much harm to the cause of religion. The people, in many cases, came to look upon the clergy as mere agents of the Government. On the other hand the clergy, protected in their position by all the resources of the State, lost a great deal of the fighting spirit. Although countless remarkable examples of fortitude and Christian endeavour might still be found among them, many energetic men whom personal inclination or tradition would have called to holy orders, sought a career in other fields.

Other religions were placed under the control of a special department of the Ministry of the Interior—a practice which had many obnoxious elements in it.

Among the other Christian confessions the Protestants (the Lutherans in particular) enjoyed complete freedom. This was due to the large number of high State functionaries who were of German origin. Furthermore, since the eighteenth century every consort of the Russian

Tzars and most of the Russian Grand Duchesses were of Protestant origin.

Roman Catholicism was suspect; not as a religion, but as "the Polish religion." There were historical grounds for this friction, going back hundreds of years—to the time when the Polish Roman Catholic clergy had attempted to convert the Orthodox peasantry of the Ukraine and White Russia by "Apostolic blows and knocks."

III

THE REVOLUTION

A TREMENDOUS change took place after the Revolution of March, 1917. The principle of complete religious freedom was proclaimed. Even before the Revolution the best members of the Orthodox Church, both clergy and laity, regarded the close affiliation of Church and State as a thing abnormal. The idea of reestablishing the Patriarchate as a living symbol of Church independence and freedom was cherished by most religious thinkers.

After the Revolution, with the Government's assent a General Council of the Orthodox Church elected Bishop Tikhon to the Patriarchate of Moscow and of all Russia. The same Council established new rules of Church administration, by which the laity regained all their former canonical rights.

The Council of 1917 began its work on the eve of the Communist Revolution; the election of the Patriarch took place while the noise of gunfire was resounding in the streets of Moscow. The triumph of the Bolsheviks put in power a party definitely hostile to religion, superseding the Provisional Government, whose attitude was one of tolerant indifference.

Communism v. Religion

The Communists very often compare the execution of their policy with the operations of warfare, and use military terms to describe the various forms of their activity. In this language there are three sectors on the "anti-religious front" of the Communist Government. They are: (1) atheist propaganda (2) the infliction of legal disabilities upon religious bodies and believers and (3) persecution of religion.

To understand the real religious situation in Russia, it is important to note that the anti-religious activity of the Communist Government has never been essentially modified with regard to the first two sectors—the active dissemination of atheistic views and infliction of legal disabilities upon those who profess religion. Religious persecution has continued without intermission for fifteen years, but the Communist Party has frequently altered the extent of its activity in this sector.

The principal method is that of direct atheistic propaganda: anti-

religious education in schools and Universities; the publication of anti-religious books by the State Printing Office; the dissemination of anti-religious views in the Red Army, Professional Unions, factories and villages; and the use of the Arts, the theatres, cinemas, and broadcasting for anti-religious purposes.

Atheism is the "State religion" of the U.S.S.R. In this particular field, however, the anti-religious activity of the Soviet Government does not assume the character of religious persecution. The Communist Government is only doing, on a larger scale, what every Government did which enforced membership of some particular Church as an essential qualification for State service.

Legal Disabilities

However, Communism not only propagates its own atheistic views but also endeavours, with the whole apparatus of Government, to eradicate every other. Religious bodies are prohibited to teach religion, to pursue social, economic or missionary activities. All ecclesiastics and all persons connected in any official way with religious activity are disenfranchised, which carries with it many restrictions of civic rights, increased taxation, economic disadvantages, etc.

Persecution

Moreover, through its dictatorship the Communist Government can use its administrative powers and supplement the anti-religious laws by direct persecution. The most typical examples of this kind of anti-religious activity are the trials (followed by banishment or execution) of believers, the closing and demolition of places of worship (against the will of the population), the removal of church bells, etc.

In this sector the anti-religious activity of the Communists may be divided into four periods: from 1918 to 1923; from 1923 to the end of 1928; from 1928 to March 1930; and from 1930 to the present day (end of 1932). Roughly speaking, the first period may be called the period of direct persecution; the second that of anti-religious propaganda; the third that of the renewal of direct persecution and the increase of anti-religious propaganda; and the fourth that of still-increasing anti-religious propaganda but restricted direct persecution.

Soon after the Communists obtained power they passed (January 23, 1918) a law separating the Church from the State, and proclaiming complete freedom of conscience. This law moreover gave the local Soviets the right to confiscate church property and suppress religious organizations. At the same time, the Red Terror delivered the country into the power of the Cheka—which acted independently of all legislation. Hence 1918–23 was a period of direct persecution, marked by an enormous number of victims. According to official Communist statistics alone, 30 bishops and 1,414 priests were executed in 1918–1919. Unofficial (but fully reliable) information indicates that the Cheka executed, during this period, 2,691 members of the clergy, 1,962 monks

and 3,447 nuns, clerks and other church servants—in all 8,100 persons in the Orthodox Church alone.

Completely accurate information as to the number of those executed will never be available, owing to the chaos caused by the Red Terror, and the absence of reports of any kind from the local sections of the Cheka. Up to 1922, the number of monasteries closed had reached 686. There are no exact statistics of the number of churches closed, but in any case this may safely be put at several thousands. At the same time, a campaign was waged against the veneration of sacred emblems.

In 1923, after a specially marked epidemic of executions in connection with the confiscation of church property, the general policy of the Soviet Government towards religion changed. This alteration closely followed the replacement of Militant Communism by the NEP. But its chief cause was the evident failure of direct persecution. At one of the Congresses, the Commissar of Education, Lunacharsky, said: "Religion is like a nail: if you hit it on the head, it only penetrates deeper into the wood."

Not only did the persecutions fail to eradicate religion—they actually strengthened it. They cleansed the Church of all lukewarm adherents, and produced thousands of martyrs: the unshaken constancy of the victims set their brethren a magnificent example.

The Communists recognized the failure of persecution, and after 1923 executions of the clergy became much fewer—being for the most part replaced by imprisonment or exile. The confiscations went on, but their mass character had departed. At the same time, the Soviet Government strengthened its anti-religious propaganda.

The Union of the Godless

Although from the very beginning, Soviet legislation was actively hostile to religion, yet this was partially masked by the general proclamation respecting the freedom of conscience. The constitution of the U.S.S.R. for instance contains no clauses specially directed against religion. This has been left to the Federal Republics, all of whose constitutions embody clauses providing for church disestablishment and disenfranchisement.

While conceding freedom of conscience, Communism deprived every religious sect of all legal rights, and accorded the fullest freedom to anti-religious activity. In practice, anti-religious propaganda is not merely tolerated; it is actively conducted by the State itself.

Anti-religious work was strengthened in 1925, along with the re-modelling of the Union of the Godless, a body formed in the early days of the Communist regime, which directs anti-religious propaganda in the U.S.S.R. The Union of the Godless is a semi-State institution. It works in close contact with the Communist Party—every member of which is pledged to promote the success of anti-religious propaganda. The Union is also connected with the Commissariat of Education, with the Political Administration of the Red Army, with the Central Com-

mittee of the Union of Communist Youth (Comsomol), and with the OGPU.

In 1931, the Union of the Godless numbered about 3,000,000 members. It is very active. By 1927 it had already distributed 20 million copies of a newspaper "The Godless," 1,330,000 copies of a magazine, bearing the same name, and over two million anti-religious pamphlets and leaflets. The Union organizes special "Godless cells" in factories, villages and Red Army units. It draws up the programme of the anti-religious clubs which are to be formed all over the country. It organizes anti-religious courses in the schools and Universities, and maintains a whole staff of anti-religious lecturers. The Union also arranges anti-religious theatrical and cinema performances and makes a wide use of broadcasting. The Political Administration of the Red Army and the Central Committee of the Trade Unions organize, in collaboration with the Union of the Godless, lectures and cinema-shows in units of the Red Army and at the factories.

Special efforts are made by the State and by the Union of the Godless, to interest and enlist the younger generation. It cooperates with the Comsomol, which maintains anti-religious clubs, and sets aside special sections in its periodicals for the "page of the Young Godless," distributing prizes for the most successful articles against religion. Anti-religious propaganda is also conducted in the period of training for sporting competitions, during school excursions, in clubs for the young, in summer camps, etc.

Communism has shown great proselytizing fervour in its attempt to organize a World Revolution. So also, in its anti-religious work, it is not stopped by the frontiers of the Soviet Union. The Union of the Godless is connected with the International Proletarian Free Thinkers' Association, whose headquarters are in Berlin.

Methods of Anti-Religious Propaganda

The methods of anti-religious propaganda may be divided into two main groups; methods which are simply negative or destructive, and those which are constructive.

The purely destructive methods, aimed at destroying the instinct of religion, may be summed up as follows:

Religion is displayed in a ridiculous form, and derided as a product of human stupidity and ignorance. This is done in special anti-religious humorous periodicals, which ridicule events of the Old and New Testaments, the lives of the saints and the history of the Church. Ridicule is carried further in mock processions and theatrical displays—which are usually arranged for the days of the great Church feasts, especially Christmas and Easter.

Religion is refuted also in numberless pamphlets and leaflets by the use of such arguments as have been advanced by Western Positivism since the sixties of the last century.

Religion is very often denounced from the standpoint of economic

materialism. It is usually represented as a means of exploiting labour by Capital, as an "opium for the people," which hinders the masses from entering upon a struggle for equal economic rights. The image of Jesus Christ as a servant of world Capitalism is a favourite theme of anti-religious caricature.

Religion is ridiculed from the medical point of view; for instance, taking the sacrament from a common cup is pilloried as a factor in the circulation of infectious diseases; prayers for the sick are condemned as bewildering the mind and as hindering rational treatment. It is also represented as a stimulus to drunkenness. The miracle of Cana in Galilee, and the last Supper, are represented as disgusting revels, and the first Communion as the forcing of alcoholic poisoning upon the child.

However, the purely negative methods of anti-religious propaganda are now generally regarded as insufficient. Mocking at religion often produces the opposite effect. At present, there is a growing tendency to favour positive and constructive methods of anti-religious propaganda. This paints a picture of the future Communist world, whose grandeur, prosperity and greatness are to excel everything that existed before, and extolls the proud and fearless position of the Communist atheist, who relies only upon his own strength, and bends before no one. It is contrasted with the religious promise of future happiness in Heaven, and the believer's enslavement to a higher will.

The most favoured method is the denial of religion in the name of technical progress. In the opinion of the Communists, technical progress has deprived the world of all elements of the unintelligible and mysterious. The veil of mystery has been torn from the forces of Nature, and they now stand out, in all their clearness of outline, as a vast mechanism. A proletarian atheistic world, freed from the fog of mysticism, from every religious belief, from all idealistic philosophy, will be able fully to master these forces of nature and to reach an as-yet unknown perfection of technique.

The machine is the highest attainment of organization, the most perfect form of precision. It thus becomes the symbol, incarnating the ideal of Communism. Hence the present cult of the machine in the Soviet Union.

Religion, even the Communists admit, has a special influence on the life of the people. It sanctifies the three chief events of human life—birth, marriage and death. In their anti-religious propaganda the Communists fully recognize that the simple destruction of religion is insufficient; that human nature has an ineradicable bent towards ceremony—and they replace ecclesiastical baptism, marriage and internment with Red equivalents. For instance, Red baptism takes place in the building of the local Soviet or Communist club to the sound of the *Internationale*. The ceremony itself is called *Octobrization* in memory of the Communist Revolution. Instead of a Christian name, the child is given one having some relation to Communism. The former religious

festivals have been replaced by revolutionary ones, commemorating the day of the October Revolution, of the Paris Commune etc. Religious services are replaced by solemn Communist demonstrations and processions. The names of the saints are to be replaced in the national memory by the names of the heroes of all the proletarian revolutions—from the Gracchi to Marx and Lenin.

The Communists fully recognize that the Church performed much social work in the past, and make every effort to replace its present enforced cessation. The anti-religious campaign includes in its programme a wide social activity. Local units of the Godless are encouraged to organize funds for mutual assistance, to promote education, to found schools and libraries, to conduct the struggle against alcoholism, and so on. In this way they are enabled to contrast their deeds with the enforced inactivity of the religious organizations, represented as being due to indifference towards the lot of the poor and oppressed.

Anti-Religious Laws of 1929

In 1928, after the abrogation of the NEP, anti-religious work took a new turn. Direct persecution, less active since 1923, again gathered strength; while simultaneously the anti-religious propaganda became intensified.

In 1929 executions of ecclesiastics became common everywhere; more believers were banished and imprisoned, and more churches and monasteries were demolished and closed—including even such a national sanctuary as the Chapel of Our Lady of Iberia at the gates of the Kremlin. This recrudescence of persecution was largely determined by the general course of Communist policy: which—after the crushing of the “left opposition”—returned in many respects to the ways of Militant Communism.

The anti-religious policy was put into legal form. Local regulations were codified, and took the form of a general law, which actually deprives religion of all rights.

Article 4 of the Constitution read until 1929: “With the object of securing freedom of conscience for workers, the Church is separated from the State and the school is separated from the Church, *while freedom of religious and anti-religious propaganda is recognized for all citizens.*”

In April, 1929, this article was amended to state that the Soviet law recognized *freedom of belief, and freedom of anti-religious propaganda. The right of religious propaganda, previously conceded, was abolished.* It might seem that the change was no great one. One must clearly appreciate what is meant by “freedom of belief”—when the ingenuity of this apparently innocent change will become clear.

The Commissariat of Justice, explained as early as 1926, what it understood by freedom of belief.

“Our legislation fully secures freedom of conscience; however, *not in the objective but in the subjective sense*,—that is, the Soviet Govern-

ment does not hinder any individual citizen from believing in whatever he likes or from not believing in anything—as long as his actions are not opposed to the law.”

In 1929 the Government went further. By a decree of April 8, 1929, all the separate measures, legal decrees, etc. were codified into sixty-eight articles, and became a general law. Here are some of these articles:

Article 17: “Religious associations are forbidden a) to start funds for mutual help, cooperative societies, or productive associations—and, generally, to employ the property in their hands for any other use than the performance of religious services; b) to give any material support to their members, to organize special meetings for children, youths, women, prayer, etc., also to convene any common meetings, groups, clubs, or sections for literary purposes, hand-crafts, labour, the teaching of religion, etc.; to organize excursions and children’s playgrounds, to possess libraries and reading-rooms, or to organize sanatoria and general medical aid.”

Article 18: “The teaching of any kind of religious belief whatsoever is forbidden in State, public or private schools.”

Article 22: “Religious Congresses, and the executive organs elected by them, do not possess any legal status; furthermore, they may not a) establish any kind of organization for the collection of voluntary contributions from believers; b) fix any kind of obligatory contributions; c) possess property in the name of the cult, receive it by agreement, acquire such by means of purchase or rent, or lease buildings for prayer meetings; d) conclude any kind of agreement of a financial character.”

Article 58: “In all State, public, cooperative and private institutions and enterprises, the performance of any kind of religious service is forbidden, together with the display of articles of worship of any kind.”

Even the few religious activities still permitted under this law are dependent upon special permission granted by the respective authorities.

Disabilities of the Clergy

Ministers of all religious denominations are disenfranchised. The Constitution decrees: “The following citizens are deprived of the right of vote and of election: Ministers of religion of all denominations, namely monks, novices, priests, deacons, vergers, and all other persons, paid or unpaid, performing religious functions.”

As “non-labour elements” these persons are restricted in their right to employment, as well as in that of receiving ration-cards for commodities. In general the protection of the Labour Laws is not extended to them, nor to persons participating in the observances and services of the cult (singers, choir masters, organists, administrators and employees of the Church Vestries and the religious communities, artists working for the latter, etc.¹ Ministers of religion have no right to rent

¹ Circular instructions of the Commissar of Labour of the U.S.S.R. from the 8th of June, 1929, No. 188. It must be pointed out that these latter categories are not otherwise disenfranchised.

rooms or apartments in municipal or nationalized premises; and the persons living in these premises have no right to accept ministers of religion as lodgers.¹

Besides this, a whole range of financial burdens are imposed on ministers of religion; which imposts, if strictly enforced by the local authorities, make existence itself practically impossible.

In addition to ordinary taxes ministers pay a special income tax. If a minister is engaged in farming he also pays the agricultural tax, to which is added a tax of 100% on any income derived from his religious functions. To these taxes is added the special tax imposed on all persons who are ineligible for election to administrative positions. As all ministers are disenfranchised, they have to pay this special tax as well. Being "non-labour" elements, ministers are not subjected to conscription—hence they have to pay a special military tax (between the ages of 20 and 40). During the first five years of military age, this tax must be paid every year—afterwards, once every 5 years.

Anti-Religious Activity of the Narkompros

During the first few years after the Communist Revolution, the Soviet Government limited its anti-religious activity to forbidding religious instruction in schools of all denominations. No anti-religious propaganda on a large scale was introduced. In 1929 the principle of anti-religious education was officially proclaimed. The Commissariat of Education published a special decree ("Problems of Anti-Religious Education and Anti-Religious Propaganda in Technikums") relating to the introduction of anti-religious propaganda into Normal Schools for teachers.

Still more important and detailed are the instructions of the Narkompros of March 28, 1929: "Organization of Anti-Religious Work in Pedagogical Technikums." Here is an extract: "The whole scholastic system, the whole system of professional and technical education, including also the Pedagogical Technikums, must be placed in the forefront of anti-religious activity. Their duty is to form detachments of Militant Godless; who, after their graduation from Technikums, must continue the fight in the field of the cultural revolution. The Pedagogical Technikums must devote special attention to the anti-religious fight. . . . This militant attack on religion must have a systematic character—it must be carefully planned and systematically organized; aiming at creating in the students a definitely materialistic mentality. The contents of all scientific disciplines studied at the Pedagogical Technikums, without any exception, must strengthen this mentality. The programme of every branch of science must be drawn up to conform with this principle."

Many other decrees of the Commissariat of Education state openly that the Soviet school aims "to place children in Godless surroundings,"

¹ Decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars, "Law respecting religious associations," pp. 58-60.

and strives to "evoke a moral disgust with religion." All subjects of study, even such as mathematics and foreign languages, must be tinged with a Godless tendency, and the whole atmosphere of the school must be permeated with Atheism. School libraries must be supplied "not merely with ordinary textbooks and literature, but with textbooks and literature upon anti-religious problems." The Narkompros recommends the literature published by the Union of the Godless; and directs special attention to the poster-gazette "The Godless in the School," published by the newspaper "The Godless," which has besides articles and illustrations, blank spaces which are supposed to be filled up with local anti-religious propaganda.¹

Teachers are urged to take an active part in the anti-religious fight. This question is dealt with in the Instructions of the Commissariat of Education. "Anti-religious Education in Schools," which were issued for the Easter Holidays of 1930 under the title "Participation in the anti-Easter Campaign."

The instruction states: "It is necessary to develop, on a large scale, the work of creating children's anti-religious mass-organizations in schools; and also units of the Union of the Godless in all cultural and educational institutions . . . It is imperative to create, around the collective organizations of Godless teachers, a permanently active body, consisting of representatives of all the children's organizations of the school (the Union of the Godless, Comsomol, Pioneers, dramatic circles, etc.). The following slogans are recommended: "Not a single school nor a children's organization without a unit of the Union of the Godless." "Not a single religious teacher in a Soviet school." "Every teacher of the Soviet school must be an active fighter for Godless children."

However, the Commissariat of Education does not limit its anti-religious activity to schools or to children. In 1930 the Leningrad Department of Public Education issued the following order: "All cultural and educational institutions, and those working in them, are definitely required to direct their activities towards the denunciation *everywhere* of religious reaction, the destruction of religious prejudices; and the fight for a new Socialistic life."²

In December 1929 there were issued Instructions "For the establishment of inspectors of anti-religious propaganda in all institutions of the Commissariat of Education."³

The Commissariat of Education is supporting special anti-religious museums and has also issued orders to all other museums to carry on anti-religious activity.

The Commissariat of Education and its various institutions have published a whole range of other decrees and instructions, which give the general principles for anti-religious work, make obligatory the

¹ Instructions "Supplying Schools with Anti-Religious Literature" (The Narkompros Weekly 1929. No. 1).

² The Instructions "Participation in anti-Easter campaign" Appendix to the magazine "Prosvetshenie," 1930, No. 30.

³ The Narkompros Weekly, 1929, No. 50.

acquisition of anti-religious literature for all schools, promote anti-religious work among social workers, and so on. It is impossible even to enumerate all such decrees, regulations and instructions.

Besides the Commissariat of Education many other official organizations take an active part in anti-religious activity. Thus the "Comsolskaya Pravda,"¹ 8 December 1929 reported:

"The Praesidium of the Moscow Soviet has informed us that the Moscow Soviet has forbidden the felling of firs and pines (for Christmas). All persons felling and selling these trees for religious purposes will be punished according to Article 85 of our Penal Code."

And further: "The Moscow branch of the State Printing Office has made various arrangements for the anti-Christmas campaign. In the State Library, an anti-religious exhibition of books will be organized, as well as a debate on anti-religious matters. A debate will also be organized in the Central Library for Children. In the book shops of the State Publishing Office there will be exhibitions, and also debates regarding the books that should be read for the anti-Christmas campaign."

The same paper also stated:

"The Moscow Provincial Soviet has organized an anti-religious film exhibition. In the course of one month this exhibition, accompanied by a lecturer, has visited twenty villages."

Fresh Persecution of the Clergy

During 1929 the Soviet Government announced several times that the clergy were not, and never had been, subject to execution, imprisonment and persecution on account of their religious activity, but only for their counter-revolutionary acts. Therefore it becomes very important to see what is understood by "counter-revolutionary acts" in this respect.

"The Godless" of March, 1929, denouncing religion as a camouflage for counter-revolution, says:

"All religious babble is but a blind. Behind this come lamentations about 'terrible times,' 'great sorrow,' 'decadence of morals,' 'break-up of the family,' 'great anxiety as to the fate of the country,' etc. Why do they all say this? Evidently in order to undermine the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses for the building up of a new life. They (priests and preachers) are trying to disorganize our workers' Front."

Here is what "Comsolskaya Pravda" of Nov. 20, 1929 prints on the subject:

"There can be no doubt that this sectarian (religious) demagoguery is a danger. Under a religious guise, we find purely political tendencies—the admission of the kulaks into collective farms; their equalization with the labouring classes . . . The chief idea of brotherhood is that the poor peasants should embrace the kulaks. Under the slogan of Christian claptrap is hidden the propaganda of 'peace among all classes'

¹ Organ of the Communist Union of Youth.

—the liberation of the kulaks from the yoke of the proletarian dictatorship.”

And “Izvestia” of January 6, 1930; remarks:

“In the hands of the priests, religion, is like a bandage hiding from the eyes of the workers the true inflictors of their sufferings—‘Evil comes not from Capital but from the devil.’ ‘Christ was born to destroy the power of Satan.’ ‘Christ was born to suffer for men. Help him in his work.’ These and other similar *counter-revolutionary* slogans play a particularly important part in religious propaganda during the Christian festivals. The blinded, stupefied and poisoned believer begins to rejoice, and forgets all about the (class) struggle.”

Dealing in particular with the activity of the Baptists, who at one time sought to curry favour with the Soviet Government, “The Godless” of Nov. 10, 1929 says:

“In expectation of Christmas the Baptists have grown more active. There is not much novelty in their programme . . . which is an obvious mask for a *counter-revolutionary* movement . . . The Baptists are mobilizing their forces; they say: ‘. . . in expectation of Christmas, when the angels of God sang the song of peace and brotherly love above the sinful world, we, the preachers of the Gospel, must also raise our voices to speak God’s word of peace and brotherly love. We must declare to all who fight—men and classes—that all men are brothers, sons of their Heavenly Father.’ . . . It is characteristic of the Baptists that they are passing from defence to attack. They declare—‘All refusals to take part in debates (with the Godless) must be regarded as a symptom of weakness. We propose that our brethren and sisters should steadfastly prepare themselves for the struggle against Godlessness and Materialism.’ An active attack on Godlessness, Marxism and Materialism—that means a struggle against Communism and against the Soviet authorities. They clearly imply their estimate of the Labour State when they say ‘Among men perishing in this sinful world there reign hatred, envy, malice and a desperate struggle, moans and curses.’ For us, it is the Socialist construction; for the Baptists it is the triumph of the horrible powers of Hell. Thus the black, demoniacal, religious forces are revealed as *political counter-revolution*.”

On the basis of the law of April, 1929, and these extracts from the Soviet Press, a priest or preacher commits a political and counter-revolutionary offence, and “disorganizes the workers’ front” if he preaches religion to a group of children; if he preaches Christian love and solidarity, the suffering of Christ for the sins of men, festal joy, peace on earth and everlasting life; if he rebukes the lack of morality, the dissolution of the family, embitterment, hatred and strife; if he speaks in public against Godlessness and Materialism. In other words, the performance by any priest or preacher of his purely religious duties or anything directly connected with them is regarded as a political and counter-revolutionary offence.

IV

THE FIVE YEARS PLAN

WHILE religious persecution was at its highest, the Central Committee of the Communist Party published, on March 15, 1930, a decree by which the more violent measures directed against religion were thereafter prohibited.

This act, which inaugurated the fourth period of the struggle against religion is highly significant. It is so characteristic of the Communist Government's general policy with regard to religion, and illustrates so fully the present religious situation in the U.S.S.R., that it deserves special attention; as also do the conditions under which it was issued.

The question of uprooting religion by direct administrative measures was raised many times by the anti-religious leaders. It became especially acute in June, 1929, during the Second Congress of the Union of the Godless. The extremists insisted on the necessity of active administrative measures. The moderates, headed by E. Yaroslavsky, denounced such measures as ineffective and inefficient. Both were equally convinced of the necessity for an active fight against religion; the point at issue concerned only the selection of methods. On this occasion E. Yaroslavsky made a very important declaration.

"Again and again we must repeat, comrades, that the fight against religious hierarchy (priests and active churchmen of all religions) is one thing—and that propaganda among the masses is quite another thing. When we deal with the top there may be counter-revolutionaries and all other undesirable elements among them; but when we deal with the masses, these are not counter-revolutionaries, but just simple workmen and peasants whom we have only to persuade that they are wrong. It is said 'let us administer a blow to the priesthood, which is becoming recalcitrant,' but the recalcitrant priesthood represents only one part of the problem. When we have to deal with millions of believers, the method and means of persuasion must be carefully and cleverly worked out. . . . With regard to the Nepmen and kulaks we have already taken, and are taking, very resolute measures; but with regard to the very considerable body of the labouring population, these measures are not suitable. . . . We are urged that the basis of our anti-religious fight must be a determination to destroy immediately the nests of religion. What does this mean? To speak plainly, it means the suppression of all *religious organizations*; if we adopt this standpoint, this would mean a desperate conflict with at least 60-70 millions of the labouring classes. Would this be good policy or not? Most certainly it would be a grave error; and we, being convinced atheists, materialists and Leninists will not adopt this standpoint, because . . . we are subordinating all our activity to the interests of the class struggle. . . . All our steps, and our

methods of fight at any given moment are being measured by, and adjusted to, the interests of this class-struggle.”¹

Thus the measure of intensity of the administrative measures of repression directed against all believers is to be measured by the extent of the resistance offered by the masses, or believers. The right amount of violence to be used (from the standpoint of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and especially of its General Secretary—Stalin) is called “general line of the Party.”

Religion and Agrarian Collectivization

The religious policy of the Communist Government is intimately connected with its economic policy. The increased pressure of economic measures increases the pressure on religion, and *vice versa*. Religion is especially strong among the peasants; and when, for example, the economic pressure on the peasants was increased by the campaign for collectivization in 1929, religious persecution simultaneously took a more active form.

The local administrations urged by the Godless, began a systematic closing of churches, and pulling down of church bells—a wholesale “destruction of the nests of religion.” This campaign of destruction raged for almost a year. Regardless of the insignificant protection that the law still afforded to religious institutions (parish churches, for example, could not be closed without a majority vote of the population), the local authorities succeeded in closing hundreds of churches, and in suppressing thousands of religious organizations by deporting the priests and the leading members of the religious communities, and confiscating what little was left them from preceding confiscations. Any resistance by the population was treated as an anti-Soviet demonstration, which led to conflicts with the police—and, sometimes, with special detachments of the OGPU troops.

When violence and pressure seemed to have attained a climax, new instructions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party were published quite unexpectedly (March 15, 1930). They abrogated the “suppression of the kulaks and individual farmers as a class by administrative measures.” These were issued to quiet peasant discontent and to bring about a maximum increase in the sown area for the next harvest.

These same instructions of March 15 also indicated a change in the Government’s anti-religious policy, especially in the villages. This was due to several causes: (a) in many cases the Kolkhoz were losing their members because the violent persecution of religion was exhausting the patience of the peasants; (b) furthermore, it became evident that too much pressure was being brought to bear upon the religious peasants, and that this was proving harmful to anti-religious propaganda itself. The fears expressed by the moderate wing of the Union of the Godless proved fully justified; too much zeal for the implanting of Atheism by

¹ E. Yaroslavsky’s speech on Aims and Methods of Anti-religious Propaganda, Godless Congress, 11 June, 1928, Official Report, Moscow, 1929.

administrative measures had resulted in an increase of religious feeling. This fact is noted in the Instructions of March 15, themselves: "The administrative closing of churches without the consent of the overwhelming majority of the village . . . usually leads to the increase of religious prejudices."

Among the ranks of the anti-religious workers these instructions caused a considerable amount of disorganization. In many cases they were understood to mean a complete cessation of anti-religious activity.

On March 20, 1930 there was held in Moscow the plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Union of the Godless. The proceedings of this body explained quite clearly the real meaning of the Instructions of March 15th. The explanation thus afforded has a most important bearing upon the present anti-religious policy in the U.S.S.R.

The Conference declared most decidedly that there was to be no cessation of anti-religious activity. E. Yaroslavsky, the President of the Union, stated in his opening speech:

a) That the fight against religion, against the leaders of the religious movements, and against the priesthood and religiously active laymen would still be merciless and decisive.

b) That the fight against religion among the "believing masses of workmen and peasants must be adopted to actual possibilities, to the measure of resistance of the believers"—in other words, it must be subordinated to the principle of efficiency.

He added "our main aim in the class-struggle is for the moment, the widest possible development of collectivization in the villages, the widest possible participation in the Socialistic uplifting of the poor and middle-class peasantry. Is it not self-evident that in cases where some question of the pulling down of bells, or of the immediate closing of a church, is causing a conflict in a village, it is better to wait, better to carry on a deeper and more serious propaganda? . . . The closing of a church without previous preparation may evoke a hostile attitude towards the Kolkhoz and towards the Party. . . . Of course, religion is an obstacle in the way of Constructive Socialism . . . But, if it is impossible to remove this obstacle today, why not work towards removing it in a year's time?" ("The Godless," March 25, 1930.)

Thus in March, 1930 the Communist policy, as regards administrative measures of anti-religious coercion, was altered; but no change took place in the general attitude towards religion. There was no halt in the active dissemination of atheistic views, nor were any of the previous decrees restricting religious freedom repealed.

All the legal restrictions upon religious freedom still remain in force: prohibition of social activity for religious bodies, prohibition of religious propaganda, prohibition of religious education, increased taxation, closing of churches by the decision of the unbelieving part of the population, and the disenfranchisement of the servants of a religion and of all those actively connected with it. Those who have been condemned for religious offences still remain on the Solovetzky Islands, in Siberian lumber

camps, in prisons, etc. On March 16, 1930, the day after the famous Instructions were issued, the Council of People's Commissars passed a law by which former teachers of religion, and former professors of the Theological schools and seminaries, were deprived of any right to the pensions granted to all teachers ("Izvestia," No. 126, May 9, 1930). There is then no reason whatever to believe that the persecution of religion has weakened in the U.S.S.R. As stated before, only the policy towards the masses was changed in 1930. However, it would be a mistake to think that the struggle in this sector was entirely discontinued. It has not been stopped, only modified.

The best evidence that the persecution of religion has not stopped since March 15, 1930 is supplied by the one man whose every word is law in the U.S.S.R.—Stalin. During his speech at the XVI Conference of the Communist Party on June 24, 1930, he said:

"Collectivization, the fight with the kulaks, the fight with the enemies of Socialist construction, anti-religious propaganda, etc. is the inevitable right of the workmen and peasants of the U.S.S.R., a right fixed by our Constitution. We must and we shall uphold the constitution of the U.S.S.R. with full consistency." ("Pravda," No. 177, June 29, 1930.)

The policy adopted by the Communist Government in March, 1930 is in force at the present time (end of 1932). Changes, determined by the actual political and economic situation, may come—a strengthening or a relaxation of the present harsh administrative measures. But the implacably hostile attitude adopted towards religion, and the active fight against it, will last as long as Communism lasts; for as already shown, this hostility is not temporary nor occasional, but springs from the very nature and psychology of Communism itself.

V

THE PRESENT POSITION OF RELIGION

WHILE the anti-religious activity in the U.S.S.R. can be described with sufficient accuracy by reference to definite laws, decrees and statistical data, very little precise information is available about the life of religious bodies, which exist in conditions recalling the early Christian catacombs. As for statistical data on this point, such simply do not exist.

In a speech made on July 11, 1929, E. Yaroslavsky stated that some 60 to 70 millions of the labouring population of the U.S.S.R. remain actively religious. The numerous censuses taken by the Soviet Government contradict each other; in view of the inconveniences and dangers which an open avowal of religious belief may entail, it is scarcely possible that the results of such official enquiries could do otherwise.

By closely scrutinizing the information supplied by the Soviet Press itself, however, it is possible to arrive at some general conclusions.

1) There is no doubt that anti-religious propaganda has had more

than a partial success. That part of the population which is most attracted by Communism has—especially among its younger generation—abandoned religion. If only a few become *active* atheists, large numbers become passively so.

2) Numerous groups which were only nominally or officially described as belonging to some religious persuasion have now openly repudiated religion altogether. At the present moment, the religious communities consist only of actively religious persons. Within these a new relationship, similar to those which existed in the early Christian communities, is now established; one of spiritual brotherhood and friendship, of mutual aid, of intimate and personal contact between the ministers and the flock.

3) The Soviet Press itself reveals that religion still exists and is manifest in all groups and classes of the population. There is no doubt that of later years religious tendencies have greatly increased among the *workmen*. The Soviet newspapers often report that workmen have built new churches or houses of prayer in factories; and this religious activity appears to be especially prevalent in such large industrial centres as the Don basin, Stalingrad etc.

The same is true with regard to the Red Army, in spite of the fact that any manifestation of religious feeling by the rank-and-file may entail considerable disadvantages and trouble. For this reason, religious feeling among the Red Army soldiers usually remains secret, and becomes known only in special circumstances. Thus the Soviet Press has often reported cases when specified units of the Red Army, regarded as Godless on the basis of official reports, had been found, at inspections, to possess ikons and other religious symbols, carefully concealed by the soldiers in their bags. There are also reports that many men in barracks pray after the lights are turned off.

The peasantry, which was the stronghold of religion before the Revolution, seems to be undergoing a twofold change. Anti-religious propaganda records its greatest success in villages, especially among the younger people. But on the other hand there is also a considerable increase of religious feeling in the villages. It was mainly the resistance of the peasants to anti-religious activity which forced the Government to change its policy in the early part of 1930. At that time the Soviet Press was full of reports concerning the violent opposition of the peasants to the closing of churches, an opposition which in many places assumed the form of open and armed revolt.

The Soviet Press attempts to prove that religion, in the villages, is mainly supported by the former rich peasants. However, the same Press frequently affords evidence that religion survives even in the collectivized farms.

In spite of special efforts made towards anti-religious education, religion still holds its ground in the schools and Universities. Many official surveys show that in some schools more than half of the scholars are religious. Taking into consideration the fact that answers to enquiries

on the subject are not always outspoken, it may be conceded that the proportion of religious children is, actually, still higher. It seems that the proportion of religious teachers is also very high; teachers are very often removed from their posts because of their religious feelings.

However paradoxical it may seem, it is possible to find religious people, although in insignificant numbers, even among the members of the Communist Party. Nearly every report of the "cleansing" the Party from undesirable elements mentions cases when members were removed from the Party because of their religious convictions.

An especially striking and important fact is the increase of religious tendencies among the Soviet intelligentsia. This fact is particularly significant because, before the Revolution, the majority of the intelligentsia were either indifferent, or hostile towards religion. At the present moment, not only do the intellectuals exhibit an increase of religious feelings, but they are mainly returning to the fold of the Orthodox Church and the Orthodox religious rites.

According to official statistics, the highest proportion of people performing all religious rites (about 93%) is to be found among the higher intelligentsia. Furthermore, these statistics also show that the majority of new priests ordained in the U.S.S.R. belong to the same class. Thus one of the most singular results of Communism's anti-religious activity is that while atheism attracts certain groups of the uneducated population who were previously attached to religion, the educated groups—who were previously inclined to atheism—now turn to religion.

The Orthodox Church

It was undoubtedly the Orthodox Church which suffered mostly from persecution; she also lost the greatest number of adherents as compared with other religions. On the other hand, what she lost in quantity she gained in quality, as only those who truly believe remain in her fold. In number she remains the most numerous religious body of the U.S.S.R.

Unfortunately, since the Communist Revolution, and especially after the death of Patriarch Tikhon (1924), it has been impossible for the faithful to organize the administration of the Church. Central authority is at present very enfeebled; and the dioceses, and even parishes, of the Church are left very much to their own devices. This is due to several factors; the most important being, that the Soviet Government has persistently forbidden the convening of a Church Council for the purpose of electing a successor to Patriarch Tikhon.

The latter's attitude to the new order of things in the country underwent a radical change shortly before his death. In 1917 he had excommunicated the new rulers of Russia, an act which led to terrible reprisals against the clergy by the Soviet Government. The Patriarch was kept in close custody and was unable to direct the Church. In 1923 he found himself compelled to abandon his previous policy, and declared that the Government's policy, plans and theories did not concern the Church.

For a while (this was during the NEP) this alleviated the situation a little. However, the Government found other means for disrupting the Church's organization. Through the OGPU it had secretly supported a body of dissenters, who set up a rival organization, under the name of "The Living Church." Unpopular as the latter was, it succeeded with official support in making a breach in "the religious front"—exactly as the Government desired. Its short and inglorious existence—one never hears of it now—had a disastrous effect on the outcome of the religious struggle, weakening resistance and engendering chaos where concord and community of effort against the spread of Atheism should have reigned supreme.

The privations which Patriarch Tikhon endured during his imprisonment, and the lamentable state of the Church, hastened his death. He had time, however, to appoint several bishops who were to administer the Church provisionally until such time as a Council could meet to elect a new Patriarch. The Government promptly arrested most of these bishops—among them the Metropolitan Peter, whose energy, eloquence and great popularity marked him as a likely successor to Tikhon. He is still a prisoner in Siberia, although nominally head of the Orthodox Church in the U.S.S.R.

The only bishop whom the Government did not molest was the Metropolitan Sergius. At one time he had been a prominent member of the Living Church and his standing among the faithful was extremely doubtful, hence, possibly, the Government's leniency.

Sergius went further than Patriarch Tikhon. He not only stood for non-interference by the Church in the affairs of the State; he demanded loyalty to the Soviet Government from all Orthodox clergy, both in the U.S.S.R. and abroad. It is difficult to judge of the circumstances which led him to take this step. In principle, the clergy of every denomination owe their country the same allegiance as any other citizens do. But history has never before known a Government which makes religious convictions a crime.

The result of this step, which in 1927 allowed him to form a sort of administration of the Church (a Synod was appointed, and allowed to function for a time), was what might have been expected. Many of the dioceses refused to recognize him as their head; partly because of his connection with the Living Church, and partly because his public pronouncement condoned, to some extent, the persecution of religion.

In addition, the recrudescence of anti-religious activity in 1929-1932 practically annulled the 1927 agreement with the Government. This condition of affairs remains unaltered today, and it is impossible to forecast when and if conditions will permit the establishment of an organized Church administration.

Meanwhile, in spite of all difficulties, the faithful not only hold their ground, but are even able to counteract, in part, the anti-religious propaganda.

There is no doubt that the Russian Church, reduced in numbers but

immensely rejuvenated by persecution and suffering, remains the main spiritual force in the country—a force capable of enormous future development.

Other Religious Bodies

After the Revolution, some Protestant persuasions, especially the Baptists, increased considerably. This is partly explained by the fact that the Communists during the first years of their rule directed their attacks more particularly against the Orthodox Church and left the other relatively unmolested. This truce ended about 1928; and at the present moment the Protestants are as much oppressed as the Orthodox Church. They are holding their ground, however, and display ability through support from abroad (the Baptists) to combat anti-religious propaganda.

There has also been a marked increase of the so-called “mystical” sects in the U.S.S.R. Under the influence of the Government’s anti-religious activity, and of a radical change in all traditions and habits of life, the expectation of an approaching Day of Judgment is considerably on the increase among people of all confessions. This expectation creates a very favourable soil for the growth of mystical sects. As the majority of these are secret, it is very difficult to obtain exact information about them. But in addition to those which existed before the Revolution, various new ones have arisen, brought into existence by the events of the Revolutionary epoch. Among them the sects of the “Red Dragon” and “Fedorovtzi” are especially important; the trial of the latter in 1929 made them well known, not only in the Soviet Union but also beyond its borders.

The Jewish religion is persecuted in no less a degree than the Christian; and among the Jews conversions to atheism have been extremely numerous. Since the Revolution, the Jewish population has greatly diminished in numbers, and the voice of the religious Jew is heard in protest even less than that of his Christian fellow-citizen. This, when compared to pre-Revolution days is a remarkable fact.

The non-Christian religions—Islam, Buddhism, Lamaism and various local pagan religions in the remote parts of the country—seem to have been the least affected by the Revolution, although anti-religious propaganda is directing its attention to them also. Such propaganda is difficult, since it demands a knowledge of many native languages. In the regions where the influence of Communism is most strongly felt, certain individuals, or even certain groups may abandon the religion of their fathers. But on the whole these religions have been but little affected by the new order of things. Their turn, however, will undoubtedly come later.

This brief survey of the “religious front” in the U.S.S.R. justifies the assertion that the main objective of Communism’s anti-religious activity has not been reached. Communism has succeeded in converting certain

groups of the population to atheism but all its attempts completely to eradicate religion have failed. Religion remains a great factor, sometimes deeply hidden in the conscience of individuals, and often taking the form of secret societies. Suffering has only purified it. The religious spirit has undergone changes also in other ways: the old inter-religious disputes are, to a large extent, forgotten and the relations between different confessions have vastly improved.

EDUCATION

I

INTRODUCTION

Russia's history, her size and the distribution of her varied population fully account for all the difficulties that had to be faced in solving the problem of how to educate the masses of this vast continent. To spread education amongst a hundred-and-odd races speaking more than a hundred dialects and languages of different origin, and scattered all over a huge expanse of land was indeed a task of outstanding size.

Before the reign of Peter the Great, Russian education was exclusively in the hands of the Church; which was almost the sole agent of educational progress.

Till the close of the seventeenth century education centred among the higher ecclesiastical schools, which gradually became Theological Academies—the most prominent being that of Kiev. All these centres pursued exclusively religious aims, and did not follow the example of similar centres in the Western world, which devoted their energies more and more to things secular until they became Universities—centres of scientific learning. The Russian Academies remained theological schools, in form and substance, throughout.

It was for the purpose of Empire-building and government that Peter the Great laid the foundation of secular education. This explains its exclusive class character—intended as it was almost entirely for children of the upper classes, destined for State service—and also its professional curriculum; from which, originally, abstract knowledge was completely excluded. It was only in the middle of the eighteenth century that a start was made, by the foundation of the University of Moscow, towards independent scientific work in Russia.

Furthermore, the schools served the urban population only. The peasantry, before the abolition of serfdom in 1861, could never, or very rarely, use the secular schools. Hence the education of the bulk of the population remained, as previously, in the hands of the Church.¹

Tzar Alexander II, by liberating the peasantry and introducing local self-government, created favourable conditions for the development of popular education. This became one of the chief concerns of the new rural and town institutions.

¹ Parochial schools.

Briefly, the school system after Alexander's reforms was as follows:

1. Primary education—Primary (Elementary) schools; Town and District schools; the State, Zemstvos and Municipalities shared in the cost of primary education. Ages 8 to 11 and 11 to 14.

There was a certain number of private Primary schools, licensed by the State.

2. Secondary education—Secondary schools or Gymnasiums. With the exception of a small number of private Secondary schools, these were kept at the expense of the State. All scholars paid a small tuition fee—about Rbles. 50. Ages 12 to 19.

3. Higher education—Universities, and various institutes corresponding to a faculty of a University. All these were maintained by the State.

The whole country was divided into Educational (School) Circuits with a Curator at their head. A Ministry of Education was the supreme administrative authority.

In addition, other Government Departments also maintained their own educational (professional) institutions.

Count Tolstoy's Reforms

Very soon after the initiation of this new and broader system of education the reactionary reforms introduced by the Minister of Education, Count Dimitry Tolstoy, affected its normal development and for decades to come made it the subject of a considerable amount of controversy and political struggle.

These reforms pursued a definitely political objective and consisted in the adoption of a purely classical form of education in all Secondary schools; this, the reformer maintained, would divert the rising generation's attention from the political problems of the country into the field of abstract knowledge. Furthermore, the classical Secondary schools were to be treated as merely a preparatory stage for the Universities and henceforth were to cease having an independent educational significance.

Theoretically the reforms affected the Secondary schools only; but of course their influence was very great throughout the system, on the Universities in particular.

Only as a concession to public opinion Count Tolstoy's scheme admitted the existence of another form of Secondary school—the Science school, with a curriculum from which the classic studies were omitted, and where somewhat greater prominence was given to mathematics and natural sciences. However, these schools were allotted quite an inferior position compared to the new Classic Gymnasiums, their students being admitted to the competitive examinations for the High Technical schools, but debarred from the Universities.

These reforms did not commend themselves either to the Tzar, to a majority of the Council of Empire, to the institutions directly concerned with education, or to the people. Only after lengthy agitation, and when repeated attempts on the Emperor's life had impressed the need for

combatting revolutionary propaganda, was it possible to persuade Alexander II to agree to the minority opinion of the Council of Empire. The scheme was made law in 1868.

From the very beginning, Count Tolstoy's plan was stubbornly opposed by all the prominent teachers in the country. When it became law it automatically placed the greater majority of the educational staff into the ranks of the opposition, a condition which prevailed till the introduction of liberal reforms during the World War.

II

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION IN THE BEGINNING OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

THE introduction of local self-government (Zemstvos and Municipalities) in the seventies gave a great impetus to primary education; for example, while in 1880 the Primary schools numbered about 22,000, in 1908 there were 100,000; and in 1914 their number had grown to 150,000.

The influence of the Zemstvos also made itself felt in many other directions. The curriculum of the schools were brought into closer contact with the children's environments; the teachers were encouraged to adopt more modern methods of education; foreign practice and theory were studied; and every effort was made to enable teachers to compare notes (teachers' conferences).

The Ministry of Education, it must be said, took some time before welcoming these new tendencies. The traditions of Count Tolstoy long remained a paralysing influence. However, by the nineties official circles had awakened to the fact that official opinion was on the wrong track. The Ministry began to issue decrees, of a purely administrative character, altering the programmes of the Secondary schools to decrease the importance of the classical element in education and increase the proportion of studies having more affinity with the practical realities of life. However, such sporadic and disconnected measures were necessarily of insufficient value, while they plunged the schools into a welter of controversy.

Bogolepov's Committee

The first serious investigation into the problems of education, particularly as affecting the Secondary schools, was made by a Committee set up (1900) by the Minister Bogolepov. Its report acknowledged that contemporary Russian education was divorced from real life; that the different stages of education were not correlated; that none of the different types of schools gave a complete cycle of education; that the syllabus of the courses was filled with matter not so much designed to

improve the natural gifts of the students as to encourage them in mental gymnastics (chiefly the development of memory); that none of the courses gave its students practical knowledge but only one-sided theoretical development. As a result, it was pointed out, a great number of students did not obtain their school certificates and were turned out of the schools utterly unprepared for the struggles of life—failures who went to swell the ranks of the disaffected. It was emphasized that the system introduced by Count Tolstoy had increased the very evil—social unrest—against which it had been directed.

The Duma and Education

A new phase in the development of education was reached after the first Revolution. The third Duma (1907–1908) devoted, from the start, great attention to considering this subject in a laudable endeavour to initiate long-overdue reforms.

Owing to difficulties—chiefly centring around the subject of primary education in reaching a complete agreement between the Legislature and the Ministry of Education on the course to be followed—no new general law was promulgated. For the time being, the Legislature confined itself to enacting separate laws, chiefly of a financial character. These laws, however, paved the way for a wide development of primary education, and for the planning of a network of Elementary schools which should cover all Russia.

The Statute of May 3rd, 1908, formed the core of this plan. Its basic provisions were as follows: general compulsory education was to be introduced during the next ten years (*i. e.* by 1918); the duration of the primary course was fixed at four years (from 8 to 11); the law fixed a minimum wage for the teachers and provided for an increase of pay every five years. The development of the network of schools was assigned by law to the Zemstvos under the general control of the Ministry of Education. State subsidies for the maintenance of the teaching personnel and for equipment were guaranteed to the Zemstvos; and subsidies also covered part of the expenses for the building and maintaining the Primary schools. The expenses of building, and all other incidentals, were to be met by the Zemstvos out of local taxation. But, to assist them in this task, a special “Peter the Great Building Fund” was put at the disposal of the Ministry of Education; this was to be annually increased by grants from the Exchequer. Out of this capital the Zemstvos could obtain building loans on easy terms (up to 80% of the value) or subsidies (up to 50% of the value).

The events of the War naturally created unfavourable conditions for the fulfilment of this plan; the Government was compelled to extend until 1922 the period which was to see the complete introduction of compulsory primary education. By this date, Russia was to be provided by a network of Primary schools, 317,000 in number, sufficient for the entire rising generation—according to estimates, some 15,500,000 scholars.

Higher Primary School

The type of school which, as a link between the primary and secondary stages of education, next received attention, was the Higher Primary school. Its course, lasting four years, was intended as a continuation of primary education on the lines of the three junior forms of the existing Secondary schools; at the same time, it was designed to give a complete cycle of education. It replaced the Town and District schools of the seventies, and soon proved its utility.

In 1914 there were already 1339 Higher Primary schools, and their number grew even during the War. But it was not until 1916, under the reforms introduced by the Minister of Education, Count Ignatiev, that these schools were definitely correlated with the Primary and Secondary schools.

With the object of training and improving the staffs of both types of schools, Teachers' Seminaries and Normal Schools were provided. Their number gradually increased, notwithstanding the financial difficulties caused by the War. At the end of 1916 there were 168 Teachers' Seminaries and 43 Normal Schools, with about 30,000 students.

In addition the Government, finding these institutions inadequate to provide the necessary number of teachers for Primary schools, encouraged graduates of the Secondary schools to adopt teaching as a career. Students of the Girls' Secondary schools, who passed through an additional pedagogical course, proved themselves particularly suitable for this purpose.

Advent of the Agronome

The development of education amongst the agricultural masses was not left entirely to the regular teachers of the Primary schools. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Zemstvos commenced to pay more attention to the economic and technical shortcomings of the village, as a consequence of which a new educational factor made his appearance in the countryside—the trained agronome.

As part of the land reforms of the Ministers Stolypin and Krivoshein, the Department of Agriculture decided to place throughout Russia a large body of trained agronomes, who were to give technical assistance to the peasantry. Among other duties, the teaching in Primary schools of the essentials of agriculture devolved on the agronome. The Department of Agriculture hoped, by establishing a connection between the District agronome and the teachers of the Primary schools, to bring the schools into contact with the real requirements of life; the agronome was to spread in his district such a knowledge of the natural conditions as was of primary importance to the local agrarian population.

The War and the Revolution prevented this new factor from having its full effect on the course of education; as the scheme was only introduced as late as 1910-11.

The 1915 Reform of Secondary Education

Nor did the Legislature lose sight of the problem of secondary education. A Committee on the subject, which the Duma established in 1908, came to the same conclusions as Bogolepov's Committee. The Duma next decided upon a series of necessary reforms.

The Ministry of Education at that time, however, did not see eye to eye with the Legislature on the reforms to be introduced. The decision was several times postponed; and the subsequent outbreak of War still further held up the execution of any radical change.

It was only during the War (1914-1916) that the Government at last attacked this burning question. A great deal of preparatory work was done by a special Committee, representing not only the interested Government Departments, but also comprising members of both Legislative Chambers and prominent figures in the scholastic world. A complete scheme was drawn up for the reform of secondary education, its place in the general policy of education and its programme of studies.

The chief aim of the proposed reforms were as follows: the correlation of the Secondary schools with the other stages of education; every stage to comprise a completed cycle of education; each to permit its pupils either to pass on to the next, or to graduate. By this method the whole system of education was to be unified.

The school was to be brought into closer contact with life's problems and labours; its task was to develop the natural gifts of the students, their creative faculties and initiative. The school was to take into account the many racial divisions of Russia's youth; and in the early stages instruction was to be given in the mother tongue. The school was to be democratic—accessible to all children, in accordance with their capacities; in the higher stages co-educational schools were to be permitted under special conditions.

These ideals, laid down in the report of the Committee, served as a basis for the various schemes of reform which it drew up. Unfortunately, the Government was not able to introduce these reforms in their entirety. It was able, by separate administrative regulations and by partial legislation considerably to ameliorate the situation, and to improve the course of school instruction; but the War and the Revolution of 1917 effectively prevented any complete reform.

Statistics collected in 1915 illustrate the state of secondary education; there were 797 Classical schools (Gymnasias), with 152,000 boy scholars, 284 Science schools, with 80,000 boy scholars; and 965 Secondary schools with 383,577 girl scholars. In addition there were some fifty girls' schools (totalling about 14,000 scholars) of the so-called Empress Marie's Foundation established by the consort of Tzar Paul I.

The Specialist Schools

Fully to estimate the development of secondary education in Russia

before the Revolution, one must note that, besides the Ministry of Education, there were other Government Departments which maintained their own schools. This was due, in a great measure, to the unsatisfactory preparation for technical work which the Classical schools gave their students. In most cases these special schools bore a professional character. Such were those founded by the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Agriculture; and later, the Commercial schools by the Ministry of Trade. In type these institutions resembled the Science schools. In 1915 there were 220 such schools, with about 60,000 scholars.

The religious educational establishments (theological seminaries), 431 in number, with about 83,000 scholars, gave their graduates the right, under certain conditions, to complete their education at the Universities. The part played in education by the Military schools (in particular, the Cadet Corps) which were similar in character to the Secondary schools, was also very important; there were 33 of these institutions with 11,000 scholars—who, after graduating, could transfer to the Universities.

III

THE UNIVERSITIES

THE foundation of the University of Moscow in 1755 was the first step in the development of academic education in Russia. It was soon followed by the foundation of several others. At first the Universities, like all Russian schools of the period, had as their aim the preparation of youths for Government service. Later in the nineteenth century the Universities strove to develop an independent existence, as "temples of learning" under an autonomous regime. This tendency was strongly opposed by the Government; which, chiefly from political motives, repeatedly introduced regulations restricting the autonomy of the Universities and subjected them to control by the Ministry of Education. But the Universities strove none the less to establish their independence—not only as regards scientific work, but in matters of administration—and hence there arose a great deal of friction between the Government and academic circles.

At last, the law of 1916 granted the Universities and High Technical Institutes almost full autonomy; and thus established new and friendlier relations between the Ministry of Education and the University Boards. War conditions did not permit this law to take full effect, but the old antagonism between the two was brought to an end.

When reviewing the state of Academic education in pre-Revolutionary Russia, one must bear in mind that the Ministry of Education was not alone in the field. Nearly all the Government Departments had special (professional) Institutes under their control, institutes corresponding to a faculty of a University.

In 1916 there were eleven Universities (each sub-divided into several faculties, with special schools attached to them); but the total number of educational institutions having an academic status numbered a hundred, with about 150,000 students. The doors of all these stood open by law, to all classes of the population¹; while large subsidies from the Exchequer, low tuition fees, a considerable number of scholarships, and a wide organization of public assistance for the needy made them available to students of very limited means. The proportion of such students was always very high. Data given in the "Messenger of Education" for October 1914, show an average of 54% rising to 83% for the University of Yuriev (Dorpat) and decreasing to 45% for the University of Kiev.

The academic standard of the Russian Universities was very high. In so far as equipment and endowment went the Government vied with society in its generosity towards all educational institutions with an academic status.

IV

SCHOOL ADMINISTRATION

BETWEEN the reforms of Emperor Alexander II and those of 1915 the system of school administration varied but little.

The Ministry of Education was in general control of all the educational establishments of the Empire, with the exception of those set up by other Government Departments. However, till the end of the nineteenth century a certain degree of decentralization existed; this was represented by the Curators of the Educational Circuits.

The country was divided into eleven Educational Circuits, each with a Curator at its head. Each Circuit embraced several Provinces of a common ethnographical character. The Curators had very wide powers of administration and control in all matters pertaining to school life; and were, to some extent, independent agents in deciding matters of local interest.

The efforts of the Ministry of Education, at the end of the nineteenth century, towards centralization gradually deprived the Curators of their independence. The Ministry concentrated in its hands the exclusive management of the schools and, disregarding all local needs and circumstances, established a standardized regime.

Public opinion strenuously opposed this policy; and the Curators, now the agents of the Ministry of Education, became the butt of its attacks. The Duma, in which the Zemstvo element was always very strong, was inclined completely to abolish this office. The reforms of 1915-1916, however, maintained it. The impetus given to education, and the increased powers of local institutions, made it necessary that the

¹ With the exception of the Jews who were limited to a quota.

Curators—the representatives of the central authority—should continue as a link between the Ministry of Education and the machinery set up to administer and develop education.

The Primary schools were administered by the Zemstvos and Municipalities. For this purpose District and Provincial School Councils were set up, composed of representatives of the Ministry of Education (in the persons of the Inspectors of Primary schools), the District Marshals of the Nobility and representatives of the local Zemstvos.

The Secondary schools were administered through School Councils and Inspectors (District and Provincial), appointed by the Curator.

After the Revolution of 1905–1906 public interest in these schools had been constantly increasing. The events of those years affected the life of the Secondary schools very deeply, their scholars taking an active part in disorders, strikes, etc., all over Russia.¹ The Government, which until then had strenuously resisted all outside attempts to obtain a share in their management, saw itself forced to allow Parents' Committees to cooperate with the School Councils in the task of administering the schools. However, the pacification of the country weakened the importance of the Parents' Committees, until the reforms of 1915 and 1916 enlarged and developed their powers and responsibilities.

The relation of the Curators to the Universities underwent great fluctuations. At one time they had entire control over academic institutions; but gradually, with the development of academic independence, the functions of the Curators lost all significance for the Universities. They were more directly under the control of the Ministry itself.

The 1915 Scheme

In 1915 a bill designed to reform the whole system of school administration was presented by the Government to the Legislature.

Its main feature consisted in creating, wherever possible, collegiate administrative bodies, composed of persons representing the teachers, the Government and the institutions of local self-government. It also established a uniform system of administration for all grades of schools throughout the country.

A Primary school was run by the Head Master supported (in those schools where there were several teachers) by a Teachers' Council. District School Councils were to have entire control over all the Primary schools in the district; in their membership were represented those public bodies (Zemstvos and Municipalities) on whom the task of financing of primary education devolved by law; the Curator in the person of the Inspector of Schools; the Teachers' Councils and the District Agromonomical organization. The teachers were appointed by the School Councils (subject to confirmation by the Inspector of the Schools).

The Provincial School Council, a novelty in school administration, was divided into two sections:

¹ Public opinion was unanimous in its condemnation of the revolutionaries' efforts to enlist immature youth in its cause.

a) The Primary School Council, comprising representatives of the Provincial autonomous bodies (Zemstvos and Municipalities), the staffs of the Primary schools, and the Curator.

b) The Secondary School Council, comprising representatives of the self-governing bodies and institutions responsible for the maintenance of the Secondary schools, and of their staffs, together with an Inspector of Secondary schools (appointed by the Curator).

The administration of a Secondary school was entrusted to a Pedagogical Council composed of its entire staff, with a Director at the head; the representatives of the Parents' Committee took part in the labours of this Council. Appointments of teachers were made with the assistance of the Pedagogical Council; who presented their candidates to the Provincial School Council; the latter selected a nominee for confirmation by the Provincial Inspector of the Secondary schools.

At the head of each Educational Circuit, the bill retained the old institution of the Curator—as a representative of the Ministry of Education.

The Curator was provided with a Circuit Council, composed of representatives of the Provincial School Councils, of the school staffs, distinguished men of science and representatives of the University Boards.

A Special Council (meeting at the Ministry of Education) was also to be formed; comprising representatives of the Circuit Councils, officials of the Ministry and prominent members of the scholastic profession. This was to direct the instructional work of the schools and to form a last court of appeal from the decisions of the Circuit Councils; it was also to settle disputes that might arise between these Councils in different Circuits.

This bill, having passed every stage of interdepartmental and Committee discussion, failed to become law although many of its provisions were enacted by ministerial decrees; this was due, first, to the political events of the end of 1916; and, later, of the Revolution.

In addition to these projected reforms, it had been planned, in order to facilitate research work on educational problems and to develop education throughout the Empire, to create an Imperial Pedagogical Museum, together with a Pedagogical Academy. Branches of this Museum were intended to form part of every Educational Circuit.

University Administration

The question of the administration of the Universities took a different course, owing to the fact that the Government agreed to make them practically autonomous—reserving only a general control for the Ministry of Education; but since representatives of the Universities sat in the Circuit Councils, and also in the Special Council at the Ministry of Education, coordination of the work of the Universities with the rest of the system was well assured.

The Government decided to create new Universities in such centres as could serve large sections of the country—sections with common

ethnographical, historical and cultural interests. The existing Educational Circuits indicated these regions fairly accurately. During the War, and despite the financial difficulties of the country, two new Universities were founded (those of Perm and of Rostov-on-Don); the number of the faculties of the Universities of Saratov and Tomsk was increased; and a University was proposed for Irkutsk.

V

THE EDUCATIONAL BUDGET

IT CANNOT be said that the vote for education formed a prominent feature of the pre-Revolutionary Russian budget. In 1916 the estimates of the Ministry of Education constituted 7.5% as against 3.4% of the Empire budget in 1908. On the other hand, the expenditure for education was steadily on the increase; whereas, the whole Budget increased one and one half times between 1908 and 1916, the cost of education over the same period had more than tripled.

In 1914 the Exchequer was spending Rbles 1.26 per head of the whole population on education; the expenditure per pupil being Rbles 9.04.

It must be remembered, that this did not cover all expenditure on education; as previously stated, many other Governmental Departments provided funds for education in their own (special and professional) schools; while much education was provided in the private schools, and still more—as regards the masses—in “literacy classes,” held in all the units of the Army and Navy, through which many thousands of young men passed in the course of their military service.

Owing to the present (post Revolutionary) condition of the Russian archives, it is impossible to give even an approximate estimate of these important additions to the sums allotted for education.

The Education Budget was not limited to grants from the Exchequer. Important grants for primary education came from local budgets—those of the Zemstvos in particular. In 1914, 34 Zemstvos supplied Rbles 104,000,000 for primary education—31.1% of the general expenditure. The total expended by the Zemstvos, Municipalities and other local bodies on primary education reached Rbles. 150,000,000 in that year.

To this must be added the funds derived from “Peter the Great’s School Building Fund.” Under the law of 1908, Rbles 10,000,000 per year were granted to this Fund from the Exchequer; this sum being placed, through the Ministry of Education, at the disposal of the local self-governing bodies. Commissar of Education Lunacharsky estimated the general pre-War expenditure on education at Rbles 314,000,000.

The share borne by the Exchequer in financing different categories of schools under the Ministry of Education was: 59% of the budget of the

Universities and similar institutions, 52% of the Classical schools and 57% of the Science schools. The remainder was made up by the pupils' fees (varying from Rbles 50 to Rbles 100 a year), by grants from local institutions and educational societies, and by private donations.¹

APPENDIX A

ESTIMATES OF THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION FOR 1916 AS PRESENTED TO THE LEGISLATURE

	<i>Budget for 1915</i>	<i>Estimates for 1916</i>
	<i>Rubles</i>	
1. Administrative expenses of the Board of Education.....	5,128,423	5,175,849
2. Expenses of Scientific Bodies (Academy of Science, Etc.).....	3,001,278	3,084,227
3. Universities	10,641,232	10,687,441
4. Secondary schools	36,756,399	38,477,337
5. Primary schools	79,724,275	88,597,848
6. Other expenditure for education (training of teachers, professors etc.)	3,985,901	3,985,901
7. Upkeep and repairs of Buildings.....	6,528,355	6,679,223
8. Peter the Great's Building Fund.....	10,000,000	5,000,000
9. Pensions	3,149,364	3,472,054
	158,915,227	165,159,780

The Legislature anxious to do its utmost to promote education found it possible, in spite of the War difficulties the country was experiencing, to increase these estimates by Rbles. 30,000,000 to Rbles. 195,159,780, which in due course received Imperial sanction.

APPENDIX B

NUMBER OF SCHOOLS AND STUDENTS (returns for 1916)

<i>Denomination of school</i>	<i>Number of Schools</i>	<i>Number of Students</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
1. Universities and Higher Technical and Professional schools (all departments).....	100	150,000	
2. Secondary schools:			
a) Classical (boys)	797	152,000	
b) Science (boys)	284	80,000	
c) Commercial (boys)	274	59,000	
d) Cadet Corps (boys).....	33	11,000	
e) Diocesan (boys)	431	83,577	
f) Girls	965	383,577	
Girls (Emp. Mary schools).....	20	14,000	

¹ A large proportion of these grants were used to pay for poor students.

<i>Denomination of school</i>	<i>Number of Schools</i>	<i>Number of Students</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
3. Primary schools:			
a) High	1,339	270,000	{ Calculated on the average figures of attendance
b) Elementary	167,000	8,000,000	
c) Parochial	60,000	1,500,000	
4. Normal Teachers' Schools.....	43	1,700	{ For graduates of Secondary schools
5. Teachers' seminaries	168	27,000	{ For the training of teachers for Primary schools
91% of the children of the Empire attended the schools; the literacy of the total population was estimated at 56%.			

VI

THE REVOLUTION

AT THE end of the War, Russia stood prepared to introduce a compulsory primary education and had a general scheme of reform well in hand; the necessary arrangements for this had been made by all the institutions concerned. This was admitted by the first Minister of Education in the Provisional Government, Professor Manuylov, who expressed the view that a revolution in the sphere of education had already been achieved under the Imperial regime; the Provisional Government, in fact, simply introduced most of the measures prepared in 1915-16.

However, towards the end of 1917 the political life of the country took such a turn that the normal course of education could not but be interrupted. Thanks to the harmony that had come to reign during the last few years between all sections of the Russian school,—the staff, scholars, parents and administration—it withstood the pressure of revolutionary disintegration longer than could have been expected, while the authority of the teachers was able for some time to resist the political cyclone that was sweeping the country.

The first year after the Bolshevik Revolution, the schools were left very much to their own devices. The minor decrees of the Government did not affect the substance of their work. The People's Commissariat of Education (Narkompros) directed its attention solely towards introducing political propaganda into the schools, forbidding religious teaching and combating any counter-revolutionary elements in them. The ebb and flow of the Civil War and the general chaotic state of the country relegated the problem of education to the background. The Government, however, realized that action was necessary to save the schools from complete annihilation. In the autumn of 1918 it issued the *Statute of the Uniform Labour School*, the first of a series of educational de-

crees. The school policy of the Narkompros has since been subject to numerous radical changes, in precise accordance with the similar changes of the general Communist policy.

These changes can be divided into five periods: from 1917 to the NEP (1923); from 1923 to 1927 (the NEP); from 1928 to the end of 1929; the speeding up of the Five Years Plan necessitated changes in 1929; and as recently as August 21, 1932 the Communist Party has ordered a complete reversal of school policy.

VII

THE FIRST PERIOD

SPEAKING at the time of the 1918 Statute, Lunacharsky, Commissar of Education, announced in a bombastic declaration that the reform was "all embracing," and would place Soviet education on a pinnacle in the eyes of the whole civilized world. The Narkompros attached the greatest value to "the development of personality in a Socialist society of equals." A "labour principle" was the acknowledged basis of the new school; the child should study all subjects whilst "exploring, collecting, taking photographs, modelling . . ." On the other hand, the school would instruct the child in the principles of manual labour. The new aim of education was a "polytechnically educated youth."

The organization of the Primary and Secondary schools was arranged by the Statute in the following order: From October 1, 1918, the schools of all denominations came under the Commissariat of Education and were designated by the name of Uniform Labour School. They were divided into two standards; the first for children from 8 to 13, and the second for children from 14 to 17. The education in both standards was free of charge. The management of every school was entrusted to the School Collective Body which included all the scholars, "school workers" (teachers) and the School Council; which, in turn was formed of all school workers, of delegates from the labouring class of the district (in the proportion of one to every four school workers), of delegates of the scholars (such as were 12 and upwards) in the same proportion and one representative from the Department of Education of the local Soviet. The ultimate idea of the Statute was that the school would replace the home. It aimed at separating the children from their families—children would not only learn in the school but also live in "houses for children."

For the first half-year the sum of Rbles. 2,000,850,000 was allocated for the realization of this plan. Actually neither the financial estimates nor the plan were realized. As Posner, a member of the Commissariat of Education remarked: "this estimate was intended to make an impression on the public opinion of the country, and abroad."¹

¹ "Popular Education." 1919. Official publication of the Narkompros.

The idea of a "labour school" and "uniform school" was not new; it had been the aim of the reforms introduced during the last ten years before the Revolution. The originality of the Soviet conception of what "labour" means merely served to distort the principle. According to the testimony of the members of the X Congress of Soviets (1923), "in those schools where the labour principle was actually in use, it was transformed into manual labour, and was in no way connected with tuition for productive labour or scholastic training, (consisting as it did of carrying wood, washing floors and staircases, carrying potato bags, etc.)."

The principle of juvenile autonomy introduced by the Statute of 1918, which made the election of teachers dependent on the vote of the pupils, reduced authority to a farce. Although this principle did not play so important a part from 1921 on, there remained the Communist cells in every school, which exercised both open and secret control over the activities of the schoolmasters.

"Popular Education," in the end of 1919, gives a summary of the conditions of school life, resulting from the Communist reforms. Among other things it states ". . . school-rooms are not heated; food is insufficient; epidemics are frequent; school equipment is inadequate; no provision is made for the teachers; the non-attendance at the schools is appalling, reaching 75% in some cases, . . . the ignorance shown in introducing the labour principle has aroused dissatisfaction among the population, affecting the attendance of scholars and discrediting the new schools in the eyes of the people. The peasants say: We send our children to school in order to learn, we don't send them there to light fires, to work—they can work at home. . . ."

In the first period only the negative side of the Soviet Government's programme was realized: the abolition of religious instruction, the disintegration of school discipline, and, lastly, the fusion of Secondary schools for boys and girls; a measure promulgated without any consideration of its probable effect upon adolescent morals.

As a result illiteracy grew rapidly. An examination of the particulars of the census of 1920 is interesting; whereas in 1914, 91% of the children were receiving instruction in the schools in 1918 the figure dropped to 62%, in 1919 to 49% and in 1920 to 24.9%.

Between 1914 and 1920 illiteracy among the total population had grown from 44% to 65%.¹

Scrutinizing particulars collected for the years 1920–22, the Central Statistical Bureau comes to the following conclusion: "the contemporary school gives a finished primary education (4 years' course) only to less than one-fourth of the children attending the schools (23.9%). The remainder leave the schools having probably only attained some knowledge of reading and writing; while a considerable part, over a quarter (30.2%) leave after one year's attendance and should be classified as illiterate. . . ."

¹ "Popular Education" 1921.

With regard to professional education, in his review of 1923 Lunacharsky himself acknowledged that it was entirely abandoned at the outset of the Revolution.

A Confession of Failure

In 1923, Lunacharsky made the following statement with regard to the prospect of completing this plan "... we must be prepared for the day which will clearly demonstrate that the greatly extended network of schools created by a colossal effort of the peasants and the proletariat must collapse, because it has no material base. . . . By October, 1922, we had only 55,000 schools with 4,750,000 pupils. . . . The decrease has not stopped at that figure—it has begun going at such a rate that it represents now a reduction of 40%, 50%, 60% and perhaps even more as compared with the pre-Revolutionary figures. We are already far behind 1914. The limits of this catastrophic decline cannot yet be determined, as we are in a state of complete chaos at present. . . . Most awful instances of pauperism, premature death and sickness exist amongst the teachers. . . . A teacher earns 12% of a minimum which is in itself not a normal wage for a worker, being equivalent to Rbles. 2.90 in gold a month. . . ."¹

Things were no better with the Universities; continuing his report Lunacharsky said: "... we have created a considerable number of academic schools² and are now obliged to close nearly all of them. So far we have closed 49 academic schools . . . and notwithstanding the number eliminated, we are still considering whether we should not do away with many more, since their present existence is a miserable one."³ In the same report Lunacharsky stated: "... before the War the Government spent Rbles. 238,000,000 a year on popular education, while in addition Rbles. 76,000,000 were allotted to it from the local budgets. In the present year the whole amount spent on popular education was Rbles. 36,000,000. . . ."

The collapse of the original Utopian plan was complete. Even the principle of free education disappeared; payment for the elementary schooling was made obligatory, and exemption was only granted to the poorest elements of the population. In 1923, the financing of all schools was entrusted to the local authorities.

The "Model Demonstration School"

The striking contradiction between the actual facts and the glowing reports of some foreign visitors, as to education in the U.S.S.R. at that time is easily explained. During the whole first period of the Soviet school policy and, to a less extent, at present, the "model demonstration schools" have been carefully maintained by the Government. According

¹ Report of Lunacharsky to the X Congress of Soviets. "Popular Education" 1923.

² It must be remembered, that 100 such schools existed before the Revolution. The word "created" is more a figure of speech than a strictly accurate statement.

³ Report of Lunacharsky to the X Congress of Soviets. "Popular Education" 1923.

to Soviet statements, these schools constituted about 2% of all the existing educational institutions. In most instances, teachers, trained under the old regime were at the head of these schools. The Government lavished money on them, however detrimental to the general scheme of education; at the same time, it hardly interfered at all with the details of their management.

VIII

THE SECOND PERIOD

THE NEP introduced a more sober view of things, replacing the illusions of the first period. The Statute of 1918 was condemned. A new principle was proclaimed—the school must serve the aims and the practical needs of the domestic and foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. At the same time the principle of one central governing body was abolished. Each Republic of the Union was to have its own Commissariat of Education; the Narkompros of the U.S.S.R. being a general directing agency.

New Educational Aims

The organization and programmes of the schools between 1923 and 1927 were determined by *The Statute of the Uniform School of 1923* and by the curricula adopted by the State School Council (GUS).¹

Two fundamental tasks were set for education. First, the training of a new generation of Communists to relieve (ultimately) those now in power; and, secondly, the training of specialists. The ideal was a class-conscious professional school.

The 1923 Decrees

Although the schools continued under the names of “uniform” and “labour” the decrees and curricula of 1923 completely altered the meaning of these words. In place of the previous schools, divided into two standards, three separate types of schools were created and officially designated by the number of years of instruction; the “Four,” “Seven” and “Nine” years schools. The “Four years” replaced the Primary school; the “Seven years” was a Primary school with one division (three years) of the Secondary school added; the “Nine years,” a Primary school and two divisions of the Secondary school (three years of the first division and two of the second); the last two categories were usually designated as Secondary schools. Owing to the scarcity of Secondary schools, especially of those with the full five classes (“Nine years” schools) it was extremely difficult for the pupils to complete their secondary education. According to Soviet statistics, only 4 to 5%

¹ Gosudarstveny Ucheny Soviet. These curricula could not be altered by the Commissariats of Education of the Federal Republics.

of those graduating from the "Four years" school were able to continue their education to the full term.

The "Seven years" and "Nine years" schools were independent types, determining the future career of their graduates. Those who finished the "Seven years" school had the right to enter the so-called Technicums for a further three years; the Technicums were purely professional schools, below the academic stage. There was no direct connection between the "Seven years" school and academic education; the only existing link was that which the "Workers' Faculties"¹ of the Universities afforded; but this path was only open to children of Communists, Comsomols and workers. The "Nine years" school was the only course which led directly to academic education.

If, in the preceding period Soviet pedagogues understood the word "labour" to mean actual work done by the scholar, the programmes of 1923 made "labour" a scientific subject for study. According to Petrovsky, assistant to Lunacharsky, "the science of labour does not arise from the study of natural conditions or of methods of labour, but is conveyed to the scholars as a ready-made conception, a final conclusion of the Marxian dogma based on *class-war*." The Soviet teacher Pinkevitch demands that this dogma be "firmly impressed on the minds of the scholars."

The Complex Theme

The decrees of 1923 introduced the methods of "Marxian teaching" for Primary and Secondary schools. The school programmes were not subdivided into subjects but into abstruse "complex themes," the object in view being the "development of mass Communist ideology among the scholars."

Under such a system the scholars were regarded merely as "human material for building a Socialist society"; the greater majority of the scholars being deterred from developing their individuality. To further this last aim examinations were abolished.

The "complex themes" for the first year was "the life and labour of the family in village and town"; for the second year "labour in the village generally, and the town budget"; the third year, "the local budget"; the fourth year (ages 11 to 12) "the budgets of the U.S.S.R. and other States"; in the fifth the complex theme was agriculture and its different forms; in the 6th year it was "the history of labour" and in the 7th—"the scientific organization of labour."

All instructional material connected with these themes was divided under three heads: "labour," "nature," "society." The system excluded the following, as independent subjects: reading, writing, arithmetic, the mother tongue, foreign languages, history, geography, literature and the natural sciences. A knowledge of reading, writing, arithmetic, etc. it was supposed, could be acquired "naturally" without special

¹ Rabfak.

lessons being devoted to them; they were to be acquired whilst studying the above mentioned complex themes.

The introduction of the complex theme was not the original invention of Soviet educators. In the past this method was called "the synthetic system" and laid down that in the first stages of schooling the instruction of the child should explain his surroundings. In the higher stages of education, synthetic tuition meant the harmony between the separate subjects taught. What was new under the Soviet regime was that instead of *life* it was *dogmatic principles* that appeared as the basis of the complex theme.

Further Failure

The Soviet Press, as far back as 1925, pointed out the discrepancy between the complex theme system and the usual requirements of school tuition. It was found quite impossible to follow regulations and the teachers were soon obliged secretly to introduce instruction in individual subjects contrary to approved plans.¹

Here a most important factor of education—the teacher—must not be forgotten. The great majority of the teachers carried on their work in a distinctly hostile atmosphere. For statistics show that in 1926 Communist teachers numbered only 2.5%. The rest were "non-party" men who did not approve of the new methods and to whom the authorities showed no sympathy, or encouragement.

In 1926 the Narkompros itself condemned the system of 1923: "the teaching of the following subjects in our school is placed on a bad basis; writing, reading and arithmetic, sociology, natural history, geography and mathematics."

Compulsory Education

It was only in 1925 that the Soviet Government found itself in a position to handle the problem of compulsory primary education. The rising tide of illiteracy was becoming a national menace and the discontent of the masses (to whom during the NEP the Communists felt obliged to cater to a certain extent) both with the conditions prevailing in the Primary schools and their insufficient number urged the Government to elaborate a scheme of progressive development. Accordingly a decree was published late in 1925 providing for the creation of a network of Primary schools, able to accommodate all the children between the ages of 8 and 11, to be completed in 1935.

The decree did not include a comprehensive financial plan for the building of new schools; only one-third of the building expenses were to be granted from the budgets of the Federal Republics, while the remaining two-thirds were to be provided by the local authorities from unspecified sources.

The yearly cost of one "educational unit" (1 teacher and 40 scholars) was fixed at Rbles. 800; the amount spent on a similar unit in pre-

¹ "Popular Education" 1926.

Revolution days was Rbles. 823.3. This was a sore point with the Soviet Press, which emphasized the fact that the old ruble was worth considerably more than the Soviet token. "Problems of Education," a new official publication of the Narkompros, estimated the Soviet budget for education for 1927 at not more than 65.3% of the last pre-War budget.

IX

THE THIRD PERIOD

New plans and curricula were compiled in 1928 coincidently with the inauguration of the Five Years Plan, and from that time a new educational policy was followed. It came as a compromise between Communist ideals and the demand for sounder methods of instruction. Even among the more violently Communistic teachers, pleas for moderation were heard. The Soviet teacher Pistrak ("On the Way to the New School" 1927) wrote: "there is no need to repudiate indiscriminately every method of the old school, just because it is old."

The new programme completely abandoned the complex themes and resumed instruction in individual subjects. The Secondary schools received orders to rearrange their programmes so as to form preparatory courses for the Universities. In a desire to raise the standard of the Secondary schools, it was decided to add an extra year to the "Nine years" school, this to be compulsory for those proceeding to higher education. Most of the "Nine years" schools were thus transformed into "Ten years" schools.

A Government decree promulgated in October, 1929 ordered that the "Ten years" school was to serve as a compulsory stage for the higher Technical schools; the "Seven years" school, for Secondary Technical schools; the "Four years" school, for Elementary Technical schools. This decree in a great measure reestablished the structure of technical education as it had existed before the Revolution.

An important obstacle, however, to the normal development of education in the U.S.S.R. at the time was financial stringency. A report of the Narkompros states: "the financial basis of the school is far below pre-War level—it reaches no more than 75% of the pre-War expenses of the elementary school per pupil, and 65% per teacher." But however important this might be, it did not constitute the chief defect of the system. This was the continual change of methods and aims, which created a state of chronic chaos equally incomprehensible to the staffs and the scholars—all of whom were made passive subjects for the experimental activities of Communist theoreticians. In the words of the Soviet teacher Radchenko ("Popular Education" 1926) "we keep changing from one system to another, and make plans and schemes which we reject or cast aside without ever trying them out to the end. What is worse, we ignore precedent, and each would-be organizer dubs

his predecessor a 'cobbler' and considers it his duty to introduce something diametrically opposite. The result of such an organization is naturally disastrous."

X

THE UNIVERSITIES

IF THESE vacillations seriously affected the quantity and quality of the graduates of Primary and Secondary schools, the endless experiments that were made with the Universities completely disorganized them.

Academic autonomy, firmly established before the Revolution, was in contradiction to the principles of Communism. What is more the Universities showed no desire to submit to the dictates of the new regime; which were contrary to the accepted standard of science and learning. This sounded the death knell of the old Universities.

A decree published on August 8, 1918 initiated a series of measures destined to abolish academic autonomy.

The decree established the right of every one who had attained the age of 16 to enter the Universities *without examination*. This measure was intended to allow the peasant and the working youth, unable to pass through the Secondary schools, to fill the faculties. The students were entitled to take part in the administration of the Universities and the Communist cells to exercise control over the teaching personnel.

It became evident, from the very beginning, that students so recruited were incapable of following the University course, hence the authorities, while not annulling the decree, were obliged to permit examinations being held for those desiring to join the Universities. In addition to this, and in order to proletarianize the Universities, special Workers' Faculties (Rabfaks) were established in 1920, to serve as preparatory courses, at first lasting three years and extended to four in 1927.

The "Class-Conscious" University

To keep the proletarian element in a majority, the class-principle of admission to the Universities was introduced in 1923; 90% of all vacancies were allotted to the Rabfaks and Communist students, the remaining 10% to students not connected with the Communist Party or with Soviet officialdom. After the autumn of 1930, the conditions for admission were somewhat altered—all graduates of the Secondary schools were entitled to enter the Universities without examination, but only if furnished with a certificate testifying that they professed a "sound proletarian ideology." Thus the Universities became centres of learning for only one privileged section of the population. The returns for 1927 clearly illustrate this: 40% of all students came from workers'

families, 33% were peasants, 13% were children of Soviet officials and only 6% belonged to other classes.

Experiments with Programmes

Experiments in changing the curricula of the Universities started in 1920, when an attempt was made to reduce the normal course to 3 years, by introducing a system of narrow specialization. But, after one year, a decree followed that the students, if they wished, could take a longer course: this step being forced on the authorities by the poor results obtained.

However, till 1922 the Soviet Government gave the University Boards a certain freedom in drawing up their programmes, only interfering in the legal and economic studies, where the instilment of Marxian principles was made compulsory. The ensuring of orthodox instruction in these matters was in the hands of the Communist cells of each University. But from 1923 onwards the composition of the programmes was entrusted to the State School Council (GUS).

In 1926, the programmes were again reexamined. At the same time the courses were extended to 4-5 years. Finally, in connection with the Five Years Plan, University education was made subordinate to the problem of industrialization.

The University Directorates

The decree of October 5, 1918 had abolished the existing system of academic hierarchy, and the various scientific decrees. All the personnel of the Universities was divided into two groups—professors and lecturers, the latter becoming professors after lecturing for three years.

However, before 1922 academic autonomy was still officially recognized and the Government restricted itself to periodical “clean-ups” of those not sufficiently subservient to its authority. In 1922, the management of the Universities underwent a radical change. A Directorate consisting of three to five members appointed by the Commissariat of Education, was placed at the head of every University. The professors were entitled to select their candidates for the Directorates, but the Commissariat was free to confirm or reject them. This brought all autonomy to an end.

According to data given in “Popular Education” for 1929, in 71 Universities (and other schools of an academic status) of the Union there were 30 Communist Presidents and 122 Communist members of the Directorates, while 41 Presidents and 92 members were “non-party” men. The same publication states that only 4.6% of the professors and 8.6% of the lecturers were Communists. The Communists, however, did what they liked as they had the whole Party and State machinery to support them.

The highest of all academic institutions of the U.S.S.R.—the Academy of Science—met with the same fate; in 1929 it was compelled to open

its doors to influential members of the Party, however inconspicuous these might be in the realm of science.

XI

THE FIVE YEARS PLAN

AT THE end of 1929, in connection with the speeding up of industrialization, a *Five Years Plan for Cultural Construction* was drawn up by the Narkompros. The main features of the Plan are as follows: 1. the training of an army of qualified workers; 2. the complete abolition of illiteracy¹ and religion—"the mainstays of the old regime"—and the proletarianization of Secondary and Academic education.

The expenditure per pupil was increased from Rbles. 3.29 (1927-28) to Rbles. 4.2 (1932-33). It is interesting to compare these figures with pre-Revolutionary ones: the St. Petersburg Zemstvo allowed Rbles. 5.17 per scholar, and the Moscow Zemstvo Rbles. 12.16, this in addition to funds supplied from the State Exchequer.

The Plan provides for an increase of from Rbles. 6.15 to Rbles. 10 per scholar, in 1932 and 1933, for expenditure on building and repairs. Yet even then only 49% of the schools will be housed in their own buildings, and the other 51% will be compelled to use the same buildings, in relays.

The general cost of the Educational Plan, according to the official Soviet forecast, will involve the expenditure between 1929 and 1935 of Rbles. 9,000,000,000, of which Rbles. 2,000,000,000 are earmarked for building purposes and Rbles. 1,000,000,000 for material assistance to the scholars. The same forecast predicts a deficit of Rbles. 1,800,000,000 (20%) which it will not be possible to cover either from the Budget of the U.S.S.R. or from those of the Federal Republics of the Union. It is "hoped" that the deficit will be covered by voluntary contributions of the population.²

The Soviet Press affords very little information as to the prospects of this plan, or the results achieved. At the XVI Communist Congress (July 1930) the President of the Trade Unions, Shvernik, stated: "On the average, illiteracy increases by 2.6% a year."

This is well illustrated by the statistics of illiteracy among the recruits for the Red Army, on the day of enrollment: it was 11.42% in 1924, 12.47% in 1926 and 14.01% in 1930.³

Class Policy

While a class-distinction existed in the schools before the inauguration of the Five Years Plan and especially in the higher stages the Plan intensified it by introducing the so-called "class-mobilization for

¹ See Appendix D.

² "Popular Education" Moscow, 1929.

³ "Popular Education" 1930.

the front of learning." The local Party-authorities are instructed to carry out "recruiting" for this or that school and are even sometimes ordered to select Communists from the local party organization for "scientific training"; this of course leaves but very few vacancies for outsiders.

A radical change in academic education was made by a decree of the TZIK of the U.S.S.R. (July 23, 1930) on the reorganization of the Universities, technical schools and Workers' Faculties. This reorganization is to be effected on the "lines of a close combination of theoretical instruction with practical work for specialization of the schools in the branches of industry."

Of the academic institutions of the U.S.S.R. only the Normal Teachers' and Art schools remain under the Commissariat of Education, together with such of the University faculties as are not being reorganized into special technical schools. The Medical Faculties are transformed into Medical Institutes and placed in charge of the Commissariat of Health. All the High Technical schools are to be transferred to the corresponding Commissariats, and other technical departments, of the U.S.S.R. The schools situated in the agricultural areas are being given an "agricultural character."

Militarization of Schools

The Five Years Plan is accompanied by another process—the militarization of education; this is, moreover, being transformed into the instrument of "Red Preparedness." By 1928, special courses of military instruction were introduced into all Universities and many technical schools. From the autumn of 1929 onwards, military instruction was made compulsory for all students of the Universities.¹ In the autumn of 1930 this measure was extended to all students of the senior classes of the "Ten years" schools.

The general supervision of military instruction is concentrated in the hands of the local Military Command and delegated to special officers. Both the Party and the government spare no efforts to bring the pre-military training to a high level of efficiency.

A very important part in the militarization of the schools is played by the "Osaviachim."² There are very few schools in existence now where the Osaviachim has not a cell. In some schools up to 90% of the pupils are enlisted in its ranks.

In order to expedite the militarization of the schools Commissar Lunacharsky was replaced in 1930 at the head of the Narkompros by the Red General Bubnov, who previously held the post of head of the Political Administration of the Red Army.

¹ "Narkompros Weekly" 1929.

² See "Armed Forces."

XII

LATEST REFORMS

THE poor results of education in the U.S.S.R. in the latter years, especially in the question of training of professional men for the industry has been forced upon the minds of the responsible Communist leaders during 1931 and 1932. The failure of Soviet industry to live up to estimates is, and with reason, partly ascribed to the extremely poor training which Soviet youth receives in the schools. Stalin and his nearest collaborators were forced to admit that this was due chiefly to the defective system of tuition. In accordance with these views the Executive Committee of the Communist Party promulgated a decree on August 25, 1932 which fundamentally reverses the policy of education since the Revolution in favour of a system resembling that which obtained in pre-Revolution days.

The Resolution starts with the statement that “. . . the main defect of the Soviet school—insufficiency of general knowledge, defective preparation for higher technical training and almost complete absence of knowledge in such matters as physics, chemistry, mathematics, the mother tongue and geography—has not been removed . . .” and orders the Narkompros to elaborate new programmes by January 1, 1933 with a view: 1) to increase the historic elements of education in such branches as sociology, language, literature and geography; 2) to increase the hours devoted to mathematics in the Primary and Secondary schools; 3) to extend the programmes on physics, biology, chemistry and geography; 4) to introduce the compulsory training in one foreign language in the Secondary schools; 5) to introduce new programmes of tuition in the mother tongue and sociology; 6) to return to the *lesson* as the basic method of training; 7) to ensure the actual predominance of the pedagogical staff in questions of education; 8) to introduce the principle of yearly examinations and 9) to enforce school-discipline.

Thus on the close of the fifteenth year after the Bolshevik Revolution the Party sees itself forced to return to “bourgeois” methods of instruction which it had set itself to destroy and for which it intended to substitute a “new-world” system.

CONCLUSION

The latest decree of the Communist Party regarding education is the clearest condemnation of the policy pursued by the Soviet Government till the end of 1932. There is, however, an aspect of education which throughout the fifteen years of the Soviet regime, has remained un-

altered—the special political turn that is given to instruction in all the schools of the U.S.S.R.

Soviet youth is taught everything through the prism of Communism; the past history of their country and the outside world are represented as organized oppression of the rich over the poor, of the strong over the feeble. All non-Communist principles and ideas are condemned as either illiterate, or harmful and obnoxious! Hatred towards the “bourgeois” world is the fundamental aim of instruction and Soviet text books and programmes do not stop at exaggeration and extortion of the truth. In a sentence, general and even professional education has become part of Communist propaganda.

It is, therefore, not astonishing to discover when meeting Soviet youths their lack of true knowledge and prejudicial attitude towards everything which is not Communistic. This is a feature prominent in the experience of foreign visitors to the U.S.S.R. and of foreign educators, who come into contact with Soviet students at home, or abroad.

Such a state of affairs, however advantageous for Communist propaganda, cannot be considered anything but deplorable and pregnant with disastrous and dangerous possibilities from both a national and international point of view.

APPENDIX C

ALTHOUGH there exist no accurate returns about the number of persons educated in the schools of the U.S.S.R. the following *estimates* for 1932–33 are of some interest:

Urban schools (of all denominations).....	4,814,000
Country schools (of all denominations).....	18,809,000

These figures include evening classes for adults—chiefly workmen—which constitute some 20% of the total. The children in the Primary schools (“Four years” schools) are estimated at 90% of the total children population of the U.S.S.R.¹

The above estimates must be accepted with a great deal of circumspection. It is characteristic of Soviet educational statistics that only estimates are published and not actual returns.

¹ Official estimates of the Narkompros. Moscow, 1931.

SCIENCE

I

SCIENCE AND REVOLUTION

ON THE eve of the eighteenth century the upper classes of Moscow society, and also the Government, were keenly conscious of the backwardness of Russia in science as a result of her long isolation from Europe. Many disjointed attempts were made to raise the standard of knowledge to a higher level but with poor results, as the country at large had grown to be proud of its isolation and evinced no desire for a change. These efforts served, however, to demonstrate two outstanding facts: the national ignorance of Western methods of learning and the complete absence among the general public of the most elementary basis for its development.

It needed a man of Peter the Great's personality and enterprise to lay, within a short period, the enduring foundations of Russian learning. "Our science," writes C. F. Oldenbourg, member of the Academy of Science of the U.S.S.R. "is the youngest amongst the sciences of the great countries and peoples . . . We owe the birth of scientific knowledge in our midst to the efforts and will of the State (under Peter the Great) which saw in it the necessary instrument for developing our national resources . . . This historical origin of our science considerably influenced its subsequent development and in many ways foreshadowed its future progress. The science of the Soviet State, in this respect, is a descendant in the direct line of the revolutionary period of Peter the Great. . . ."

There is indeed a distinct similarity between the reforms of Peter the Great and the scientific and technical activities in the U.S.S.R. Knowledge in the Great Tzar's day, as under the Communist regime, was introduced by the State and for the State. The fundamental difference, however, is that in Peter the Great's time scientific endeavour was centred in the upper strata of society, whereas the Soviet system has a marked tendency to "proletarianize" science, to bring it down to the intellectual level of the masses; moreover, Peter the Great encouraged every branch of knowledge without undue discrimination; in the U.S.S.R. discrimination is the general rule, and only those branches of knowledge which have received the Communist *imprimatur*—the materialistic branches, in other words—now receive State support.

Russian Mentality

In order best to understand the present condition of Russian science, and to visualize its possible further progress, one must understand two characteristics of the Russian mentality which have influenced Russian scientific thought in the past and which are particularly important with relation to Marxism.

The first of those characteristics may be described as *monism*—a tendency to prefer all phenomena to one central principle (whether spirit or matter). The second may be called *concretism*—a tendency to subordinate the realities of life to abstract principles. In the nineteenth century a division of all men of science into two camps, materialists and idealists,—i. e. enemies or champions of religion—took place. Both camps held monistic and concretistic views; and this combination made their struggle with each other extremely embittered.

Both camps had their ideologists who formed two distinct schools of Russian thought—the spiritual and the materialistic; the latter, since the seventies, was very much under the influence of Marxism. In all fairness, one must admit that the materialists—such as Chernyshevsky, Plekhanov and Lenin—were (and are) much more intolerant than their opponents of the religious camp (Vladimir Soloviev, the brothers Troubetskoy, Feodorov, etc.). Since their victory (i. e. the Revolution) they have done all in their power to wipe their adversaries out of existence and to erase from the human mind even a memory of those branches of knowledge which are non-materialistic.

Efforts have been made in the past to unite the two camps synthetically. The most important of the exponents of this policy was N. Feodorov, a thinker and scientist who died early in the twentieth century. He has a large following, which seeks to unite the spiritual and the material in one system of ideas. Little as yet can be said about this school, as the Revolution has afforded the materialists, for the present, endless opportunities for suppressing their idealist opponents.

II

SCIENCE IN THE U.S.S.R.

RUSSIAN knowledge has always tended to apply itself to the realities of life. The greatest Russian scientists, from the time of Lomonossov (eighteenth century) onwards, were always distinguished by their desire to serve humanity—to alleviate its sufferings by means of scientific research. This was largely due to the direction given to knowledge by Peter the Great. It was intended chiefly to serve the State and society; and was, therefore, mainly practical in its applications. There is therefore nothing absolutely new in the Soviet principle that “science is one of the most important instruments for state-building

which governs the rhythms of development and constitutes a powerful factor of the coming cultural revolution."¹

What is new in it, is the hypertrophied growth of technical learning; coupled with the decline, and sometimes even the extinction, of the spiritual branches of knowledge.

The disproportionate and exclusive development of technical science acquires grotesque forms—too many eager expectations are associated with the very word "science" and the results are sought with too much impatience. The Communist Party links up purely scientific work with the Party dogmas of Marxism, of *Scientific Socialism* as they call it, and with class-war.

"The building of Socialism"—writes N. Bukharin, one of the foremost Communist ideologists—"gives science the only true and real base for development . . . The Communist class-policy is a scientific policy and the only possible scientific policy . . . no other political party bases itself on such a sober objective and scientific analysis of life as the Bolshevik Party." Further, Bukharin insists that the organization of society on Socialist principles gives science an unprecedented uniformity of method; this is to be found in the dialectic materialism of Marx." It is only natural, in these circumstances, that such sciences as are least affected by materialism should have the best opportunities for development; while on the other hand the non-materialistic and humanitarian branches of knowledge (logic, psychology and—worse still—theology), which cannot conform to the ruling dogma, find themselves in an unenviable position.

Scientific Socialism is the State dogma, propagated by every means at the disposal of the ruling Party and stands as the moral, social, ethical and scientific basis of the new order and the source of inspiration for all actions of the authorities. It has permeated every branch of Soviet science and governs, guides and directs such of its branches as Jurisprudence, Political Economy, Philosophy, etc. These are now no more than the servants of Marxism. In short, Marxism has taken the place of religion and has become a pseudo-religious theory. It is essential to realize this in order to understand its position in the U.S.S.R. The works of Marx and his disciples (Engels and Lenin) have become Gospels—the source of all truth, the light of the future World. Marxism has been lifted, from the status of one theory among many, to a position of almost divine exaltation. Such principles as "class-struggle," "materialistic conception of the universe," "collectivism," etc. are dogmas that may not be contradicted under pain of the wrath of the "Chosen People"—the proletariat. All other views are not only heresy but crime.

The greatest danger to Marxism, thus protected from competition, lies in itself. The last few years have witnessed a great struggle in the Party between Marxist-naturalists and Marxist-dialecticians and the rise and fall of the greatest champions on either side have demonstrated

¹ "Science and Technology in the U.S.S.R. 1917-27." A. Joffe, Moscow, 1927.

the vagueness and the defects of the two schools of Marxian thought. It is remarkable that the opposing camps accuse each other of a tendency to "idealism"—against which a war to the death has been declared on all scientific fronts.

Both these camps forget that Marxism, born over half a century ago, lags far behind the new advances made, especially since the War, in the natural sciences no less than in the realm of ideas. In the light of this new knowledge, the defectiveness and unsoundness of Marxism, as applied in practice to the Russian world, become more and more apparent. It has been termed a pseudo-religion; it now appears as a pseudo-scientific doctrine.

III

NATURAL AND TECHNICAL SCIENCES

THE very privileged position of natural and technical science in the U.S.S.R. is vigorously defended by such scientists as have thrown in their lot with the destinies of Scientific Socialism, in other words, with the Communist Party. They are developing the idea that any science which does not come into the orbit of Scientific Socialism is no science at all; what is more, it is actually anti-scientific. From this there is only one step to declaring that everything which does not conform to Scientific Socialism is nothing but a form of ignorance, superstition and illiteracy. It is not surprising, therefore, that the following slogan should be employed against idealism: "In its struggle against non-Marxian idealism, Soviet science must receive a mighty support from the Dictatorship of the Proletariat." This is nothing less than an appeal to physical force.

In spite of this, it would be a mistake to view the present position of Soviet science with cynical detachment. Belief, even in false ideas, is still a faith. One cannot deny that the men responsible for implanting Socialism in the U.S.S.R. are full of scientific enthusiasm and are capable of transmitting it to certain sections of the population. Participation in the construction of the New State and unwavering belief in its glorious future have assumed the form of a religion; the particular veneration paid in the U.S.S.R. to scientific instruments and machinery can be called ritualistic. Technical and natural science has been raised to an almost transcendental status and "Productive Power" (natural resources) deified.

"Productive Power"

It is perhaps of interest to know how the term "Productive Power" originated. A well-known Russian scientist, V. P. Semenov—Tian-Shansky, states that it was first employed in a guide-book to the All-Russian Exhibition at Nizhni-Novgorod in 1896. The term was

explained in this publication as embracing the natural resources of the land, these being subdivided into 1. mineral, 2. botanical, 3. animal, 4. sources of kinetic energy and 5. irrigational.

Such, today, are the branches of science which receive full support from the Soviet State. All others are, at best, tolerated; at worst, persecuted. A brief survey of a few of the privileged sciences follows.

Mathematics have always held, ever since the days of Lomonossov and Lobachevsky, a place of honour among Russian sciences. They have retained this in the U.S.S.R. Prof. S. Oldenbourg, President of the Academy of Science of the U.S.S.R. has a right to say that Soviet mathematicians rank high in the world's estimation.

Physics and Chemistry, chiefly in their applied forms, are (as in pre-Revolutionary days) on a very high level. At present, the number of institutions and persons doing research work in these sciences is considerably greater than before the Revolution.

Geography is entering a new phase of extraordinary development, stimulated by the growing desire to learn all there is to be known about the physical possibilities of the U.S.S.R., its structure, its racial composition, etc. Scientific expeditions have greatly increased in number, and the data collected are widely utilized. In this respect the work recently accomplished in the remoter districts of the U.S.S.R. is of quite first-class importance.

The development in Geography and Demography has been accompanied by similar progress in *Botany*, *Geology*, and *Zoology*. The study of the soil for agricultural purposes has for decades been the greatest achievement of Russian geologists. For a country whose interests were until now predominantly agricultural this is of course, of very great importance.

Biochemistry and *biophysics* attract a great deal of attention in Soviet scientific circles. It is in these sciences that one particularly notices that materialistic enthusiasm which tries to discover in the micro-organism, the crystal and the atom the origin of all things. The Soviet Government gives every facility for research work in these two branches of science, hoping that it may be found possible to destroy scientifically the transcendental theory of creation and to discover a scientific one.

Soviet science, while based on theory ("dialectic materialism") on one side, is definitely practical on the other. Thus, technology has greatly progressed; research in metallurgy, in wireless telegraphy, aeroplane and motor-building, etc. are greatly encouraged and have achieved striking results. In 1930 and 1931 a general geological survey of the country discovered enormous and previously unknown reserves of natural resources.

The Soviet Government has created over 150 scientific research institutes for the purpose of assisting the work of industrialization. This serves to illustrate the close bond that exists between science, technology and the national economy in the U.S.S.R.

Lack of Personnel

The author of "Science and Technology in the U.S.S.R."¹ has to admit, however, that there are many weak links in the scientific chain; the most serious is the scarcity of trained scientific personnel. The Communists hope that they will be able to solve this problem by encouraging the most talented individuals. Obviously "promotion by talent" only does not give the results which are obtained when there is more reliance on training, for a genius is not born every day. One must remember, too, that the class-policy of the Communist Party forces them to look with distrust on scientists of a non-proletarian origin. Even those scientists who have thrown in their lot with Marxism are only tolerated, because they cannot be replaced.

IV

NON-MATERIALISTIC (HUMANISTIC) SCIENCES

THERE is a very considerable difference between the technical and the humanistic sciences. The latter demand greater freedom of individual expression than the technical. This, of course, is exactly the opposite of the spirit now reigning in the U.S.S.R.; where everything and everybody must conform with the dogmas of Marxism. For this reason, non-materialistic science has not exactly prospered under the Soviet regime. A few examples will illustrate this.

During the last years before the World War, Russian *Archaeology* received considerable encouragement. In its purely practical form, it still commands a marked interest in the U.S.S.R.; but the Communist anti-religious tendencies considerably diminish the importance of its achievements. Some of the Russian archaeologists (such as N. P. Kondakov) were forced to emigrate in order to continue their studies—especially in ecclesiastical archaeology.

Philology has received a new impetus in the U.S.S.R. owing to its federal constitution. Recent achievements in this field have added considerably to the work done by previous generations. Here, again, great stress is laid on the practical aspects: *e. g.* the greatest attention has been paid to compiling dictionaries of the various languages of the Union.

Philology in the U.S.S.R. today is under the virtual dictatorship of Prof. Marr, founder of an institute for the study of language in the Union, and well-known Japhetologist.² It is unfortunate, however, that his peculiar moral and scientific conceptions, and his insistence that even philology must be Marxian, prevent the development of

¹ *Op. cit.*

² Japhetism is a recent theory as to the origin of the Aryan languages.

other and perhaps even more important philological theories than Japhetism.

Russian Occidentology—a subject in which Russia formerly compared favourably with the most prominent European historical schools—was subjected, during the Soviet regime, to the full force of Communist dogmatism.

The very close attention paid by the Russian historians to Europe in the past can be explained by the fact that they tried to find solutions in the historical traditions of European nations for the many questions of Russian life. The Soviet scientists follow the same tradition. They, too, seek for answers to Soviet questions in the historical progress of the West; but their views are highly prejudiced and coloured by Communism. Whereas the founders of the Russian school of Occidentology (Prof. Kareev, M. M. Kovalevsky, L. Vinogradov and others) will always hold an honoured place among the world's historians, the spiteful and superficial works written by the majority of Soviet historians will scarcely outlive their authors. Among the few exceptions are "Europe in the Era of Imperialism 1871-1919" (by Prof. E. B. Tarle, Moscow 1927); "An Outline of Economic History during the Middle Ages" (by Prof. P. M. Petrushevsky); both authors were punished for Marxian heresy and, therefore, counter-revolutionary activity.

The Marxian historians pay particular attention to European revolutions. They study and interpret these from a Communist point of view and try to create a revolutionary genealogy, culminating in the Russian Revolution and in the ultimate or World-Revolution yet to come. Furthermore, these historians invariably exalt the principle of War and force: they preach and justify terror and class-struggle. Thus their activity takes a very definitely propagandist turn. Occidentology in the U.S.S.R. is no more than an instrument of the Communist Party for World Revolution.

Orientalogy in the U.S.S.R. finds itself in a very different position. This branch of historical knowledge had always flourished in Russia and has achieved results of universal importance. The whole East had long been the favourite hunting-ground of Russian scientists. The age-long migration of the Russian population to Siberia, the Far East and Turkestan naturally attracted Russian science to these regions and their vicinity; and in the study of Central Asia, Mongolia, and Tibet Russian scientists occupy the foremost place. Similarly, in the study of the Caucasus (especially since the advent of Japhetism) their work assumes great importance.

Soviet orientology concerns itself greatly with the problems of the Near East (Turkey, Egypt, Iran and Mesopotamia). Its predominant interest, however, resides in the Far East. This is partly due to the facts mentioned previously, and partly to the political and colonial policy of the U.S.S.R. The struggle against world Capitalism and Imperialism, as embodied in propaganda among the "colonial and back-

ward nations," has determined this trend of Soviet orientology. Here, again, science is made to serve the ends of the Communist Party.

The above-mentioned branches of knowledge although non-materialistic, receive a certain degree of support from the State. There are others in this group which are neither supported nor even tolerated. Among these should be classed ancient historiography, non-Marxian philosophy, theology, etc. These and similar sciences are systematically persecuted. Works on such subjects are debarred from publication and their authors often exiled or imprisoned—since the study of subjects which do not come into the orbit of Scientific Marxism is classed as counter-revolutionary. A glaring example of this is the case of Prof. Beneshevitch, an authority on Greek manuscripts. The independence of his mind displeased the authorities. He was exiled, and his pupils dispersed, some of them suffering the same fate as their teacher.

Science can survive any losses, given the possibility of training successors for those of its servants who depart. Unfortunately, since in the category of sciences just enumerated, no such possibilities exist, the silencing of such men as Prof. Beneshevitch has disastrous effects on scientific research. Very often Russian tradition in these sciences is only continued by men who have had to emigrate.

Theology enjoys the distinction of being the worst-treated of all scientific subjects in the U.S.S.R. None of the four Academies of Theology—St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev and Kazan—was allowed to continue its labours. No books or journals on theological questions are published. Theology has been forced underground and it is only abroad that the theological tradition is being kept alive as far as possible.

From the above review it will be seen that it is impossible to generalize on the state of humanistic sciences in the U.S.S.R. Such as are applicable to Soviet practice have maintained their ground; some (*e. g.* philology in its practical form) have even progressed. But others have suffered heavily.

There is no doubt that, had Marxism not been in control of the whole moral and professional field of work, Russian scientific thought would by now have accomplished vastly more, both in quantity and quality, in every branch of knowledge. Even in the sciences most favoured in the U.S.S.R., the regime of official dogmatism and coercion does not serve to foster creative genius; depriving it of freedom, it makes all scientific endeavour a mere instrument to serve a purpose that is not scientific *per se*.

V

SCIENTISTS IN THE U.S.S.R.

GENERALLY speaking, U.S.S.R. scientists may be divided into two groups—those working with the Communist Party and those persecuted

by it. The ranks of the latter consist of all those who either were not prepared unreservedly to accept the official dogma, or who for one reason or another were not invited to cooperate but whom it was considered inadvisable either to deport or to exterminate. But even those whose cooperation was sought and who have collaborated with the ruling Party in the spirit of loyalty are not guaranteed against banishment or persecution. Many influential Soviet scientists have often found themselves in prison or exile. The official slogan proclaims "War to the death against all those who do not accept Marxism as the only scientific method"¹; and since it is extremely difficult to define what constitutes *at any given moment* the orthodox interpretation of Marxism, it is very easy to find oneself among the undesirables.

Imprisonment, deportation, exile and other repressive measures are commonly used in the U.S.S.R. against those who have doubted the truths of Marxism, who have not shown enough zeal in championing them, or who—last but not least—have displayed too much zeal for a phase of Marxism that has been declared erroneous by the victors in an intra-Party struggle. This occurs in spite of the extreme scarcity of trained scientists admitted by the Communists themselves.

The following examples, of recent date, will show the state of affairs. In 1927, after the *official* publication of a book by P. M. Petrushevsky²—one of the most prominent Russian historians—that author was accused at a meeting of the Society of Marxian Historians of (1) idealism, (2) a non-Marxian interpretation of Capitalism, (3) heretical explanation of feudalism and (4) of omitting the term "class struggle." The outcome of this debate was the closing of the Historical Institute, of which Petrushevsky was principal. He was thus deprived of his salary, and reduced to poverty. Z. Friedland made the following declaration during this debate: "Marxism is nothing less than the last word of true science, and those who disagree with it disagree with science. . . ."

VI

SCIENCE AND THE NATIONALITIES OF THE U.S.S.R.

THE reorganization of the country, in recent years, on a federal basis has given a great impetus to the study of the natural environments and the national traditions and peculiarities throughout the Union. Initially, however, the Governments of the non-Russian Republics were greatly handicapped by a lack of scientific personnel.

At this juncture, the Academy of Science of the U.S.S.R. came to their assistance. It formed a special Committee to study the nationalities. A number of other institutions, dealing with all the national problems of the Union, were simultaneously created: a Committee for

¹ Z. Friedland, one of the foremost Marxists of the U.S.S.R.

² "Outline of Economic History in the Middle Ages." State Publishing Office. Moscow, 1927.

the Study of the Races of the U.S.S.R.; a Committee for the Study of the Yakut A.S.S.R.; the Caucasian Historical and Archeological Institute; a special Committee for the Study of Kazakstan, etc. Never before were scientific expeditions organized so lavishly or on such a colossal scale, as now. Geographical, ethnographical and geological studies have developed enormously throughout the Union; from eighty to a hundred scientific expeditions are yearly organized by the Academy of the U.S.S.R. and other bodies. At present, there are over a thousand societies for the study of local conditions, a great number of sanctuaries and experimental stations and six hundred scientific museums.

A great deal of useful work has been accomplished in this particular field. It goes without saying, however, that these achievements are entirely partisan and that the same rigid opposition to non-Marxian and non-materialistic sciences is exhibited throughout the Union.

VII

SOVIET SCIENCE AND THE WORLD

ALTHOUGH Soviet science has but a short history, and is at present considerably handicapped by Marxian dogmas, its achievements are nevertheless positive and considerable and have given it an honoured place in the scientific world.

The Revolution not only reacted unfavourably on certain branches of science, but gave Soviet science, in general, a specific direction. The rupture with historical scientific tradition occasioned by the Revolution and the simultaneous estrangement of Russian science from the rest of the world, created a clear field for originality and also compelled Soviet science to enter new fields.

The "Sovietization" of Russian science helps it, in a way, to assume a national character. If it does not become petrified in its present Marxian conformation, this may open a road to future development independent of Western tutelage. Even now, in spite of all handicaps, the work of such men as Professors Pavlov, Fersman, Vernadsky, Berg and others has attracted the attention of the world at large by its originality and boldness of conception.

The scientific spirit is very much alive in the U.S.S.R. and the thirst for knowledge appears there in an unprecedented form. It is a striking paradox of the Soviet regime: for, on the one hand, Marxian dogmatism does not hesitate to use force to stamp out all opposition; and yet, on the other, no Government, society or nation has ever aspired more towards scientific achievement.

It is difficult to say exactly how the present situation on the "scientific front" of the U.S.S.R. will develop. So long as class-policy, police supervision and Marxian dictatorship have their way, there is no

possibility of any real scientific progress apart from mere technical applications.

Yet history proves that no restrictions have long been able to dominate or subjugate science. Neither Pope, nor Emperor . . . nor Soviet can permanently restrain the creative genius of Man.

THE ARTS

I

LITERATURE

It was in the field of literature that the Russian genius was most widely acclaimed by the educated people of the world and yet it was in this field also that many of the greatest misunderstandings of Russia and the Russian character occurred. To the educated reader of Europe and America Russian literature was primarily defeatist and revolutionary and, despite the recognized talent and ability of Turgenev, Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky, there was always something mysterious in the content of such a literature.

It must never be forgotten that Russian mediaeval literature, of the type familiar to English and other European students, continued until the beginning of the seventeenth century. During all this time, literature which was based on Byzantine models, consisted almost entirely of Lives of the Saints, sermons, monastic chronicles, and in general such types as dominated European literatures before the rise of Chivalry. Even the oral literature, heroic sagas, etc. are closer to the raw materials of the Western early Middle Ages than to the fully developed romances of Chivalry.

The seventeenth century saw a poor but significant attempt to transfer to Russia a belated scholasticism and then the eighteenth century and the reforms of Peter the Great tended to create rapidly a literature on the basis of the Pseudo-Classicism of France and Western Europe. As in all other fields of Peter's reforms, this literature did not reach outside of the Europeanized strata of society and could not become a national literature in the same sense as the early folk-songs and sagas. The works of the early writers of this century were often a crude but effective imitation, one might say at times caricatures, of the French writings.

The nineteenth century saw the influence of Byron and of German romanticism superimposed upon this. The results were often brilliant. Pushkin, the greatest of Russian poets, and Lermontov, the greatest of Byronists, came in this period. The writers themselves were of the higher classes and the members of that same group of young men who had gone into the Decembrist movement of 1825. Literature was primarily the plaything of the cultured aristocracy.

It was during the reign of Nicholas I that the intelligentsia began to

take shape. This was formed of young men of noble families who had been disinherited, sons of the clergy who had declined to follow in their fathers' footsteps, and peasants who had secured some education without a corresponding place in society. They were bound together by a feeling of dissatisfaction with conditions and they used literature as a means of expressing their dissatisfaction. It was from this period that Russian literature dates its definitely anti-governmental attitude.

The general temper of the day was the feeling that the peasantry held the key to reconstruction. The writers described the peasant as the republican philosopher in homespun. Literature echoed the political movement to go to the people. Turgenev threw his heart into the liberation of the serfs and pictured the last days of the high culture on the big estates. He showed weak-willed young men and strong-minded young women sacrificing themselves for the peasants and facing with a light heart official oppression. He was but one of the group that hoped and waited for the change.

Tolstoy, on the other hand, was the landowner in his early days and if he represented any class at all, it was the country gentleman who had been fighting a losing battle against the forces of centralization. Dostoyevsky alone, a product of the cities, delved into the psychological problems of life and stood outside of the great movement that saw in an agrarian reform the salvation of the country.

The Golden Age of Russian literature roughly ended with the murder of Alexander II. Within a few years Turgenev, Dostoyevsky, Nekrasov, Ostrovsky and all the men who had been recognized as the masters of the Russian letters passed away, except Tolstoy; and the latter's moral and religious interests had come to take precedence over the purely literary field.

The political reaction of the eighties hung heavy upon literature and the authors who were trained in this period were depressed and pathetic in their outlook on life. Like Chekhov they were keenly conscious of the evils of the social order. They were hopeful for a better future but they could not visualize how that future was going to come. Their minds and their hearts, their intelligence and their desires were in absolute contradiction.

No literature can live long in such a mood and towards the end of the decade and in the early nineties two avenues of escape were opened. The first of these was a declaration that art exists for the sake of art and that moral and political reform had no place in literature. The second was the adoption of the Marxian principle that reform rested on the shoulders of the city workman and not of the peasant.

The first movement was headed by men like Merezhkovsky. The writers of this group often worked in poetry which had been abandoned almost completely since the death of Lermontov in 1841. They eagerly studied the French symbolists and decadents and many of the authors like Brussov and Sologub dearly delighted in writing unmoral, if not immoral, poems and stories. So long as they could shock and scan-

dalize conventional society, they had secured their chief goal. Others again were swayed by mysticism and religion. They went outside the field of Christianity and wrote of the pagan races and their beliefs. They travelled around the world and treated the entire universe as their field. Others again created imaginary and unreal kingdoms and gave the fullest and most unrestrained play to their fancy. Many of them, following Western models, worked out styles of writing that are very difficult to follow and that could not have a wide support, except among the most esoteric members of an educated class.

The second group turned their attention to the workmen and heaped scorn upon the stolid, plodding peasant who tilled his fields, who supplied by his own labour his scanty needs, and who lived a hard and limited life. The great figure in this group was Alexis Peshkov, better known under his pen-name of Maxim Gorky. In unforgettable stories, Gorky contrasted the petty bourgeois peasants and the proletarian *boryaks*,¹ the wild, lawless men who owned no law but their own passion and their own strength, the workmen who felt themselves able to break the chains of the society that bound them and to strike out madly and fearlessly against the existing social order. His attempts to serve as a prophet and a predictor of the future were less successful, and after the Revolution of 1905 he spent most of his time on the island of Capri.

These two schools and their manifold variations dominated Russian literature at the beginning of the World War. The first group was relatively small in influence. The second included many of the most popular contemporary authors of Russia.

The War had little effect upon literature. Most of the authors were defeatist in sympathy and there are few books of importance to be noted. Perhaps the leading war work was Andreev's play, "The King, the Law and the War," (translated into English as "The Sorrows of Belgium").

The Revolution changed all this. Gorky had returned just before the War, and he remained associated with the Social Democratic Party and tolerably close to Lenin and the Bolsheviks. The great bulk of the writers of his school, however, were horrified at the excesses of the Revolution and in a short time the overwhelming majority of prominent figures joined the ranks of the emigrés. They passed out of Russia and while they are still writing and doing excellent work, it is hardly likely that many of them will live on in the productive ranks of Russian literature. Their novels deal with a past Russia and with settings that seem more and more unreal as the years go by. Some of them are even now turning to write of the fate of the emigrés, and here they have a future but this is not the work or the field in which they made their reputations.

Many of the exponents of "art for art's sake," the mystics and the originators of complex and difficult styles remained in Russia. Some

¹ Tramps or hobos.

did it in order to suffer for Russia. Others again were moved by a desire to share the fate of their country. Still others felt that only a Revolution could give free scope for an art which was so purely radical in form.

The early years of the Civil War and of Militant Communism were hardly favourable to literary production on a large scale. Prose almost disappeared but poetry was turned out with little slackening. The various schools of poets, symbolists, acmeists, decadents, etc. continued their poetical struggles even though machine guns were rattling in the streets and paper, as well as food, was almost unprocurable.

Mention must be made here of the last works of the poet Alexander Blok, *The Twelve* (a study of a Bolshevik detachment wandering through the streets of the capital) and *The Scythians* (a powerful statement that Russia was neither European nor Asiatic). Blok died his career hardly begun (1921), but his poems are perhaps the most powerful of the works produced during this period.

Of a different type was another poet, Demyan Bedny. To many he was only a political pamphleteer. A confirmed Bolshevik, he revived the tradition of fable writing and of political poems and many of his works undoubtedly deserve a definite place in the history of Russian literature. He has presented a running commentary on the events of the last years and now, decorated with the Soviet Order of the Red Star, he may fairly be called the poet laureate of the new regime.

Then the so-called "peasant poets" deserve more than a passing mention. Here belongs Kliuev who tried to unite the old ideals of the peasants and the Communist Revolution, and the still more important Essenin. The latter deserves a higher place than he was given during his lifetime. A peasant boy, he threw himself into the hooliganism of the early years of disorder. He married Isadora Duncan, his senior by many years, and after a divorce, the granddaughter of Tolstoy. He was passionately devoted to the cause of the peasantry and the city's triumph was abhorrent to him. Finally, in 1925, he ended a short life by suicide.

The "factory poets," as Bezymyansky, accepted the Revolution more wholeheartedly. They sang the song of the machine, the triumph of the cities and the collectives; but very few of their works have yet reached a polish and a universality that raises them above the commonplace.

Of the other schools, mention must be made of the Futurist Vladimir Mayakovsky. A powerful and egoistic figure, he sang the triumphs of the Revolution as if it were merely a side issue of his own personality. He glorified the Third International, the Soviet regime and the Five Years Plan. Yet Soviet critics did not fail to notice the underlying dissonance between his personality and the Revolution. He was bitterly attacked; and he too committed suicide in 1929.

With the first stages of the restoration of order, prose began to revive. The veteran Zamiatin acted almost as a teacher and guide to the younger authors who were appearing, and there soon began a new litera-

ture, of which Boris Pilniak may be taken as a definite example. These men employed all the artifices and conceits of the old writers. Their style was often obscure and involved. Thus in the *Naked Year* Pilniak sees the Revolution against incoherent backgrounds and echoes of the past. Sex and crime run rampant through his tales and the picture of Russia which they present is rather that of a nightmare, than of a functioning organization.

More important for the new literature are those men who turned to literature as a means of recounting in narrative and fictional form the experiences which they had undergone. Thus Vsevolod Ivanov, former sword-swallower and juggler, the fakir Ben-Ali-Bey, Communist partisan in Siberia, a man of little or no education, turned out stories as the *Child* and *Armoured Train 14-69* which may be lacking in refinement and polish but which are filled with a keen sense of action and of daring. This is a true "frontier literature" with all the limitations that the term implies.

Somewhat more literary is Babel. He served as a Commissar in the army of Budenny during the Polish campaign and in his *Red Cavalry*, describes in almost Tolstoyan fashion the exploits and the adventures of this force. There is much cruelty in these tales but there is also force and fire and they are agreeable and easy, if not always pleasant, reading.

With the NEP a new day dawned for literature. Some of the emigrés, as Count Alexis N. Tolstoy, returned to the U.S.S.R. in the belief that they could find useful opportunities for their talents. Others of the younger intelligentsia commenced to write or resumed their interrupted careers. The result was a very interesting and tolerably successful adaptation of the old methods of writing.

These men did not become members of the Communist Party and at the same time they were not in open opposition to it. They received the name of *Poputchiki* (fellow travellers) and for a while were tolerated and even encouraged by the Government. They present with more or less sympathy the situation of the day. Thus Gladkov in *Cement* pictures a determined workman—a super-proletarian—crashing through the mass of Soviet red tape to reopen a factory which had been destroyed during the Civil War. Lydia Seyfullina pictures the early days when the leaders of the Soviets were conscious of their mission in one field of endeavour and were not free from the old fetters in others. Still other writers as Leonov in *Tuatamur* draws a picture of the Mongol conquest of Russia, and in the *Thief* gives an almost Dostoyevskian picture of the various types of the new society. Pantaleimon Romanov in *Three Pairs of Silk Stockings* and *Without Cherry-blossom* describes the sexual confusions of the day.

Yet many of the Poputchiki felt that something was lacking in the new regime. In their stories, the Communist, wherever he occurs, is always single-minded, simple, honest and successful. Sometimes he is too limited and too unappealing to be impressive. Thus in Fedin's *Cities and Years* the German Communist Kurt Van is simple, direct, unemo-

tional and honest. The story opens with his trial before a Soviet court for killing a friend, Andrey Startzev and is acquitted; yet the reader's sympathies and, perhaps, the author's as well, go out to this friend who is a typical hero of the pre-War literature. Kindly and intelligent, gentle and responsive to the higher instincts of man, Andrey cannot stand the harsh tempo that modern life demands and he perishes as a result of a "mistaken kindness" and the attempt to repay a "bourgeois" German noble for saving his life.

Again and again this same note appeared and it would be tempting to assume that the literature of the Poputchiki in many cases had two aims: the representation of Communist success necessary, if publication was to be secured; and the reintroduction into literature of the old type of hero who was tortured by doubts as to his social mission and who wished to sacrifice himself for his fellow-men. The first was of course the main aim so far as the Government was concerned. Under the Soviet rule, no one can publicly doubt of the success of Communism and an attitude of faith is required in place of the old idea of defeatism and of tragedy.

With the adoption of the Five Years Plan, the literature changed again. Gone were the days when any hesitation was possible. The struggle between success and failure, between the Communist cause and its opponents, was once again a serious and an overwhelming fact. The Poputchiki now felt the iron hand of the Government and such psychological digressions from the true course, as they had formerly made, were to be no more.

The literature of the U.S.S.R. had to play its part in the success of the new Communist undertakings. Many of the authors were forced to be in a real sense propagandists for all the undertakings of the Government, and any forms of poetry or literature which did not actively cooperate with the new movement were looked upon with marked disfavour. Their literary career could and, in many cases was, brought to an abrupt end by a too blatant lack of zeal in the cause of industrialization.

Fiction became of value only when it expressed the triumph of the Soviet system and the successes of the new factories and the collective farms. Thus Panferov's *Bruski* gives us a definite picture of the struggle in the villages, where the forces of good and evil, of Communism and the kulaks, meet in mortal strife. This gives the modern novel a narrow and almost stereotyped form and produces an even more monotonous effect than did the defeatist literature of the pre-War days.

Literary criticism has also undergone the same transformations. Theories have been advanced that the peasantry has two souls, one that of the proletariat, the other that of the petty bourgeois, and that the function of Communism is to develop the former at the expense of the latter. The debate between schools and authors is as to the best method of advancing the cause of Communism.

Writers and critics are being assigned to factories to find proper

subjects for their work which must always propagate the views of the Communist Party. Literature at present is little more than one section of the propagandist branch of the Gosizdat. The Orders of the Red Star and of Lenin await the authors who can efficiently and effectively serve the cause of the Government. But woe unto those who do not follow this healthy example.

Perhaps the solitary exception is Maxim Gorky. During the early days of Militant Communism, he alone was able to raise his voice effectively for the preservation of writers and of art. He has been the guide and friend of many of the younger men. He has saved the lives of many writers, even those with whom he has not agreed, and for some years he was the mouthpiece of the old art and culture in the Soviet Union. As a productive writer, less can be said of him. His great work, *The Life of Klim Samgin*, is hardly up to the standards of his *Autobiography* or others of his early tales. Today he is in a very real sense a classic, an important figure on the road to Communism but his writings now are perhaps of less significance than his personality.

The future of Russian literature at home is now as in the past closely connected with a political cause. In the eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries, it was the mouthpiece for the rising Empire. It broke from that and was tied to the cause of the Opposition. Now it is once more in governmental service and closely connected with the new regime. Apart from the latter's wishes there can be no publication and no distribution. No literature has ever been so rigidly controlled by censorship as has the literature of the U.S.S.R. during the last years. The very possibility to write depends upon the faith, or at least a show of faith, of the authors in the Government and their willingness to lay aside all themes that are contrary to its desires. At present silence or emigration must be the fate of the doubter, for literature was the great weapon against the Imperial regime and the new Government will not, so long as it is able, allow the use of that weapon against itself.

II

THE FINE ARTS

THE history of the Fine Arts in Russia (whether it be painting, sculpture, architecture, music, or the theatre) has passed through the same general phases as the literature of the country. With differences of but a few years, they have felt the same influences, the same stimuli, and the same obstacles. A short account of these periods will therefore give a picture of the conditions in which the arts have developed and the path on which they are now moving.

Prior to the reforms of Peter the Great, Russian art was practically independent of the West. It moved in the Byzantine tradition which was enriched by original Russian interpretations and motives derived from

Asiatic contacts. The Russian ikons and the magnificent churches of Moscow, Novgorod and the Russian North in general, stand as immortal monuments to the Russian artistic spirit, prior to the eighteenth century. Arts in wood and stone, in enamels and in other media all were developed according to definite traditions of their own. It will be noted that in this period sculpture was conspicuously absent, since it was not allowed in the Orthodox Churches which set the artistic standards for the realm.

With the reign of Peter the Great, Western art like Western technique was introduced into Russia. Architects, painters, sculptors and masters in other fields were invited in large numbers and were given a free hand and a most liberal supply of money for the execution of their work. There is little need to list the names of these men. Suffice it to say that St. Petersburg became the most perfect example of the French *Empire* style and that Russian art of the eighteenth century was responsive to every current that secured any momentum in Europe.

It was not until late in the eighteenth century that the rich nobles of Russia commenced to patronize art, by adorning their own houses and estates, by founding their own theatres, and by developing their own orchestras. When they did so, they merely followed in the path of the Government. For the most part they accepted the same models, the same tendencies, and desired the same results. All this added to the uniformity of the culture of the period and increased the funds available for the fortunate artists on whom Imperial favour rested. It was a period when the monumental was the fashion, when the Academies in the strict sense of the word were the style, and a new patron did not mean the development of an opposing school.

Such Russian portrait painters, as Levitsky Borovikovsky and Kiprensky, succeeded in placing Russian painting on the same level as that of Europe. The greatest painting of Brullov *The Last Days of Pompeii*, won praise in Rome as it later did in Russia. Early musicians, as Glinka, represented the transference of European musical traditions to Russia, modified only by the emphasis on vocal music, again through the influence of the lack of musical instruments in the churches, as well as by the Imperial favour for opera and larger forms of composition. Of all the arts only sculpture languished.

There was slow but steady progress in various lines but the prestige of the old forms of art remained unshaken considerably longer than it was in literature. It was not until the sixties that a pessimistic movement, called in art *Peredvizhnichestvo*,¹ came into its own.

This was the application to art, especially to painting, of the desire for social reform that had marked the triumph of the intelligentsia in literature. From now on painting was supposed to be an instrument for stimulating social discontent. Its aim was to influence public opinion through the country and to be the political interpreters of the feelings

¹ *Peredvizhnichestvo* is derived from a Russian word meaning "to move from place to place"; its application to painting originated in the idea of ambulant exhibitions of paintings.

of society. As a result painting reflected nothing except weariness and discontent. Everything joyful, serene and grandiose was banished. Painting set out to illustrate the miseries of everyday life and became imbued with realistic pessimism. In brief it reflected only those sides of the national life that were reflected by the literature. Even the most talented artist of this group, I. Repin, produced many works which are only striking interpretations of the period's didactic notions of social protest. However he did draw many subjects from the nation's vigorous past.

Music could not respond so easily to the same stimulus and so the middle of the century saw the work of such composers as Mussorgsky, Rimsky-Korsakov and Chaykovsky. Most of these men composed their more important works in the form of operas, until Rimsky-Korsakov turned his attention to purely symphonic forms.

The theatre too, even though it was largely under state control and support, adopted a psychological realism with numerous melodramas, all sentimental in the extreme. The naturalism of the Moscow Little Theatre was perhaps the best that was done during the period but it was hardly of the highest type.

Thus it can be seen that that period which marked the passing of the Golden Age of literature, with its note of protest, was also distinguished in the Fine Arts, motivated as it was by the same slogans and the same pessimism. This movement was accelerated also by the fact that the Government in many fields was withdrawing its support. This was due partially to domestic political and economic reasons, to foreign complications, and also to a new democratic spirit which was making itself felt in public opinion.

Along with the revival of literature in the nineties and the belief in "art for art's sake," there came a general artistic revival, which reached its height early in the twentieth century, as the last flowering of the Russian Imperial system.

Among the painters who appeared now was Vrubel, who died early and saw but the first years of the present century. He is comparable with the greatest masters of the Renaissance in Europe. His art had an elemental strength which can only be found in great masters. He had a wide scope in his projects, great predilection to work on a heroic scale, a vivid imagination, and great firmness and fineness of technique and execution.

The most important factor of this Renaissance was the group of the *World of Art*, a journal created by Serge Diaghilev, perhaps the greatest connoisseur of his day and a remarkable organizer in almost every branch of art. He is chiefly known abroad for his connection with the ballet and the opera; but he had a much wider field and drew into his enterprises the most cultured of the musicians, painters, writers, and theatrical workers. The group revived the Russian artistic traditions of the glorious past; they awakened a genuine interest in the neglected glories of the old Russian ikons and of old Russian architecture; they

concerned themselves with graphic art, music, antiquities, the theatre, ornamental art, applied art, etc.

Perhaps in the work of this group there is something autumnal, something beautiful, something too clever, a hint of the charming decadence of an old school, reared on a great cultural tradition. To some extent their work was a pictorial retrospect, a synthetic absorption of the finest productions of past centuries.

The revival in music had come a little earlier with the generation of Glazunov, Taneev, Skriabin and Rakhmaninov. This group turned toward the piano and the concert platform, away from the opera and dramatic forms. Skriabin, perhaps the most important, if not the most talented of this generation, felt that music needed no assistance in the interpretation of the most varied subjects. The period which he introduced can be compared with that of Ravel and Debussy in France.

In the theatre this was the period of the Moscow Art Theatre of K. S. Stanislavsky, which marked from the beginning the transition from full-coloured pessimism to a more spiritualized form of realism. This theatre became a great artistic centre of more than national importance. Its Studios, however, worked in a direction not far removed from Symbolism and produced plays which could not be presented in the earlier realistic forms of the parent group.

On the eve of the World War the same interest in French modernism affected all forms of art. Futurism, Cubism, Constructionism, Expressionism and all the other fashions and schools that were existing in France, made their appearance in Russia and tended to exert a powerful influence on art of every kind. There was a school of Russian Cezannists in painting; there were the developments of I. Stravinsky and S. Prokofiev in music with their "left" musical forms. There were the developments of the Theatre of Meyerhold, where the actor was treated as only one of the accessories of the stage, part of the ensemble—which comprises actors, decorations, light and music—and where only one man emerges above the whole, the director, a complete autocrat.

In architecture the period had witnessed a growth of eclecticism which makes it very difficult to speak of a definite style especially after the passing of the *Empire* style traditions on which St. Petersburg was built.

The War again had little effect but the Revolution was staggering in every way. Many of the masters on every field went abroad among the emigrés and in the early days of the Communist Government artists fared like literary men. The new Government, caring little and knowing less of art but priding itself on its radicalism, catered to "left" art without asking if that art was intelligible and available for the masses. Most of the artists of the extreme "left" joined the Revolution and forced themselves upon the Marxist leaders. They penetrated the innumerable art offices—Literary Department, Proletarian Culture, Musical Department, Artistic Department, People's Commissariat of Education, Central Art Administration, etc. and exercised authority both in their own

names and in that of the Communists'. Their epoch was vocal but inglorious. They produced but few works of real value, with the exception of U. P. Annenkov's portraits and Meyerhold's theatre.

It was a time of hardship and of poverty and so the graphic arts were encouraged at the expense of painting. Pen drawings, xylographs, engravings on metal and linoleum, nearly all branches of graphic art produced gifted masters.

The dictatorship of "left" art was not of long duration. The proletariat itself intervened, passively but effectively. It showed no interest at all in this unintelligible art and the Communists towards the end of the NEP proclaimed that Art must be comprehensible to the masses. This led to a policy almost directly the antithesis of its predecessor. In painting, it meant a return to realism. It produced a number of painters, often gifted colourists, who copied some of the old masters, and again, as in the days of the Peredvizhnichestvo, it had a strong didactic tendency. Only this tendency is now heroic, high-spirited and optimistic, unlike the pessimistic works of the Peredvizhnichestvo. There is much strength and freshness in many of these works, especially in some of the Association of Realist Painters. Let it be said here that pessimism in painting would not be tolerated by the official censor.

At the same time, especially in the field of music, the most cultured part of the lovers of art had been removed. Chamber-music, symphonic concerts and exhibitions of painting have lost the class of people who had formerly attended them. All this had a definite reaction upon the artists and upon their work.

When the Five Years Plan was finally introduced, the Fine Arts, no less than literature or science, felt the weight of the pressure. The great number of small provincial theatres in the U.S.S.R., the stages of the workers' clubs, the second-rate painters and artists of every variety all took up their part in expressing the official optimism which is required by the Government. In music this has clearly had a tendency to simplify the entire system and today the most popular music is based on heroic, revolutionary themes.

In architecture, the Soviet Government is attempting to create a "Soviet Style" that shall immortalize in stone, cement and steel the present era. So far these attempts have failed, chiefly because no effort of real value has been made to maintain the architectural tradition, and because utility and efficiency have been allowed complete sway, to the exclusion of beauty and elegance. Whether the "Palace of the Soviets" to commemorate the completion of the Five Years Plan which is being erected on the emplacement of the demolished cathedral of the Saviour in Moscow—an event intended to symbolize the passing of the old and the birth of the new world—will be a work of art or not, is for the future to show.

Meanwhile there are signs of a revival of the theatre in the numerous productions in Moscow. These are based upon the elements of the simplest popular art as in *Petrushka* of Stravinsky. Gaiety, decor, lively

action and simplicity of expression are the basis of these productions.

Cinematography has greatly progressed under the present regime. Before the Revolution its accomplishments were far inferior to those of Europe and America. It was usually a stage play produced by second-rate actors, and unsatisfactorily photographed. Now, with the development of a high technical standard of photography, the young artists produced also a strongly psychological realism. The films of young producers as Eisenstein, Pudovkin, and others expressed traditions resembling those of the Moscow Art Theatre and this is the stranger, because it was the period of "left" art. This is particularly true of the minor films dealing with everyday life. Another type is the film on an epic scale with thousands of actors, generally dealing with some historic subject. Naturally these are full of Communist propaganda—usually introduced in a somewhat naïve and absurd way—but they are of considerable artistic value and the photography is generally excellent.

On the whole the Soviet Government has used art of every kind as only another armament in its endeavour to transform society. It has insisted that painting, sculpture and architecture, the theatre, the cinema and music, must all justify their existence by the assistance which they can give to the cause of World Revolution and of the Communist State. In doing so they have pushed the relationship between art and political thought and action further than it has ever been pushed in the past. To date the results have been disappointing in most fields, if judged by other than Communist standards. The future can only be known by its results.

THE PRESS

I

BEFORE THE REVOLUTION

RESTRICTIONS upon the Press in Russia are as old as that Press itself. Its history, extending over little more than a century—there was practically no periodical press, except Government Gazettes, before the beginning of the nineteenth century—is one of a struggle against the severity of the Censor; a severity which gradually and reluctantly gave way to a more liberal attitude towards freedom of thought and its public expression. There were epochs when the Censorship occupied itself not only with politics but with morals, taste and culture generally. In the reign of Tzar Nicholas I, mention of the “people’s will” and all reference to the needs of the lower orders was forbidden; and all historical allusions to poverty, famine and popular risings were carefully censored.

The Censor, however, could go much further than that; his blue pencil was a weapon autocratically wielded over question of style, taste and propriety. Practically, his powers were only limited by his sense of humor—and this was not always his most marked qualification.

In the reign of Alexander II the Government’s liberal policy gave tremendous impetus to the periodical press, which developed great activity. Later, Alexander III imposed fresh restrictions on this new-born freedom. Yet the movement for emancipation from the Censor’s tutelage, once begun, could not be stopped. A decided change was brought about by the first Russian Revolution (1905); all administrative restrictions on the freedom of the Press disappeared, while the laws governing it were changed to conform, in every essential, with those of the majority of western nations.

An Imperial ukaze of December 7, 1905 ordered the enactment of Provisional Rules for Periodical Publications, which provided for: 1. the abolition of preliminary and ecclesiastical censorship for all periodicals in the towns of the Empire (censorship was preserved for periodicals published in rural districts); 2. the abolition of the power of the administration to inflict penalties on the editors and members of the staff of such periodicals; 3. the annulment of Article 140 of the 1890 Law on Censorship of the Press which granted the Minister of the Interior power to prohibit or suspend periodical publications, or parts thereof, for criticism of any question of State significance, except in so

far as related to information concerning the movements of troops and warships and other measures of national defence; 4. the responsibility of the Press henceforth was to be based exclusively on the Press laws of the Civil and Criminal Codes; while the courts of justice were made the sole agencies empowered to decide on matters concerning the contravention of these laws.

On April 26, 1906, the above provisions were extended to the non-periodical Press. These enactments signalized a new era for the Russian Press; and legislation between 1906 and 1917 did nothing to impair the position thus accorded. Certain important restrictions continued, although these were not directly due to any desire, on the part of the Government, to muzzle the Press *per se*. Such were the prohibitions of the periodicals and other publications of some political parties (Social-Democratic, Social-Revolutionary, Anarchist, etc.) declared illegal in the Empire, the continued censorship of all religious literature, and the prohibition of all publications issued by such religious bodies as were excluded from the Empire.

Such was the legal status of the Russian Press on the eve of the 1917 Revolution.

This Revolution—or at least its first stage (which put the Provisional Government in power), was hailed by Russian liberal and mildly-radical public opinion as the dawn of an era of true democratic liberty. However, the War and internal complications drew the Government's attention away from any serious attempt to reform the Press laws; it sanctioned *de facto* the publication of Socialist newspapers and literature and removed by decree a series of minor restrictions imposed during the War.

The Bolshevik Revolution altered matters completely; it destroyed every trace of any connection between the Press of pre-Revolutionary days and that of the Soviet epoch.

II

UNDER THE SOVIET REGIME

It is difficult, if not impossible, to draw a parallel—or even a remote comparison—between the Soviet Press laws and corresponding legislation in any other country. The differences in psychology, legal origin and nature are really too great to admit of comparison; while the aims of the Soviet Press—the periodical Press in particular—are diametrically opposed to generally-accepted ideas.

The very system of publication is different. Every printing-press in the U.S.S.R. belongs to the State and cannot belong to any other body. Every periodical is either State-owned or State-controlled, (in the fullest sense of what that phrase implies in the Soviet Union); and every jour-

nalist is a State official, often representing some Government directly interested in a publication—very often (particularly in the case of local correspondence in the villages and factories) he is affiliated with the OGPU.

In view of the foregoing, it becomes clear that the Soviet Press cannot express public opinion; its complete dependence on the State entirely precludes the possibility of this.

But the Soviet State, in turn, is entirely controlled by the Communist Party. This—the actual ruling power in the U.S.S.R.—accordingly becomes the sole distributor of printed information. In the circumstances, it is only natural to come to the conclusion—the only possible one—that the whole Soviet Press is nothing but a colossal engine of Communist propaganda. There can be no debate as to the existence or non-existence of the freedom of the Press in the U.S.S.R. for the simple reason that the only Press is that owned, run and directed by the State—which is actively interested in seeing it grow in volume, and increasing in its penetration throughout the country and beyond its borders. No question of the existence of any other Press can—as the U.S.S.R. is at present constituted—even arise. This fact must always be kept in mind when studying the peculiarities of the Soviet Press.

Militant Communism

After seizing power, the Bolsheviks at first allowed opposition newspapers to continue publication,—but under conditions that rendered their existence precarious. On November 10, 1917, the Soviet of People's Commissars issued a decree so comprehensively worded as to confer upon the administration unlimited powers with regard to the Press. Under this decree a newspaper could be suppressed for showing hostility to the Government, for containing incitements to disorder, or for making comments deemed to be malevolent. "It is impossible," this document stated, "to allow such weapons as newspapers to remain in the hands of the foe. At the present time they are not less dangerous than bombs and bullets."

In December, 1917 a further decree created various special tribunals, composed of delegates of the Soviets of Workers and Soldiers, to adjudicate Press cases. Since no Press laws then existed, the duty of these tribunals was confined to the interpretation of decrees, whose textual obscurity was deliberately designed to secure a political object—in plainer words, to uphold the Soviet regime. The men who decided Press cases were only too willing to be swayed by this motive. They were revolutionaries, not jurists. For them, politics were everything. They believed that Bolshevism would bring justice to the masses; and therefore, that any individual who offended against the regime merited severe punishment. Economic repression went hand-in-hand with legal persecution.

A month after the Communists seized power, a measure was adopted designed to deprive opposition newspapers of their chief source of reve-

nue, and thus destroy the very foundation of their existence. All advertisements were declared to be a State monopoly; henceforth such could only appear in publications of the Soviets of Workers and Soldiers. This measure had been advocated by Lenin on various occasions, notably during September, 1917—on the eve of the Bolshevik accession to power. "The Capitalists," he wrote "define the 'freedom of the Press' as the suppression of the censor, and the liberty of every party to publish newspapers as they please. In reality that is not freedom of the press, but freedom for the rich, for the bourgeoisie, to deceive the exploited masses of the people . . . the power is given to the rich of systematic, unceasing, daily deception of the poor. Is struggle against such an appalling state of affairs possible—and, if so, how can it be carried out? There exists a very simple and perfectly legitimate method. This method is the State monopoly of advertisements."

It was strange that Lenin favoured the stifling of the opposition Press, by depriving it of advertisement revenue, rather than the suppression of it outright. Yet it must be remembered that the passage which has just been cited was written before the October Revolution. After this event the Communists not merely prevented unfriendly newspapers from earning advertisement revenue but devised and exercised legal powers for their rigorous control. It was significant, however, that they were not prepared to resort to wholesale suppression. Whilst they did not refrain from destroying most institutions, they exhibited a curious hesitancy in their assault upon the Press. This was due to the fear of arousing too violent a storm of protest from the Socialist Press abroad.

In March, 1918 more drastic measures were adopted. Press laws, hastily and carelessly drafted, were promulgated; and the hearing of Press cases was entrusted to the standing revolutionary tribunals—the special tribunals which had hitherto discharged this function being abolished. Civil war was raging; and a censorship, political as well as military, was established. Without legal formality of any kind, the police frequently suppressed newspapers and committed journalists to prison. In such circumstances, the conduct of newspapers became a nerve-racking occupation. The number of publications unfriendly to the Government rapidly dwindled; and all that remained were soon afterwards suppressed by decree (August 8, 1918). All printing-plants and equipment in private hands was seized, and the State acquired a complete monopoly of disseminating printed information.

Steps were at once taken to ensure that nothing irreconcilable with the views of the Communist Party should be published. To the Central Committee of the Party was given the task of seeing that only these views, and no others, were published. The direction of ideas, in a broader sense, was entrusted to an authority known as the "Glavlit" created for the purpose of generally controlling literary and publishing affairs (decree of June 6, 1922). The actual supervision, publication and circulation of literature was undertaken by the State Publishing Department (Gosizdat).

The NEP

In 1921 the reforms known as the NEP were introduced. The essential feature of this policy was the toleration, to a limited extent, of private trade. For purposes other than the issue of daily newspapers, private individuals were accordingly allowed to start printing and publishing businesses. The Government monopoly of the daily newspapers, however, was maintained. From this moment, control became complicated. When the State was the sole publisher, the sole owner of the printing-plant, no formal censorship was necessary. Yet even then so vast and complicated was the organization required, so intense the chaos prevailing, that it was difficult to prevent the occasional circulation of indiscretions—even of heresy. And although, in 1922, private individuals were allowed to engage in a printing or publishing enterprise, it was not intended that they should be free to print and publish whatever they wished. The State, while relaxing its economic, retained unimpaired its ideological monopoly. In order to render this monopoly effectual in the new conditions, a censorship and other forms of control were indispensable. Need arose for defining the supervisory functions of the State and of the Communist Party. The elaboration of Press laws followed. These laws could not be otherwise than disjointed and experimental—for they were improvised to meet a situation that was new in human experience, to reconcile a restricted freedom of printing and publishing with absolute control over whatever was printed and published.

The number of decrees issued in regard to all matters, the Press not excluded, was enormous. Frequently these decrees overlapped. Frequently, also, they conflicted with laws which remained unrepealed. No one, not even the highest legal authority in the land, knew the state of the law at any given moment. Certainly none dare hazard a guess as to what it would be on the morrow. The rapidity with which decrees were issued, and the contradictory character of many of them, were not solely responsible for this uncertainty. The Government did not consider itself bound to publish all its laws. Consequently, a citizen could be accused of breaking a law of whose very existence he was necessarily ignorant.

Worse still, punitive measures were possible without recourse to law. The OGPU had power to arrest, to exile or imprison, and even to shoot any Soviet citizen, and to confiscate his property. Administrative action, though not of an extreme character, could also be taken by other departments against citizens whose conduct was adjudged displeasing.

In any consideration of the condition of the Press, in the Soviet Union, the foregoing facts must constantly be borne in mind. The police were paramount. Not only could they resort to repressive measures on their own account, but—as will be shown later—room was even found for them in the organization concerned with the general control of the Press. This general control, though effectual in itself, did not represent

the sum total of the supervision to which the Press was subject. Along with it, and acting independently of it, was police supervision.

When the New Economic Policy was introduced, it was the Political Bureau of the Communist Party that determined the limits of the control to be exercised over the Press by the Party and by the State. But as neither possessed clearly-defined functions, over-lapping and confusion resulted. Ideological leadership of the Press was entrusted to the Central Executive Committee of the Party, acting through the medium of a Press Department. This was given absolute control over all views in print. It was made responsible for the political "reliability" of the Press. Without its guidance, no question of importance could be discussed. Only questions whose consideration it permitted could be raised,—only solutions of which it approved could be suggested. In the opinion of the Communists, there was no side of life to which Marxism was not applicable. It was the duty of the Party to interpret Marxism, and of the Central Committee of the Party to see that such interpretation was faithfully reflected in all publications, no matter of what kind.

*The Glavlit*¹

It has been said that two Government departments were concerned with printing, publishing, and literary affairs; the State Publishing Department, and the Glavlit. Both these departments were under the control of the Commissariat of Education. This Commissariat was, therefore, the State authority ultimately responsible for the general supervision of printing, publishing, and literary affairs. After the introduction of the NEP the scope of the Glavlit was enlarged. By a decree of June 6, 1922, it became the focus of all printing, publishing and literary activities, both State and private, and was constituted the chief censoring authority.² It consisted of a large central department with numerous local sub-departments; at its head was a board in which the OGPU was strongly represented. The branch concerned with censoring was composed of officials of various State departments. Here again the OGPU was represented. Several categories of publications were freed from preliminary censorship; those issued by the Party,³ the OGPU, and also the newspapers, which remained a State monopoly. But none of these categories was excluded from the ideological supervision of Glavlit, and all responsible persons associated with them were bound to see that the regulations issued, from time to time, to render such supervision possible were implicitly obeyed. The Central Committee of the Party conveyed to the Press the policy of the Party; the Glavlit was responsible for seeing that no ideas calculated to harm either the Party or the Soviet State crept into print.

Under this regime, the publication of anything disrespectful or hostile to the Communist Party or the Soviet power was deemed to be a crime.

¹ Supreme Literary Department.

² The decree of June 6, 1922, which gave discretionary powers to the Glavlit, is still the fundamental Press law of the U.S.S.R.

³ These were under Party censorship.

It was left to the authorities to determine the punishment. Soviet censors are explicitly directed to strike out from manuscripts submitted to them all facts, figures, and statements that may in any way compromise the Communist Party or the Soviet rule. Under the old regime, in pre-reform days, it was an offence (punishable with a long term of imprisonment) to publish anything calculated to arouse the discontent of the masses. Under the new, such is a much more serious offence—one punishable with death.

The policy of the rulers of the U.S.S.R. is to enhance all that is Communistic, while all that does not conform to this is dubbed counter-revolutionary. For example, one regulation of the Glavlit, conspicuous by its comprehensiveness, declares that the publication of views, not in conformity with those of the Soviet regime, bearing upon all important matters—as, for example, social problems, political economy, national affairs, etc., shall be prohibited under pain of heavy penalties.

In consequence of these views and enactments, no opposition newspapers are allowed to appear in any form whatever. Thus the law has no occasion to define the freedom of the Press. Its sole concern is to affirm that such freedom, being a bourgeois conception, is non-existent. As an absolute guarantee of this condition, the administrative apparatus is placed above the law; swiftness of action, and severity of punishment, are thus assured. The Glavlit may suspend a publication, impose limits upon its circulation, or suppress it altogether. In the last-named instance, the responsible editor may be either brought before the courts or handed over to the OGPU. But, as has been said, the OGPU can, of its own accord, inflict penalties—from which the death sentence is not excluded. Justice, therefore, is less esteemed than expediency.

Wholly prohibitory, the Press laws neither afford safeguards nor prescribe rights. At any moment they may be changed by decree, or superseded by administrative action. The Glavlit, which is responsible for enforcing them, is partially composed of officials representative of other departments—notably the police—and is at the same time, in relationship with other departments which also have authority over the Press. Unlike that exercised by the Glavlit, such authority is not defined by law; and is, therefore, unlimited in scope. For this reason, the Glavlit has neither the will nor the power to defend its own prerogatives; it is, at times, forced to acquiesce—and even to assist—in its own supersession.

With the exception that certain categories of State publications were relieved from preliminary Censorship, State and private publications were subjected to the same control. After the introduction of the NEP a number of printing and publishing businesses were started by private individuals. Owing to the rigidity of the Censorship, unofficial publications containing political views soon disappeared. Later, with the suppression of the NEP, and in conformity with the new policy of "Socialist construction," all unofficial publications, even those of a non-political

character, ceased to appear. Today, printing and publishing are, in the U.S.S.R., a State monopoly.

Position of the Press

The position of the Socialized Press is peculiar. Deprived of liberty itself, it desires none for others; thus, it is an instrument of repression. Not less peculiar is the status of the journalists associated with it. In reality they are officials, performing functions often of a police character; for not merely are they participants in a mechanism devised for the total suppression of individual liberty, but they bring to light counter-revolutionary conduct—and thus engage in the actual detection of delinquency.

The task of the Socialized Press, and its journalists, is therefore a simple one. They must obey, and also advocate obedience to the ruling power. From time to time the holders of this power have disputed amongst themselves. On such occasions a particular clique has gained ascendancy over the departments controlling the Press; and has waged war, through the Press, upon its opponents—at the same time denying them any opportunity for reply. For example the Press was employed to discredit notable (but, at the time, unpopular) Communists, *e. g.* Trotzky, Bukharin, Rykov, Kamenev and Zinoviev. Obedient to its masters, it proclaimed that these dissentients misinterpreted Marx and Lenin—of whose writings it proceeded to give the true and authorized version. Thus in the course of time the Press became not so much the tool of the Communist Party as that of a dominant group within this Party; and the views which it expounded were presented as Marxian orthodoxy, all who dissented being branded as infidels.

Yet, in spite of the severity of the control which is exercised over the Press in the U.S.S.R., the newspapers constantly fall into error—publish comments which are held to be inconsistent with the teachings of the dead Socialist prophets, or the views of their living successors. For this, the political shortcomings of writers are not always to blame. Frequently, Soviet rulers unexpectedly adopt courses which they formerly condemned. On such occasions it is not difficult for them to find justification; for Lenin again and again counselled “zig-zagging” as a means of preserving power. Not everyone can follow a tortuous lead. To ensure that all who have communication with the public through the medium of the Press shall speak alike, the staffs of Soviet newspapers are periodically “cleansed”; which means that their members are categorically examined—those whose answers do not give satisfaction being degraded or dismissed.

Although the duty of the Press is to praise authority, it is allowed to disparage various Soviet activities. The theory underlying this privilege is, that while neither the State nor the Party can make mistakes, their decisions may be wrongly executed. Defects are thus brought to light, and those adjudged guilty severely condemned. But criticism is kept within bounds. Anything may be said against organizations, and even

individuals, who are not highly placed,—but no reflections must be made upon the regime, or upon the principles which it maintains.

In the circumstances, it is not surprising that the Soviet Press should afford dull reading. It consists, in fact, almost exclusively of Communist propaganda, and comments upon labour questions and economic matters. The utterances of the leaders, frequently dull and uninspiring, are reported almost verbatim. Yet, in one way, Soviet newspapers are more wholesome than those of the West. They rigorously exclude the sensational and the salacious. What they gain in this direction, however, they lose by ignoring everything that is human and personal—in the simplest and best meaning of these words. They compare unfavourably with those of the old regime. Before the Revolution, Russian newspapers were of a high literary excellence; which afforded compensation for the unavoidable inadequacy of their political expression. In contrast to them, Soviet newspapers are far too political. They recognize only one kind of politics—Communist politics—and since these are made to embrace every form of activity, they are introduced even into articles relating to general affairs. This circumstance would, in itself, be sufficient to mar the work of any writer, no matter how talented. But in the Soviet Union the Press commands very few talented writers; and many of the journalists have only just emerged from illiteracy. For this reason, the standard of technical accomplishment is extremely low.

A report made to the XVI Communist Conference (1929) referred to the triviality of many newspapers, declaring that while they made much stir, they merely published banalities. The same report mentioned that 95% of the workers on their staffs had never received any preliminary journalistic training.

Growth of the Soviet Press

The growth of the Press in the U.S.S.R. has been rapid. On January 1, 1923, five hundred newspapers were published, having a total daily circulation of 1,532,910. On October 1, 1929, there were six hundred newspapers, with a total circulation of 16,000,000. It is estimated that in 1931 the number of newspapers published has increased to 1,974, with a total daily circulation of 48,000,000,—more than ten times the total circulation of all Russian newspapers before the War. The following table shows (in thousands) the growth of the central newspapers.

	1928	1929 (Daily average)	1930
Pravda	619,000	661,000	1,500,000
Izvestia	426,000	441,000	1,800,000
For Industrialization	21,000	63,000	150,000
Socialist Agriculture	21,000	69,000
Labour	82,000	105,000	167,000
Workers' Gazette	316,000	315,000	417,000
Red Star	40,000	70,000	105,000
Comsomol Pravda	167,000	240,000	345,000
Peasants' Gazette	17,000

Of the periodicals published in 1931 825 were factory newspapers (with a total daily circulation of about 2,000,000) and 300 Sovkhoz and Kolkhoz newspapers (with a circulation of something under a million). It may be mentioned that the number of "wall gazettes," (*i. e.* handwritten sheets posted in offices, institutions and factories) increased from 40,000 in 1927 to 200,000 in 1931.¹

¹ These figures are taken from the "Yearly Calendar of the Communist" (1932). They give the total circulation of all newspapers (daily, weekly, etc.) on one particular day of the year. This calculation includes large numbers of copies distributed free. Chiefly because of the free distribution, and the fact that the newspapers contain few paying advertisements, the Press is a heavy burden upon the Treasury.

ADDENDA

The following events have taken place in the U.S.S.R. since this publication has gone into print.

Foreign Relations

1. A Franco-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact was signed on November 29, 1932, in Paris. The Pact provides the usual stipulations: compulsory arbitration, non-interference (this is aimed particularly at Communist propaganda in France and her colonies) and an obligation to abstain from any inimical or prejudicial activities on both sides. Par. 5 (directed chiefly against the Russian White movement) provides that no *armed* organizations aiming at the overthrow of the existing regimes in either country will be permitted by the contracting parties.

2. The Polish-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of July 25, 1932, has been ratified on November 28, 1932.

3. At the end of 1932, the Soviet Government resumed full diplomatic relations with the Chinese Republic, which had been broken off since 1929, after the Soviet-Chinese conflict over the Chinese Eastern Railway. The unexpectedness with which relations were resumed gave rise to some tension between the U.S.S.R. and Japan, the latter refusing to negotiate the lately much-discussed treaty of non-aggression with the U.S.S.R. without a previous *de jure* recognition of the new State of Manchukuo by the Soviet Government.

4. In pursuance of the policies adopted at the Ottawa Imperial Conference, the British Government, on October 17, 1932, notified the Soviet Government of the abrogation of the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement of 1930. This event aroused a great deal of resentment in Moscow. Negotiations for the conclusion of a new agreement are, however, pending.

Internal Affairs

1. On September 28, 1932, the ancient city and the Territory of Nizhni-Novgorod have been renamed *Gorky*, in honour of the famous Russian author and the dean of Soviet literature, Maxim Gorky.

2. A new Territory—Chernigov—has been created in the Ukrainian S.S.R. by a decree of the TZIK of the U.S.S.R. of December 17, 1932.

3. The city of Ivanovo-Voznesensk has been renamed *Ivanovo* by the decree of December 30, 1932.

4. A rigid system of passport control, abolished during the NEP, has been reintroduced in the Soviet Union by a decree of the TZIK of the

U.S.S.R. of December 27, 1932: "To establish a unified passport system throughout the Union and compulsory registration of all passports with the police." Another decree issued by the TZIK on the same date subordinated the Peasants' and Workers' Militia (police) to the OGPU. These measures aim at the eradication "of counter-revolutionary, kulak and sabotage elements" from participation in all State institutions and to deprive them of such privileges as might be attached to their present position. As a result, mass dismissals and deportations of persons suspected or guilty of participation in any anti-Soviet movements in the past began early in January 1933.

5. A Party Conference has been convoked by the Politbureau of the Communist Party early in 1933. The available information indicates that momentous decisions have been resolved upon. One of the prominent features of the Conference is the purging of the Party organization of "kulak and sabotage elements." Over a hundred secretaries of local Communist organizations have been expelled from the Party ranks, as well as hundreds of old Communists and thousands of young. The accusations levelled against the delinquents are of the so-called "right opposition" character.

The official and successful conclusion of the first Five Years Plan was proclaimed at the Conference. But the subsequent pronouncements of Stalin and other leaders clearly demonstrate the fact that the economic structure of the U.S.S.R. is showing alarming fissures and is causing the gravest anxiety to its builders.

6. The Conference decided to slow down the tempos of industrialization so far as heavy industry is concerned, and to devote all efforts to promote light industry and the food supply during the first years of the second Five Years Plan. This is the result of an increasingly threatening food and consumption-goods situation which has been steadily developing through 1932 and which has assumed the nature of an acute crisis towards the end of the year.

7. The collapse of the State rationing system, which first manifested itself in the spring of 1932, is now admitted by the Soviet leaders, who have been forced to permit the free marketing of most of the staple products (bread, meat, eggs, butter, vegetable oil, vegetables, etc.). The duty to provision the workers of all the large enterprises has been relegated to the factories by a joint resolution of the Soviet of People's Commissars and the Party TZIK of December 4, 1932. As the difference between the fixed prices and those obtaining on the free market is on an average not less than 200%, and greater in some cases (eggs—400%, butter—700%, soap—1000%) this policy has led to a stringent situation among the workers, whose wages have not been correspondingly increased (only 60% since 1928) and do not suffice to defray individual expenses in spite of a reduction of consumption by 40%, as compared with pre-War figures.

8. As a result of the food crisis, the fluctuation (the migration) of labour has been continually on the increase and has assumed alarming

proportions. "Economic Life" No. 267 of November 20, 1932, reports that in the textile industry, for example, during the first nine months of 1932, 116,800 workers enlisted and 463,900 resigned from the factories. Absenteeism increased during this period from 8% to 13.5%. In consequence of this the Government has seen fit, on November 15, 1932, to abrogate Par. 47 of the Labour Code and substitute for it Par. 47¹ which deprives a worker of his right to employment, his ration card and free quarters after only *one* day of unjustifiable absence from work. This is a measure of unprecedented severity even in Soviet practice.

9. The cost of production has been steadily rising and the productivity of labour and the quality of manufactured goods as steadily on the decrease. "Economic Life" No. 267, already quoted, reports that in the autumn of 1932, the cost of manufacture, as compared with the corresponding period in 1931, increased 47%, of which only 7.7% was an increase in wages (this applies to the textile industry). At the same time and in the same industry the general decline in the coefficient of productivity fell by 21.2% and the proportion of the waste of materials and rejected goods rose to 25.46%.

The same factors characterized industry in general.

10. In order to increase the reserves of food in the country, the Soviet of People's Commissars and the TZIK of the Communist Party in a joint resolution of November 29, 1932, have decreed to discontinue the increase of the sown area of the so-called technical cultures (flax, cotton, etc.) and to increase the sowing of cereals. It is proposed to decrease the former by 2,500,000 hectares and increase the latter by 3,500,000 hectares in 1933.

11. In pursuance of greater concentration of food control in the hands of the Union Government a decree of the People's Commissars and the TZIK of the U.S.S.R. of December 2, 1932, created a Union Commissariat of the Grain Growing and Cattle Breeding Sovkhoz.

12. Severe punishments, including the capital penalty have been ordered for all persons guilty of misappropriation or neglect of State, Kolkhoz or cooperative property by a decree of the Soviet of People's Commissars and the Party TZIK, "For the Protection of Socialized Property," of August 7, 1932.

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